Vikramajit Sen, J.
1. In this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of tenant has assailed the concurrent findings of the Additional Rent Controller (hereinafter referred to as ARC) and Additional Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as RCT) in favor of the grant of eviction orders under Section 14 (1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The eviction petition was originally filed under Section 14(1)(a) and (e) also; the bona fide needs was given up by the Respondent landlord; and the claim of non-payment of rent was upheld but the protection of Section 14(2) was granted to the tenant. In these proceedings the point for consideration is whether the landlord has succeeded in proving that the tenant (Petitioner before the High Court) was acquired vacant possession of a residence i.e. 1259/4, Naiwala, Karol Bagh, Delhi.
2. In the course of the appeal before the Tribunal an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of civil Procedure had been filed by the unsuccessful tenant which was rejected in the impugned judgment for the reason (a) that the deposition of the landlord was believable and (b) that the documents could have been acquired and produced earlier. Undoubtedly the reasoning of the Rent Control Tribunal ought not to have been so very cryptic and laconic, but the factors which prevailed upon the Tribunal to disallow the application can be gathered. Mr. Ishwar Sahai, Learned Senior Counsel for the tenant has vehemently argued that keeping in mind that one of the documents sought to be produced was a registered Sale Deed of the Naiwala property, the authenticity of which could thereforee not be questioned, it should have been considered by the Tribunal.
3. On a consideration of the law it will be seen that Clause (a) of Rule 27 is clearly inapplicable. Clause (aa) of Rule 27 was also found not to be attracted since the Tenant was always in possession of the Sale Deed and had knowledge of the documents before the Municipality; and most importantly, the Tribunal did not require the production of these documents since it was satisfied that the landlord's evidence was trustworthy and credible. In this analysis, the authenticity of the Sale Deed was not relevant at all. Reliance on K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy and Ors. , AIR 1968 S C 1526 can be of no avail to the Tenant since both the Courts found that no ambiguity or two opinions existed in the case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified in this very judgment that the occasion for taking additional evidence would arise only where the requirement is of the Court to enable it to pronounce judgment, and it is not likely to arise ordinarily unless some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent on an examination of the evidence. Reliance on the Order passed in Sarada and Ors. v. Manikkoth Kombra Rajendran, : (1996)8SCC345 does not advance the Tenants case either, since it appears that the Sale Deed which was the document in question, was intrinsically in the contemplation of the Trial Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that this document should have been taken on record by the Appellate Court by allowing the application under Order XLI Rule 27. This Order is distinguishable since in the present case the Sale Deed was not even mentioned before the Controller and the question of its true construction thus did not arise. The facts of the case in hand is almost on and all fours with those in Maganlal Bhikamchand Mehar v. Mulchand Jawarmal Nahar (dead) by L.Rs. and Ors., (1969) 135 U.J. 654 (S.C.). The Hon'ble Bench comprising of three Learned Judges took note that the document was sought to be brought into evidence 'after the arguments concluded when it was clear that the High Court was recording a decision against the plaintiff'. It was observed that 'additional evidence is allowed to be produced for the requirement of the Court and not to enable a party to make good a deficiency in his case. Scooter India Ltd. v. Subhash Chander Pahwa, 1993 (2) RCR 56 was decided without reference to any pronouncement of the Apex Court. It did not even attempt to lay down any principle of law and must be read as restricted to the facts of that case. In Akash Ganga Builder v. G.P. Seth HUF, 1999 R L R 410 it was the Appellate Court itself which considered the document relevant and ordered its production. In this analysis, it is apparent that Order XLI Rule 27 is not available to a negligent and careless party who has lost the litigation. The words 'other sufficient cause' must be interpreted ejusdem generis with the main intendment of the Rule. In the present case assuming that the evidence of the parties presupposed that the Sale Deed was available on the record this may have constituted good ground for its introduction later on only if the Appellate Court harboured a doubt on the matter. The Rent Control Tribunal did not. In these circumstances I find no jurisdictional infirmity with the impugned order rejecting the application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
4. Mr. Sahai's next contention is that in proceedings under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act the burden of proving the case lies entirely on the petitioner/landlord, relying on the decision in Ganpat Ram Sharma v. Gayatri Devi, : [1987]3SCR539 where it was observed as follows:
'The landlord in order to be entitled to evict the tenant under Section 14(1)(h) must establish one of the alternative facts positively, either that the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence. It is essential that the ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a residence, whether it is suitable or not, and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts. The other aspect apart from the question of limitation to which we shall briefly refer is that the landlord must be quick in taking his action after the accrual of the cause of action, and if by his inaction the tenant allows the premises to go out of his hands then it is the landlord who is to be blamed and not the tenant.'
5. The pleadings and testimony of the parties juxtaposed to each other read as follows:
Petition Written Statement'That the respondent has 'It is absolutely wrongacquired/got possession and denied that theof alternative respondent has everresidential acquired/got possessionaccommodation bearing of any residentialNo. 1259/4 Naiwala, accommodation bearingKarol Bagh, New Delhi.' No. 1259/4, Naiwala, KarolNew Delhi as the saidhouse is fully occupiedby the tenants and notLandlord's Statement even a single inch isavailable for the 'Respondent has occupied respondent for the lasta property bearing 20 years.'No. 1259/4 at Naiwala,Karol Bagh, New Delhi. Tenant's StatementThis property isresidential property but 'The property No. 1259/4respondent has let out Naiwala, Karol Bagh isthe same to a tenant. I commercial property andhave obtained a photo is fully occupied but itcopy of receipt of rent is owned by me.....'from the tenant ShyamLal who is a tenant ofrespondent which is mark'B'.....'
6. Pleadings form the platform on which the edifice of the case is erected; the evidence is the construction carried out on the said platform or plinth. Once the building has been constructed, the plinth becomes irrelevant unless some problem or defect appears. If it is clear that the adversaries were aware of the rival cases, the pleadings largely lose relevance and would be reverted to in the case of an objection being raised in regard to the admissibility of any evidence. Evidence beyond pleadings is generally not admissible. But even this hurdle is crossed once evidence is received by the Court in the absence of any demur by the opposite party at the time when it was introduced. It parties have led evidence the formal requirements of pleadings can be relaxed. Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramani, : [1966]2SCR286 . In appellate proceeding thereforee, the Court should address and appreciate the evidence as it exists, and where parties have prosecuted their respective cases without considering the question of burden of proof, this aspect would thereafter lose significance. In Paras Nath Thakur v. Mohani Dasi (deceased) and Ors. , AIR 1959 SC 1204 the Apex Court had reiterated that the High Court cannot go into question of fact in Second Appeal (which would apply a fortiori to petitions under Article 227) and that where both parties have adduced their evidence the onus of proof loses importance. Reference may be directed to Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani, 1998 (2) RCR 268. The respective obligations of burden of proof was quite apparently lost sight of by the Tenant and this is also discernable from the simple fact of his moving the application under Order XLI Rule 27. The Tenant could have rested his oars on the Landlord's failure to discharge the burden of proof but he has not done so either before the Controller or the Tribunal. Instead, by seeking leave to produce the Sale Deed and documentation of the MCD he has sought to non-suit the Landlord. He cannot now be heard to complain on this issue. The Controller has drawn an adverse inference because of the non-production of evidence that the Naiwala property was of commercial character and was in the possession of various tenants. The Landlord had pleaded and stated these facts and had even indicated in his testimony that the Respondent had let out the premises to a Tenant named Shyam Lal. There is considerable force in the submission of Mr. Bhatia, Learned Senior Counsel for the Landlord, that the passage from Ganpat Ram's case (supra) relied on by Mr. Sahai demolishes the grounds raised by the Tenant. Since the Landlord had positively stated that the Tenant had occupied the alternative premises and even let out a part of it, the Tenant should have refuted this statement by producing the best evidence in his possession. The Tenant has not been forthright and specific in his defense, and his prevarication on the simple question of the residential/commercial character of the building in question must be held to be fatal to his defense. Mr. Bhatia has also drawn attention to the decision in Gujarat State Fertilizers v. S.M. Aggarwal, 1999 (1) RCR 552, which is indubitably of relevance.
7. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has been filed against the concurrent findings of fact and law returned by the Controller and the Tribunal. Consequent on the amendments to the Delhi Rent Control Act carried out in 1988 an appeal now lies under Section 38 only on questions of law. thereforee now the Tribunal is precluded from entering upon the factual arena. The legislature intended to restrict the ambit of the appeal and thus render the Controller as the master of the facts. In the course of the same amending exercise carried out in 1988, Section 39 was omitted and thenceforward no appeal is maintainable to this Court. Invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court runs counter to and frustrates the wisdom of the Legislature and infact renders the amendment nugatory. The employment of this Constitutional provision has become rampant. It would be well to bear in mind that under Article 227 the High Court is not expected to correct all hardships or wrong decisions made by Courts exercising their jurisdiction properly. The High Court should adjure an appellate exercise, and restrict its intervention to those instances where a flagrant abuse of fundamental legal principles have been occasioned. It should certainly eschew substituting its own judgment with that of the lower Courts, and venture forth only where the findings are perverse, or are a consequence of the incorrect exercise of jurisdiction. There is a plethora of precedents on these well settled proposition of law and hence reference to them would be a needless and wasteful spending of time. In rent matters, where a Second Appeal to the High Court has been taken away by Parliament, invoking these powers must be confined to very rare case where it is apparent on the face of the record that there was no ground for the lower Court to return the particular finding and conclusion that is under challenge. If there is any reasonable ground for the lower Court to have acted in the challenged manner, the High Court should not interfere. Learned Counsel for the Tenant had relied upon Nagendra Nath Bora and Anr. v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, and Ors. : [1958]1SCR1240 , and it is certainly relevant but not in the manner suggested by him. It has been observed therein that the High Court should not interfere simply because the Courts below had viewed the matter in a light which is not acceptable to it. In Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte and Anr. , : AIR1975SC1297 the Apex Court deprecated the exercise of powers under Article 227 by the High Court even where the latter was of the opinion that the Lower Court had misread the evidence.
8. The argument of Mr. Sahai is that there was insufficient evidence may no evidence on the record for the Controller to grant eviction but that proceeded on the questionable assumption that there was no allegation on the Tenant to elucidate that the premises admittedly purchased by him were not residential or could not be occupied. He has failed to prove these facts although he could easily have done so. Moreover he has been dishonest in his pleadings since he could have clearly averred that he was the owner but that the premises were commercial and/or were fully occupied. The tenant's denial is evasive and thereforee the obligation on the Landlord could not have been more that the making of a perfunctory and formal statement, which he has duly done. Reliance on Achutananda Baidya v. Prafullya Kumar Gayen and Ors. : [1997]3SCR709 appears to be futile since the Controller was satisfied with the evidence before her, whether this could be related to the Landlord or be negatively related to the Tenant. The Tribunal did not perceive the verdict to have been given in the absence of any evidence or as a consequences of its misreading. Hence no legal question had been arisen before him. I see it in the same light. In Mahan Amba Prasad Aghnihotri and Ors. v. Bhaskar Balwant Aher (D) Through LRs. : AIR2000SC931 and in Shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpatrao and Ors. , : AIR2000SC3094 the Apex Court has again opined that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not appellate but supervisory and it cannot interfere with a finding of fact unless there is no evidence to support the finding or the finding is perverse. This is not the position in the present case.
9. There is no justification for the Tenant invoking Article 227 and the Petition is wholly without merit. It is dismissed with costs of Rs. 5000/-.