Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.
1. By this writ petition, the petitioner(s) have assailed the award passed by Central Government Industrial Tribunal, New Delhi dated 30.7.1993.
2. The crux of the controversy raised by the petitioner is whether the Mess Committee of Uttar Railway Zonal Training School, Chandausi, Moradabad was an 'industry' or not and if the employees working in the mess of the training school were covered under the Industrial Dispute Act.
3. It is undisputed fact that the trainees of the Railway Zonal Training School formed a committee in order to run the mess where they took meals. The trainees used to get Rs.13/- as meal allowance and used to pool this amount to run the mess. The members of the mess committee used to be out of the trainees and the principal of the training institute was ex-officio President of the committee. The workers working in the mess raised an industrial dispute which was referred to the Tribunal and the question arose whether the mess committee was an 'industry' or not.
4. It is not disputed that the persons working in the mess used to be hired by the mess committee or its president. The workers, who raised dispute about the termination and other issues contended that the mess committee had an entity separate from the trainees and it was running a mess in the training institute of Indian Railways, thereforee, the employees of the mess committee were entitled to the same treatment as the employees of a statutory canteen. The employees of mess committee should be given same pay scale, treatment and status as that of railways employees. On the other hand, the mess committee submitted that it was merely a cooperative effort of trainees to run the mess and it was not an industry. Mess was nothing but a collective kitchen of the trainees so that they can take meals collectively. The trainees were free to take meal outside also. The employees in the mess were like domestic servants. Their services could be terminated any time.
5. A somewhat similar question had come for consideration before the Supreme Court in Som Vihar Apartment owners' Housing Maintenance Society Ltd. v. Workmen : (2001)ILLJ1413SC . In this case, the society had formed an association to maintain the cleanliness in the apartments and to render certain other services personally to the apartment owners. The work persons working in the society claimed dearness allowance, house rent allowance, conveyance allowance and uniforms alleging that the association was an industry. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
Indeed this Court in Rajappa case 3 : (1994)IIILLJ378SC noticed the distinction between such classes of workmen as domestic servants who render personal service to their masters from those covered by the definition in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Dispute Act. It is made clear that if literally interpreted these words are of very wide amplitude and it cannot be suggested that in their sweep it is intended to include service however rendered in whatsoever capacity and for whatsoever reason. In that context it was said that it should not be understood that all services and callings would come within the purview of the definition; services rendered by a domestic servant purely in a personal or domestic matter or even in a casual way would fall outside the definition. That is how this Court dealt with this aspect of the matter. The whole purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act is to focus on resolution of industrial disputes and the regulation will not meddle with every little carpenter or a blacksmith, a cobbler or a cycle repairer who comes outside the idea of industry and industrial dispute. This rationale,which applies all along the line to small professions like that of domestic servants would apply to those who are engaged by a group of flat-owners for rendering personal services evenif that group is not amorphous but crystallised into an association or a society. The decision in Rajappa case if correctly understood is not an authority for the proposition that domestic servants are also to be treated to be workmen even when they carry on work in respect of one or many masters. It is clear when personal services are rendered to the members of a society and that society is constituted only for the purposes of those members to engage the services of such employees, we do not think its activity should be treated as an industry nor are they workmen. In this view of the matter so far as the appellant is concerned it must be held not to be an 'industry. thereforee, the award made by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. The same shall stand set aside.
6. In the case in hand the mess was being run by the trainees themselves although they had the principal of the training institute as the ex- officio President. Railway had no control over the mess neither the training institute where the trainees were taking training had any say in the mess. The trainees, in order to take meals at reasonable rates and within the funds provided to them, used to pool the funds and run the mess. The mess was being run not to provide service to any outsider but to the trainees themselves.
7. An organisation in order to qualify as an industry must satisfy the triple test laid down by the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewarage Board v. A. Rajappa : (1978)ILLJ349SC - viz.
(i) systematic activity
(ii) cooperation between employer and employee and (iii) production and distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes. It is obvious that the production and distribution of goods and services envisaged by the Supreme Court are those which the employer produces or generates for others; if an employer produces or generates goods or services with the help of an employee for his own consumption then it cannot be said that the organisation or committee is an industry.
8. In the present case, mess committee had employed members of petitioner to cook food etc. for their own consumption. They had not employed the petitioners to produce goods or services to satisfy the needs of others.
9. I, thereforee, consider that the Tribunal rightly held that the respondent was not an industry and I find no force in the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is hereby dismissed.