Judgment:
Usha Mehra, J.
(1) In this appeal the only short point taken by the appellant is that he had been denied the protection under Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (in short the Act). In order to appreciate the point, the brief facts of the case are that the respondent herein Filed an eviction petition against the predecessor in interest of the appellants, proprietor of M/s Subhash Electrical Works, on the ground of non-payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 80.00 per month payable w.e.f. 1st July, 1967 despite the notice of demand. It was the case of the respondent that after the demand notice, a cheque was issued by the appellant's father late Shri Om Prkash which on presentation was dishonoured.
(2) That during the pendency of the petition an interim order under Section 15(1) of the Act was passed on 1st October, 1974. By the said order appellant was directed to deposit the arrears of rent from 1st November, 1970 up to date within one month at the rate of Rs. 80.00 per month and subsequent rent was to be deposited month by month by' 15th of each succeeding month. The receipt was to be shown to the Court. When the appellant failed to comply that order passed under Section 15(1) of the Act, the respondent herein filed an application under Section 15(7) of the Act seeking striking out the defense of the appellant thereby alleging that the order had not been complied with. The appellant Filed the reply. Learned Additional Rent Controller (in short ARC) after hearing the arguments on the application under Section 15(7) passed an order vide order dated 29th April, 1975, thereby declined to strike out the defense of the appellant. He, in fact condoned the delay of deposit of the rent for the month of December, 1974. The learned Arc further held that the default was neither willful nor contumacious and, thereforee, did not find it fit to strike the defense. The application under Section 15(7) of the Act was accordingly dismissed on 29th April, 1975. Thereafter the evidence was recorded and heard on merits. Vide the impugned order decree of eviction against the appellant was passed.
(3) In this appeal the only grievance of the appellant is that while passing the order of eviction, protection or the benefit which he was entitled to under Section 14(2) of the Act had not been given.
(4) I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. Perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the learned Arc had not accorded the benefit under Section 14(2) of the Act. In almost identical facts this Court in Surain Singh Vs . Tuisi Ram Araun, : 1996(36)DRJ551 after analysing the principles of law and after considering various pronouncements of the Apex Court concluded that once the Arc condones the delay in deposit of rent then it was not longer open to the landlord to contend that the tenant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Act. In this case also while rejecting respondent/landlord's application under Section 15(7) of the Act, the learned Arc mentioned that the delay being of a day or two stood condoned. In this view of the matter, it becomes clear that there was no default in compliance of the order under section 15(1) of the Act and the default, if any, stood condoned. In such circumstances, to my mind, appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed to this extent that the eviction order passed Under Section 14(l)(a) of the Act is maintained. However, the appellant/tenant is granted the benefit under Section 14(2) of the Act.