Vikramajit Sen, J.
1. The Plaintiff has initiated this Suit for eviction, possession, injunction mesne profits and damages. Pleadings have been completed. The Plaintiff has also filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that the Court may 'pass a judgment on admission in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants in terms of the prayer clause contained in the Suit'. It cannot even be imagined how a decree for mesne profits can justifiably be granted at this stage since neither an 'admission' nor cogent evidence is available. In the interest of justice, therefore, I shall at the present moment restrict the prayer to the claim for possession/eviction alone.
2. The facts of the case are that the Plaintiffs are the owners of plot No. 120 B, Sainik Farms, New Delhi. The Plaint states that the Defendant was inducted as a licensee for a term of eleven months which expired on 24.7.1998. This period is stated to have been renewed by mutual agreement for further period of eleven months each on the increased licence fee of Rs. 18,000/- per month and thereafter Rs. 22,000/- till April 2001. It is admitted that the Defendant had paid licence fee of Rs. 22,000/- per month till February 2001.
3. Consequent upon the electricity connection in the., suit premises having been disconnected due to non-payment of the Bills by the Defendant, OMP No. 286/2003 and OMP No. 54/2004 came to be filed by him. In these proceedings Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J. recorded on 27.4.2004 that - 'It is agreed to by the counsel appearing for the parties that Mr. Kuldeep Singh, the Petitioner in OMP No. 54/2004 would pay to the Respondents an amount of Rs. 20,000/- per month from March 2001 till date and also for the future months till an appropriate proceeding is taken in accordance with law.' (underlining supplied) It will be worthy to underscore firstly that these Orders were passed before the issuance of three legal notices, and secondly that the amount fixed was not termed either as rent or damages.
4. The Plaintiff caused to be issued legal notices dated 24.9.2004 and 17.3.2005; the latter was replied to by the Defendant in terms of his Advocates' letter dated 31.3.2005. Thereafter yet another legal notice dated 30.9.2005 was despatched which also was replied to by the Advocate of the Defendant by letter dated 17.10.2005, wherein it has been stated that the notice has been issued keeping in view the Defendant's admission that he is in possession of the premises 'on month to month tenancy.' The Defendant was called upon, as per the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to handover possession of the premises within a period of fifteen days from the receipt thereof, According to the Defendant's Advocate this notice was received by the Defendant on 3.10.2005. The present Suit had already been filed on 9th September, 2005.
5. It will be evident that the third notice dated 30.9.2005 has been issued for totally inexplicable reasons, after the filing of the Suit. Therefore, one would have to revert to the previous notices issued by the Plaintiff to the Defendant in order to ascertain whether the provisions of law have been met. Mr. Puri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Defendant contends that the first notice dated 24.9.2004 cannot provide the requisite cause of action for the filing of the present Suit as it is not a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Para 8 thereof reads as follows:
Therefore, under the facts and circumstances enumerated above and by way of abundant caution and without prejudice to any such previous notice served on you, whether orally or impliedly or otherwise by our client or her predecessor, our client revokes your license through this legal notice, and directs you to return the permissive possession of the licensed property to our client within a period of 15 days from the date of delivery of this notice to you.
The first notice has been copied verbatim in the second notice dated 17.3.2005. In the Reply dated 31.3.2005 of counsel for the Defendant the stand adopted is that the Defendant had taken the premises on lease for a period of eleven months at a rental of Rs. 10,000/- inclusive of water and electricity charges; that on its expiry by efflux of time a fresh tenancy was orally agreed to between the parties whereby the demised premises were let out for an unspecified term at a rent of Rs. 10,000/- per month inclusive of water and electricity charges, and that the Defendant was a tenant from month to month and that the tenancy could only be terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.
6. The case set out by the Defendant in his Advocates' Reply dated 17.10.2005 to the legal notice issued on behalf of the Plaintiff dated 30.9.2005 is that the agreement dated 25.8.1997 expired on 24.7.1998 by efflux of time and that thereafter a fresh tenancy was orally agreed to between the parties and no written agreement was executed between them. The Reply to the notice goes on to state that the Plaintiffs had let out the premises to the Defendant for an unspecified term at a rent of Rs. 10,000/-per month inclusive of water and electricity charges, and that the Defendant was a tenant from month to month. It is palpably clear that the Defendant's stance has been constant in all the Replies to the legal notices issued to him as well as in the Written Statement filed by him. It has further been stated that the Defendant 'being a legal and valid tenant in the property the tenancy .... could only be terminated in accordance with the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. The said tenancy could only be terminated by issuing a notice of fifteen days terminating the tenancy of my client.... No such notice has been issued till date.' Reference to the above detailed Order passed by Mukundakam Sharma, J. has also been made. In paragraph 6 it has been stated on behalf of the Defendant that he 'is duly complying with the order of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and has paid upto date rent.' In para 10 of this Reply it has been reiterated that the Defendant is in occupation of the Suit premises on the basis of a month to month tenancy. In para 13 it has been stated that 'the said agreement had all the trappings of a tenancy and after the expiry of the aforesaid agreement by efflux of time my client is a tenant from month to month for an unspecified term at a rent of Rs. 10,000/- per month inclusive of water and electricity charges.'
7. In the Written Statement a stand en passant has been made that the Plaintiff has failed to prove his ownership. Since it is avowedly the Plaintiff who put the Defendant in possession of the premises the Defendant is legally incompetent to challenge the Plaintiffs ownership. Attention need be directed no further than Tej Bhan Madan v. IInd Additional District Judge : AIR 1988 SC 1413 and Anar Devi v. Nathu Ram 1994 (4) SCC 240. The Defendant has thereafter denied that the rent was initially enhanced to Rs. 8000/- for the period July, 1998 and May, 2000, and thereafter to Rs. 22,000/- till March, 2001. The Defendant has reiterated the position adopted by him in the Reply to the legal notices to the effect that there was no specified term of lease and the tenancy is month to month basis. In para 13 of the Written Statement it has been stated that 'that amount of Rs. 20,000/- per month payable from March, 2001 was mutual agreement before this Court and despite Plaintiff pressing for a higher amount Defendant for lower amount on being counsel by Hon'ble Court both the Plaintiff and Defendant, through their lawyers agreed for the amount of Rs. 20,000/- per month. It is stated said fixation of payment of Rs. 20,000/- per month as rent without prejudice to the rights and contention of the Defendant. The mutual understanding cannot be read as one sided admission by Defendant.' In para 22(c) the averment is 'that in reply dated 31.03.2005 Advocate for the Defendant sufficiently submitted that the tenancy is not for a specified period but for unending period subject to payment of rent which is payable for month to month basis and Plaintiff is entitled for the eviction of the property only in case of non-payment of rent as per the provision of Transfer of Property Act.'
8. It is in this factual matrix, set out in the Defendant's reply to the legal notice and his asseverations in the Written Statement, that the relief of possession has to be considered.
9. The Plaintiff has filed IA No. 8014/2006 under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC praying that Judgment be pronounced against the Defendant predicated on admissions made by him. Mr. Puri, learned Senior Counsel for the Defendant has made a vain attempt to withdraw or play-down the admissions made by the Defendant. Punjab National Bank, Betul v. Deviram AIR 1985 MP 87 was cited in as support. This decision, however, states that the erroneous admission by a legal practitioner on a question of law is not binding on the party and does not preclude him from challenging the wrong concession. The distinction is that in the present case there is an admission pertaining to facts. The next case relied upon is Chikkam Koteswara Rao v. Chikkam Subbarao : AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1542 where it was found that the admissions were not clear in their meaning. Mr. Puri has thereafter relied on The Pullangoda Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerela : (1972) 4 Supreme Court Cases 683 and to the observations found in para 5 thereof to the effect that an admission is an extremely important piece of evidence but it cannot be said to be conclusive inasmuch as the person who made the admission and show that it is incorrect. It is, however, incongruent to apply this ratio to the facts of the present case since Mr. Puri has not been able to substantiate that the 'notice to quit' had not been received by the Defendant and/or that by virtue of any provision under the Transfer of Property Act or any other law, the Defendant would not be liable for ejectment. Learned Counsel for the Defendant has also not succeeded in showing that the so-called admission has been construed out of context as was the case in Dharamwati Bai v. Shiv Singh : AIR 1991 Madhya Pradesh 18. Similarly I am unable to appreciate that the Plaintiff seeks to rely on admissions of the Defendant in the Reply to the notice and/or in the Written Statement by ignoring other statements, as per the enunciation of the law in Dudh Nath Pandey v. Suresh Chandra Bhattasali : AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1509. Reference on behalf of the Defendant to Ramaji Batanji v. Manohar Chintaman : AIR 1961 Bombay 169 is also futile since I am of the opinion that the admissions are clear precise and unambiguous, and not capable of two interpretations. Order XII Rule 6 contemplates the situation where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleadings or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. Even a cursory reading of this Rule discloses the sense of urgency which is expected of the Court where such circumstances present themselves. In following passages from the unreported Judgment of the Apex Court in Uttam Singh Dugal and Co. Ltd. v. Union Bank of India are apposite-
As to the object of the Order XII Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that 'where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.' We should not. unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.
The next contention canvassed is that the resolutions or minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, resolution passed thereon and the letter sending the said resolution to the respondent bank cannot amount to a pleading or come within the scope of the Rule as such statements are not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. When a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability by an application filed under Order XII Rule 6 and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the court, we do not think the trial court is helpless in refusing to pass a decree. We have adverted to the basis of the claim and the manner in which the trial court has dealt with the same. When the trial Judge states that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors meeting and the letter sent as well as the pleadings when read together, leads to unambiguous and clear admission with only the extent to which the admission is made is in dispute. And the court had a duty to decide the same and grant a decree. We think this approach is unexceptionable.
Before the trial judge, there was no pleading much less an explanation as to the circumstances in which the said admission was made, so as to take it out of the category of admissions which created a liability. On the other hand, what is stated in the course of the pleadings, in answer to the application filed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the stand is clearly to the contrary. Statements had been made in the course of the Minutes of the Board of Directors held on 30th May, 1990 to which we have already adverted to in detail. In the pleadings raised before the Court, there is a clear statement made by the respondent as to the undisputed part of the claim made by them. In regard to this aspect of communicating the resolution dated 30th May, 1990 in the letter dated 4th June, 1990 what is stated in the affidavit-in-opposition in application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is save, what are matters on record and save what would appear from the letter dated 30th May, 1990 all allegations to the contrary are disputed and denied. This averment would clearly mean that the petitioner does not deny a word of what was recorded therein and what is denied is the allegation to the contrary. The denial is evasive and the learned judge is perfectly justified in holding that there is an unequivocal admission of the contents of the documents and what is denied is extent of the admission but the increase in the liability is admitted.
Order XII Rule 6 prescribes that this duly may even be a suo moto exercise. This is also the view of the Division Bench of this Court in Surjit Sachdev v. Kazakhstan Investment Services Pvt. Ltd. : 66 (1997) DLT 54. The following passages will illustrate that the facts were wholly different.
17. The question now is that whether there is any admission or not so as to entitle the plaintiff to have a decree for possession. The factors which deserve to be taken into consideration in order to enable the Court to pass a decree in plaintiffs favour as regards possession in such like suit, are: (a) existence of relationship of Lessor and lessee or entry in possession of the suit property by defendant as a tenant; and (b) determination of such relation in any of the contingency, as envisaged in Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. One of the modes stated therein is by efflux of time limited by the lease. Only on unequivocal admission of the above two factors will entitle the plaintiff to a decree on admission. Admission need not be made expressly in the pleadings. Even on constructive admissions Court can proceed to pass a decree in plaintiffs favour.
28. Lease in this case having come to an end even on the defendants' plea on 14.1.1996. The defendants having no right, the plaintiff definitely is entitled to a decree for possession since no issue can be said to be arising for determination in so far as claim for possession is concerned. On this score alone the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree on the admission contained in the written statement.
10. On 7.9.2006, during the course of hearings, counsel for the Defendant had prayed for an opportunity to file a Reply to the said IA No. 8014/2006 as proceedings stood adjourned to 11.9.2006 on the request of counsel for the Defendant. He had been granted liberty to fife a Reply. No Reply has been filed. However, arguments have been heard in detail; The Reply to the legal notices on behalf of the Plaintiff issued to the Defendant have been set out in great detail above, for the reasons that admissions need not be found only in pleadings. The Rule envisages a situation where admissions may be located even outside pleadings, and these admissions could be in oral or in writing. In the present case, however, the admissions can be found not only in the Reply but also in the Written Statement. Regardless of whether the Plaintiff had filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, it is expected of the Court under that Rule without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties to pronounce judgment on the issues, the determination of which stands concluded because of the availability of admissions in that regard.
11. It will be recalled that in the first two notices dated 24.9.2004 and 17.3.2005, the stand of the Plaintiff was that the Defendant had been granted a mere licence in terms of the Agreement dated 25.8.1997. This relationship was sought to be severed by the issuance of the notice calling upon the Defendant to handover possession of the premises within a period of fifteen days. The Reply dated 31.3.2005 asserts that the Agreement dated 25.8.1997 had all the trappings of a tenancy thereby rendering the Transfer of Property Act to be the relevant law between the parties. A holistic reading of the pleadings leave no manner of doubt that the Plaintiff had proceeded on the basis that the Defendant was a tenant; she has fallen in line with the Defendant's assertion of status to the property. It is trite to state that if the Defendant is a mere licencee, there would be no impediments in this Court passing warrants of possession in favour of the Plaintiffs forthwith. Chapter VI of the Indian Easement Act, 1882 is the fasciculous dealing with these rights. The definition of a licence is contained in Section 52, and Section 62 enumerates the incidents where the licence would be deemed to have been revoked. I shall proceed on the assumption that the Defendant is a tenant of the Plaintiff. The legal regime governing the relationship of Lessor and lessees is to be found in Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 105 defines a lease. Section 107 stipulates that a lease of immovable property for any term exceeding one year can be made only by a registered document. Section 111 enunciates that a lease of immovable property determines on the happening of eight events, the first of which is by efflux of time limited thereby. In the present case, this would be on the expiry of eleven months from 25.8.1997, viz. 24.7.1998. It will be recalled that the Agreement is for eleven months only and hence law does not mandate for it to be registered. Thereafter the Defendant would be a tenant who is holding over the property and whose continued presence is a sufferance to the landlord; hence the term tenant by holding over or tenant by sufferance. In the present case the rent is over Rs. 3500/- and therefore, the Defendant cannot claim the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act, otherwise he could also be called a statutory tenant. The entitlement of the Defendant cannot extend beyond the tenancy month in respect of which rent has been accepted by the landlord; hence the term 'tenant' from month to month. However, since the present Suit has not been filed immediately on the determination of relationship by efflux of time, the issuance of a notice had become mandatory. If the Suit coincided with the determination of the lease by efflux of time it need not have been preceded by notice to quit. In the facts of the present case Section 111(h) unequivocally comes into operation. We must now travel to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which lays down that in the absence of a contract a lease of non-agricultural or non-manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either Lessor or lessee, by fifteen days notice. This Section has been amended by Act 3 of 2003 with the objective by eradicating the troublesome technicalities that always attached to the issuance of a legal notice to quit. In its prior form this notice had to directly and exactly coincide with the end of the month of the tenancy. A large volume of precedents had been built-up in this regard and defences were taken pertaining to the tenancy month etc. All this has now become irrelevant. Fifteen days notice commences from the date of the receipt of the notice and it is now only relevant that the Suit should be filed after the expiry of the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The Suit appears to have been filed on 9.9.2005 which is more than fifteen days after the receipt of the legal notice dated 17.3.2005. In this regard attention should be drawn to the decision of the Division Bench in Union Bank of India v. Sushila Goela : 125 (2005) Delhi Law Times 161 (DB) : 2005 (85) DRJ 318 (DB). Since the first paragraph of its Reply dated 31.3.2005 explicitly records that the former was received on 18.3.2005, there can also be no dispute pertaining to the date of the receipt of the legal notice to quit.
12. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Defendant has submitted that there is no alternative available to this Court but to hold that no notice under Section 106 had been issued since the stand adopted in the notice dated 17.3.2005 was that the Defendant was a licencee of the Plaintiff. I find no merit in the submission for the reasons that it asserted and therefore stands admitted by the Defendant that he is a tenant and in such a situation Section 106 must be complied with. The Defendant cannot approbate and reprobate on the fundamentals of the relationship between the parties. In filing the Plaint in its present form the Plaintiff has adopted the Defendant's stance, which she is not precluded from doing.
13. The next contention raised by learned Senior Counsel for the Defendant is that there is a waiver of the notice to quit inasmuch as the Defendant has tendered and the Plaintiff has accepted rent for the premises for a period subsequent to the issuance of the notice to quit. Reliance has been placed on Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act, with special reference to illustration (a) thereof, whereas invocation has been placed on behalf of the Plaintiff on the preceding Section 112 of the Act. Indubitably the Defendant has been tendering Rs. 20,000/- per month which has been accepted by the Plaintiff. The second proviso to Section 112, in my opinion, cannot be invoked in favour of the Plaintiff if 'rent has been accepted for the period prior as well as subsequent to the filing of the present Suit.' What is important, however, is that there was no agreement between the parties for the payment of Rs. 20,000/- as rent in contradistinction to damages. Dr.Mukundakam Sharma, J. did not use the word 'rent' or 'damages' in the Order. For a contract to come into existence it is essential that consensus ad idem must exist between the parties. Alternatively stated there must be adequate assent or mens rea in evidence or existence for an agreement to become legally binding and metamorphose itself into a contract. In Shanti Prasad Devi v. Shankar Mahto : (2005) 5 Supreme Court Cases 543, it has been held that even though the lease deed contained renewal clauses, mere acceptance of rent after the tenure of the lease would not tantamount to transform the 'holding over' nature into a contractual tenure. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J. has expressed similar views in Prithvi Raj Bhalla v. Industrial Cables (India) Ltd. : 99 (2002) Delhi Law Times 139 : 2002 (64) DRJ 574 while applying the dictum in Sardari Lal v. Pritam Singh : AIR 1978 SC 1518. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J. concluded 'that mere acceptance of rent from a lessee would not manifest the intention of the Lessor to renew the lease and that acceptance of rent would be necessary to assert that the Lessor assented to the lessee continuing in possession and the Lessor intended renewal of the lease.' Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J., however, held that no relief could be granted in respect of the claim for damages. In Talbot and Co. v. Haricharan Halwasiya, : AIR (39) 1952 Calcutta 47, it has been opined that unless the Lessor is aware that forfeiture has been incurred there cannot be any question of waiver or forfeiture since there would be no intention to treat the lease as subsisting after forfeiture In Mani Mann v. Ram Dulari 2001 II AD (Delhi) 178 : 2001 (58) DRJ 618 (DB) the Lessor had claimed damages for the period past the termination of the tenancy and had also clarified that if rent is tendered, it would be accepted without prejudice to the claim for damages. It was held that acceptance of'rent' did not amount to waiver of the notice to quit. In Delhi Jal Board v. Surendra P. Malik : 2003 III AD (Delhi) 419 : 2003 (68) DRJ 284 (DB) the Division Bench found that since the tenancy was governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act acceptance of rent after the notice would not tantamount to its waiver. A similar approach has been adopted in Smt. Munni Devi v. State of U.P. : AIR 1977 Allahabad 386. Reliance has also been placed on Khudiram Mukherjee v. Samsul Bari : AIR 1983 Calcutta 303 and Padmanabhan Pillai v. Sankaran Viswambaran : AIR 1987 Kerela 98. In the case in hand the fixation of Rs. 20,000A took place in proceedings before the Court. It is not possible to hold that on the acceptance of the said amount of Rs. 20,000/- the Plaintiff had intended the Defendant to continue in possession as a tenant. In B.K. Narayana Iyengar v. H.V. Subba Rao AIR 1958 Mys 113, K.S. Hegde, J. as his Lordship then was had gone to the extent of holding that whilst a statutory tenant is not a trespasser, he is still liable to pay rent and merely because he pays the rent, there can be no interference that the tenancy was intended to continue. A bitter legal battle was being fought between the parties. The Court obviously wanted to alleviate the discomfort of the Defendant who could not obtain electricity supply without the consent of the Plaintiff and desired to balance the equities by directing the tenant/defendant to pay compensation or damages for his user of the Plaintiffs property. If the parties and/or the Court had fixed the sum of Rs. 20,000/- as payment of rent in contradistinction to damages, this should have been clearly and unequivocally stated in the Order. I am of the opinion that the Plaintiff was only accepting the sum of Rs. 20,000/- as damages that had been fixed by the Court. Of course, there can be no debate that after the issuance of the legal notice to quit the Plaintiff would have been best advised not to accept any further tender even by way of damages. As has been observed in several judgments, litigation takes its own time and a landlord should not forfeit any and every return from the property owned by him unless it is palpably clear that the sum accepted by him is a product or fruit of a fresh tenancy. This finding is confined to the peculiar and singular facts of the present case and should not be construed as an opinion that a landlord can accept moneys tendered as rent even after the issuance of a notice to quit. It is therefore legally prudent to ask for orders or directions for the Court in respect of the period post the issuance of the legal notice to quit, and till then stoicly forbear from accepting any money from the tenant.
14. The contention on behalf of the Defendant that on the expiry of the Agreement on 24.7.1998, tenancy from month to month for an unspecified term had come into existence is legally untenable. If by the phrase 'unspecified term' the Defendant means only a tenancy from month to month then this is certainly envisaged in law; but with the attendant character that the relationship can be severed by the issuance of a notice to quit. If the Defendants means that unspecified term means an unending lease or a period beyond eleven months at a stretch, the existence of a duly registered lease is essential. Such a relationship would actually amount to a conveyance of the title of the property and would attract the payment of substantial stamp duty. This contention is wholly devoid of merit and is dismissed.
15. By way of summary, it is recorded that the Plaintiff has succeeded in showing that a valid notice to quit in consonance of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property. Act had been served on the Defendant who claims to be a tenant. The tenancy was from month to month since the initial period covered by the Agreement dated 25.8.1997 had come to an end by efflux of time. The present Suit for Possession has not been filed during the pendency of a contractual period of tenancy since no Lease Deed is available and reception or oral testimony is legally impermissible. So far as the acceptance of Rs. 20,000/- per month is concerned it did not partake of the nature of rent and therefore, could not be seen as a waiver of the notice to quit. I, therefore, decree the Suit in respect of the relief of possession which was also the approach adopted by me in Ved Prakash v. Marudhar Services Limited : 2000 V AD (DELHI) 845 : 2000 (54) DRJ 654. IA No. 8014/2008, therefore, stands allowed in these terms. The Plaintiff shall be entitled to Rs. 10,000/-as costs.
16. The Suit be listed for further arguments on 22nd November, 2006 in respect of the claim for damages/mesne profits in the light of the observations made by Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J. in Prithvi Raj Bhalla (supra). In other words, the Plaintiff is prima facie precluded from claiming any amounts towards damages or mesne profits since it has received the sum of Rs. 20,000/- per month from Defendant.