Judgment:
R.C. Lahoti, J.
(1) Some time in the year 1989-90 the petitioner raised a dispute under Section 60 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 ( hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, for short) complaining of failure on the part of the society in alloting a plot to him. He had sought for a declaration that he was bonafide and legal member senior to respondent No.2 and that respondent No. 3 was not a bonafide and legal member of the Society. The respondent No.2 filed a reply raising an objection that the petitioner was not a member of the Society as the Managing Committee of the Society had never approved his membership nor issued a share certificate to him.
(2) The Joint Registrar (Arbitration) exercising powers of the Registrar held by his order dated 26.12.1990 (Annexure-F )that the petitioner never became a member of the Society and could not have filed a dispute under Section 60. Rule 30 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Rules, 1973 (hereinafter 'the Rules', for short) laying down procedure for disposal of application for admission of member was not fully complied with. Merely by moving an application and paying Rs. 110.00 no person can become a member of the Society. The petitioner did not have locus standi to file the case. The case filed by the petitioner was liable to be dismissed by reference to Clause (iii) of sub-rule (4) of Rule 88.
(3) Aggrieved by the dismissal in liming of the claim filed by the petitioner, he preferred a revision petition under S. 78(6) of the Act to the Cooperative Tribunal. The Tribunal has held that the order of the Registrar having been passed under section 60 of the Act no revision lay to the Tribunal. The revision has thereforee been dismissed as not maintainable.
(4) Aggrieved by the above said two orders the present petition has been filed.
(5) At the hearing, the learned counsel for the parties have confined their submissions to the question whether the Cooperative Tribunal was right in holding the revision filed by the petitioner not maintainable.
(6) It would be useful to extract and reproduce the relevant parts of the provisions contained in Section 60, 61, 76, 78, 80 of the Act and Rule 88 of the Rules. They are as under :
60.Disputes which may be referred to arbitration (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society other than a dispute regard- ing disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of the society arises- a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members, or b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any officer, agent or .employee of the society or liquidator, past or present, or c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased employee of the society, or d) between the society and any other co-operative society, between a society and liquidator of another society or between the liquidator of one society and the liquidator of another society, such disputes shall be referred to Registrar for decision and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proccedings in respect of such dispute. (2) xxx xxx xxx xxx (3) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is or is not a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court. (4)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36) of 1963) but subject to the specific provisions made in this Act the period of limitation in the case of a dispute referred to the Registrar under sub-section (1) shall- (i) when the dispute relates to the recovery of any sum including interest thereon due to a co-operative society by a member thereof, be computed from the date on which such member dies or ceases to be a member of the society; (ii) save as otherwise provided in sub clause (iii) when the dispute relates to any act or omission on the part of any of the parties referred to in clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1) be six years from the date on which the act or omission with reference to which the dispute arose, took place; (iii) when the dispute relates to a co-operative society which has been ordered to be wound up under S. 63 or in respect of which an administrator has been appointed under Section 32, be six years from the date of the order issued under section 63 or Section 32 as the case may be; (iv) when the dispute is in respect of an election of an officer of a co-operative society other than a society referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 31, be one month from the date of the declaration of the result of the election.' (b) The period of limitation in the case of any other dispute except those mentioned in the foregoing clause which are required to be referred to the Registrar under the last proceeding section shall be regulated by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 ( 36 of 1963) as if the dispute was a suit and the Registrar a civil court. (c) Notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (a) and (b), the Registrar may admit a dispute after the expiry of the period of limitation, if the applicant satisfies the Registrar that he had sufficient cause for not referring the dispute within such period and the dispute so admitted shall be a dispute which shall not be barred on the ground that the period of limitation has expired. 61.Reference of dispute to arbitration- (1) The Registrar may, on receipt of the reference of dispute under section 60-(a) decide the dispute himself, or (b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the Lieutenant- Governor with powers in that behalf, or (c) refer it for disposal to one arbitrator. (2) The Registrar may withdraw any reference transferred under clause (b) of sub-section (1) or referred under clause (c) of that subsection and decide it himself or refer the same to another arbitrator for decision. (3) The Registrar or any other person to whom a dispute is referred for decision under this section may, pending the decision of the dispute, make such interlocutory orders as he may deem necessary in the interest of justice. 76. Appeals (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 77, an appeal shall lie under this section against xxx xxx xxx xxx (i) any decision or award made under S.61. xxx xxx xxx xxx (2) An appeal against any decision or order under sub-section (1) shall be made within sixty days from the date of the decision or order- (a) If the decision or order falls under clause (g),(h),(i) or (1) of subsection (1) to the Tribunal; xxx xxx xxx xxx 78. Delhi Co-operative Tribunal' Xxx xxx xxx xxx (6) The Tribunal may call for and examine the record of any proceedings, in which an appeal lies to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and if in any case it shall appear to the Tribunal that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled or reversed, the Tribunal may pass such order thereon as it may deem fit. 80. Revision Subject to the provisions of S. 77, the Lieutenant Governor may, suo moto or on the application of a party to reference, call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which no appeal lies to the Lieutenant-Governor under S. 76 ( not being any proceedings in which an appeal lies to the Tribunal) for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality and propriety of any decision or order passed and if in any case it shall appear to him that any such decision or order should be modified annulled or revised, he may pass such order thereon as he may deem fit. Rule 88. Procedure for making Reference of Dispute (1) Where a party to a dispute referred to in sub-section (1) of section 60 desires to have the dispute determined in accordance with the sub section, the party shall apply to the Registrar in writing in Form 17 stating inter alias (i) all the facts constituting the cause of action, (ii) names and addresses of the other parties (iii) facts showing that the subject matter of dispute is not barred by limitation, (iv) relief claimed in terms of money or otherwise. Each statement in the application shall have separate consecutive paragraphs Seriallly numbered. At the end of the application there shall be made verification with the place and date of verification. (2) A party, referring the dispute under sub-section (1) of section 60 to the Registrar shall pay a fee of Rs. 10 plus process fee at the rate of Rs. 2.50 for each party which shall be deposited in advance in the Financing Bank in the name of the Registrar in 'Settlement and Executive Service Expenses Fund' the original of pay-in- slip for the deposit of this account shall be attached with the application for reference of a dispute. The application for reference of a dispute shall be delivered in the office of the Registrar personally and receipt obtained or by registered post along with as many spare copies of the application as there are parties on the opposite side. (3) On receipt of the application, the Registrar shall enter it in a register in form 18 and allot case No. on the application. (4) If the Registrar is satisfied that the application is maintainable under Section 60, he shall by an order, admit the application for decision of the dispute in accordance with the Act and Rules and record his findings on the following points : (i) whether there is a dispute; (ii) whether the dispute comes within the purview of sub-section (1) of section 60; iii) whether the dispute is between parties mentioned in clauses (a), (b),(c) and (d) of sub-section (1) of section 60. iv) whether the dispute is within time according to sub-section (4) of section 60. (5) After the application has been admitted by the Registrar and after the claimant has deposited the arbitration fee in the manner and according to the scale of fees fixed by him, the application along with his orders thereon shall be referred for decision to the arbitration. Explanationn : The expression 'Arbitration' wherever occurring in these rules, means the authority mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 61 whether the authority may be the Registrar himself.' xxx xxx xxx xxx
(7) Section 60 confers power and jurisdiction on the Registrar to decide the disputes referred to therein. It also excludes jurisdiction of courts to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of such disputes as lie within the jurisdiction of the Registrar. The Registrar has also been vested with jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether a dispute referred to him is a dispute covered by Section 60 or not. Section 60 is a complete and self contained provision on jurisdiction. Even if the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of S.61 were not there, it would not have made any difference in so far as the jurisdiction conferred by S. 60 on the Registrar to decide the disputes is concerned. Sub-section (1) of S. 61 merely enables the jurisdiction conferred by Section 60 on the Registrar being exercised not only by the Registrar but also by a person empowered by the Lieutenant Governor or by an arbitrator. However, even such a person or arbitrator acquires jurisdiction to decide dispute by reference to Section 60 of the Act. In other words. Section 60 confers the jurisdiction to decide; sub-Section (1) of Section 61. provides for forum- it merely speaks of persons who may exercise the jurisdiction. In addition, sub- section (2) of S. 61 confers power on the Registrar to withdraw and decide or make over a reference and sub- section (3) of S. 61 confers power to make interlocutory orders.
(8) Thus a decision or award is made only under S. 60. S. 61 does not stricto sensu provides for an award or decision being made; it contemplates only such orders being made: (i) an order by the Registrar making over a reference to a person empowered by the Lieutenant Governor or an arbitrator if he may not choose to decide the dispute himself, (ii) an order by the Registrar withdrawing any reference from an officer empowered by the Lieutenant Governor or an arbitrator and keeping it to himself for decision or referring the same to another arbitrator, (iii) an interlocutory order.
(9) Could it have been intended by the legislature to make a decision or award made under S.61 appealable when the decision or award has to be made under S. 60 and not S. 61 Could it have been intended by the legislature not to provide remedy of appeal against decision or award made under S. 60 Was it intended by the legislature to provide remedy of appeal against orders of secondary value or interlocutory orders merely, falling within the scope of S. 61 and the remedy of revision only against decisions or awards, falling within the scope of S. 60 though they may be final in nature? This would be incongruous. Ordinarily in all the laws providing for remedies of appeal and revision both, the legislative policy is to provide remedy of appeal against the final decision or award which finally terminates the proceedings and to provide remedy of revision against interlocutory orders or the orders of the secondary importance. Is it a case of casus omissus or a crease in legislative fabric in Delhi Co-operative Societies Act
(10) In our opinion, S. 60 and S. 61 of the Act are part of one scheme. They have to be read together. Sections 60 and 61 taken together contemplate the different facets and stages of one compact proceedings which begin with initiation of reference and terminate with the decision or award. The words 'decision' and 'award' do not have much distinction in so far as their legal efficacy is concerned as used therein.The two words are not defined. It appears from the language used in Ss. 60 and 61 that a final decision by the Registrar or a person empowered by the Lieutenant Governor amounts to a decision while a decision by an arbitrator amounts to an award; award being a more appropriate term to be used for describing the final decision of a dispute by an arbitrator. The different stages are : (i) the stage of admission by the Registrar- going into the question of maintainability of the application seeking reference; (ii) a decision on forum by the Registrar whether he would retain the dispute for decision by himself or would like to transfer it for disposal to a person empowered by the Lieutenant Governor or would like to refer it for disposal to an arbitrator; though the Explanationn enacted to sub rule (5) of Rule 88 obliterates the distinction between the Registrar and the Arbitrator inasmuch as the expression arbitrator would include all the three authorities referred to in sub section (1) of S.61 including the Registrar himself; and (iii) The stage of adjudication on merits of the main dispute when the application having been found to be maintainable, the merits of the dispute raised in the application seeking reference have to be gone into and decided by an award. At the stage of admission, maintainability is decided by finding out answer to all the four questions covered by clauses (i) to (iv) of sub rule (4) of Rule 88 which crystalise what is otherwise contained in and contemplated by sub- sections (3) and (4) of S.60.
(11) Sections 60 and 61 being part of one scheme; merely assigning different section numbers would not make any difference. For the purpose of clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S. 76 it shall have to be held that 'any decision or award made under S. 61' mean any decision or award made in the proceedings forming part of one composite scheme contemplated by Sections 60 and 61 read together as if they were one section. A decision or award finally terminating the proceedings under Sections 60 and 61 being appealable to the Iribunal by Virtue of S. 76(2)(b) read with S. 76(1)(i), any decision or order passed at any stage anterior to the passing of final decision or award and not finally terminating the proceedings would be open to revision by the Tribunal under section 78(6) so as to call for and examine the record of such proceedings. Such orders are thereforee, and of necessity, not open to revision under Section 80. The revisional jurisdiction of the Lieutenant Governor under S. 80 is confined to calling for and examining the record of such proceedings in which no appeal lies either to him or to the Tribunal under S. 76. The orders which are open to revision under S.78(6) are not open to revision under S.80.
(12) Yet another reason why the legislature has found it convenient to use in S. 76(l)(i) the expression 'made under Section 61' following the words 'any decision or award' is not far to seek. Section 60 confers jurisdiction on the Registrar. Section 61 permits the same jurisdiction being conferred on any person empowered by the Lieutenant Governor or the arbitrator as well. If clause (i) of S.76(1) would have been drafted as any decision or award under S. 60' then it would have remained confined in its operation to the decision or award made by the Registrar alone. The use of 'made under S.61' permits embracing within its scope of any decision or award made by any of the three authorities contemplated by Section 61(1).
(13) It is pertinent to note that S. 76(l)(i) provides for an appeal against 'any decision or award made under Section 61.' Section 76(2)(a) providing for limitation and forum of appeal speaks of 'decision or order' falling under clause (i). The word 'order' is not be found in Section 76(l)(i) while the word 'award' is not to be found used in S.76(2)(a). Section 78(6) provides for revision being filed against 'any decision or order.' This 'crease' gives rise to a few questions. Does it mean that S.76, though having made an award appealable, has omitted to provide any forum if the appeal be directed against an award If it be a decision, would it be both appealable and revisable Has the legislature committed a mistake of providing a forum for appeal against an 'order' without making it appealable? The answer is that the terms-'decision,' 'order' and 'award' have been loosely used. What real meaning is to be assigned to each of these words shall have to be found out from the context in which they have been used.
(14) At the stage of admission while examining maintainability of a reference the Registrar may hold it to be not maintainable under sub-section (3) of S.60 or may under sub-section(4) hold it barred by time either on its face or after refusing to condone the delay in referring the dispute within the prescribed time. In either case, the reference would stand finally disposed of though without any adjudication on merits of the dispute. Answers to the questions touching the maintainability of the claim, the entitlement of the petitioner to prefer the claim, the jurisdiction of the Registrar to adjudicate upon the same, whether or not it was brought within the time prescribed if adverse to the applicant would finally terminate the reference proceedings and such a decision or order would also constitute rest judicata in subsequent proceedings, if any, would all stand finally adjudged. On the contrary, there may be cases where any of the questions referred to in Rule 88(4) having been decided in favor of the claimant by an order of the Registrar, the reference would continue to remain pending for adjudication of other issues. Such order of the Registrar would not terminate the proceedings in reference and so it would be an order passed at an interim stage. The proceedings after reaching their logical end would result in a final decision or award being passed. In our opinion, an order which finally terminates the proceedings would be appealable. An award would be appealable. Any decision or order which does not terminate the proceedings would be revisable. Such an interpretation alone would satisfy the rule of harmonious interpretation and bring out the legislative intent behind enacting Ss.76 and 78(6).
(15) We may now deal with the apparent inconsistency between the provisions contained in S. 76((l)(i) and S. 76(2)(a) Can if be said that the legislature provided the right of appeal against any decision or award made under Section 61 but failed to provide a forum for appeal against an award and also failed to prescribe a period of limitation for an appeal against an award
(16) Let us note a few relevant principles of interpretation.
16.1'In determining either the general object of the legislature, or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one. 'An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available.' Where to apply words literally would 'defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result' we must ' do some violence to the words' and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction.'
[The Interpretation of Statutes, Maxwell 1976 12 Edn.199]
16.2'Where possible, a construction should be adopted which will facilitate the smooth working of the scheme of legislation established by the Act, which will avoid producing or prolonging artificiality in the law, and which will not produce anomalous results.' [Maxwell, ibid,p.201]
16.3'Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence.' [ibid. p.228]
16.4'Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskillfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule: 'the canone of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution.' [ibid p.228]
16.5.Denning, L.J. in Seaford Court Estates Ltd v. Asher (1949) 2 All E.R. 155 164, said: 'When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament and then he must supplement the written words so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature. A Judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases'
The above said view has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court of India in several cases (See the Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Chief Justice G.P. Singh 1993 (5) Edn 47)
(17) It cannot be held that the legislature has expressly provided for a right of appeal against any decision or award by one hand, and in the next breath and by another hand it has taken away the right in so far as an award is concerned by failing to provide a forum for it. Inasmuch as sub-section (2)(a) refers to the 'decision or order falling under clause (i) it must be held that the phrase 'decision or order' has been employed in a wider sense so as to include within its meaning any 'decision or award made under S. 61' the words as used in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S.76. May be the legislative drafting suffers from a defect, a realistic solution shall have to be found out by interpretative process.
(18) The legislature would not have intended the same decision or order being appealable as well as revisable in the absence of an explicit language having been used to that effect. Obviously the words 'the decision or order,' as occurring in S. 76 and those occurring in S. 78 (6) have to be assigned a different meaning taking colour from the context in which they have been used and by reading out the legislative intent. This is for reasons more than one.
18.1In Jay Mahabir Cooperative House Building Society Ltd vs. Panchal Keshavlal Narbheram, : [1987]2SCR894 , of Delhi Act a provision of Gujrat Act pan materia with S. 78(6) came up for consideration of their Lordships. Their Lordships have opined that the phrase 'any proceedings in which the appeal lies to it' would mean the proceedings in which an appeal would lie after final decision or disposal of the proceedings i.e. the decision of the dispute by the Registrar. Any decision or order passed at a stage anterior to the stage of the final decision or order would be revisable.
18.2'One way in which repugnancy can be avoided is by regarding two apparently conflicting provisions as dealing with distinct matters or situations.' (Maxwell, ibid p.187).
18.3'The same word may be used in different senses in the same statute and even in the same section.' (Maxwell, ibid p.279)
18.4Section 38(1) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 or ovides 'an appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller made tinder this Act to the Rent Control Tribunal. In the Central bank of India v. Gokal Chand : [1967]1SCR310 , for assigning meaning to the term 'order' the Supreme Court adopted an objetive oriented approval taking light from the context in which the term 'order' has been used and held- 'The object of S. 38(1) is to give a right of appeal to a party aggrieved by some order which affects his right or liability. In the context of S. 38(1), the words 'every order of the Controller made under this Act', through very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties, in a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass many interlocutory order under S. 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are stops taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding ; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders, it is open to any party to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding.'
18.5Keeping in view the above said principles, we are clearly of the opinion that while the decision or order' referred to in S. 76 means a final decision or order or a decision or order or award rendered at the final stage of the proceedings which brings an end to the proceedings, in so far as authority seized of the proceedings is concerned; the words 'decision or order' as used in S. 78(6) mean any decision or order which does not finally terminate the proceedings but keeps the proceedings alive in spite of or on account of passing of that decision or order.
(19) To sum up :
(1)Sections 60 and .61 of the Delhi Cooperative Act, 1972 though separately numbered are essentially part of one scheme and constitute one provision taken together. The three authorities referred to in sub section (1) of Section 61 decide a dispute deriving the power and jurisdiction to do so from S. 60 of the Act;
(2)The expression 'any decision or award made under Section 61' occurring in clause (i) of sub- section (1) of S. 76 necessarily means any decision or award made under S. 60 by any of the authorities mentioned in S. 61.
(3)Any decision which finally terminates the proceedings in a reference or an award given by any of the authorities contemplated referred to in sub section (1) of S. 61 at any stage of the proceedings contemplated by Section 60 and 61 is appealable; any decision or order which does not finally terminate the proceedings in reference but keeps the proceedings alive by virtue of, or in spite of, the passing of such a decision or order would be revisable;.
(4)A decision under sub-section (3) or (4) of S. 60 or a decision on any of the four questions referred to in Rule 88(4), if adverse to the applicant, would bring the proceedings in reference to an end and hence would be appealable. The same decision if favourable to the applicant would keep the proceedings in reference alive and hence would be a decision or order passed at an interim stage. It would be revisable under Section 78(6). An appeal would then lie against any decision or award to be passed at the end of such proceedings.
(20) The following kinds of orders under Section 61 would be revisable Under section 78(6) and not appealable :
(I)an order of the Registrar retaining the dispute for decision by himself or transferring it for disposal to any person empowered by the Lieutenant Governor or referring it for disposal to an arbitrator. (sub section (1).
(II)ANorder by the Registrar withholding any reference and retaining it for decision by himself and referring the same to another arbitrator for decision; (sub-section (2)
(III)An interlocutory order by any of the three authorities made in the interest of justice (sub- section (3)
(21) We may now deal with the three decisions which were cited at the bar.
21.1Jay Mahabir Cooperative House Building Society Ltd vs. Panchal Keshavlal Narvbheram, : [1987]2SCR894 , is a case where the Deputy Registrar had accepted an objection based on the doctrine of rest judicata. Against that order a revision petition was filed to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to reopen a question which had already stood decided at an earlier stage of the proceedings. It was held: 'The word 'proceeding' here is qualified by the phrase in which an appeal lies to it. It is not disputed that after final disposal of these proceedings i.e. decision of the dispute by the Registrar or by his nominee an appeal will lie to the Tribunal and thereforee in the impugned judgment the Division Bench of the Gujrat High Court took the view that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to call for and examine the record of such proceedings.'
21.1.1The view taken by the Gujrat High Court was held as correct. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to call for and examine the record of the Deputy Registrar in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
21.1.2A reading of the report clearly shows that the question arising for decision before their Lordships was what was the meaning of the words 'proceedings in which an appeal lies to the Tribunal.
21.1.3Based on the Supreme Court decision is a Single Bench decision of Delhi High Court in Sh Ajit Singh vs Madan Jha Delhi Coop Tribunal 1988 (1) D.L. 446. 'X' was removed from the membership of the Society by the Managing Committee. He raised a dispute and the Joint Registrar made a reference under section 60 of the Delhi Act to an arbitrator. This order was challenged by filling a revision before the Cooperative Tribunal under S. 78(6) of the Act. The Tribunal dismissed the revision as not maintainable. It was held that the proceedings initiated by 'X' before the Registrar were amenable to the jurisdiction of Tribunal by way of appeal after a final order was made by the arbitrator and thus the Tribunal could revise any order made earlier in the proceedings.
21.2.1This decision supports the view we have taken.
21.2.2However, Ajit Singh's case does not deal with the question whether an appeal or revision would lie if the reference would have been rejected i.e. if the Joint Registrar would have refused to make a reference under Section 60 of the Act to an arbitrator and thereby finally terminated the proceedings.
21.3Hans Raj v. Govt Servant Cooperative Housing Society 1987 Rlr 153 is a Db decision. The petitioner filed a claim before the Registrar for the refund of Rs. 2373.00 along with interest. The Deputy Registrar Shri Saini, who exercised the powers of the Registrar, held that it was a dispute existing between a member of the Society which is covered under Section 60(1) of the Act and the reference was within time. He appointed arbitrator and referred the disputes to the arbitration of Shri Sodhi an arbitrator who gave an award in favor of the petitioner. Against the award the Society filed an appeal under S. 76 of the Act to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the application was not maintainable under S. 60 read with Rule 88 as it was made after a period of about 16 years and hence was barred by time. The appeal was allowed and the award was set aside.
21.3.1It was submitted that the appeal under Section 76 was provided against any decision or award made under Section 61 and not against the decision of the Registrar under S. 60. The Division Bench held : 'Section 76 only provides for an appeal against any decision or award made u/s 61. Section 76 does not provide for an appeal against the decision of the Registrar u/s 60. After a dispute is referred to an arbitrator u/s 60 the arbitrator has only to go into the merits of the disputes and give his award. It would not be open to the arbitrator u/s 61 to examine the legality or validity of the reference of the disputes to him or to re- examine the question of limitation which u/s 60 is completely within the domain of the Registrar to examine. '
21.3.2It would appear from para 13 of the said judgment that it was not disputed by the counsel for the respondent that S 76 does not provide for an appeal against an order made by the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar under Section 60 of the Act. Thus the point appears to have been decided on concession. Para 14 also shows the Division Bench having arrived at a finding that the Tribunal had wrongly held that 'the Deputy Registrar had not dealt with the question of limitation.
21.3.3The real question arising for decision before the Division Bench was whether an Arbitrator to whom the reference was made by the Registrar could re- examine and reopen the finding recorded by the Registrar before making over the case to him. The order of the Deputy Registrar Shri Saini was not the subject matter of appeal. The Division Bench decision is, thereforee, not an authority for the proposition whether a decision by a Registrar finally terminating a proceedings would be appealable or not.
(22) The above said being the position of law, we may now test the nature of the order which was impugned before the Cooperative Tribunal in the case at hand. The petitioner had sought for reference of a dispute to the Registrar. The Registrar heard on the admissibility of the petition under section 60 read with Rule 88(4)(iii) and arrived at a finding that the petitioner had no locus standi to raise the dispute as he was not a member of the Society. The status of the petitioner qua the society has been finally adjudicated upon. Consequent to the finding the reference has been rejected. It is a final decision. It has left nothing pending before the Registrar. Hence the decision would be appealable to the Tribunal under clause (i) of sub section (1) of S. 76 read with the section 76(2)(a). The petitioner had preferred a revision in view of an unsettled position of law. The fact remains. that it was Cooperative Tribunal having jurisdiction to hear whether an appeal or a revision. Thus, the forum would not change. In the interest of justice the revision filed by the petitioner should have been allowed to be converted into an appeal and then heard and disposed of in accordance with law.
(23) For the foregoing reasons the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 31.1.1991 passed by the Cooperative Tribunal is set aside. The revision petition filed by the petitioner would stand revived. The Tribunal shall permit the revision filed by the petitioner being converted into an appeal under S. 76(2)(a) read with S. 76(2)(i) if the petitioner seeks such a conversion. It shall then be heard and disposed of in accordance with law. No order as to costs.