Rajiv Shakdher, J.
CM No. 1723/1999
1. This is an application effectively under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 CPC filed by the Appellant for adducing additional evidence. The additional evidence which the Appellant seeks to produce are seven bills issued by Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, New Delhi. The bills span over a period commencing from 3.11.1988 to 9.9.1990. These bills are for various services rendered by the hospital to the Appellant herein; including two bills for laboratory and pathological facilities provided to the Appellant.
2. It is the case of the Appellant that these bills pertain to the treatment rendered to the Appellant during the period of his hospitalization and the expenses incurred by him.
3. The Appellant in the application has averred that due to the accident suffered by him he underwent physical and mental trauma which resulted in his inability to run his factory. The closure of the factory resulted in the bills in issue being misplaced. He further avers that these bills having been traced, he wishes to produce them in order to justify his claim of pecuniary damages suffered by him on account of actual expenses incurred by him towards his treatment by the hospital. He further avers in Paragraph 3 of the application that despite due diligence the said bills could not be traced and hence, were not produced before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as in short the 'tribunal').
4. The application is opposed by the Respondents primarily on the ground of unexplained delay in producing the said bills and lack of due diligence shown by the Appellant. He submits that the reasons given in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application do come within the scope of Order 47 Rule 27 to enable the Appellant at this late stage to place the evidence on record.
5. In order to dispose of the application certain facts need to be noted.
6. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Appellant met with an accident on 29.9.1988. The vehicle involved in this case being Bus No. DEP-8488 (hereinafter referred to as the 'offending vehicle') was owned by Respondent No. 1 and the same was driven by driver (i.e. Respondent No. 2) employed by Respondent No. 1.
7. As a result of the accident, the Appellant suffered grievous injuries. The Appellant has suffered a fracture of his right hip and knee.
8. On 11.1.1989 the Appellant instituted an action before the tribunal. The said action was registered as Petition No. 8/89.
9. The tribunal decided Petition No. 8/89 vide its judgment dated 01.12.1998. The tribunal in disposing of the petition framed the following issues:
1. Whether Bus No. DEP-8480 was involved in the accident as alleged.
2. Whether there is negligence on part of the R-2.
3. Whether any injury, as alleged, was caused to the petitioner.
4. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the compensation as claimed.
5. Relief.
10. The trial in this case concluded on 25.09.1988.
11. As regards Issue No. 1 the tribunal keeping in mind the testimonies of the Appellant and Respondent No. 2 and taking into account the site plan produced, came to the conclusion that the offending vehicle was involved in the accident, however, the attributability of fault was apportioned between the Appellant and the Respondents to the extent of 15 and 85% respectively.
12. In answering Issue No. 1, the tribunal found that there was no dispute that the Appellant had suffered injuries on account of the accident in question.
13. Insofar as the Appellant's claim for compensation is concerned, the tribunal noted in paragraph 4 of the judgment that under various heads a claim in the sum of Rs. 3,30,000/- Along with interest @ 12% had been made. The tribunal after due deliberation in Paragraph 15 of the judgment dated 01.12.1998 awarded a total compensation of Rs. 51,500/- under various heads to which a reference is made hereinafter. However, out of the sum of Rs. 51,500/- 15% of the amount was deducted on account of contributory negligence of the Appellant. Consequently, the Appellant was awarded a sum of Rs. 43,775/- which was rounded off to Rs. 44,000/-. However, in so far as the interest was concerned, the tribunal awarded interest @ 12% for a period of three years only w.e.f 1.12.1995; on the ground that the petitioner had been responsible for the delay in the prosecution of the case.
14. Aggrieved by the judgment of the tribunal, the Appellant has preferred the present Appeal before this Court under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to in as short as the 'Act') . The Appeal was filed on 10.5.1999 Along with an application for condensation of delay. The delay was condoned by this Court by an order dated 29.11.2000. Thereafter the Appeal was admitted by an order dated 22.5.2003.
15. At the time when the Appeal came up for hearing Mr.S.C.Sharma, learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that Along with the Appeal the present application under Order 41 Rule 27 had been filed for placing on record additional evidence for consideration by this Court. As noted above, the reasons for not being able to place the additional evidence before the tribunal is adverted to in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the said application.
16. Mr.S.C.Sharma, Advocate for the Appellant submits that in arriving at a full and fair compensation with respect to the injuries suffered by the Appellant it would be in the fitness of things that an opportunity be given to place the said additional evidence on record. He further submits that it would enable the Court to adjudicate the matter to its satisfaction and pass an appropriate order in respect of the claims made before the tribunal.
17. As against this, Mr.J.N.Aggarwal vehemently opposes the maintainability of the petition. As noted herein above, he submits that the reasons given in the application do not come within the ambit of Order 47 Rule 27 and hence, the said application is not maintainable. He submits that the application be dismissed in limine. In support of his submissions Mr.Aggarwal has also relied upon two judgments of the Supreme Court entitled Bassayya I.Mathad v. Rudrayya S.Mathad and Ors. reported in : AIR2008SC1108 & the other entitled Mahavir Singh and Ors. v. Naresh Chandra and Anr. reported in AIR 2001 SCC 134. Mr.Aggarwal, counsel for the Respondent has also placed reliance on a judgment of a single Judge of this Court entitled Vidya v. D.T.C and Anr. reported in 2008 (101) DRJ 112 for the purpose that medical compensation can only be given based on proof. Reliance was placed on observations of single Judge of this Court in the aforesaid case in Paragraph 9 of the judgment wherein; a reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lata Wadhwa's case reported in : (2001)IILLJ1559SC is made .
18. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the application filed by the Appellant deserves to be allowed for the following reasons:
i. the scheme of the Act seems to suggest that even though proceedings before the tribunal are often perceived as adversarial in nature, they are in fact inquisitorial. A reading of the statement of objects & reasons and the provisions of Section 158(6) of the Act read with Section 166(4) would show that the role of the tribunal is undoubtedly inquisitorial in nature. How the tribunal or court is to carry out its enquiry is best left to the tribunal or the court as always, bearing in mind however; that it shall be carried out within the four corners of the Act. The purpose being to quicken the pace of adjudication and burden the litigant's with as low a cost as possible. This, to my mind, is achievable if the procedural mine field is avoided while keeping in mind the principles of natural justice whereby; each side is given full opportunity to rebut the case of the other side. The concern of legislature is best reflected at times in the statement of Object and Reasons. The Motor Vehicles Act has been amended several times, however, the Statement of Objects and Reasons in the Amended Act 47 of 1982, and the Statement of Object & Reasons of the Act 54 of 1994 gives some clue as to the concerns of the Legislature. The relevant portion of the same read as follows:
Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amending Act 47 of 1982- There has been a rapid development of road transport during the past few years and a large increase in the number of motor vehicles on the road. The incidence of road accidents by motor vehicles has reached serious proportions. During the last three years, the number of road accidents per year on the average has been around 1.45 lakhs and of these the number of fatal accidents has been around 20,000 per year. The victims of these accidents are generally pedestrians belonging to the less affluent sections of society. The provisions of the Act as to compensation in respect of accidents can be availed of only in cases of accidents which can be proved to have taken place as a result of a wrongful act or negligence on the part of the owners or drivers of the vehicles concerned. Having regard to the nature of circumstances in which road accidents take place, in a number of cases, it is difficult to secure adequate evidence to prove negligence. Further, in what are known as 'hit-and-run' accidents, by reason of the identity of the vehicle involved in the accident not being known, the persons affected cannot prefer any claims for compensation. It is, thereforee, considered necessary to amend the Act suitably to secure strict enforcement of road safety measures and also to make, as a measure of social justice, suitable provisions first for compensation without proof of fault or negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the vehicle and, secondly, for compensation by way of solarium in cases in which the identity of the vehicle causing an accident is unknown. A number of suggestions have been received for amendment of the Act from the State Governments, Union territory administrations, representative organisations and other persons for making the provisions of the act more effective. The Law Commission of India, in its Fifty-first Report on Compensation for Injuries Caused by Automobiles in Hit-and-Run Cases, has made certain suggestions with respect to hit-and-run cases. The Law Commission has also made a number of suggestions in its Eighty-fifth Report on claims for compensation under Chapter VIII of the Act. The examination of these suggestions would take some time. The more important of these suggestions, which require to be implemented urgently, have been identified and it is proposed to give effect to the same through the present Bill.The Statement of Object and Reasons of Act 54 of 1994:
Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amending Act 54 of 1994-
(1) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988) consolidated and rationalised various laws regulating road transport. The Act came into force with effect from 1st July 1989 replacing the Motor Vehicles Act 1939.
(2) After coming into force of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, Government received a number of representations and suggestions from the State Governments, transport operators and members of public regarding the inconvenience faced by them because of the operation of some of the provisions of the 1988 Act. A review Committee was, therefore, constituted by the Government in March 1990 to examine and review the 1988 Act.
(3) The recommendations of the Review Committee were forwarded to the State Governments for comments and they generally agree with these recommendations. The Government also considered a large number of representations received, after finalisation of the Report of the Review Committee, from the transport operators and public for making amendments in the Act. The draft of the proposal based on the recommendations of the Review Committee and representations from the public were placed before the Transport Development Council for seeking their views in the matter. The important suggestions made by the Transport Development Council relate to, or are on account of -
(a) the introduction of newer type of vehicles and fast increasing number of both commercial and personal vehicles in the country;
(b) providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long-drawn procedure;
(c) ...
(d) ...
(e) ...
(f) ...
(g) ...enhancing penalties for traffic offenders.
19. Section 158 and Section 166 of the Act i.e. 1988 Act corresponds with Section 106 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. However, Sub section (4) of the Section 158 and Sub section (6) of the Section 166 were introduced only on 14.11.1994. The relevant part of these provisions reads as follows:
158. Production of certain certificates, license and permit in certain cases-.(6) As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy of made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and Insurer.166. Application for compensation.-...(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.
20. Mr. J N Aggarwal has submitted that the court could not take resort to Section 158(6) and Section 166(4) as these provisions were inserted only in 1994. This submission to mind is not tenable. The point to be noted is that before the tribunal closed the trial on 25.09.1998 the said sub-sections had already been incorporated in the Statute. The said provisions are procedural in nature. The action was pending in the tribunal at a point in time when the said provisions were introduced. As noted above, trial in the matter concluded on 25.09.1998. In these facts, the said provisions will apply. Hence, in my opinion what the trial court could have done had an application been moved before it the appeal court is also empowered to do, by taking recourse to the said provisions. In this regard the observation in the following cases are quoted with profit:
1.Attorney General v. Vernazza reported in 1960 (3) All ER 97 placetum F to G which read as follows:.Let me consider first the proceedings which the respondent himself has already instituted against other litigants. If the effect of the new Act is to prevent him from continuing those proceedings to their ultimate conclusion, then it may be said to be a 'retrospective' Act, at any rate in the sense in which Lord Blackburn once had occasion to use the word 'retrospective'. But whether this is a proper use of the word 'retrospective' or not in doubt. If the new Act affects the respondent's substantive rights, it will not be held to apply to proceedings which have already been commenced, unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested. See Colonial Sugar Refining Co v. Irving (6). But if the new Act affects matters of procedure only, then, prima facie, it applies to all actions pending as well as future; for, as Lord Blackburn said:
Alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be. See Gardner v. Lucas (7). The Court of Appeal seem to have thought that the new Act affects the respondent's substantive right to carry on his pending proceedings; and that it ought not to be given a retrospective operation. I cannot, I am afraid, share this view. The new Act does not prevent the respondent from continuing proceedings which it is proper for him to carry on. It only prevents him from continuing proceedings which are an abuse of the process of the court. It the proceedings are not an abuse and he has prima facie grounds for them, then he will be given leave to continue them. This is no interference with a substantive right. The courts of this country have an inherent power to 'prevent the abuse of legal machinery which would occur, if for no possible benefit the defendants are to be dragged through litigation which must be long & expensive'.
See Willies v. Earl Beauchamp (8), by Bowen, L. J.: and when the courts of this country exercise this power, they are not depriving a man of a vested right. They are only exercising a control over their own procedure. No man, let alone a vexations litigant, has a vested right to bring or continue proceedings which are an abuse of the process of the court.
21. Even if the new Act did not affect substantive rights, however, I think there are clear words in this Act which show that Parliament intended it to be retrospective. The Act empowers the High Court to make an order 'that any legal proceedings instituted by him in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without such leave.'
22. That Act was passed on May 14, 1959. Suppose the court made an order on the next day, May 15, 1959, following the very words of the statute, as Parliament clearly contemplated that it might. That order would clearly prohibit the continuance of proceedings already begun before the Act. Else it would have no effect. Just as during the war Acts were passed so as to enable penalties to be increased even after the offence was committed (9), so, here, this Act of 1959 was passed so as to prevent proceedings being continued which had already begun. To this extent the Act is retrospective. If the Attorney-General had made a fresh application to the High Court after May 15, 1959, he could undoubtedly have obtained an order prohibiting the respondent from continuing his pending litigation without the leave of the court.
23. But what about the Court of Appeal? The new Act was passed after the judgment of the High Court and before the hearing in the Court of Appeal. Can the Court of Appeal take the new Act into account and make an order under it or must it leave the Attorney- General to make a fresh application to the High Court? It is, of course, clear that, in the ordinary way, the Court of Appeal cannot take into account a statute which has been passed in the interval since the case was decided at first instance, because the rights of litigants are generally to be determined according to the law in force at the date of the earlier proceedings; see Re Debtor, Ex P. Debtor (No. 490 of 1935) (10) New Brunswick Ry Co v. British and French Trust Corpn. Ltd. (11). But it is different when the statute is retrospective either because it contains clear words to that effect or because it deals matters of procedure only; for then Parliament has shown an intention that the Act should operate on pending proceedings, and the Court of Appeal are entitled to give effect to this retrospective intent as well as a court of first instance;'
24. Anant Gopal Sheorey v. The State of Bombay reported at : 1958CriLJ1429 which read as follows:.(4) The question that arises for decision is whether to a pending prosecution the provisions of the amended Code have become applicable. There is no controversy on the general principles applicable to the case. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defense in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes on P.225; Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd v. Irving 1905 AC 369. In other words a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective.
(7) By Section 34 of the amending Act, Section 251 of the Code was substituted by two Sections i.e. 251 & 251A. Section 251 lays down the procedure in warrant cases. It provides:
Section 251 'In the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, the Magistrate Shall - (a) in any case instituted on a police report, follow the procedure specified in Section 251A; &
(b) in any other case, follow the procedure specified in the other provisions of this Chapter.
Sub clause (a) deals with the cases instituted on a police report and Sub clause (b) with other cases. To the former Section 251A is made applicable. Section 342A is in Chapter 24 and there is nothing in the amending Act or the amended Code which makes the provisions of S 342A inapplicable to criminal proceedings which are pending before a Magistrate and in which the recording of evidence has been commenced.
(8) In our opinion on the plain construction of the words used in Section 116 of the amending Act, Section 342A in available to the appellant. The High Court, it appears, was misled into construing the words in Clause (c) of Section 116 i.e. 'as if this Act had not been passed'. The High Court was thereforee in error and the appellant is entitled, in our view, as a competent witness for the defense to testify in disproof of the charges made against him or any other person charged together with him at the same trial.
25. The insertion of Sub-section (6) to Section 158 and Sub-section (4) to Section 166 only exemplifies what is already woven into the fabric of the Act. They merely, to my mind, delineate the role and the purpose for which the tribunal was conceived right from its inception. It thus, gives a clue as to the nature and the role that a tribunal ought to play with regard to adjudication of claims filed before it.
ii) The exception to the principle that a appellate court shall not permit a party to produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary are stated in Rule 27 of Order 41. The Sub rule 27 of Order 41 reads as follows:
(a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or
(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes the notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time of when the decree appealed against was passed, or
(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause.
26. The facts in this case clearly demonstrate that Sub rule 1 (a) is not applicable. What is required by this Court is to examine whether the facts which obtain in this matter would bring the Appellant's case within Sub rule 1 (aa) or 1 (b) or both. The reasons given in the application by the Appellant which is, that the grievous injury suffered in the accident had traumatic effect on him which led to closure of his factory and consequent, inability to trace the bills in issue would, to my mind, furnish enough reasons for me to allow the application; more particularly, there being nothing on record to disbelieve the averments made in the application supported by an affidavit. The respondent's bald denial cannot take the matter any further.
27. I shall now assume for the sake of argument that this is a case which does not fall within the ambit of Sub rule (1) (a), but surely it would in my view be open to the Court to take resort to Sub rule (1) (b) where while discharging its inquisitorial role, it is not in a position with the evidence available to pronounce a judgment to its 'satisfaction' keeping in mind that the attempt of the court is to give full and fair compensation. In my opinion, the present case presents such a situation.
28. In order to fully adjudicate the cases involving personal injury, the tribunal or the court is required to award the compensation broadly under two heads - pecuniary and non pecuniary damages. As regards the pecuniary damages, courts are required to asses the evidence with respect to expenses incurred or income lost as a result of the injury suffered both; in cases, where it results in a mortality or; disability - whether permanent or temporary. In the case of non pecuniary damages, there is necessarily a great deal of estimation involved. It is in this context that to my mind, when evidence in the form of bills is placed before the appellate Court, it would result in grave injustice to the claimant to refuse an opportunity to him to prove his claim to facilitate payment of full and fair compensation. The approach of the court in dealing with award of compensation for death or personal injury should be one which errs on the side of being liberal as otherwise; it would belie the adage that procedure is only a 'hand-maiden' of justice. Thus in my opinion, it is incumbent upon a court or the tribunal to enable the parties to place such evidence on record which would facilitate payment of full and fair compensation. In this regard, see observations in the case of Rattan Lal Mehta v. Rajinder Kapur and Ors. Reported in : 1996IAD(Delhi)552 etc.
29. The judgments cited by Shri J.N.Aggarwal are distinguishable. Insofar as the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Basayya I.Mathad v. Rudrayya S. Mathad and Ors. is concerned this was a case where the matter had come to the High Court in the second round and the High Court in second appeal under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code (in short CPC) had reversed its earlier finding of fact by placing reliance on a document which was placed before the High Court. The Supreme Court in this context discussed the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27. It is to be noted that while allowing the Appeal, the Supreme Court issued directions which appear in Paragraph 10 of the judgment. Amongst others one such direction is direction No. 5 whereby the Supreme Court directed as follows:.10 Though Mr. S N Bhat, learned Counsel for the respondents reiterated his earlier stand that the decision in RSA 105 of 1997 cannot be gone into in the absence of appeal against the same, in the light of our above-mentioned discussion, reasons thereon coupled with the infirmities pointed above and the earlier decision is not in terms of Section 100 as well as Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, we are unable to accept the said objection and pass the following order: 5. Both parties are at liberty to file appropriate petition, if they so desire, for production of any material as additional evidence subject to satisfying the conditions prescribed in Rule 27 of Order XLI CPC.
30. The other case cited by Sh J.N.Aggarwal is entitled Mahavir Singh and Ors. v. Naresh Chandra and Anr. reported in AIR 2001 SC 134. This was a case where the High Court interfered with the order of the Court below which had rejected an application under Order 41 Rule 27 for production of additional evidence while in exercising its power of revision under Section 115 of CPC. The discussion on the scope of Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 107(d) of CPC is detailed out in Paragraph 5 of the judgment. The ratio of the judgment is that; since the High Court was exercising its revisional jurisdiction it could not have applied the principle that the document was required to be admitted to enable the Court to pronounce a judgment. The Supreme Court observed that since the High Court was exercising revisional powers and the Appeal was not before it, the said principle could not have been invoked. In the instant case the entire appeal is before me and I am satisfied that the document in issue, if proved will facilitate adjudication of the claims in the appeal. In my view what is important is the following observations of the Supreme Court in the said case which read as under:.The expression 'to enable it to pronounce judgment' has been subject of several decisions including Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy : [1979]2SCR424 , wherein it was held that when the appellate Court finds itself unable to pronounce judgment owing to a lacuna or defect in the evidence as it stands, it may admit additional evidence. The ability to pro-nounce a judgment is to be understood as the ability to pronounce a judgment satisfactorily to the mind of Court delivering it. It is only a lacuna in the evidence that will empower the court to admit additional evidence (see The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lal Pancham : [1965]1SCR542 ) But a mere difficulty in coming to a decision is not sufficient for admission of evidence under this rule. The words 'or for any other substantial cause' must be read with the word 'requires' which is set out at the commencement of the provision, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the appellate Court requires additional evidence, that this rule would apply as noticed by the Privy Council in Kesowji Issur v. GIP Railway (supra). It is under these circumstances such a power could be exercised. thereforee, when the first appellate court did not find the necessity to allow the application, we fail to understand as to how the High Court could, in exercise of its power under Section 115 CPC could have interfered with such an order, particularly when the whole appeal is not before the Court. It is only requires such evidence to pronounce the judgment the necessity to adduce additional evidence would arise and not in any other circumstances. When the first appellate Court passed the order on the application filed under Order XLI, Rule 27, CPC, the whole appeal was before it and if the first appellate Court is satisfied that additional evidence was not required, we fail to understand as to how the High Court could interfere with such an order under Section 115 CPC. In this regard, we may notice the decision of this Court in Gurdev Singh v. Mehnga Ram : AIR1997SC3572 , in which the scope of exercise of power under Section 115, CPC on an order passed in an application filed under Order XLI, Rule 27, CPC was considered. When this decision was brushed aside by stating that the principle stated therein it not applicable to the facts of this case. We do not think so. The High Court ought not to have interfered with such an order.
31. The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court explain the expression 'to enable it to pronounce judgment' appearing in Order 47 Rule 27 CPC, would mean - the 'ability to pronounce a judgment satisfactory to the mind of the Court delivering it'.
32. As held by me above, to my mind, it would amount to great injustice if an opportunity is not given the appellant to place his evidence on record. The evidence in issue would enable this Court to pronounce a judgment which would satisfactorily dispose of the claim made by the Appellant.
33. The third authority cited by the learned Counsel for respondent in the matter entitled Vidya v. DTC and Anr. reported at 2008 (101) DRJ 112 does not favor the respondent. This was a case where the Court was dealing with the appeal finally. The judgment of this Court in Vidya v. DTC case does not deal with the issue involved in the disposal of the present application. The relevant observation in para 9 of the judgment pertained to award of compensation based on necessary proof. The judgment is distinguishable and has no relevance to the issue presently at hand.
34. Having given the Appellant an opportunity to place its evidence on record I must also give an opportunity to the respondent to rebut the genuineness of the documents sought to be placed on record. This, according to me, would sub-serve the interest of justice and the interest of parties before me. In the circumstances, I direct the tribunal to permit the Appellant to prove the genuineness of the bills in issue; the details of which are given hereinbelow:
Dated Amount (Rs.)16.12.1988 11576 09.09.1990 6641 03.11.1988 48651 08.09.1990 7600 04.09.1990 45 05.09.1990 20
35. Both counsels agree that the best course in the circumstances would be that the counsel for the Appellant be allowed to file certified copies of the original bills filed with the application.
36. Given the fact that this is an old matter, the tribunal is requested to expedite the exercise and complete the same preferably within a period of (twelve) 12 weeks from today. The parties and their counsels are directed to appear before the tribunal on 26.05.2008.