Judgment:
Usha Mehra, J.
(1) Smt. Nirmaljit Arora respondent No. 1 let out her premises bearing No. Dd 31 Kalkaji Extn. New Delhi, to M/s. Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd., respondent No. 2 for the residence of its employee Shri Hans Raj Shiv, the petitioner. Lease was for a period of three years executed on 17th July, 1980. The premises was let out for residential purposes. On or about 18th February, 1995 the said Smt. Nirmaijit Arora filed a petition for ejectment of the respondent M/s. Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. on the ground of bonafide requirements. The said petition was dismissed. On 31st October, 1987, this petitioner resigned his job with M/s. Bharat Steels Ltd. He, however, did not vacate the premises let out to respondent No. 2 for the residence of this petitioner so long he remains in service of respondent No.
(2) That when the premises was not vacated, the respondent No. 1, Smt. Nirmaljit Arora sought eviction against respondent No. 2 to whom she had let out the premises. Petition was filed on the ground of sub-letting and parting with possession of the premises in question. Against the order of the Rent Controller, revision was filed in the High Court which was listed as Civil Revision No. 470/ 87. It the said Civil Revision Petition an application was filed by the respondents 1 and 2 i.e., the landlady and the tenant bearing C.M. No. 412/95 under Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure. It was informed to the Court by the respondents herein that they had entered into a compromise, the terms of which were incorporated in the application (CM. No. 412/95). lt was prayed therein that order of ejectment be passed in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties. This Court of the basis of the said compromise supported by the affidavits of the landlady and the tenant passed the order of eviction on 6th March, 1995 under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and also applying the provision of Section 14(7) of the Act granted six months time to the teat to vacate the premises.
(3) By this petition, Shri Hans Raj Shiv, ex-employee of respondent No. 2 has assailed the said compromise decree of eviction dated 6th March, 1995, inter alia, on the ground that the said order is against law and public policy of the State. Drawing the attention of this Court to para No. 3 of the said compromise application, Mr. J.M. Sabharwal pointed out that the landlady therein agreed to forego the arrears of rent payable from July, 1993 and further agreed that till vacation of the premises she would not charge rent. This according to Mr. Sabharwal amounted to consideration received by the tenant for relinquishing his right of tenancy. Such an act is prohibited by the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (in short the Act). Moreover, the order dated 6th March, 1995 passed by this Court was based on collusive action of the respondents. The petitioner who was occupying the premises was ignored. He had not been heard. His objections to the execution have been wrongly dismissed by the Rent Controller as well as by the Tribunal.
(4) Mr. J.M. Sabharwal during arguments primarily restricted his challenge on two grounds namely, (i) that the order dated 6th March, 1995 was collusive, and (ii) it is prohibited under Section 5(3) of the Act.
(5) At the outset it must be mentioned that facts regarding creation of tenancy by respondent No. 1 to respondent No. 2 i.e. M/s. Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd. for the residence of its employee i.e., the petitioner are not in dispute. That the petitioner resigned from the service of respondent No. 2 is also not in dispute. It is also an admitted fact on record that respondent No. 2 did not deliver the vacant possession of the premises to respondent No. 1 after the petitioner resigned its ojob. Since the tenancy was in the name of M/s. Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd., hence the parties were competent to enter into an agreement. thereforee, I am not persuaded to hold that the compromise arrived at and recorded by this Court was collusive.
(6) Now turning to the important question of law raised by Mr. J.M. Sabharwal i.e., whether by giving up the claim of recovery of arrears of rent, it amounted to consideration for relinquishing the tenancy and so hit by Section 5(3) of the Act?
(7) To answer the above question, we must first know the object and reasons for bringing the provisions of Section 5 on the statute book. Section 5 was inserted with the sole object to provide the control of rent. It prohibits the recovery of rent in excess of standard rent. It in fact was inserted to protect the tenant from the landlord to claim excess rent than the standard rent fixed. Similarly it prohibits the landlord from charging premium or Pagri as consideration in order to let out his premises. The reading of Sub-section (3) of Section 5 which is reproduced as under shows that it prevents the tenant from exciting the situation for scarcity of accommodation. It prohibits the tenant or for that matter sub-tenant for claiming or receiving any payment in consideration of relinquishment, transfer or assignment of his tenancy. Such a claim or payment received as consideration alone would constitute an unlawful act.
SUB-SECTION3 of Section 5 :
'5.Unlawful charges not to be claimed or received ; (3) It shall not be lawful for the tenant or any other person acting or purporting to act on behalf of the tenant or a sub-tenant to claim or receive any payment in consideration of the relinquishment, transfer, or assignment of his tenancy or sub-tenancy, as the case may be, or any premises.
(8) The question for consideration is whether the words 'any payment in' as used under Sub-section 3 of Section 5 of the Act would mean cash payment. The word 'consideration' is preceded by the words 'any payment in'. Any payment has to be in cash or in the form of money paid by the landlord to the tent in order to allure him to relinquish his right in the tenancy. There is distinguishable feature between the consideration paid and relinquishing the right to claim arrears of rent or giving up the claim to receive actual rent. Giving up the claim by no stretch of imagination would amount to payment which is a precondition stipulated under Sub-section 3 of Section 5 of the Act. 'The dictionary meaning of the word 'Payment' mentioned in the Concise Oxford Dictionary stated for, '(i) the act or an instance ofpaying,(ii) anamountpaidand(iii) reward,recompense'.The word 'Pay' has been defined as, '(i) given, (ii) hand over the amount of'. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary describe the word 'Payment' as, (i) paying for work; (ii) money, etc. paid for work; (iii) something given in return. From the dictionary meaning of the word 'payment' it is clear that it is associated with actual payment to be made by the landlord to the tenant as part of the consideration. But the reading of para 3 of the application filed under Order 23 Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code and which is reproduced as under and which formed part of the order dated 6th March, 1995, show that the landlady did not pay anything by way of any consideration. She only voluntarily gave up the claim of arrears of rent due from respondent No. 2. That, to my mind, does not amount to any payment in consideration.
PARA3 of the Application : That the respondent is in arrears of rent from July, 1993. The petitioner agrees to forego the said rent and it is further agreed between the parties that the respondent shall not be responsible for the payment of rent prior or after the passing of the eviction order by this Hon'le Court.'
(9) Voluntarily giving up of rent cannot be treated at par with 'payment' as stipulated under Sub-section 3 of Section 5 of the Act.
(10) It is nobody's case that Smt. Arora made any payment to respondent No. 2. Giving up of rent due, to my mind, would not fit in the prohibition carved out under Section 5(3) of the Act. The intention of the Legislature was to prohibit by way of consideration any amount being paid by landlord to tenant for taking back the possession. But this waiving of or giving up the relief of recovery of rent by the landlord will not fall under the prohibition. Giving up the arrears of rent as part of compromise by no means can be called money paid as consideration. This view of mine can be supported by the following illustration, suppose a petition for eviction is filed by the landlord on two counts i.e. for non-payment of rent and on bonafide requirement. During the pendency of a petition the tenant induces the decree of eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement but wants to contest on the ground of non-payment of rent. The landlord Realizing that his need for the premises is urgent gives up the relief on the ground of non-payment of rent because that requires long drawn contest. In such an eventuality, it cannot be said that his giving up or relinquishing the second relief i.e. non payment of rent meant payment in consideration of the tenant incurring the decree of eviction. Present case is covered by such an eventuality whereby the facts show that the landlady needed the premises for her residence she gave up her relief of claiming arrears of rent. This, to my mind, would not take her case to the prohibition of Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the act nor would amount to payment. Giving up of a claim is not at par or on the same footing as payment in consideration.
(11) For the reasons stated above, I find no merits in the submissions made by the petitioner nor any illegality in the compromise order passed by this Court dated 6th March, 1995. Since the order of eviction was validly passed against a tenant it has to be binding on all persons occupying the premises.
(12) Mr. J.S. Arora appearing for the respondent took a preliminary objection regarding the locus standi of this petitioner to challenge the compromise order dated 6th March, 1995. Mr. Arora contended that since the compromise was between the landlady and the tenant, the present petitioner who was merely occupying the premises as an employee of the tenant has no locus standi to challenge the said compromise. If the petitioner could not be imp leaded as a party the he cannot challenge the agreement. To support his contention he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Mr. Alok P. Jain v. M. Sunita Narinder Ahuja, 1995 1 Ad Delhi 8 where this Court was also considering almost similar question i.e. the locus standi of a stranger to the proceedings. In that case the petition was filed against .the judgment and order of the lower Court who dismissed the application of the petitioner. That petitioner filed the revision petition against the dismissal. The question arose whether the applicant who was not party to the suit before the Trial Court could be imp leaded as a party in the revision petition Answering the question in negative this Court observed that the applicant being not a tenant in the disputed property, hence had no locus standi to be imp leaded as a party. The revision petition filed by him was dismissed. Relying on these observations, Mr. J.S. Arora contended that since the tenancy was in the name of M/s. Bharat Steel Tubes Ltd., respondent No. 2, of course for the residence of the present petitioner, but the present petitioner merely on the strength of occupancy of the premises cannot become a tenant of the respondent No. 1, thereforee, no locus standi to challenge the compromise arrived at between the tenant and the landlord. I find force in this submission of Mr. Arora. The petitioner has no locus standi to challenge validly arrived agreement between the landlady and the tenant. He is stranger to the tenancy agreement which was between the respondents 1 and 2. Hence has no locus standi to challenge their act. The order of evidence is binding on the petitioner in view of the provision of Section 25 of the Act. The petition is accordingly dismissed.