Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. The plaintiff, a private limited company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 3,35,000/- against the defendants including the Secretary, Ministry of Finance (Revenue) and the Commissioner of Customs. The plaintiff was carrying on the business of import and export. It had applied and was given Duty Free license No. 3361427 dt. 13.1.89 with import entitlement of 204000 kgs of acrylic fibre without payment of duty. In terms of the said license, the plaintiff was to make export of acrylic yarn of 200000 kgs with 75 per cent acrylic contents. The plaintiff discharged the obligations under the terms of the license. However, it was subsequently alleged that the officials of defendant No. 4 in collusion with officials of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were causing harassment to the plaintiff and were making false reports in regard to the product of the plaintiff. In furtherance to these acts, a notice was issued by defendant No. 4 on 16.11.89 under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962. To this show cause, reply was submitted by the plaintiff. The goods of the plaintiff were confiscated and the penalty was levied upon the plaintiff by the defendants vide order dated 25/30.8.91. Against this order, an appeal was preferred. The plaintiff ultimately filed a writ petition and the order of confiscation as well as imposition of penalty upon the plaintiff was quashed. The sum of Rs. 5 lakhs which was deposited in the appeal before the authorities was liable to be refunded and was refunded on 5.5.98. The plaintiff was forced to *suffer on account of illegal and unauthorized acts of the defendants and to the extent that it served a notice upon the defendants on 21.08.98 claiming the interest. Having failed to receive any money, the plaintiff filed the present suit for recovery of the said amount. The suit was contested by the defendants and various actions taken by the authorities, as afore-referred, were justified. It was also stated that the amount was returned to the plaintiff on 5.5.98 and the plaintiff was not entitled to claim any interest on the refund. Upon the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issue:
whether the plaintiff is entitled to the amount claimed? OPP
2. Having permitted the parties to lead evidence, vide its judgment and decree dated 21.3.2001, the trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiff with the following relief:
After hearing both the parties, going through the material on record, I am of the opinion that no doubt there is no provision in the Customs Act, 1962 to give interest on the refunded amount except when the case of the applicant is covered Under Section 27-A of the Customs Act. However, keeping in view the principle laid down in the authority cited above, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to interest from the defendants on the deposit of Rs. 5,00,000/- with effect from the date of deposit till it was refunded to the plaintiff on 5.5.98, as it was on account of the erroneous order of defendant No. 3 that the plaintiff had to make arrangement for five lacs to be deposited with the defendants and the said amount remained with the defendants, without any legal authority. However, so far the rate of interest is concerned, since the plaintiff has not produced on record any document to show that the plaintiff had arranged this amount on account of lending facilities and had been actually paying interest @ 22% p.a. or 24% p.a. So keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and relying upon the authority cited above, I allow the claim of the plaintiff with direction to the defendants to pay interest @ 12% p.a. to the plaintiff on the amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- with effect from the date of deposit i.e. 20.7.95 till 5.5.98 when the amount had been refunded to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is further entitled to interest @ 12% p.a. on the decretal amount pending litigation till its realisation. The suit of the plaintiff is decreed with proportionate cost.
14. Decree-sheet be prepared accordingly.
File be consigned to the Record Room.
3. Aggrieved from the said judgment and decree of the trial court, the defendants have filed the present regular first appeal. Along with the appeal, two applications for condensation of delay has been filed. CM 183/2003 is an application under Section 151 of the CPC for condensation of delay in refiling the appeal. Though it is not clear, but it appears that the appeal was re-filed after more than an year. CM 184/03 is still another application under Section 151 of the CPC praying for condensation of delay in filing the appeal and the delay as per the applicant is of 293 days.
4. Both these applications have been vehemently opposed by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent in appeal. It is contended on its behalf that no cause much less a sufficient or a reasonable cause has been shown for condensation of delay in filing the appeal. It is also argued that the applications are mis-conceived and the two applications for condensation of delay have been filed primarily to mislead the court inasmuch as even the date of the judgment has been wrongly mentioned as 21st March, 2002 while it is dated 21.3.2001. It is stated that in fact, the delay in filing the appeal is more than two years and not even one line of plausible Explanationn has been stated in these applications so as to invoke the discretion of this Court entitling the applicants for condensation of delay.
5. Learned Counsel appearing for the applicants stated that the delay in filing the appeal is for the reason that the photocopies of the documents available with the department were not readable and the efforts were made to trace out the readable copies and get the same fairly typed and after fair typing, the appeal was filed. It is also stated that UOI has to take approval of many offices before filing an appeal and the file takes time to move from one place to another and the lawyer's opinion is sought and thereforee, the delay would be a normal feature in such matters. In these circumstances, condensation of delay is prayed for.
6. The suit of the plaintiff was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 21.3.2001. As per the photocopy of the certified copy placed on record, the certified copy was ready on 31.3.2001. The present appeal for the first time was filed on 8.1.2002 and then refiled on 28.1.2003. As on 8.1.2002 when the appeal was filed, it was barred by 293 days. The Registry had returned the same with other objections including that the appeal was barred by time. As it appears from the index of the appeal that even the proper ad valorem court fee was not affixed, application for condensation of delay was not filed and even the appeal and the application for stay was not accompanied by a duly attested affidavit. From the paper book on record, it appears that the court fee itself was purchased in January, 2003 and the affidavits were got attested in 2003, though one of them was dated as 2001. The most interesting feature is that even till date, the certified copy of the judgment has not been filed on record till today, the photocopy of which was allegedly filed in the year 2002. The application filed for condensation of delay runs into 6 paragraphs out of which three are very formal paragraphs and paragraphs No. 2 to 4 read as under:
2. That in order to file the accompanying RFA, the appellants had to procure the documents from the office of the lawyer in the court below. In procuring the documents the unavoidable delay could take place. Further in order to institute judicial proceedings on behalf of Union of India the approval of many offices is required. The such approval is mandatory and unavoidable.
3. That the decision of filing judicial proceedings on behalf of Union of India can not be a decision of any individual and it has to be the decision of entire system. First of all, the opinion of lawyer for filing appeal has to be their, thereafter the matter is taken up with various offices/Ministries as Ministry of Law etc.
4. That in passing through the unavoidable channel, the preparation and filing of the accompanying RFA could be delayed. The said delay was beyond the control of any particular individual (Deponent).
7. The above are the reasons stated for condoning the delay. No reference of any office or date has been given in the application. The application lacks basic details which would be essential for the court to consider a request for condensation of delay. It is true that UOI unlike a normal litigant may not be called upon to explain each day's delay by giving a reasonable or plausible Explanationn but the entire delay has to be explained at least in a composite manner so as to enable the court to exercise the discretion in favor of the applicant, if the application satisfies the ingredients enunciated by different judicial pronouncements.
8. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants while heavily relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Anr. : AIR2000SC2306 contended that the power to condone the delay has been conferred to do substantial justice and the court should adopt a liberal approach and the delay resulting from official procedures should normally be condoned. Firstly, the facts of that case were entirely different as there was a seniority dispute of nearly 150 Inspectors and 400 officers of the rank of Deputy S.P. Secondly, reasons had been stated in detail in that case for condoning the delay. At this stage, it will be useful to refer to the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Delhi Wakf Board v. Sh. Balbir Singh (RFA No. 80/82 decided on 20th March, 2006) where the court after discussing the various judgments, held as under-
We may also notice that even the present appeal is barred by time and application being CM No. 165/82 was filed for condensation of delay and the reason given is that the appellant came to know of the order of the Court only on 17.2.82 where after he filed this appeal in March, 1982. Though the provisions of Section 5 have received a liberal construction in recent past, still the Court cannot ignore that the fact where an appeal gets barred by time, a definite right accrues to the opposite party and such right should not be taken away in a routine manner and without disclosure of good and a sufficient cause for condensation of delay.
The application filed for condensation of delay in the present case hardly gives any reason or cause much less a reasonable Explanationn for condoning the delay. Merely because there was no communication between the client and counsel could hardly be a reason for condoning the delay of 2 years as the order was pronounced on 5th November, 1980 in the presence of the counsel and the appeal was filed in the year 1982.
At this stage, we may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal and Ors. v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. : [1962]2SCR762 wherein the Court held as under:
In construing Section. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favor of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has accrued o the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. 2nd 13 Mad 269, Approved.
It is however, necessary to emphasis that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condensation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;....
Reference can also be made to a judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Sanjeev Babbar and Ors. v. Dev Papers Pvt. Ltd. Vol.Cxviii (1998) 1 PLR 814 wherein the court held as under:
5. As is clear from the above facts that the present petitioner has been most negligent and irresponsible in pursuing his remedy. The revision petition as originally filed was barred by time as is clear from the afore-stated dates. In fact no revision was filed. It was only some papers with the impugned order which were filed without any grounds of revision as required under law. Even the requisite Court-fees was not levied. When a petition becomes barred by time, a right accrues to the other party and such a right cannot be taken away by the Court merely on an application which lacks bonafides and does not disclose any sufficient cause for condensation of delay. In the present case, the revision itself may be barred not only by 67 days, but even more, because after its return on 3.7.1996 it was refiled on 3.4.1997 with grounds of revision. The delay in filing as well as in re-filing has not been explained in any of the applications. It is unfortunate, but is true , that present case discloses the extent to which a petitioner can be irresponsible and negligent of his own rights. The provisions of Limitation Act cannot be so liberally construed so as to frustrate the very purpose of the provisions of the Limitation Act. In this regard reference can be made to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr. JT. 1997 (8) S.C. 189, where the Hon'ble Court held as under:
Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, thereforee, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condensation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs. In the application for condensation of delay hardly any reason has been stated. All that has been stated is that no authorised person had appeared on behalf of the appellant when the decree was passed on 5th November, 1980. Thereafter, application was filed under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC and later on another application was filed under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. Both these applications were dismissed by the trial Court on 16th February, 1980 as not maintainable and the appellant came to know about the said orders on 17th February, 1982. thereafter, an appeal was filed in this Court on 3rd March, 1982. Except giving these dates, the application gives no Explanationn, much less a sufficient cause for justifying the prayer for condensation of delay. The vague averments in the application cannot be the basis for denying a substantial benefit in law to the respondent. The right of the other party cannot be taken away on such averments, which would constitute no sufficient cause on the true and correct interpretation of the sufficient cause contemplated under the provisions of the Limitation Act.
We find no merit in this application and would decline to condone the delay.
9. Even in the case of UOI v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. 1988 (38) ELT 739 (SC), the Supreme Court took the view that the Government being impersonal takes longer time in filing the Appeals/Petitions than the private bodies or the individuals. Even giving that latitude, there must be some way or attempt to explain the cause for such delay and as there was no whisper to explain what legal problems occurred in filing the special leave petition , the application for condensation of delay was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Still in another case reported as Collector of C.Ex., Madras v. A.MD. Bilal & Co. : 1999ECR488(SC) , the Supreme Court declined to condone the delay of 502 days in filing the appeal while observing that the application disclosed no satisfactory or reasonable Explanationn. Still in a more recent case titled as P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr. : 1997ECR785(SC) , the Supreme Court reiterated the above principles and declined to condone the delay and held as under:
Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, thereforee, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condensation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.
10. The judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Tata Yodogawa Ltd.(supra) and A.MD. Bilal & Co. (supra) are squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The application for condensation is without any content, reasonable or satisfactory Explanationn. It was obligatory upon the part of the applicant-UOI to reasonably explain the delay, may be, by not giving Explanationn for each day of delay but to explain the delay in a composite manner. In the entire application, no reference of any date, officers and the need for sending the file to any particular section has been stated. This was a case implicate for recovery of money of Rs. 3,35,000/- which had been decreed against the authorities and it was held that they were liable to pay interest. It does not appear to be such a complicated issue for determination by the court which would require the UOI or its officers to take years and years to decide whether the appeal should or should not be filed. Then when it is filed after an year, it is incomplete in all respects for which action there is not even a whisper much less an Explanationn as to why the appeal was kept back for another one year and even the court fee for the appeal was purchased after the lapse of two years from the date of the judgment. This conduct of the applicants is nothing but a negligent attitude and they are taking it to be for granted that the UOI is entitled to claim condensation of delay de hors its averments in the application. For these reasons, we find no merit in these applications and decline to condone the delay and dismiss both these applications.
11. It may be noticed that the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, as a last attempt, intended to persuade the court that it should condone the delay and hear the appeal on merits as a substantial question of law as to the jurisdiction of the court to try and decide the suit in question, arises in the appeal. We have clearly stated that there is no occasion for this Court to condone the delay of 293 days in filing the appeal and an year in refiling the appeal. The contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent is that the appeal initially was not filed properly or in accordance with law, thus, it would be no filing as per the rules of the High Court. According to him, there is a delay of more than two years in filing the appeal, particularly in view of the objections raised by the Registry and the fact that the certified copy of the decree was not available and the ad valorem court fee was not affixed on the memorandum of appeal. Though, we have declined to condone the delay but still we will proceed to refer to the sole contention raised on behalf of the appellants on merits with regard to the court having no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. This contention of course has to be noticed only to be rejected. No such plea was raised in the written statement that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present suit. No issue was framed in this regard. The parties led evidence completely conceding to the fact that the court had territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit in question. Even if there could be such an objection, it would stand waived and even before this Court it is nowhere stated or clear from the memorandum of appeal as to on what ground the jurisdiction of the court is questioned. The plaintiff had claimed interest on the amounts wrongfully retained by the defendants which they were obliged to refund. In fact, the claim itself was based for the negligent and irresponsible act of the officers of the defendants in not refunding the amount to the plaintiff. Thus even this contention has no merit and needs to be rejected.
12. For the reasons afore-stated, we find no merit in this appeal. The same is dismissed while leaving the parties to bear own costs.