Hima Kohli, J.
1. The present appeal arises out of the order dated 11th August, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge on an application bearing is No. 1023/2003, whereby the respondent/plaintiff who is the wife of the appellant/defendant prayed for directions to the appellant/defendant to reimburse the respondent/plaintiff for the expenses incurred by her on account of her treatment for Tuberculosis of the Spine amounting to Rs. 66,542/-, up to 3rd January, 2003. By way of the impugned order, the learned Single Judge observed that the respondent had failed to file any reply to the application in question which was pending for almost two and a half years. It was also observed that various receipts had been filed by the respondent showing that she was suffering from Tuberculosis of Spine and was undergoing treatment for the same which was still continuing. On the basis of the consolidated details of expenses filed by the respondent and annexed to the aforesaid application moved by her, the learned Single Judge directed the appellant to reimburse the respondent the expenses to the extent of Rs. 66,542/- within a period of eight weeks from the date of the said order.
2. Aggrieved by the aforementioned order, allowing the application of the respondent the appellant has preferred the present appeal. Along with the said appeal, he has also filed an application (CM No. 17317/2005) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying inter alia, for condensation of delay of 35 days in preferring the present appeal. In the said application, it is submitted by the appellant that a certified copy of the impugned order dated 11th August, 2005 was applied for in the registry of this Court on 18th August, 2005. The registry delivered the certified copy of the order on 23rd August, 2005, upon which the appellant approached his counsel to examine the order and advice as to whether the same could be assailed before the Division Bench. It is submitted that the counsel examined the order and asked the appellant to verify from the court records as to whether the respondent had filed all the necessary documents in support of her claim as made in the application in question. It is further stated that the appellant verified the records and informed his counsel on 5th October, 2005 that no original receipts in support of her medical reimbursement had been filed. Based on the said information, the counsel for the appellant opined that it was fit case for preferring an appeal against the impugned order before the Division Bench. After seeking the said opinion, the appellant tried to contact his counsel to file the appeal but on account of the fact that the courts were closed for the Dussehra vacations, he could contact his counsel only on reopening of the High Court, i.e. on 18th October, 2005 and accordingly his counsel prepared and filed the present appeal on 20th October, 2005. Hence, the appellant has sought condensation of delay of 35 days in filing the present appeal which, according to him, was neither deliberate nor intentional.
3. We have heard the learned Counsels for the appellant and the respondent and have also perused the records.
4. We would also like to indicate that upon the present appeal being filed, notice was issued to the respondent on 9th December, 2005. The respondent was present in person and accepted notice in the court. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned for two dates, i.e. 5th April and 11th July, 2006. When the matter was taken on 23rd August, 2006 and the counsel for the appellant failed to appear, we had imposed costs of Rs. 10,000/- on the appellant, payable to the respondent. It was also indicated that in case of failure to make the payment within two weeks, the appeal shall be deemed to be dismissed without further reference to the court and with this order, the matter was adjourned to 6th September, 2006. After the aforementioned order was passed, the appellant stated that he could not pay the costs and thus the appeal was dismissed on 23rd August, 2006 itself.
5. Subsequently, fresh applications were filed by the appellant, being CMs No. 12295-97/2006 praying inter alia, amongst others, for recalling the order dated 23rd August, 2006. When the applications were listed before the court on 11th September, 2006, counsel for the appellant stated that the appellant was willing to pay the costs imposed on him within ten days and that the appeal be restored for hearing on merits. Accordingly, the matter was renotified for 21st September, 2006 on which date it was stated that the costs had been paid by the appellant to the respondent. Consequently, the appeal was restored to its original position and arguments were addressed by the counsels for the parties on both, the application for condensation of delay and also the main appeal.
6. On hearing the counsels for the parties and upon examining the aforesaid application for condensation of delay, we are quite sceptical about the averments made by the appellant therein. The Explanationn sought to be offered by the appellant to explain the delay with effect from 23rd August to 20th October, 2005 apart from being factually inaccurate, appears to be rather sketchy and ambiguous. Upon perusing the records of the suit file, we find that there has been no change of counsel for the appellant; in fact, the counsel for the appellant has remained the same, both at the time of arguing the application before the learned Single Judge, as also at the time of filing the present appeal. We also find that the documents which the appellant claims were required by his counsel to be verified from the court records, in support of the claim of the respondent for medical reimbursement, were filed by the respondent under an index dated 28th August, 2000 endorsed as duly received on behalf of the appellant on 30th August, 2000. It is, thereforee, not understandable as to what was the purpose of the counsel asking the appellant to verify the records when the aforesaid documents were very much in power and possession of the appellant not only at the time of arguing the application in the year 2003, but much earlier, i.e. in the year 2000. Assuming that the counsel for the appellant had called upon the appellant to inspect the court records, there are no material particulars furnished in the application as to when or around which date did the appellant approach his counsel to examine the order, when did the counsel, after examining the order ask the appellant to verify the records, when did the appellant apply for and carry out inspection of the court records to verify the same. There is only a bald statement made by the appellant in the application to the effect that he reported to his counsel only on 5th October, 2005 that there was no original receipt in support of the medical reimbursement claimed by the respondent on the record. In any case, it is not understood as to why the counsel asked for the records when the very same counsel argued the matter before the learned Single Judge and continued to appear for the appellant even thereafter in the suit proceedings as also filed the present appeal on behalf of the appellant. It is not as if the counsel for the appellant was unaware of the records or not well-versed with the case of the appellant. Hence, the Explanationn given by the appellant for the period with effect from 23rd August to 5th October, 2005 appears to be very wishy washy and quite unsatisfactory. There is no just and sufficient cause demonstrated by the appellant for condoning the delay in preferring the present appeal.
7. In the course of arguing the application for condensation of delay, the counsel for the appellant strenuously argued that he had a sound case on merits . He submitted that the impugned order dated 11th August, 2005 is misconceived and contrary to law for the reason that the amount granted by the learned Single Judge towards medical reimbursement for the treatment undertaken by the respondent was covered within the word 'maintenance' as defined under Section 3(b) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') and that as the appellant was already directed to pay a maintenance of Rs. 3,000/- to his wife, the respondent herein, and a sum of Rs. 1,500/- to his minor daughter who was residing with the respondent thereforee, he could not be saddled with the liability to pay any further amounts whatsoever to the respondent. It was, thereforee, submitted that even on merits the appellant had a very arguable case in his favor and hence, he should not be thrown out at the threshold merely on account of certain technicalities and that the Explanationn as given by the appellant in his application for condensation of delay, ought to be accepted.
8. In view of the aforesaid submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellant, we also propose to examine the matter on merits. We have perused the memo of appeal as well as the records of the suit being CS(OS) No. 1415/2002 which were summoned by us vide order dated 11th July, 2006.
9. Counsel for the respondent has opposed the appeal and submitted that the present appeal is misconceived for the reason that the learned Single Judge, vide order dated 18th March, 2002, passed in is No. 11727/1999, only fixed an interim maintenance. The said application had not been finally decided and was still pending adjudication. It was also submitted that even the present application on which the impugned order has been passed, was pending since the year 2003. Notice on the said application was issued on 28th January, 2003 and no reply whatsoever was filed by the appellant to the aforesaid application which came to be decided only on 11th August, 2005, after a lapse of two and a half years. It was further stated that the appellant has been adopting dilatory tactics throughout the suit proceedings, only to harass the respondent and frustrate her suit and that the present appeal is yet another attempt on the part of the appellant to buy time. It was further submitted that the respondent and her daughter are staying with her parents. The appellant has failed to provide any residence to the respondent and their daughter and is refusing to pay the respondent even a penny towards her medical bills subject matter of the impugned order.
10. The facts of the case are that in November, 1999, the respondent filed a suit under Section 18 of the Act as an indigent person, claiming maintenance to the extent of Rs. 20,000/- per month with effect from 16th August, 1996 and/or in the alternate, Rs. 13,500/- per month and a residential accommodation. Along with the said suit, the respondent also filed an application for interim maintenance being is No. 11727/1999 on which vide order dated 18th March, 2002 the learned Single Judge fixed an interim maintenance at Rs. 3,000/- per month payable by the appellant/defendant, to the respondent from the date of the application. However, while passing the said order, the learned Single Judge also recorded the fact that the respondent was suffering from Tuberculosis of the Spine and was confined to bed and that for the expenses incurred by her in her treatment, she would be at liberty to file a statement of expenses which will be considered at the appropriate stage. Subsequently, the respondent filed the aforesaid is No. No. 1023/2003 on which the impugned order dated 11th August, 2005 came to be passed by the learned Single Judge.
11. As culled out from the records, a complaint had also been lodged by the respondent against the appellant and his mother under Sections 406/498A of the Indian Penal Code. The trial court vide judgment dated 27th May, 1996 convicted the appellant and his mother. An appeal was preferred by the appellant and his mother against the said judgment. The learned Additional District Judge vide judgment dated 26th October, 2004, sentenced the appellant to pay a fine of Rs. 3 lacs under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and in default thereto, to undergo rigorous imprisonment of three years. Out of the said fine of Rs. 3 lacs, the respondent was permitted to receive Rs. 2.75 lacs as compensation. The mother of the appellant was also sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 75,000/- and in default thereof, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. Out of the said amount of Rs. 75,000/-, the respondent was permitted to receive Rs. 50,000/-. We have been informed that the respondent has received a compensation of Rs. 3,25,000/-, out of which she has paid Rs. 70,000/- towards court fee on the plaint, which had been initially filed as an indigent person.
12. The plea of the appellant to the effect that the word 'maintenance' as defined in Section 3(b) of the Act includes medical attendance and treatment and as the appellant is paying the respondent Rs. 3,000/- per month, he is under no obligation to pay any further sums to the respondent towards medical reimbursement, requires to be examined. The definition of the word 'maintenance' under the Act is as below:
3 (b). Maintenance includes-
(i) in all cases, provision for food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment;
(ii) in the case of an unmarried daughter, also the reasonable expenses of an incident to her marriage.
13. We have perused the aforementioned provision. In the present case, it is a matter of record that the suit preferred by the respondent under Section 18 of the Act is still pending adjudication. Even though there is no separate provision in the Act for grant of maintenance pendente lite, pending the said proceedings, the respondent is entitled to receive interim maintenance by filing an application to the said effect. Even otherwise, it is no longer rest integra that the courts have inherent power to grant interim maintenance to the aggrieved party under the proceedings initiated and pending under Section 18 of the Act. In this regard, we may refer to the judgment rendered by a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of P. Srinivasa Rao v. Smt. P. Indira and Anr. reported as I (2001) DMC 749. Justice S.B. Sinha (the then Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court), speaking for the Bench, referred to a catena of judgments on the aforesaid issue, including a Full Bench judgment of the Orissa High Court in the case of Khadal Penthy v. Sulash Dei reported as : AIR1989Ori137 and observed as under:
Para 26: There cannot be any dispute that the Court while exercising its inherent power, should not overlook the statutory provisions and such power cannot be invoked to nullify or stultify a statutory provision. Here the question of nullifying or stultifying the statutory provisions cannot and does arise. Sections 18 and 20 of the Act recognised the absolute right of a wife and minor child to seek for maintenance. Both the provisions have not expressly prohibited to claim interim maintenance pendente lite. thereforee, where circumstances warrant and on prima facie satisfaction of the merits of the case, the Court is not prohibited from exercising its inherent power of jurisdiction to grant maintenance to the deserted wife and children pendente lite in the interest of justice.
Para 27 : Further, in our view, independent of the inherent power of the Court under Section 151, C.P.C. the wife and children are entitled for grant of interim maintenance under the scheme and provisions of the Act itself. The expression `maintenance' in Sub-section (b)(i) of Section 3 of the Act is an inclusive one providing for provision for food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment. There may be number of cases where a child cannot be sent to school for want of money. There may also be instances where he deserted wife or the son who are suffering from prolonged illness may be required immediate medical assistance and treatment and they may not be able to meet the expenses. The mother may not be able to provide medical assistance to herself or to her ailing child. thereforee, an urgent need may arise for medical assistance or treatment either for the wife or the child, which may not await decision in the suit, which will take several years to conclude. In absence of medical assistance and treatment, the wife or the child may not survive to obtain and/or reap the fruits of the decree that may be granted by the Court ultimately. In our view, that was not the intention of the Legislature. The very fact that the inclusive definition contained in Sub-section (b) (i) of Section 3 of the Act confers an absolute right of maintenance, the same is required to be made effective by Court if necessary by passing an interim order. In view of the scheme of the Act conferring an absolute right on the wife and the minor children to seek for maintenance, a liberal construction has to be given to the provisions of the Act to construe that such ancillary or incidental power has been conferred on the Court by implication to grant interim maintenance the wife and child in cases where it is justified on prima facie satisfaction of the merits of the case. The provisions of Sections 18 and 20 cannot be interpreted in such a manner as to defeat justice to the deserted wife and her dependent child.
14. We are also of the opinion that providing basic requirements such as medical treatment to the spouse and child which is a moral obligation of the husband, can neither be denied nor be deferred till final adjudication of the suit proceedings. The Act is a beneficial legislation in favor of the wife and the dependent children and it is settled law that the provisions of such a Statute should be read down to give true meaning and effect to the aims and objects of the Act and to dispense justice. It is trite to state that medical assistance, just like food, clothing, shelter and education is an essential requirement for survival and cannot be withheld by the husband from the wife and children till final adjudication of the suit. On the same lines and in the same spirit, the Bombay High Court has rendered a decision in the case of Atul Sashikant Mude v. Niranjana Atul Mude reported as (1998) DMC 271 : AIR 1998 Bom 234, and it has been held that:. With respect, we find it difficult to accept this reasoning. In our opinion, the question whether he Court has jurisdiction to pass interim order can never be dependent on the possibility on the defenses to the suit. What is more important is that the Act viz., Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, avowedly is for codifying the law relating to maintenance amongst Hindus. it is extremely relevant to notice that the inclusive definition of 'maintenance' states that 'maintenance' includes, (i) in all cases, provision for food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment; an (ii) in the case of an unmarried daughter, also the reasonable expenses of and incidental to her marriage. In our opinion these aspects of maintenance clearly contemplate grant of the same when the same is needed. That the wife, if she succeeds, will be entitled to arrears is no consolation. For example, there may be urgent need of medical attendance and treatment which surely cannot await the decision of the suit after several years.
It was further observed:.not passing such an order, in our opinion, is not only more disastrous but may defeat the entire object and purpose of the Act. Maintenance, as stated, is the support to life having provision for food, clothing, residence, education, medical attendance and treatment and shelter which, when denied, are required immediately to be granted and cannot await the duration of a long trial. It is relevant to notice in that behalf, that the provisions of Section 18(1) give absolute entitlement to a Hindu wife to be maintained by her husband during her life-time. If this has to be ensured, urgent ad interim and interim orders as required under the circumstances of the case will have to be passed.
15. thereforee, in interpreting the law, it has been held that the court must not only proceed on the basis of dictionary meanings assigned to a particular word, but dispense justice by keeping in mind at all times not only the legal obligations but also moral and social obligations of a husband qua his wife and dependent children. Instead of being fettered by sheer technicalities, it would be paramount to keep in mind, the interest of the spouse and the child. Interpretation of law must be in accordance with the tenets of justice, equity and good conscience and not be shackled by Victorian interpretations that have lost their relevance in this day and time.
16. In these circumstances, the learned Single Judge had passed the order dated 18th March, 2002 fixing an interim maintenance of Rs. 3,000/- per month payable by the appellant to the respondent. However, as is apparent from a bare perusal of the aforesaid order, the issue with regard to the respondent's claim for reimbursement towards expenses incurred by her on her treatment was left open by the learned Single Judge with the liberty to the respondent to file a statement of expenses which when filed, was ordered to be considered at the appropriate stage. It is pertinent to note that in terms of the aforesaid order dated 18th March, 2002, admittedly the appellant has been paying the respondent Rs. 3,000/- per month, though reluctantly, irregularly and erratically.
17. In the light of the aforesaid order, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to turn around and claim that the aforesaid amount of interim maintenance being paid to the respondent includes the entire expenses incurred by her on medical treatment. This was also for the obvious reason that since the year 2002, the respondent was stated to be suffering from Tuberculosis of the Spine and the said treatment was an ongoing, prolonged and continuing process. It was for the said reason that it was thought appropriate by the learned Single Judge to defer the issue with regard to the payment of medical expenses, for a later date. Subsequently, the respondent filed an appropriate application for reimbursement of the medical expenses incurred by her, amounting Rs. 66,542/- up to 3rd January, 2003, duly supported by details of the medical expenses incurred by her on her treatment. The respondent has also placed on record the bills and receipts referred to in the said statement. We have perused the same and find that there is no reason to disbelieve the respondent. The order of the learned Single Judge is purely need based. It has been rightly ordered that the appellant is liable to reimburse the medical expenses incurred by the respondent to the extent of Rs. 66,542/-. It is rather unfortunate that instead of meeting his obligations and paying the said amount as ordered to be paid over a year ago, the appellant has been dilly dallying and this is despite the fact that though there was no stay operating against the said order, the appellant has refused to pay even a penny to his wife, the respondent herein.
18. In view of the fact that the respondent is receiving only a paltry amount of Rs. 3,000/- per month towards interim maintenance and that too, as reflected from the records of the suit proceedings, is being paid in an erratic and irregular manner, there is no reason whatsoever for the appellant not to pay the respondent the actual sums incurred by her towards her medical treatment. The appellant cannot be permitted to wriggle out of his obligations, particularly when he has not even bothered to provide any residential accommodation to the respondent and her minor daughter who are staying at the paternal home of the respondent.
19. We are, thereforee, of the opinion that even on merits, the appellant has failed to make out any case for interference with the impugned order directing the appellant to reimburse the medical expenses incurred by the respondent to the extent of Rs. 66,542/-. Neither the conduct of the appellant nor the grounds taken by him, on merits, for setting aside the impugned order dated 11th August, 2005 warrants any interference. The appeal is devoid of any merits and is, thereforee, dismissed. CM No. 12296/2006 also stands dismissed. The application (CM 17317/2005) seeking condensation of delay also stands rejected. No order as to costs.