Vikramajit Sen, J.
1. After detailed arguments were heard on 3.12.2001 the matter was adjourned for today on the request of Mr. V.K. Shali, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The matter has again been heard at length but there has been no appearance on behalf of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
2. It appears that about one thousand workers have been employed by Respondent No. 1 for a period of almost two decades. However, this employment is not direct, but through a labour contractor. Ms. Salwan, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 1 clarifies that tenders have been invited by Respondent No. 1 since 1984 and that 'transporters' and not labour contractors are engaged by this process. This does not appear to make the slightest difference for the reason that it is evident that there is a perennial requirement for workmen for effecting the distribution of food grains etc. to Fair Price Outlets through out the National Capital Territory. The nomenclature does not detract from the fact that these thousands of workers have been denied the rights and benefits of regular employees by engaging them indirectly. The state derives, possibly, a meagre financial advantage, since the contractor, whether he is a labour or transportation one, is paid for this facility. The salutary observations of Apex Court are sadly ignored by the State itself. It is also paradoxical that while the State legislates it thereafter itself transgresses the statute.
3. As far back as 1996 the workmen engaged in this distribution had applied to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for referring their case to the State Advisory Board under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. A number of reminders have been addressed to these Respondents but they have failed to motivate and move the Respondents to take any decision. The receipt of the representations made by the Petitioner has, however been admitted. Ms. Salwan, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.1 has read out the submissions made in the Counter Affidavit to the effect that the need for engaging workmen for the distribution of food grains etc. has been drastically reduced. This contention, however, is not relevant for the purpose of the decision in this writ petition. The proper forum would be to raise these contentions as and when a Committee is constituted by the State Government to consider the abolition of contract labour in Respondent No.1. It was also contended by Mr. Nayar, learned Senior counsel who had appeared for Respondent No.1 on the previous hearing, that the writ petition is no longer maintainable in view of the observations of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others etc. etc. v. National Union Water Front Workers and Others, : (2001)IILLJ1087SC I am unable to accept this argument. The said decision does not state that workman cannot seek a Reference to the appropriate committee under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.
4. The decision merely opines that the proper remedy available to workman in the event of the cessation of their services would be through the Industrial Disputes Act. The Constitution Bench, thereforee, deprecated the passing of the orders by the High Court and other courts having the effect of giving direct appointment to the workman. This is not the prayer in the present petition.
5.The prayers in the writ petition are as follows:
'(a) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other suitable order or direction to the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi to constitute a committee under Section 5 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to go into the question of abolishing employment of Contract Labour by the Delhi State Civil Supplies Corporation, Respondent No.1, in the work of handling, loading and unloading of specified food articles, loose grain and sugar and marking of bags thereof, and
(b) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other suitable order or direction to the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi to take a decision on the question of abolishing employment of Contract Labour by the Delhi State Civil Supplies Corporation, Respondent No.1, in the work of handling, loading and unloading of specified food articles, loose grain and sugar and marking of the bags thereof, and
(c) Call for the necessary records, and
(d) Pass such other and further orders as may be deemed necessary by the Court.'
6. These prayers are not for the issuance of a mandamus for effecting direct employment of the workman with Respondent No.1 or any other body. It only seeks to meaningfully exercise the rights which have been conferred by the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. It is indeed unfortunate that in order to avail the rights conferred by Parliament the Petitioners have already had to wait for five long years, because the administration has not taken a decision and instead the officers of the Respondents have been discussing the matter in the absence of the Petitioners.
7. Over five years have elapsed since the Apex Court had made the following observations in Gujarat Electricity Board v. Hind Mazdoor Sabha, : (1995)IILLJ790SC . But these views have been ignored as is apparent from the facts of the present case.
'While parting with the these matters, we cannot help expressing our dismay over the fact that even the undertakings in the public sector have been including in unfair labour practice by engaging contract labour when workmen can be employed directly even according to the tests laid down by Section 10(2) of the Act. The only ostensible purpose in engaging the contract labour instead of the direct employees is the monetary advantage by reducing the expenditure. Apart from the fact that it is an unfair labour practice, it is also an economically short sighted and unsound policy, both from the point of view of the undertaking concerned and the country as a whole. The economic growth is not to be measured only in terms of production and profits. It has to be gauged primarily in terms of employment and earnings of the people. Man has to be the local point of development. The attitude adopted by the undertakings is inconsistent with the need to reduce unemployment and the Government policy declared from time to time to give jobs to the unemployed. This is apart from the mandate of the directive principles contained in Articles 38,39,41,42,43 and 47 of our Constitution. We, thereforee, recommended that--
(a) all, undertakings which are employing the contract labour system in any process, operation or work which satisfies the factors mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 10(2) of the Act, should on their own, discontinue the contract labour and absorb as many of the labour as is feasible as their direct employees;
(b) both the Central and State Governments should appoint a Committee to investigate the establishments in which the contract labour is engaged and where on the basis of the criteria laid down in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 10(2) of the Act, the contract labour system can be abolished and direct employment on its own should take the initiative to abolish the labour contracts in the establishments concerned by the following the procedure laid down under the Act.
(c) The Central Government should amend the Act by incorporating a suitable provision to refer to the industrial adjudicator the question of the direct employment of the workers of the ex-contractor in the principal establishment, when the appropriate Government abolishes the contract labour.'
8. Ms. Salwan has argued that meetings have been held from time to time between officers of the Respondent No.1 and those of Respondent Nos.2 and 3. At these meetings the requirements of Respondent No.1 had been discussed in detail and that too behind the back of the Representationist. There is still no answers why Respondent Nos.2 and/or 3 has not passed any order till date, allowing or declining the Petitioners' simple request that the matter be referred to the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Quite possibly, the delay may be because Respondent No.1, although it is a distinct legal entity is one of the alter egos of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Even though their officers are drawn from the same cadre, they are expected to discharge their statutory duties without fear or favor, regardless of whether the decision may be uncomfortable for one or all of them.
9. Citizens such as the Petitioners should not be constrained to approach the High Court for the vindication of their statutory rights because of the failure of the Administration to take a decision. Since there has been considerable delay already, I direct that the present writ petition should be considered by the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, and a decision be taken thereon, whether or not a case for issuance of notification under Section 10 of the said Act is made out within sixty days from today. This is the procedure which found favor with of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in All India General Mazdoor Trade Union (Regd.) v. Delhi Administration And Others, . The Hon'ble Supreme Court adopted this procedure after perusing its previous decision in R.K.Panda v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. : [1994]3SCR1034 .
10. Keeping in perspective the delay in disposing of the petitioners' request, which has been pending since 1996, and keeping in view that they have been unjustly constrained to approach this court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Petitioners are entitled to costs which are quantified at Rs.10,000/-. Costs be paid equally by the Respondents to the Petitioners within thirty days.
11. The petition stands disposed of.