Sat Pal, J.
(1) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 20th September, 1991 passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi whereby the learned Rent Control Tribunal upheld the order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 21.8.1991 in terms of which he allowed the application turn execution of eviction order filed by Shri Hans Raj, respondent (hereinafter referred to as landlord) and issued warrants of possession ignoring civil court's decree dated 10.10.90.
(2) Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the landlord let out the suit premises bearing flat No.20B, New Qutub Road, Delhi to the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the tenant). In the year 1962 the landlord filed an eviction petition against the tenant under Clause (b) of proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground of sub-letting. It was alleged in this petition that the tenant sublet, assigned or otherwise parted-with the possession of the suit premises to Kanwar Bhan, whose LRs are respondents No.2(a) to (c), (hereinafter referred to as the sub-tenant) without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord. This petition was dismissed by a learned Additional Rent Controller vide order dated 7th November, 1967 on the ground that the suit property belonged to the Government and as such the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the suit premises by virtue of Section 3 of the Act. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Additional Rent Controller, the landlord filed an appeal before the Kent Control Tribunal which was accepted vide orders dated 9th February, 1968 passed by the learned Rent Control Tribunal and an eviction order was passed under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. The tenant challenged the aforesaid order dated 9th February, 1968 passed by the Rent Control Tribunal in this Court in Sao 229/68. The said appeal was, however, dismissed by this Court on 8th December, 1972 and the eviction order was upheld.
(3) Since the suit premises which were situated in slum area and were covered under the provisions of Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (in short Slum Areas Act), the landlord filed an application under Section 19(1)(b) of the said Act on 5th February, 1973 for obtaining the permission from the competent authority. The application, however, was rejected by the competent authority vide orders dated 18th July, 1973 on the ground that the said application was not in accordance with the rules. Thereafter, the landlord filed a fresh application under the provisions of the slum Areas Act on 18.5.1979 which was contested by the tenant and finally the permission was granted by the competent authority on 24.11.86.
(4) On 15th April, 1987, the landlord tiled an application for execution of the order of eviction. Objections on behalf of the tenant were filed on 3rd October, 1987 in the execution proceedings. The main objection taken by the tenant was that the application for execution was time barred under Article 136 of the Limitation Act as the execution was being sought after the expiry of more than 12 years from the date of eviction order. The objections were dismissed by the executing court vide order dated 15.7.88 on the ground that in the present case, the decree became executable only after the permission was granted by the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act and as such the limitation would run from the date such permission was granted and not from the date of order of eviction. It may be, noted here that the tenant did not file any appeal against the aforesaid order dated 15.7.88.
(5) On 5th October, 1988 objections in the execution proceedings were filed by the sub-tenant also. The main objection of the sub-tenant was also similar to that of the tenant. He also contended that the application for execution was time barred as the execution was being sought after the expiry of more than 12 years from the date of passing of the eviction order. It was also contended, by the sub-tenant that no permission of the competent authority had been obtained to execute the decree against him and such decree could not be executed against him. The objections of the sub-tenant were, however, dismissed by the executing court vide order dated 25.11.89. The sub-tenant filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal against the said order dated 25.11.89 and the same was dismissed by the learned Rent Control Tribunal vide order dated 30th January, 1990. Against these orders, the sub-tenant filed an appeal bearing No.SAO 11/90 in this Court which was also dismissed on 21st March, 1990. Aggrieved by this order, the sub- tenant filed Special Leave Petition in the Hon'ble Supreme Court and notice on this petition was issued to the landlord on 2,4.90. After hearing learned counsel turn the parties, the Special Leave Petition was, however, dismissed on 30th July, 1990.
(6) During the pendency of the Special Leave Petition filed by the sub-tenant, the tenant filed a suit bearing No.89/90 in the Civil Court and in that suit he contended that the period of Limitation for executing the decree was 3 years as prescribed in Article 137 of Schedule to Limitation Act and Article 136 of the said schedule which prescribes a period of 12 years for execution of any decree would not apply to the eviction order passed by the Additional Rent Controller. On these grounds, the tenant prayed for a decree for declaration that the Rent Controller not being a Civil Court was not competent to execute an eviction order after the expiry of a period of three years. He also prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the landlord from executing the eviction order. The said suit came up for hearing before Shri R.S. Mahla, Sub-Judge on 6.4.1990 and the learned Sub-Judge granted ex-parte interim stay against the landlord restraining him from executing the eviction order. The suit was contested by the landlord and finally the suit was decreed by the Learned Sub-Judge on 10.10.90. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 10.10.90 passed by the Civil Court, the landlord filed an appeal which is pending before a learned Distt. Judge, Delhi.
(7) On 5th March, 1991. the landlord filed' an application in the execution proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller. In this application it was prayed that the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court on 10.10.90 was without jurisdiction and as such was a nullity and should be ignored. It was further prayed that the warrants of possession be issued. This application was allowed by the learned Additional Rent Controller vide order dated 31st August, 1991 .and the warrants of possession was issued. It was also ordered that a fresh letter be sent to the Distt. Judge for reference to Police Authorities for revalidation of the police aid. Against this order the tenant filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal which was dismissed by the learned Rent Control Tribunal vide orders dated 20.9.91. Aggrieved by this order, the tenant has filed the present appeal which was admitted on 23.10.91 and interim stay was granted in favor of the tenant.
(8) Mr. Swatantra Kumar, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant submitted that the decree passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller was not a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure and was, thereforee, governed, by Article 137 (Residuary Clause) of the Limitation Act, 1963. He submitted that the limitation under the said Article 137 was three years. He sub' mitted that the order of eviction was passed by the Rent Control Tribunal on 9.2.68 and in terms of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the landlord could file the application for obtaining permission of the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act within three years from the said order. Since the landlord filed the first application after the expiry of three years from the order of eviction, the order of eviction had become time barred and could not be executed. He further submitted that even the second application for obtaining approval of the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act was not tiled within three years from the date of rejection of the first application and on this ground also the eviction order had become time barred and could not be executed.
(9) Learned counsel further submitted that the order passed by the Additional Rent Controller or the Rent Control Tribunal was a decree of the Civil Court for the purpose of execution but was not a decree for all purposes. He, thereforee, contended that such an order was not a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure and as such the Article 136 of the Limitation Act was not applicable. Learned counsel also submitted that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to pass a decree for declaration to the effect that a particular eviction order had become unexecutable as the same was barred by limitation. He further submitted that the decree passed by the Civil Court in the present case was binding in the execution proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller and as such the orders passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller and learned Rent Control Tribunal were not sustainable and were liable to be set aside. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the case of The Kerala State Electnaty Board. Trivandrurn VS . T.P. Kunhaliumma, : [1977]1SCR996 and two judgments of this Court in the cases of Sohan Lal Lamba VS. Sarvshri S.L. Kapoor and A.L. Kapoor, 1969 Rcr 174 and Shri Jiatendra Kumar Agganml VS. Shri Lakshim Kant Mukt, 1974 Rcr 134.
(10) Mr. Arora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the landlord drew my attention to Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and relating to the execution of the decree were to be determined by the Court executing the decree and such questions could not be determined by a separate suit. He also drew my attention to Section 43 and Sub-Clauses (1) and (4) of Section 50 of the Act and submitted that in terms of these Sections, the Civil Court had got no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of the eviction of any tenant or to any other matter which the Controller was empowered by or under the Act except the question of title to any premises. He submitted that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether application for execution of the eviction order was barred by limitation. He, thereforee, contended that the judgment and decree dated 10.10.90 in S.No-89/90 passed by the learned Sub-Judge was a nullity and non-est. He further submitted that its invalidity could be setup in execution proceedings. He, thereforee, contended that the impugned orders of the learned Additional Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal ignoring the said decree were legal and valid. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunder Dass VS . Ram Parkash, : [1977]3SCR60 and a judgment rendered by a Full Bench of this Court reported in the case of K.C. Manchanda VS . M/s. Murree Brewery Co. Rawalpindi, : AIR1968Delhi167 .
(11) Learned counsel for the landlord further submitted that in the execution proceedings the tenant had filed objections on 3.10.87 and the same were dismissed by the executing court on 15.7.88 and no appeal was filed against the said order. He also submitted that sub-tenant had also filed the objections in thv execution proceedings on 5.10.80 which were dismissed on 25.11.89. Subsequently, the appeal filed by the sub-tenant against the order dated 25.11.89 was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal on 30.1.90 and second appeal of the sub-tenant was dismissed by this Court on 21.3.90 and the Special Leave petition filed by the sub-tenant was also dismissed on 30th July, 1990. He, thereforee, contended that the tenant and the sub-tenant were not entitled to raise the question of limitation with regard to the execution of the eviction order in the present appeal. In support of his contention he placed reliance on a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs . Mulamehand, : AIR1973MP293 .
(12) Learned counsel for the tenant further submitted that under Section 42 of the Act, an order made by the Rent Controller or an order based on appeal under the Act was executable by the Controller as a decree of Civil Court and as such Article 136 of the Limitation Act was applicable to such a decree. He, thereforee, submitted that the limitation for execution the decree in the present case was 12 years and not three years. He further submitted that since the order of eviction in the present case could be executed only after obtaining the permission from the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act, the limitation would run from the date when the said permission was granted by the competent authority. He submitted that in the present case admittedly the permission under the Slum Areas Act was granted by the competent authority on 24.11.86 and the application for execution was filed on 15.4.87. He also submitted that the landlord had taken steps to obtain the said permission within 12 years from the date of passing the eviction order. He, thereforee, contended that the application for execution of the landlord was within the limitation. In support of his contentions, learned counsel place reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kashi Rani Vs . Rakesh Arora, : [1987]3SCR1001 and two judgments of this Court in the cases of Shankar Lal VS . M/s. Shadi Ram Ram Swaroop & Ors. : 7(1971)DLT311 and Des Raj & Anr. VS. Noor Khan, Air 1985 Delhi 470.
(13) Mr. Gupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the LRs of the subtenant reiterated the submissions made by the learned counsel for the tenant, he also submitted that in the case of Kashi Ram (supra), the Supreme Court had not decided the point as to whether Article 136 was applicable to a decree under the Delhi Rent Control Act and the only point which was decided in that case was that since the landlord had not taken steps under the Slum Areas Act within 12 years, the eviction order had become time barred.
(14) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. Before examining the question as to whether in the present case, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the tenant for a declaration to the effect that the Rent Controller not being a Civil Court was not competent to execute an eviction order after the expiry of a period of three years and further whether the Civil Court could grant a permanent injunction restraining the landlord from executing the eviction order after expiry of three years from the date of the order, it will be relevant to refer to Section 47(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Sections 42, 43 and Sub-Sections (1), (4) of Section 50 of the Act which are reproduced hereinbelow :- Section 47(1) Cpc All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. Delhi Rent Control Act Section 42: Controller to exercise powers of civil court for execution of other orders:- Save as otherwise provided in Section 41, an order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under this Act shall be executable by the Controller as a decree of a Civil Court and for this purpose, the Controller shall have all the powers of a civil court. Finality of order:- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. Section 50 Jurisdiction of civil courts barred in respect of certain matters : (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so tar as it relates to the fixation of standard rent in relation to any premises to which this Act applies or to eviction of any tenant there from or to any other matter which the Controller is empowered by or under this Act to decide, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Controller under this Act shall be granted by any Civil Court or other authority. (4) Nothing in Sub-Section (1) shall be construed as preventing a civil court from entertaining any suit or proceeding for the decision of any question of title to any premises to which this Act applies or any qustion as to the person or persons who are entitled to receive the rent of such premises.
(15) In terms of Section 43 of the Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under the Act is final and cannot be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings. In terms of Section 50 of the Act Civil Court cannot entertain any suit or proceeding with regard to the eviction of any tenant or any other matter which the controller is empowered by or under the Act to decide and no injunction in respect of any action taken by the Controller under the Act can be granted by any Civil Court. The only exception to this, is found in Sub-Section (4) of Section 50, according to which the Civil Court can entertain a suit turn the decision of any question of title to any premises to which the Act applies or in question as to the person or persons who are entitled to receive the rent of such premises. Thus, it is clear that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for declaration that an eviction order after the expiry of period of limitation has become time barred and the Rent Controller is not competent to execute such an order as the same does not fall under the exception provided in Sub-Section (4) of Section 50 of the Act.
(16) Under Section 42 of the Act, an order passed by the Rent Controller or an order passed on appeal under the Act are executable by the controller as a decree of Civil Court and for this purpose the controller has all the powers of a Civil Court. In terms of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, and relating to the execution shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. Since the question as to whether an eviction order has become time barred after the expiry of limitation, relates to the execution, it has to be decided by the Rent Controller/Additional Rent Controller which has passed the eviction order and Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit with regard to this quesfion.
(17) In view of the aforesaid reasoning, the C'ivil Court lacked inherent jurisdiction in the present case and the judgment and decree dated 10.10.90 in S.No.89/90 is a nullity. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Sunder Das (supra) where 'the decree sought to be executed is a nullity turn lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court passing it, its invalidity can be setup in an execution proceeding. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The same view was taken up by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of K.C. Manchanda (supra). In view of this the learned Additional Rent Controller while passing order on 31.8.91 rightly ignored the decree dated 10.10.90 passed by Shri R.S. Mahla, Sub-Judge, Delhi. Since that decree was passed without jurisdiction and was a nullity, the impugned order passed by the learned Rent Control Tribunal upholding the order of the Additional Rent Controller is legal and valid.
(18) As stated hereinabove, the tenant on 3.10.87 had filed objections including the objection that the application for execution was barred by limitation and these objections were dismissed by the executing court on 15.7.88. Thereafter no appeal was filed on behalf of the tenant against the said order dated 15.7.88 and that order thus became final against the. tenant in execution proceedings. Similarly, the objections filed by the sub-tenant which also included the objection of the application for execution being time barred, were dismissed on 25.11.89 and further first as well as second appeal filed by the sub- tenant were dismissed on 30.1.90 and 21.3.90 respectively. Even the Special Leave Petition filed by the sub-tenant was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 30.7.90. In view of these facts the tenant and the sub-tenant cannot be permitted to urge in this appeal that eviction order passed by the Rent Control Tribunal on 9.2.68 has become time barred and could not be executed. In the present appeal the only question for consideration is as to whether the Civil Court which passed the decree on 10.10.90 in S.No-89/90 had jurisdiction or that court lacked jurisdiction. Since I have held that the Civil Court lacked inherent jurisdiction and the decree passed by that Court is a nullity, the question of limitation cannot be allowed to be raised in this appeal.
(19) Even assuming that the question of limitation could be raised in this appeal, I do not find any merit in the contortion urged by learned counsel for the tenant and the LRs of the sub-tenant. In terms of Section 42 of the Act, the order made by the Controller is executable by the Controller as a decree of Civil Court. Admittedly Article 136 of the Limitation Act applies to a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure. Since an order passed by the controller is executable as a decree of a Civil Court, the present case will be governed by Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and under that Article the limitation is 12 years. In the case of Kashiram (supra) the decree holder did not take any step for obtaining the permission under the Slum Areas Act within 12 years from the date of the decree and as such it was held that the execution of the decree became time barred. But in the present case the decree holder had filed both the applications for obtaining the permission of the competent authority before the expiry of 12 years from the date of the eviction' order and as such the execution of the eviction order was not time barred. Further the limitation in the present case will run from 24th November, 1986, the date on which permission was granted by the competent authority under the Slum Areas Act. The view I have taken finds full support from two judgments of this Court in the cases of Shankar Lal (supra) and Des Raj (supra).
(20) In view of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed and the interim stay shall stand vacated. The appellant shall also pay to the respondent No.1 costs which I quantify at Rs.3000.00 .
(21) Lower Court records be sent back forthwith.