S.N. Kapoor, J.
1. This appeal is result of an unusual situation in the sense that while respondent wife, Meena Kumari, sought divorce from the respondent Man Mohan Vaid on the ground of cruelty and desertion under Sections 13(1)(i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called 'the Act' for short), and divorce decree was granted in her favor the appellant Man Mohan Vaid seeks a declaration to the effect that no valid marriage has ever taken place, and as such question of divorce would not arise. Man Mohan vaid appellant by this appeal intends to seek relief in criminal appeal.
2. According to Smt. Meena Kumari, she was married to Shri Man Mohan Vaid, the respondent according to Hindu-Sikh rites and ceremonies at Gurudwara Singh Sabha, Shankar Vihar, Vikas Marg, Delhi, on 25.11.1990. It was an outcome of a prolonged love affair for both awaited approval of their respective parents. But ultimately they married against the wishes of their parents, but with the approval of other elders. After marriage the parties lived at the house of maternal uncle of Man Mohan Vaid. Shri Jai Kishan. Everything went smoothly for a month. But after a month Manmohan Vaid started ill-treating her and even leveled false allegations against her due to the influence of his father and sister, for the father and sister of Man Mohan Vaid were not happy because of insufficient dowry. The respondent started demanding VCR, Colour T.V., refrigerator, etc. at their instance. When the appellant failed to ask her parents and maternal uncles to give these articles, she was beaten mercilessly on 1.1.1991. It caused a mental shock. On 28.4.1991 father and sister of the respondent came to his maternal uncle's house where the parties were residing and asked him (Man Mohan Vaid) as to why he did not kick her out of the house when she had not brought the articles of dowry as demanded by them. The respondent also responded to the instructions of his father by slapping her and abusing her and pulledher hair lock and dragged her out of the gate of the house. Father of the respondent told him to desert her if she did not fulfill the demands of dowry. On 3.5.1991 the appellant, his father and sister compelled the respondent to write a note as dictated by them and got the note signed by her. She was beaten up thereafter mercilessly and the respondent herself dropped her near her father's house. The requests made by the father of the respondent in June, 1991 to allow her to join her matrimonial home were flatly rejected. She filed a compliant with the police against the respondent under Sections 498A/406, IPC. She had not condoned the acts of cruelty and desertion.
3. The appellant Man Mohan Vaid on the other hand in his written statement denied the factum of marriage. According to the appellant, he was never married with the respondent. He also claimed that all the allegations leveled in the petition against him were false and the present petition and the criminal case filed against him were the result of conspiracy between the respondent her maternal uncle and her parents.
4. On pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues:
'(i) Whether the petitioner was married to the respondent on 25.11.1990 at Gurudwara Guru Singh Sabha, Shankar Vihar, Vikas Marg, Delhi-92, according to Hindu rites and ceremonies. If so, its effect?
(ii) Whether the respondent treated the petitioner with cruelty as alleged in the petition. If so, its effect?
(iii) Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner without reasonable excuse. If so, its effect?
(iv) Relief.'
5. The learned Trial Court held that Manmohan Vaid was married to Meena Kumari on 25.11.1990 at Gurudwara Guru Singh Sabha and the marriage was valid in the eyes of law. The learned Trial Court also took the view that the acts and omissions of the appellant amounted to grievous form of cruelty. The learned Trial Court also held that the appellant had deserted the respondent. Period of two years had expired at the time when this petition was presented. Thus, the learned Trial Court dissolved the marriage under Section 13(1)(i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, by granting a decree of divorce.
6. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid decree of divorce, the present appeal has been filed by the appellant-husband.
7. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the marriage was a fraud and no marriage did take place. There was no convincing evidence on record relating to alleged cruelty, except the self-serving statements about the demands and beatings, etc. In absence of marriage the question of desertion would not arise and thus, the findings of the learned Trial Court were neither based on correct facts nor based on the application of correct law.
8. I have heard learned Counsels for the parties and gone through the record.
9. Before proceeding further, it would be desirable to take note of definition of the terms Hindu as given in Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act, which reads as under:
'2(3). The expression 'Hindu' in any of this Act shall be construed as if it included a person who, though not a Hindu by religion, is, nevertheless, a person to whom this Act applies by virtue of the provisions contained in this section.'
10. Insofar as the question of marriage is concerned, the respondent in her statement claimed that on 25th November, 1990 her marriage was solemnized with the appellant at Gurudwara Guru Singh Sabha, Delhi, according to Hindu/Sikh rites and customs. About 15 to 20 relations of the parties, including their maternal uncles and aunts and a few children attended their marriage. She claimed that she had taken 'fears' around sacred Holy Guru Granth Saheb, exchanged garlands and offered 'ardas' and blessings were given by their relations at the time of solemnization of marriage. She also proved on record the photographs of the marriage Ex. PW1/ 10 to Ex. PW 1/18.
11. PW 1, Jai Kishan Vaswani, also stated that he did 'Kanya Daan' in the marriage between the parties, for the parents of the parties were not agreeable as it was a love marriage. He proved the photographs of the marriage as Ex. PW 1/10 to PW 1/18; identified the relations of the parties and the Granthi, who solemnized the marriage in the photographs. He testified that the marriage was solemnized according to Sikh rites, including the four 'fears'.
12. PW 3, Bansi Lal, stated that his brother-in-law had informed him that the marriage between the parties was to be solemnized in Gurudwara about 8 to 10 days before the marriage. Evidence and statement of the appellant.....
13. PW 4, Madan Prakash Sharma, the photographer, stated that he took the photographs when the marriage was being solemnized. He exhausted two rolls of film. He proved the negatives of the photographs as Ex. PW 4/10 to Ex. PW 4/61. He contended that both the parties being Hindus, their marriage could not have been performed according to Sikh rites and customs and there was no occasion for them to go to Gurudwara Guru Singh Sabha for solemnization of marriage as 'Anand Kara]' ceremony.
14. It need not be said that the term 'Hindu' includes a Virshaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj, a Buddhist, Jain or Sikh and it just excludes Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew. It is not the case here that any of the parties is a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion. Consequently, the term 'Hindu' embraces both the parties, irrespective of the fact that whether they follow the tenets of Sikhism, Jainism or Buddhism or Virshaiva or Lingayat or a follower of Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj.
15. Now, let us see the requirements of Sections 5 and 7 of the Act, which read as under:
'5. Conditions for a Hindu marriage.--A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfillled, namely-
(i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage;
(ii) at the time of marriage, neither party,
(a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or
(b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or
(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity;
(iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of [twenty-one years] and the bride, the age of [eighteen years] at the time of marriage;
(iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two;
(v) the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two;
[***]
7. Ceremonies for a Hindu marriage.--(1) A Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party thereto.
(2) Where such rites and ceremonies include the saptpadi (that is, the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire), the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken.'
16. As regards the conditions for a Hindu marriage under Section 5 of the Act, none of the parties claims that any of these conditions has not been fulfillled, As regards ceremonies required under Section 7 of the Act, a Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies 'of either party thereto and where such rites and ceremonies include the saptpadi that is, taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride before the sacred fire, the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken.'
17. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. V.M. Issar is that the marriage has not been solemnized 'in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party thereto', for none of them was Sikh and it was not a customary right for either of them to perform marriage according to Anand Karaj rites. The parties being Hindus saptpadi must have been performed before the sacred fire for completion of the marriage as regular marriage.
18. In support of his contention learned Counsel for the appellant referred to the case of Mousumi Chakraborty v. Subrata Guha Roy 2 (1991) DMC 74 . In that case, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed as under;
'12... ...The registration is not the sole proof of marriage in order to become a valid marriage. Section 7 of the said Act provides that the validity of a marriage will depend on observance of 'customary rites and ceremonies'. The expression 'customary rites and ceremonies' means such Shastric ceremonies, which the caste or community to which party belongs is customarily following. Customary rites and ceremonies to be accepted must be shown to have been followed definitely as an essence of marriage ceremony from ancient times and recognised such ceremonies as obligatory. Two essential ceremonies to the validity of a marriage are (a) Invocation before the sacred fire and (b) saptapadi. Absence of these essential ceremonies invalidates the marriage. In our view; two ceremonies essential to the validity of a marriage, as stated above, have to be proved and that where the factum of marriage is disputed essential ceremonies constituting the marriage must have to be pleaded and proved. Evidence regarding the performance of marriage according to Hindu rites must be brought on record to show that there had been a valid marriage
21. The Supreme Court in the case of Bhaurao Shankar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in : 1965CriLJ544 , held that under the Hindu Marriage Act the word 'marriage' must be solemnized, means in connection with a marriage to celebrate a marriage with proper ceremony with due form. It was also held in that case that there are two ceremonies essential to the validity of a marriage viz. Invocation of the sacred fire and saptabadi, that is taking seven steps by the bridegroom and groom jointly before the sacred fire. Admittedly, in the instant case there was no marriage celebrated with proper ceremony and with due form.'
19. It is contended that since none of them was Sikh, the marriage could not have been performed by Anand Karaj ceremony. It is not the case that the saptpadi took place in front of sacred fire.
20. Learned Counsel for the appellant and also referred to other cases as Ravinder Kumar v. Kamal Kanta 1975 R L R 347, in support of the contention that Sikh religion which permits the Anand Karaj form of marriage is treated by the Act as distinct from the Hindu religion which does not recognise as valid any marriage ceremony wherein the datta homam and saptpadi are not performed. In that case it was not even pleaded that even though both the parties were Hindus by religion, either of them cold be married according to custom in the Anand Karaj form which only the Sikhs normally recognise. The Court also took the view that tenets of each religion have to be kept in view so that a marriage would be valid only if the ceremony through which it is solemnized is sanctioned by the religion of either party as a customary ceremony.
21. Daya Wanti and Ors. v. The State of Haryana 1979 M L R(P&H;) 158, was a case under Section 494, IPC and in that case it was held that 'if the parties who belonged to Hindu faith entered into a marriage by means of Anand Karaj, the ceremony prescribed for a Sikh marriage, the parties cannot be regarded as husband and wife if the marriage is not valid marriage according to law applicable to the parties and it was no marriage in the eyes of law'.
22. Another case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant in Darshan Singh v. The State of Punjab 1 (1982) DMC 160 , and it also related to the question of bigamy and the sentence related thereto and the same view was followed.
23. Davinder Kaur v. Santokh Singh and Anr. 1992 (2) A I H R (P& H) 224, was a criminal case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant. Again the same view was followed.
24. Learned Counsel for the appellant also relied upon Surjit Kaur v. Garja Singh and Ors., : AIR1994SC135 . In that case the ceremonies were not proved and the following observations were made in para 13 of the judgment (pg. 137):
'Prima facie, the expression 'whoever.....marries' must mean 'whoever .... marries validly' or 'woever...... marries and whose marriage is a valid one'. If the marriage is not a valid one, according to the law applicable to the parties, no question of its being void by reason of its taking place during the life of the husband or wife of the person marrying arises. If the marriage is not a valid marriage, it is no marriage in the eye of law. The bare fact of a man and a woman living as husband and wife does not, at any rate, normally give them the status of husband and wife even though they may hold themselves out before society as husband and wife and the society treats them as husband and wife.'
25. Insofar as the judgment in Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh AIR 1971 SC 1153, is concerned it was again a criminal case relating to an offence under Section 494, IPC wherein it was held that the 'proof of solemnization of second marriage in accordance with essential religious rites applicable to parties is a must for conviction for bigamy and mere admission by accused that he had contracted second marriage was not enough.'
26. The learned Counsel for the appellant also relied upon Darshan Kumar and Ors. v. State of Haryana . That mater also related to criminal case under Section 498A read with Section 34, IPC and the evidence of the father and the bride was not accepted for there were variations.
27. In this regard the contention of the other side is two-fold. Firstly, that once the fact of celebration of marriage is proved the Court shall presume everything necessary to validate the marriage including performance of essential ceremonies (See Veerappa v. Michael AIR 1963 SC 983 .
28. In Sridhar Dey v. Kalpana Dey, : AIR1987Cal213 , a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court took the view that unless the legality of the marriage is disputed on the specific ground of non-performance of essential ceremonies, a party proving the factum of marriage need not specifically prove further that all the ceremonies necessary to validate the marriage were also performed and in such a case, on the proof of the factum of marriage, a Court shall presume performance of all essential ceremonies by relying upon a judgment of the. Privy Council in Mauji Lal v. Chandrabati (1911) 38 Cal. 700, and Veerappa v. Michael : AIR1963SC933 . It also took the view that a presumption of this sort in favor of marriage would only be negatived by disproving every reasonable possibility, It was reiterated on the basis of the two earlier judgments in Brindaban Chandra v. Chandra 1885 12 Cal. 140 and in Lopez v. Lopez 1885 12 Cal. 706 , of Calcutta High Court 'that in suits for restitution of conjugal rights, once the fact of celebration of a marriage is proved, the Court shall presume everything necessary to validate the marriage including the performance of essential ceremonies'.
29. As regards distinct and different standards of proof in Civil and Criminal matter, in Sridhar Dey v. Kalpana Dey (supra), after mentioning that Bhaurao's case (supra), was a criminal matter, it was laid down that the standards of proof in Civil and Criminal matter are materially different and while preponderance of probability is good enough for a decision in civil jurisdiction, in a criminal trial affecting liberties of the citizen, the offence charged must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The Calcutta High Court relied upon N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, : [1975]3SCR967 , where it was ruled that 'the civil standard of proof of preponderance of probabilities, and not the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, applies to matrimonial proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act and that it would be wrong to import criminal standard in trials of a purely civil nature'. In Kanwal Ram v. Himachal Pradesh Administration, : 1966CriLJ472 and Priya Bala v. Suresh Chandra AIR 1971 SC 1153, the distinction has been scrupulously maintained and in both the cases even admission of marriage, which is sufficient to prove marriage for civil matrimonial disputes had been ruled to be not sufficient to prove marriage in prosecutions for bigamy or adultery. It was held in Sridhar Dey v. Kalpana Dey's case that the requirements of criminal prosecution as to the positive proof of essential ceremonies as laid down in Bhaurao; Kanwal Ram and Priya Bala (supra), could not be imported in a civil proceeding for restitution of conjugal rights unless the performance of those ceremonies is specifically disputed. Ultimately it was observed in Sridhar Dey v. Kalpana Dey that once the factum of marriage is proved, everything necessary to validate such marriage, including the observation of essential ceremonies, shall be presumed, particularly in a case like the one at hand where either in the pleadings or in the evidence on the ground of non-performance of necessary ceremonies or otherwise for there was absolutely no cross-examination whatsoever of any of the witnesses on the evidence on these points.
30. In Guru Charan Behara and Ors. v. Adikanda Behara and Ors., : AIR1972Ori38 , the Single Judge of Orissa High Court following Mauji Lal v. Musammat Chandrabati Kumari 38 Ind. App. 122 , and Veerappa Chettiar v. Michael, : AIR1963SC933 , took the view that insofar as the ceremonies for marriage under Section 7 of the Act are concerned their performance will be presumed if the factum of marriage is established.
31. In Rajdei v. Lautan 1980 All. 169, Allahabad High Court also noted distinction between two different standards of proof in civil and criminal matter after referring to Bhaurao's case (supra). It was further held that it was not the law that performance of saptpadi must be proved in every case.
32. From the above conspectus of law few propositions arise. Firstly, that there are distinct and different standards of proof for the civil and criminal matters and the standard of proof beyond any reasonable shadow of doubt, would not apply in civil matters; and in civil matters the preponderance of probability in favor of marriage would be sufficient to hold that all ceremonies were performed. Secondly, in such a matter it is to be presumed that all essential ceremonies have been performed unless and until the opposite party claims specifically that particular ceremony was not performed while the factum of marriage and performance of certain ceremonies are virtually evident in view of the statement of the appellant and the respondent recorded in Court and the photographs on record read with the evidence led by the appellant. In may be mentioned that the statement of the appellant before the learned Trial Court as well as this Court does not inspire requisite confidence to accept and to act on his testimony in view of wavering nature of these statements.
33. There is another facet in this regard. Supposing, for the sake of arguments it is accepted that the ceremonies have not been proved and there is a presumption in favor of ceremonies having taken place, the question would always be: 'What shall be the impact of non-performance of ceremonies? Insofar as the criminal matters are concerned, it is essential that all the ceremonies must be proved beyond any reasonable shadow of doubt while it is not so in civil cases. But it is not so in civil matters.
34. In this connection, it is further notable that Sections 10 and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act lay down the provisions which provide ground for declaring a marriage null and void or voidable. It is notable that marriage is required to be held void under Section 11 of the Act in case (i) either of the parties had a spouse living at the time of marriage; or (ii) the parties are within the degrees of prohibited relationship; or (iii) if they are sapindas of each other, i.e. in contravention of conditions specified in Clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5. A marriage could be held voidable if there was consent given in contravention of condition specified in Clause (ii) of Section 5. If the Legislators thought that a marriage in absence of appropriate ceremonies was void or voidable then there could have been a provision either in Section 11 or Section 12 to make the marriage void or voidable with specific reference to ceremonies mentioned in Section 7 of the Act also. Since this is not so, it is a definite omission and it is a pointer indicating that legislative intent was otherwise. This was probably so on account of the fact that the villagers as well as the Pandits in the countryside may not be very well versed in performing Vedic rituals and saptpadi or appropriate form of homam. Would it be possible to accept a proposition in such a circumstance to say that if a Hindu performs a marriage according to Anand Karaj rights it would be illegal, and not a valid marriage? One has to keep in mind again the different standards of of proof in civil and criminal matters. In criminal matters since liberty of an individual is involved one has to say --Yes, unless and until all requisite ceremonies are stated and proved it would not be possible to accept that the marriage has been proved for the purpose of a criminal trial to deprive an individual of his personal liberty. But the same standard cannot be applied to a civil matter where preponderant of a probability is the rule. One has to look into the matter by considering Section 17 which specifically refers to punishment for bigamy and one has to apply the requisite standards of proof seeing the nature of the case: criminal and civil.
35. Seeing the photographs and the conduct of the living of the appellant at the house of maternal uncle along with the respondent it is virtually a conduct which amounted to admission of marriage. This conduct cannot be ignored and, thereforee, for the purpose of Hindu Marriage Act, it has to be held that there was a valid marriage between the appellant and the respondent. One could also not ignore the certificate issued by Sindhi Panchayat, Malviya Nagar and Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee which were placed on record. A certificate issued by Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee shows that any Sehjdhari family having full faith in Sahib Guru Granth Saheb Maharaj and Ten Sikh Guru Sahibans and whose marriage has been solemnized in any Gurudwara Saheb -- according to rules of the Committee that marriage ceremony would be valid marriage. As regards the alleged non-performance of saptpadi, firstly it shall be presumed in the circumstances in the shape of lavan fears and secondly non-performance by itself would not be sufficient to declare marriage invalid/void or voidable.
36. One could also not be oblivious to the fact that in cross-examination of the respondent it was suggested by the appellant that their marriage was solemnized because they had a love affair from 1986 to 1990 and this suggestion was admitted to be correct by the appellant. But, in his own statement he denied the love affair. The appellant admitted the photographs Ex. PW 2/1 indicating that the petitioner was being blessed by their maternal uncles. The question of blessing would not have arisen in case no marriage was solemnized. The presence of the parties in Gurudwara had not been denied. It is preposterous to think and accept the submission that on 25th November, 1990 the respondent had been drugged before the alleged marriage was performed. Had it been so, his own maternal uncles and aunts would not have been present at Gurudwara at that time and that too against the wishes of father of the appellant. No complaint was ever made about drugging. Granthi of Gurudwara would not himself have solemnized the marriage if the respondent was not fully conscious. As regards the commission about the tension, when parents of both the parties had not approved this marriage and only maternal uncles of both the sides had approved it, then one could imagine that the parents of both could cause disturbance by coming all of a sudden and creating a scene. The learned Trial Judge has noted the demeanour of the appellant and the respondent and this Court has also noted his demeanour. He could go to any extent. In view of the aforesaid discussion the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that no valid marriage had taken place between the parties on 25th November, 1990 at Gurudwara Guru Singh Sabha has to be rejected.
37. Now, coming to the second limb cruelty, the respondent-wife stated on oath that just after a month of her marriage, father and sister of the respondent started instigating the respondent to ill-treat her, in case demands of VCR, Colour TV, etc. was not fulfillled. Since she could not fulfill their demands he abused arid threatened her and beat her mercilessly and threatened that she would be thrown out of the matrimonial home. She also stated that on 1st January, 1991 she was beaten up by the respondent. She also stated that she was insulted by him and even locked in the room, in addition to levelling the allegations that she had no character. She claimed that father and sister of the appellant tortured her both mentally as well as physically on 1st January, 1991 and 28th April, 1991. She also stated that they asked the appellant that if she did not fulfill their demands of dowry she should be thrown out of the house. On 3rd May, 1991 father and sister of the appellant came in evening and told her that she would not be kept in the house. She was beaten up and the appellant compelled her to write a note on a piece of paper and finally dropped her near the house of her father. A simple question arises whether any self-respecting wife would reasonably be asked to put up with such a conduct and continue to live with the other party? If it is so, in the light of the judgment in V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, : AIR1994SC710 , it would amount to mental cruelty. Nor, it can be accepted that the course of conduct adopted by the appellant was one which did not adversely affect the respondent as has been held in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddy, : [1988]1SCR1010 .
38. It may further be added that Supreme Court in the case of G.V.N. Kameshwar Rao v. G. Jabilli, : [2002]1SCR153 , (after referring to N.G. Dastan v. S. Dastane, : [1975]3SCR967 ); S. Hanumantha Rao v. S. Ramani : [1999]2SCR296 :(1999) 3 SCC as under :
'........it is not necessary to prove that the nature of the cruelty is such as to cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful for the petitioner to live with the other party.'
39. It was further observed as under :
'A degree of cruelty which involves conduct of such a nature as to have caused damage to life, limb or health or to give rise to reasonable apprehension of such danger is thereforee not required to be proved by the petitioner for obtaining a decree for divorce. Cruelty can be said to be an act committed with the intention to cause suffering to the opposite party. Austerity of temper, rudeness of language, occasional outburst of anger, may not amount to cruelty, though it may amount to misconduct............. Having regard to the sanctity and importance of marriage in a community life, the Court should consider whether the conduct of the counter-petitioner is such that it has become intolerable for the petitioner to suffer any longer and to live together is impossible, and then only the Court can find that there is cruelty on the part of the counter-petitioner. This is to be judged not from a solitary incident, but on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances.'
40. As is evident from the above discussion it was a love marriage performed against the wishes of the parents of both the sides in the presence of maternal uncles. It is also apparent that the appellant at first was so much infatuated that he did not bother about the sentiments of his father and sister, etc. and entered into inter-caste marriage. He failed not only to protect the respondent-wife against the humiliations and mental torture caused by the father and sister, but he himself was guilty of beating and humiliating her and demanding dowry, not once but several times on several dates as has been stated hereinabove.
41. Firstly, marrying a person persuading her to marry by going against the wishes of her parents and thereafter humiliating her by denying the marriage; by demanding dowry by joining hands is humiliating and causing both mental and physical torture to a wife after a love marriage, could be nothing else but mental cruelty. The loss of reputation is immense in the society to which both of them belong, their educational level and the environment in which they lived. The respondent had suffered a traumatic experience by not only non-protection but non-cooperating, assisting in humiliation and in physical and mental torture by his own father and sister and himself causing a similar humiliation and mental and physical torture for the purpose of demanding dowry, indicated that his acts fell squarely in the expression of cruelty. It was mental as well as physical cruelty. It is very much evident that a person who denied marriage after a month at the behest of his father and sister and thrown the respondent out of the house had no intention to continue with the marriage and deserted the respondent. That is the reason that the entire insistence of learned Counsel for the appellant was attacking the marriage and not on defending the allegations about cruelty and desertion.
42. If seen in this light and in the light of the evidence on record, it is evident that the learned Trial Court was absolutely justified in taking the view that the appellant was guilty of cruelty. Nothing more is required to uphold the view taken by the learned Trial Court.
43. In the aforementioned circumstances, in view of the distinct and different standards of proofs in criminal and civil matters and the aforesaid circumstances stated hereinabove along with the above said legal position, this Court does not find any force in this appeal. It is made clear that this Court is not deciding the criminal appeal to apply the standards of a criminal trial to prove the things beyond all shadow of reasonable doubts and, thereforee, unable to accept the contention of the appellant and reject the same. The appeal having no force is dismissed.
44. Parties are left to bear their own costs.