Judgment:
T.S. Thakur, J.
1. Having served in Delhi for a period of three years, petitioner has been transferred to a Field Station in Jaisalmer, Rajasthan. Aggrieved, he has filed the present writ petition challenging the said order on the ground that the same is in violation of his Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as also the policy regulating transfers and postings in the Indian Air Force. The order is also challenged on the ground that the same is vitiated by malafides and bias against the petitioner.
2. We have heard Mr. Pandey, counsel appearing for the petitioner, and perused the record. Transfer of a public servant from one place to another is made in the exigencies of service and are not interfered with by the Courts unless they are shown to be incompetent in the sense that the authority issuing the order has no jurisdiction to do so or found to be vitiated by mala fides or extraneous considerations. This is particularly so in the case of Armed Forces, BSF, CRPF and ITBP, whose personnel are duty-bound to serve at any place to which they may be transferred. The legal position on the subject is settled by a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court. Reference to some of those decisions should in our view suffice.
3. In B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka and Ors. : (1986)IILLJ516SC , the Supreme Court summed up the law regarding transfer of an employee in the following words:
It is well understood that transfer of a Government servant who is appointed to a particular cadre of transferable posts from one place to another is an ordinary incident of service and thereforee does not result in any alteration of any of the conditions of service to his disadvantage. That a Government servant is liable to be transferred to a similar post in the same cadre is a normal feature and incident of Government service and no Government servant can claim to remain in a particular place or in a particular post unless, of course, his appointment itself is to a specified, non-transferable post.
The norms enunciated by Government for the guidance of its officers in the matter of regulating transfer are more in the nature of guidelines to the officers who order transfers in the exigencies of administration than vesting of any immunity from transfer in the Government servants.
4. In Shilpi Bose and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. : (1991)IILLJ591SC , the above position was reiterated in the following passage:
The Courts should not interfere with transfer orders which are made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or or on the ground of mala fide. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department.
5. Again in Union of India v. S.L. Abbas 1993 SCC 2444, the Apex Court held that the guidelines issued by the Government and the policies, if any, regarding transfer of employees from one place to the other do not create any enforceable legal right in favor of the employee to insist that he should be continued at a particular place for any particular period or time. Orders of transfer will not, thereforee, be interfered with simply because the same are in violation of the policy or guidelines. The petitioner's argument that his transfer from Delhi to Jaisalmer is in violation of the guidelines regarding postings in Air Force, thereforee, needs notice only to be rejected.
6. Mr. Pandey next argued that the order of transfer was vitiated by mala fides of respondents No. 5 to 10, who have decided to throw the petitioner to a remote and hard area of Jaisalmer on Indo-Pak Border. He was at pains to argue that respondent No. 8 had spoiled the petitioner's ACR for the years 2004 and 2005 on account of a personal grudge that he harboured against him and against which the petitioner has sought redress before the competent authority. He contended that the transfer of the petitioner first to Sri Lanka followed by a temporary attachment to Bangalore were also attempts to punish the petitioner and clearly showed the respondents? bias towards him. Relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in The Management of the Syndicate Bank Ltd. v. The Workmen : (1966)ILLJ440SC , Arvind Dattatraya Dhande v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. : AIR1997SC3067 , Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji : [1952]1SCR135 , Dr. S.P. Kapoor v. State of Himanchal Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1981 SC 2181, Inderpreet Singh Kahlon and Ors. v. State of Punjab : AIR2006SC2571 , he argued that this Court could redress the petitioner's grievances by quashing the order of transfer and directing his continuance in Delhi for another two years.
7. The order of transfer in the instant case has been passed by Air Officer Commanding (AOC), respondent No. 5 in the case. Although, there is a vague assertion in the petition that respondent No. 5 was biased against the petitioner and the order of transfer was issued for malafide reasons, no particulars of the circumstances constituting malafides have been given. It is fairly well settled that while malafides are easy to allege but difficult to prove. Any challenge based on bias or mala fides must be supported by particulars and assertions that would probabilize, if not conclusively prove, the allegation. Besides, the Officer against whom malafides are alleged must be arrayed as a party respondent to the petition by name to enable him to meet the allegations and defend his action.
8. The petitioner has not chosen to implead respondent No. 5, the maker of the impugned order of transfer as a party respondent by name. That apart, the petition does not contain any particulars regarding malafides qua the said Officer. The writ petition makes repetitive allegations against respondents No. 7 to 10, but there is nothing to show that the said respondents were in any way instrumental in having the petitioner transferred only to punish him, as is sought to be made out by the petitioner. Even if one were to assume that respondents No. 7 to 10 had any malafide intentions, the validity of the order of transfer issued by respondent No. 5 cannot be affected by the same so long as the exercise of power by Respondent No. 5 remained unaffected by such malafides.
9. In the result, this writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.