Judgment:
Ajit Prakash Shah, C.J.
1. This appeal is placed before this bench in view of the reference made by the Division Bench. The appeal arises from an order of the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition summarily on the ground that significant part of the cause of action could not be said to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court merely because the order under challenge had been passed by the Appellate Authority located within its territorial jurisdiction when the events leading to the filing of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority and the parties to such proceedings are located outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The learned single Judge relying on various judgments including Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise : 2007(213)ELT323(SC) , Bombay Snuff (P) Ltd. v. Union of India : 2006(194)ELT264(Del) , Rajkumar Shivhare v. Assistant Director of Enforcement, Mumbai 154 (2008) DLT 28 and West Coast Ingots (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi : 2007(209)ELT343(Del) held that going by the strict provisions of Clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the petition, however, the basic issue was whether this Court really was the most appropriate Forum to decide the present petition considering that the significant part of the cause of action imperative for the effective settlement of disputes had not arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. The learned single Judge further held that any stand taken by him to the contrary would lie in the teeth of the consistent and settled approach adopted by the Supreme Court as well as this Court in various judgments referred to above.
2. When this matter came up for hearing before the Division Bench it was sought to be urged on behalf of the appellant that the view taken by the single Judge runs counter to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal : [1976]1SCR505 and Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India : 2004(186)ELT3(SC) . It was also contended that the decisions in Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra) and Bombay Snuff (P) Ltd. v Union of India and Ors. (supra) relied upon by the learned single Judge dealt with statutory appeals and the law as laid down therein could not be applied to a writ petition where the jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A contention was also raised that the order of the original authority merged in the order of the Appellate Authority and thus the courts in Andhra Pradesh could have no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, which challenged the order of the Appellate Authority located in Delhi. In this regard, reference was made to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Kishore Rungta and Ors. v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. : 2003(151)ELT502(Bom) and the decision of this Court in Indian Institute of Technology v. P.C. Jain and Ors. : 45(1991)DLT42 . Further relying on Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. UOI : [1961]2SCR828 , it was urged that in any case the writ petition was maintainable in Delhi under Article 226(1) of the Constitution of India as the seat of the Appellate Authority was in Delhi. The Division Bench felt that the issue of jurisdiction is of considerable importance and since correctness of several dicta of the Division Benches of this Court was questioned, deemed it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger bench.
3. We, therefore, proceed to deal with the limited question of jurisdiction. We are at present not concerned with merits of the disputes between the parties, for the matter has not yet been heard on merits. It is, therefore, not necessary to set out the facts in detail. It is, however, necessary to examine the scope and nature of proceedings before the Appellate Authority, which led to the filing of the petition in this Court.
FACTS
4. The respondent No. 3 purchased certain fire policies from the appellant for insuring the stock of Red Sanders Wood in its godown located at Andhra Pradesh. On 29.6.1996, an accidental fire broke out at the said premises. On account of the alleged loss suffered due to the accidental fire, a claim for damages to the tune of Rs. 40.17 crores was preferred by the respondent No. 3 against the appellant. This claim, however, was repudiated by the appellant vide letters dated 21.5.2001 and 1.6.2001, inter alia, on the ground of non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the fire policies.
5. An appeal was filed by the respondent No. 3 against the repudiation of its claim before the Insurance Regulatory Development Authority (for short 'the IRDA'), respondent No. 2 herein. Vide order dated 31.7.2002, two surveyors were appointed by the IRDA for survey and loss assessment as well as for re-examination of the question of damages claimed by the respondent No. 3. Inasmuch as two surveyors appointed by the IRDA disagreed vastly on the quantum of claim payable by the appellant, they filed their reports separately - one assessing the claim of the respondent No. 3 at Rs. 21,01,00,000/- and the other at Rs2,21,34,819/-. After reviewing the reports filed by the surveyors as well as after seeking the comments of the appellant and its surveyors on such review, the IRDA vide order dated 2.6.2003 directed the appellant to settle the claim at Rs. 2,21,34,819/-.
6. Against the order passed by the IRDA, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority constituted by the Central Government, the Ministry of Finance, respondent No. 1 herein (for short 'the Appellate Authority'). The Appellate Authority vide its order dated 5.3.2004 directed the IRDA to appoint two surveyors for a joint report on the claim for the reason that there existed a substantial difference in the amounts of loss assessed by the previous two surveyors. Accordingly, the IRDA appointed two new surveyors, who in their joint report, submitted on 9.10.2006, assessed the net loss suffered by the respondent No. 3 at Rs. 7,95,50,300/-. However, vide order dated 1.2.2007, the IRDA rejected the assessment made in the joint report and directed the appellant to make payment of Rs. 2,21,34,819/- to the respondent No. 3. The view taken by the IRDA in its order dated 1.2.2007 was, however, negatived by the Appellate Authority in its order dated 20.6.2007 and consequently the Appellate Authority directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 7,95,50,300/- less the amount of Rs. 2,21,34,819/- already paid on account to the respondent No. 3.
7. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 20.6.2007 the appellant filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 7569/2007 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking, inter alia, that the orders dated 5.3.2004 and 20.6.2007 passed by the Appellate Authority be set aside. The writ petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge by passing the order under appeal.
ARGUMENTS
8. On behalf of the appellant learned senior counsel Mr. Atul Y. Chitale strenuously contended that the order of the Appellate Authority constitutes a part of the cause of action and the writ petition would thus be maintainable before the Delhi High Court, within whose jurisdiction the Appellate Authority was constituted. The counsel relied upon the decision in Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (supra), wherein the Court held that if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow, then Lucknow bench would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. He also referred to the decision in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) in which following the Nasiruddin's case it has been reiterated that when an order is passed by a court or tribunal, a part of cause of action arises at that place and as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority. He referred to the Bombay High Court judgment in the case of Kishore Rungta and Ors. v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. (supra) wherein following the Supreme Court decision in Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., : [1963]2SCR563 , it was held that where the appellate authority reverses the order under appeal or modifies that order or dismisses the appeal and thus confirms the order without any modification, in all such cases if the appellate authority has disposed of the appeal, the operative order is the order of the appellate authority whether it has reversed the original order or modified it or confirmed it. In that case it was held that as the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal - Jaipur merged in the order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Mumbai, the courts in Jaipur would have no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition which challenged the order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai. He referred to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Indian Institute of Technology v. P.Cjain and ors. (supra) and a decision of the Madras High Court in ORJ Electronics Oxides Ltd. v. Customs, Excise and Service Tax and Anr. : 2008(225)ELT202(Mad) wherein a similar view was taken. It was, therefore, urged by him that in the present appeal the order of the IRDA merged in the order of the Appellate Authority, which was located in Delhi and thus part of the cause of action arose in Delhi and the Delhi High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
9. The principal contention of Mr. Chitale is that the case of Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra) dealt with a statutory appeal under Section 35(g) of the Excise Act and the law as laid down therein would not be applicable to the facts of the present case where the jurisdiction of this Court had been invoked under Article 226. Similarly, it was pointed out that the case of Bombay Snuff (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) also dealt with the filing of statutory appeal and thus would have no application in the facts of the present case. Mr. Chitale further submitted that till date the Constitution Bench decision in the case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. UOI (supra) with regard to Article 226(1) is good law. He submitted that in Khajoor Singh's case, it has been held that the High Court within whose limits the order is passed will have jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition dehors the question where the cause of action arose. He submitted that the focus in Article 226(1) of the Constitution is on the location of the authority or person or government to whom the writ is to be issued. He further submitted that Article 226(2), which was introduced by the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution in 1963, is not a curtailment of the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts, but an amplification of the same. Learned Counsel also contended that the reference to the case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. UOI (supra) in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) was in the context of Article 226(2) and not Article 226(1) as the question of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226(1) was not in issue in the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (supra).
10. On the other hand, Mr. Yashobant Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting respondent (respondent No. 3), submitted that as the substantial cause of action had arisen outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi, the writ petition has rightly not been entertained. He submitted that the insurance cover was granted at Renigunta, Andhra Pradesh, the insurance claim was repudiated at Renigunta, Andhra Pradesh and the representation against repudiation was made to IRDA at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, the parties are also located within Andhra Pradesh. He, therefore, urged that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in whose territory the original proceedings originated would have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and not the Delhi High Court within whose territory the Appellate Authority passed the order. He referred to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in West Coast Ingots (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi (supra) wherein a similar submission that the judgments of the Division Benches of this Court in Bombay Snuff (P) Ltd. v Union of India and Ors. (supra) and Suraj Woolen Mills v. Collector of Customs, Bombay : 74(1998)DLT507 , would not apply because they concern the filing of statutory appeals was expressly rejected. He submitted that the underlined principle recognized in both judgments is that the High Court should not exercise jurisdiction only because the tribunal whose order is in appeal is located within its territorial jurisdiction. He also referred to two earlier decisions of the Division Benches of this Court in Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta v. CIT : [1978]113ITR817(Delhi) , and Birla Cotton and Spinning Mills Ltd. v. CIT, Rajasthan (1980) 13 ITR 354, where appeals had been filed against the orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal at Delhi although the assessees resided and carried out business outside Delhi. In both these cases this Court declined to exercise jurisdiction. Mr. Das contended that if the submission of the petitioner is accepted, then both the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Delhi will have jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties. He submitted that this was not the intention of the Legislature since such interpretation would only cause confusion. According to him in a situation where the insured as well as the insurance company both are aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority and both of them assail the order of the appellate authority before different High Courts because of their convenience and the different Courts pass different judgments, it would lead to complete confusion since the authorities against whom the writ is issued would be in dilemma. He urged that the IRDA being the original authority shall be bound by the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court. The submission of the counsel is, therefore, that the principle applied in Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra) in respect of statutory appeals should also be applied in the matter of writ jurisdiction under Article 226. In this connection he placed strong reliance on the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Bill, 1962, which was enacted as the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963. He referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. and Ors. v. Kalyan Banerjee : (2008)3SCC456 , where the Court held that if the entire cause of action has arisen outside the West Bengal State, mere location of the head office of the company in West Bengal would not confer jurisdiction upon Calcutta High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226. He also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties : [1985]3SCR598 , in which the Court held that mere service of notice regarding acquisition of the land at the company's registered office within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. He also referred to a pre-Constitution judgment of the Judicial Committee in the well known case of Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi reported in 70 I.A. 129 in which it was held that Madras High Court will not have jurisdiction merely because the Board of Revenue, which was the appellate authority in the matter of settlement of rents was located within the town of Madras and the order complained of was made in that town.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
11. In the context of the arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties it would be appropriate if the legislative history of the High Courts' territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 is traced from its inception. Article 226 of the Constitution originally read as follows:
226. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred on a High Court by Clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) of Article 32.
12. This fell for consideration in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao : [1953]4SCR1144 . In that case the petitioner applied to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of prohibition restraining the Election Commission, a statutory authority located at New Delhi, from enquiring into the alleged disqualification of the respondent for membership to the Madras Legislative Assembly. The High Court of Madras issued a writ. The Election Commission approached the Supreme Court. Allowing the appeal and reversing the decision of the High Court, the Court held that the Madras High Court did not have the power to issue such a writ. The Court observed that ' the rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on a statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises, but insists on the presence of the person or authority 'within the territories' in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction'. The argument of inconvenience was also not accepted because the plain meaning of Article 226 was clear.
13. Again this question arose in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. UOI (supra). A Bench of seven Judges was called upon to consider the correctness or otherwise of the decision in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra). The majority reaffirmed and approved the view taken by the Court earlier in Saka Venkata Subba Rao and held that the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir was right in not entertaining the writ petition filed by the petitioner on the ground that it had no territorial jurisdiction. Speaking for the majority, Sinha CJ observed : (AIR p.538, para 13):
13. ... It seems to us therefore that it is not permissible to read in Article 226 the residence or location of the person affected by the order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being within those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction.
14. Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and after Clause (1), new Clause (1-A) was inserted which read as under:
226. (1-A) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
By the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Clause (1-A) was renumbered as Clause (2).
15. The effect of the amendment was considered by the Supreme Court in Alchemist Ltd. and Anr. v. State Bank of Sikkim and Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 335. The Court observed:
15. The effect of the above decisions was that no High Court other than the High Court of Punjab (before the establishment of the High Court of Delhi) had jurisdiction to issue any direction, order or writ to the Union of India, because the seat of the Government of India was located in New Delhi. Cause of action was a concept totally irrelevant and alien for conferring jurisdiction on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. An attempt to import such concept was repelled by this Court. In the circumstances, Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and after Clause (1), new Clause (1-A) was inserted which read as under:
226. (1-A) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.16. It may be stated that by the Constitution (Forty- second Amendment) Act, 1976, Clause (1-A) was renumbered as Clause (2). The underlying object of amendment was expressed in the following words:
Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution, the only High Court which has jurisdiction with respect to the Central Government is the Punjab High Court. This involves considerable hardship to litigants from distant places. It is, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226 so that when any relief is sought against any Government, authority or person for any action taken, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises may also have jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions, orders or writs.The effect of the amendment was that the accrual of cause of action was made an additional ground to confer jurisdiction on a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
17. As Joint Committee observed:
This clause would enable the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The Committee feels that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises in part only should also be vested with such jurisdiction.18. The legislative history of the constitutional provisions, therefore, makes it clear that after 1963, cause of action is relevant and germane and a writ petition can be instituted in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which cause of action in whole or in part arises.
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
16. The jurisdiction under Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India is thus distinct and separate. Article 226(2) confers an additional power on every High Court to issue writs throughout its territory within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises. From the provision in Article 226(2) it is clear that the maintainability or otherwise of the writ petition in the High Court depends upon whether the cause of action for filing the same arose, wholly or in part, within territorial jurisdiction of that Court. 'Cause of action' is a phenomenon well understood in legal parlance. The collocation of the words 'cause of action wholly or in part arises' seems to have been lifted from Section 20 of the CPC, which section also deals with the jurisdictional aspect of the courts. As per that section, the suit could be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the 'cause of action wholly or in part arises'. Judicial pronouncements have accorded almost a uniform interpretation to the said compendious expression even prior to the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution as to mean 'the bundle of facts which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court'. [See Read v. Brown (1889) 22 QBD 128, Mohd. Khalil Khan v. Mehbood Ali Mian ].
17. A Bench of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors. : (1994)4SCC711 considered at length the question of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2). Some of the relevant observations made in the judgment are extracted hereunder:
Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause - notwithstanding anything in Article 32 and provides that every High Court shall have power 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction', to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, 'within those territories' directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under Clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by Clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such parson is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding 'that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at best its case in the writ petition.
It is well settled that the expression 'cause of action' means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh Lord Watson said:.the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in Paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
18. In Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (supra), the Appellate Tribunal at Lucknow, pursuant to the orders passed in Writ Petition No. 750/1964 by the Lucknow bench of Allahabad High Court, heard the appeal and directed the Regional Transport Authority, Bareilly to grant one permanent stage carriage permit to each of the respondents No. 10 to 12. The order of the Appellate Tribunal was challenged in a writ petition filed before the Principal bench of Allahabad High Court. The main ground in the writ petition was that the Lucknow bench of the Allahabad High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide Writ Petition No. 750/1964, because the dispute arose at Bareilly in Rohilkhand Division, which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court, sitting at Allahabad, and it had nothing to do with the Oudh territory. The matter was referred to the Full Bench. One of the questions before the Full Bench was whether the expression '...in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh' used in the first proviso to Article 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, refers to the place where the case originated or to the place of the sitting of the last court or authority whose decree or order is being challenged in the proceeding before the High Court. Another incidental question was whether the writ petition could have been entertained, heard and decided by the Judges sitting at Lucknow. The Full Bench took a view that Lucknow Bench had no jurisdiction to hear Writ Petition No. 750/1964. Allowing the appeal, a four Judge bench of the Supreme Court held as follows:
36. The meaning of the expression 'in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh' in the first proviso to para 14 of the Order was answered by the High Court that with regard to applications under Article 226 the same will be 'a case arising within the areas in Oudh' only if the right of the petitioner in such an application arose first at a place within an area in Oudh. The implication according to the High Court is that if the right of the petitioner arose first at any place outside any area in Oudh and if the subsequent orders either in the revisional or appellate stage were passed by an authority within an area in Oudh then in such cases the Lucknow Bench would not have any jurisdiction. The factor which weighed heavily with the High Court is that in most cases where an appeal or revision would lie to the State Government, the impugned order would be made at Lucknow and on that view practically all writ petitions would arise at Lucknow.
37. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court is incorrect. It is unsound because the expression 'cause of action' in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression 'cause of action' is well-known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen part within specified areas in Oudh and part outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action.
38. Fourth, the expression 'cause of action' with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad
19. The judgment in Nasiruddin case clearly holds that the place where an order is passed by an appellate authority or revisional authority, as the case may be, the same would confer jurisdiction on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, it has been held that even where a part of the cause of action arose, it would be open to the litigant, who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. This principle was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra). But before we examine the decision in Kusum Ingot, we may refer to the Constitution Bench judgment in Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. (supra) and the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Kishore Rungta and Ors. v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. (supra) and of the Delhi High Court in Indian Institute of Technology v. P.C. Jain and Ors.(supra) and that of the Madras High Court in ORJ Electronics Oxides Ltd. v. Customs, Excise and Service Tax (supra).
20. The decision of the Supreme Court in Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. (supra) was rendered prior to the amendment to Article 226. In this case, the respondent had imported certain quantity of mineral oil. Out of this quantity, the appellant, the Collector of Customs, Calcutta, confiscated a part of the quantity. He also imposed a personal penalty on the respondent under the Sea Customs Act, 1878. The respondent appealed to the Central Board of Revenue under Section 188 of the Act and this appeal came to be dismissed. Thereupon, the respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in Calcutta High Court. A question was raised as to the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court to hear the petition. The matter was referred to a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The Full Bench addressed itself to two questions, namely, (i) whether any writ could issue against the Central Board of Revenue which was a party to the writ petition and which was permanently located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, and (ii) whether if no writ could issue against the Central Board of Revenue any writ could be issued against the appellant (Collector of Customs) which was the original authority to pass the order under challenge, when the Appellate Authority (namely, the Central Board of Revenue) had merely dismissed the appeal. The Full Bench held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ against the Central Board of Revenue. On the second question, it held that as the Central Board of Revenue had merely dismissed the appeal against the order of the Collector of Customs, Calcutta, the really operative order was the order of the Collector of Customs, which was located within the jurisdiction of the High Court and that, therefore, it had jurisdiction to pass an order against the Collector of Customs in spite of the fact that the order had been taken in appeal to the Central Board of Revenue, to which no writ could be issued. The Full Bench granted a certificate of appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, allowing the appeal, held as follows:
4. The question therefore turns on whether the order of the original authority becomes merged in the order of the Appellate Authority even where the Appellate Authority merely dismisses the appeal without any modification of the order of the original Authority. it is obvious that when the appeal is made, the Appellate Authority can do one of three things, namely, (i) it may reverse the order under appeal, (ii) it may modify that order, and (iii) it may merely dismiss the appeal and thus confirm order without any modification. In all these cases after the Appellate Authority has disposed of the appeal, the operative order is the order of the Appellate Authority whether it has reversed the original order or modified it or confirmed it We, therefore, feel that on principle when once an order of an original Authority is taken in appeal to the Appellate Authority which is located beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it is the order of the latter Authority which is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of; and as the High Court cannot issue a writ against the Appellate Authority for want of territorial jurisdiction it would not be open to it to Issue a writ to the original Authority which may be within its territorial jurisdiction once the appeal is disposed of, though it may be that the Appellate Authority has merely confirmed the order of the original Authority and dismissed the appeal.
The Court went on to hold:
(5.) It is this principle, viz. that the appellate order is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of, which is in our opinion the basis of the rule that the decree of the Lower Court merges in the decree of the Appellate Court, and on the same principle it would not be incorrect to say that the order of the original Authority is merged in the order of the Appellate Authority whatsoever its decision- whether of reversal or modification or mere confirmation.
21. In Kishore Rungta and Ors. v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. (supra), the petitioners challenged an order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai, dismissing the petitioners' appeal from an order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur and also an order passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal dismissing the petitioners' review application. On behalf of the respondent, a preliminary issue challenging the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court was raised relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sita Ram Singhania v. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd. and Ors. : [1999]3SCR512 , and a judgment of the learned single Judge (H.L. Gokhale, J as he then was) dated 22nd February, 2000, in the case of Gurukripa Pesticides Pvt. Limited and Ors. On the other hand, the petitioner's contention was that the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal merged in the order of the Appellate Tribunal which is in Mumbai. Accordingly, the Mumbai Court would have jurisdiction in view of Article 121 of the Constitution of India. The Court applying the ratio in Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. (supra) held that the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal in Jaipur merged in the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai. The courts in Jaipur would have no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition which challenges the orders of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai. The Mumbai Court, therefore, had the jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
22. In Indian Institute of Technology v. P.C. Jain (supra), the order of compulsory retirement was passed in Mumbai and the petitioner was working at Mumbai. The statutory appeal was rejected by the Appellate Authority at Delhi. A Division Bench of this Court, following the decision in Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. (supra), held as follows:
18) The law is, therefore, well settled that when the original order merges in the appellate order, the writ is maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the appellate authority is based. The High Court of Delhi did possess the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and there is no infirmity or allegation in the finding of the learned single Judge on this ground. We affirm the same accordingly.
23. In ORJ Electronics Oxides Ltd. v. Customs, Excise and Service Tax (supra), the Madras High Court held that the order was passed by the Tribunal at Chennai and, therefore, the cause of action had arisen in Chennai and the writ petition could lie at the Principal bench of the High Court at Chennai. The view of the single Judge holding that the words 'in respect of cases arising out of' would mean 'pertaining to the district of' or 'arising from' and, therefore, the writ petition could be entertained only at the Madurai bench of the High Court and cannot be entertained at the Principal bench was held to be incorrect. The Court following the judgment in Kusum Ingots (supra) held that the Principal bench at Chennai will have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
24. We may now refer to the decision of a three judge Bench in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra) in some detail. In this case, the question before the Court was whether the seat of Parliament or the legislature of a State would be a relevant factor for determining the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The appellant before the Supreme Court was a company having registered office at Mumbai. It obtained a loan from the Bhopal branch of the State Bank of India. The bank issued a notice for repayment of the said loan from Bhopal purported to be in terms of the provisions of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Questioning the vires of the said Act, a writ petition was filed before the Delhi High Court by the appellant which was dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The submission of the appellant before the High Court as also before the Supreme Court was that as the constitutionality of a parliamentary Act was in question, the High Court of Delhi has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The bench held that the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the C.P.C. and Clause 2 of Article 226 being in par! mater!a, the decisions on interpretation of Section 20(c) C.P.C. shall apply to the writ proceedings also. Keeping in view the expressions used in Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. The Court then went on to state that passing of a legislation by itself does not confer any right to file a writ petition unless a cause of action arises therefor. Explaining the distinction between a legislation and executive action, the Court observed:
20. A distinction between a legislation and executive action should be borne in mind while determining the said question.
21. A parliamentary legislation when it receives the assent of the President of India and is published in the Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will apply to the entire territory of India. If passing of a legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so done because a cause of action will arise only when the provisions of the Act or some of them which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner. A writ court, it is well settled, would not determine a constitutional question in a vacuum.
23. A writ petition, however, questioning the constitutionality of a parliamentary Act shall not be maintainable in the High Court of Delhi only because the seat of the Union of India is in Delhi. (See Abdul Kafi Khan v. Union of India.)
The Court further observed that the decision in Nasiruddin is an authority for the proposition that place from where an appellate order or revisional order is passed gives rise to a part of cause of action although the original order was at a place outside the said area. Even when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. As the order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, the writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of original authority merges with the appellate authority which is required to be set aside.
27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority.
The Court, finally cautioned that where only a small or insignificant part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.
25. The decision in Kusum Ingots (supra) thus affirms the view taken in Nasiruddin's case that an order of appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action and a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority. Further, when a part of cause of action arises within one or the other High Court, it will be for the petitioner to choose his forum. The same line of reasoning was adopted in an earlier judgment in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra : AIR2000SC2966 , where Thomas, J. in his concurring judgment observed:
34. When the Constitution was framed, Article 226, as it originally stood therein provided that
every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs....Some of the decisions rendered by different High Courts during the earlier years of the post-Constitution period have given a wider perspective regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court and pointed out that a High Court can exercise powers under Article 226 even in respect of tribunals or authorities situated outside the territorial limits of its jurisdiction if such tribunal or authority exercises powers in such a manner as to affect the fundamental rights of persons residing or carrying on business within the jurisdiction of such High Court [vide K.S. Rashid Ahmed v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, M.K. Ranganathan v. Madras Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd., Aswini Kumar Sinha v. Dy. Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs. It was Subba Rao, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) who observed in M.K. Ranganathan case that:
If a tribunal or authority exercises jurisdiction within the territories affecting such rights it may reasonably be construed that the authority or the tribunal functioned within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and, therefore, is amenable to its jurisdiction.35. But a Constitution Bench of this Court has held in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao thus:
[T]he power of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the two-fold limitation that such writs cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court either by residence or location within the territories subject to its jurisdiction.36. It was the said decision of the Constitution Bench which necessitated the Parliament to bring the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution by which Clause (1A) was added to Article 226. That clause was subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution Forty Second Amendment. Now Clause (2) of Article 226 reads thus:
226(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.37. The object of the amendment by inserting Clause (2) in the Article was to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court in Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (Supra) and to restore the view held by the High Courts in the decisions cited above. Thus the power conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 could as well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which 'the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises' and it is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that High Court. The amendment is thus aimed at widening the width of the area of reaching the writs issued by different High Courts.
26. The learned single Judge in deciding the issue of territorial jurisdiction has relied upon the decisions of this Court in Rajkumar Shivhare v. Assistant Director of Enforcement, Mumbai (supra) and West Coast Ingots (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi (supra), which in turn rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra) and a judgment of the Delhi High Court in Bombay Snuff (P) Ltd. v. UOI (supra). The decision in Ambica Industries and Bombay Snuff (P) Ltd. dealt with statutory appeals and the law, as laid down therein, cannot be applied to a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Ambica Industries case, the issue was relating to determination of situs of the High Court in which appeals would lie under Section 35-G(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The appellant therein carried on business at Lucknow and was assessed at that place. The matter ultimately came up before CESTAT, New Delhi, which had been exercising territorial jurisdiction over U.P., NCT of Delhi and Maharashtra. The appellant then filed an appeal in terms of Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act before the Delhi High Court, which in turn held that it had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter. The appellant then filed the appeals before the Supreme Court by special leave. Referring to Section 35G(9) of the Central Excise Act, the appellant submitted that the High Court had erred in arriving at the said conclusion. It argued that in terms of Section 100(1) CPC, the order of the first appellate court being a decree, a second appeal would lie before the High Court to which it was subordinate. On behalf of the appellant, reliance was placed on the decision in Nasiruddin case. Dismissing the appeal, Justice S.B. Sinha, speaking for the bench observed:
12. The said decision proceeded on the basis that part of the cause of action may arise at the forum where the appellate order or the revisional order is sourced. If, thus, a cause of action arises within one or the other High Court, the petitioner shall be the dominus litis. Indisputably, if this set of reasoning is to be accepted, the impugned judgment as also the decision rendered in Bombay Snuff would not be correct. Before dilating on the said proposition of law it may be noticed that the decision of a tribunal would be binding on the assessing authority. If the situs of the Appellate Tribunal should be considered to be the determinative factor, a decision rendered by the tribunal shall be binding on all the authorities exercising its jurisdiction under the said tribunal.
13. The Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, exercises jurisdiction over all the three States. In all the three States there are High Courts. In the event, the aggrieved person is treated to be the dominus litis, as a result whereof, he elects to file the appeal before one or the other High Court, the decision of the High Court shall be binding only on the authorities which are within its jurisdiction. It will only be of persuasive value on the authorities functioning under a different jurisdiction. If the binding authority of a High Court does not extend beyond its territorial jurisdiction and the decision of one High Court would not be a binding precedent for other High Courts or courts or tribunals outside its territorial jurisdiction, some sort of judicial anarchy shall come into play. An assessee, affected by an order of assessment made at Bombay, may invoke the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court to take advantage of the law laid down by it and which might suit him and thus he would be able to successfully evade the law laid down by the High Court at Bombay.
14. Furthermore, when an appeal is provided under a statute, Parliament must have thought of one High Court. It is a different matter that by way of necessity, a tribunal may have to exercise jurisdiction over several States but it does not appeal to any reason that Parliament intended, despite providing for an appeal before the High Court, that appeals may be filed before different High Courts at the sweet will of the party aggrieved by the decision of the tribunal.
The Court made it clear that in a case of this nature, the doctrine of cause of action may not be invoked. The tests which are relevant to petitions under Articles 226 and 227 cannot be applied when the appellate court exercises its jurisdiction over a tribunal situated in more than one State. In such a situation, the High Court situated in the State where the first court is located should be considered to be the appropriate appellate authority. The Code of Civil Procedure did not contemplate such a situation. It was further observed that in Nasiruddin's case (supra) and in Kusum Ingots case (supra), the Court was not dealing with a question of this nature. Therefore, the same are not authorities for the proposition that the High Court, which is situated at the same place as the situs of the tribunal, alone will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action doctrine is given effect to, invariably more than one High Court may have jurisdiction, which is not contemplated.
27. In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ambica Industries and also of this Court in Bombay Snuff (P) Ltd. have no bearing in deciding the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India. The distinction between statutory appeals to the High Court and petitions under Article 226 has been carved out by the Apex Court itself. The law laid down with respect to statutory appeals in Ambica Industries case is thus not applicable to writ petitions arising out of orders of Tribunals.
28. The decisions relied upon by Mr. Yashobant Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, in State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties (supra) and Eastern Coalfields Ltd and Ors. . v Kalyan Banerjee have no application to the present case where the appellate authority whose order is impugned in the writ petition is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. The judgment of Judicial Committee in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (supra) is a pre- constitution judgment and is of no assistance to the respondent.
29. As held in Nasiruddin's case, even where part of the cause of action arose, it would be open to the litigant, who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. In the present case, since the Appellate Authority is situated at New Delhi, the Delhi High Court has the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, there was no occasion for the learned single Judge to apply the principle of forum conveniens to refuse to exercise the jurisdiction. The principle of forum nonconveniens originated as a principle of international law, concerned with Comity of Nations. A domestic court in which jurisdiction is vested by law otherwise ought not to refuse exercise of jurisdiction for the reason that under the same law some other courts also have jurisdiction. However, the remedy under Article 226 being discretionary, the court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction when jurisdiction has been invoked mala fide. There is no such suggestion in the present case. Nothing has been urged that it is inconvenient to the contesting respondent to contest the writ before this Court. The counsel for the contesting respondent has not disputed the jurisdiction of this Court; his main contention is of possibility of conflict. We do not find any merit in this contention of the counsel for the contesting respondent. First, that is not the case in hand. The contesting respondent is not aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority and has not assailed the same before any High Court. Thus, there is no possibility of conflicting judgments or confusion in the present case. Secondly, even if in a given case such a situation were to arise, the same is bound to be brought to the notice of the court and the likelihood of both courts proceeding with the writ petition and conflicting judgments is remote. In such a situation, following the principle in Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the subsequently filed petition may be stayed in view of the earlier petition entailing similar questions or the court may ask the petitioner to approach the High Court where the earlier petition has been filed. In our opinion, it will be inappropriate to refuse to exercise jurisdiction merely on the basis of possibility of conflict of judgments, particularly in view of the clear language of Article 226(2).
30. Having held that this Court has jurisdiction, it cannot be said that only a insignificant or miniscule part of the cause of action has accrued within the jurisdiction of this Court or that the substantial cause of action has accrued within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. In fact, the sole cause of action for the writ petition is the order of the appellate authority and which cause of action has accrued entirely within the jurisdiction of this Court and this Court would be failing in its duty/function if declined to entertain the writ petition on the ground of the contesting respondent being situated within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Though the petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, it cannot be lost sight of that jurisdiction in such cases under Article 226 is overlapping with Article 227. Article 227 is clear in this regard. The power of superintendence over Tribunals is vested in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal is situated. In that light of the matter also, it cannot be said that only insignificant or miniscule part of the cause of action has accrued within the jurisdiction of this Court. The appellate authority in the present case having passed the order which is impugned in the petition, being situated within the jurisdiction of this Court, even if the cause of action doctrine were to be invoked, substantial part of the cause of action has accrued within the jurisdiction of this Court only. Even the language of the impugned order giving rise to the cause of action in the writ petition, discloses significant cause of action to have accrued within the jurisdiction of this Court. This Court while deciding this writ petition is not required to issue any direction, order or writ to any person outside its jurisdiction. Section 110H of the Insurance Act provides for appeal to the Central Government, seat whereof is admittedly within the jurisdiction of this Court.
CONCLUSION
31. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that where an order is passed by an appellate authority or a revisional authority, a part of cause of arises at that place. When the original authority is situated at one place and the appellate authority is situated at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. As the order of appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the petitioner is dominus litis to choose his forum, and that since the original order merges into the appellate order, the place where the appellate authority is located is also forum conveniens.
32. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the learned single Judge is set aside. The writ petition is restored to file. The learned single Judge is requested to decide the writ petition expeditiously and preferably within a period of three months from today.