Roshanara Begum Vs Union of India - Citation 700329 - Court Judgment

Judgment:

P.K. Bahri, J.

(1) A large number of writ petitions have been referred for being decided by this Full Bench as all of them involve some important common questions of law besides some writ petitions having, in addition, certain additional points for decision. We shall, at first, deal with the disputed questions of law and facts which arc common to all the petitions and thereafter shall deal with individual cases with regard to their additional points.

(2) The challenge in all these writ petitions is to the acquisition proceedings pertaining to the land belonging to the petitioners in pursuance to the various notifications issued from time to time for the common public object of planned development of Delhi. The Master Plan of Delhi, which came into force in 1962, in its Introduction, gives the broad background in which it became necessary to have the growth of the city planned in a more scientific and modern way. As indicated in the Master Plan, in order to check the haphazard and unplanned growth of Delhi following the partition of the country and the phenomenal growth of the population with its sprawling residential colonies without proper layouts and without thd conveniences of life, as far back as in November 1955, the Central Government had set up a Delhi Development (Provisional) Authority and in December 1955, the Town Planning Organisation was set up and was placed under the administrative control of the Delhi Improvement Trust to advice on all matters pertaining to the planning in the National Capital Territory of Delhi.

(3) In September 1956, an Interim General Plan, which was intended to provide an outline for planned development during a period of two to three years till preparation of a comprehensive long range plan, was prepared.

(4) It was also noticed that about 70000 people have been migrating to Delhi from rural areas every year and it was necessary to have suitable sites in several zones where very low income group people may be able to put up cheap houses but layouts have to be in accordance with standards. It is not necessary to elaborately deal with the various objects which were sought to be achieved by having a planned development of Delhi as same can be culled out from the Master Plan. In pursuance to the said objects for having a planned development of Delhi, from time to time, various Notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act were issued, more particularly on November 13, 1959, October 24, 1961, April 4, 1964, April 16, 1964 and January 23, 1965.

(5) On the basis of the first Notification, large areas of land were sought to be acquired and some declarations in respect of the land so notified in 1959 were issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Soon after some notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act were issued, a spate of writ petitions were filed challenging the acquisition proceedings on various grounds by a number 'of aggrieved persons whose lands were sought to be acquired as per Notification issued in 1959. Most of such writ petitions were dismissed by this Court on 19th July 1971 and the LPA's were dismissed on April 29, 1972 and the judgment is reported as Aflatoon v. Lt.Govemor of Delhi lLR 1971 Delhi 311,

(6) Appeals were taken to the Supreme Court but they came to be dismissed in 1974 and that judgment is reported in Aflatoon Vs . Lt. Governor of Delhi : 1974CriLJ742 . The Supreme Court had put its seal of approval with regard to the said Notification and Declarations holding the the planned development of Delhi is a public purpose for which the large tracks of land could be acquired.

(7) A controversy was also raised by some of the persons affected by the Declarations issued from time to time under. Section 6 of the Act using the Notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act as the reservoir for issuing more than one Declarations under Section 6 of the Act. In order to clarify the legal position, the Parliament intervened and brought about amendment to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act by passing Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1967 by which the earlier Ordinance issued to give validity to the said Declarations issued from one Notification under Section 4 were validated and it was made clear that more than one Declaration can be issued in respect of the land notified in a particular Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act and required the authorities to issue the Declarations within two years of the issuance of the Ordinance in respect of the land notified under Section 4 prior to the enforcement of the Ordinance. The challenge to the said amending Act was negatived by the Supreme Court in case of Uday Ram v. Union of India A.I.R. 1968 S C 1138.

(8) In respect of the aforesaid Notifications issued from time to time and Declarations issued on the basis of the said Notifications, the notices under Section 9 and 10 of the Act came to be issued in the year 1980 and 1981. The writ petitions came to be filed challenging the acquisition proceedings again and one of the writ petitions filed in this Court Ved Prakash v. Union of India, C.W.P. No. 963/80 was dismissed in 1980. However, Special Leave Petition was admitted by the Supreme Court as per Civil Appeal No.2630/80 and some of the writ petitions challenging the said acquisition proceedings were directly admitted for hearing in the Supreme Court in the year 1981.

(9) It is not out of place to mention that in most of the writ petitions, a mention has been made about the Special Leave Petition having been admitted by the Supreme Court and various writ petitions also having been admitted to hearing by the Supreme Court and thus, this Court also admitted the present writ petitions and granted the order of status quo with regard to the possession in all these cases.

(10) Reference to the Full Bench was made as per order of the Division Bench in case of Roshanara Begum v. Union of India in C.W.P. No.701/81 on April 10, 1981 mentioning that in some of the cases the proceedings for giving the awards commenced in 1976-77 and the awards were made in the year 1980-81 and in some of the cases, proceedings for giving the awards were yet to be commenced and notices have been issued under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act and the question which would arise for consideration would be whether after lapse of such a long period, the acquisition proceedings should not result in abandonment of the acquisition proceedings and another question which would arise is whether after acquisition has been completed and award has been given in respect of some land out of the land that was mentioned in a particular Declaration under Section 6 of the Act, could another award be made in respect of the remaining land mentioned in Section 6 of the Declaration. In nutshell, the question would arise as to whether more than one award is contemplated by the law in respect of the land, subject mailer of one Declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act.

(11) Another question which was of importance which arises in some of the cases was interpretation of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Authority Act as to whether giving of a notice, 'as required by Section 55 of the Act, and omission of the authorities to complete the acquisition proceedings would or would not result in abandonment of the acquisition proceedings completely in respect of the particular land in respect of which Section 55 of the Act is applicable. After mentioning these important questions of law arising in a bunch of cases, the Division Bench directed that.all these petitions be heard by a Full Bench and in this way, the Full Bench was constituted.

(12) The Supreme Court has given its decision in respect of the Special Leave Petition admitted by it and also in respect of certain writ petitions directly entertained by the Supreme Court and that decision is Ram Chander v. Union of India 1994 (1) S C C 43. Interpretation of the law laid dawn by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment is one of the important questions which has been holly agitated before us by the counsel for the partigs. Suffice it to mention at this stage that the Supreme Court had dismissed the said appeal as well as the writ petitions and had granted 12% additional interest after the expiry of two years from August 23, 1974 in respect of the cases in which awards had been made prior to the amendment of Section 23 of the Act by incorporating Section 23(1)(A) which came into force on 30th April 1982 by which the awards made after 30th April 1982, the Parliament itself provided for grant of additional compensation of 12% per annum and in respect of the cases where the award had been given prior to April 30, 1982, the Supreme Court granted additional compensation of 12% keeping in view that there had taken place unexplained unreasonable delay in completing the acquisition proceedings by the authorities which would have otherwise persuaded the Courts to have struck down the acquisition proceedings on the basis of the writs Filed under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court and under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court.

(13) WE-MAY mention at this stage that Section 11-A was introduced in the Land Acquisition Act by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984 which prescribes for the limitations in which the award has to be made. Now, it is evident that in respect of the land for which acquisition proceedings were pending before the enforcement of the aforesaid provisions, the 'awards had to he made within the two years of the enactment of this amendment and in respect of the Notifications to be issued after this amendment again the awards have to be made within the lime prescribed in the said provision.

(14) Before we come to the grips with the holly contested legal points, we may refer to the facts of the case pertaining to Civil Writ Petition No.701/8] at First. Notification under Section 4 in this case was issued on November 13, 1959 by which land measuring 3470 acres was intended to he acquired. On May 16, 1966, declaration under Section 6 was issued in respect of only-2153 bighas and 2 bids was of land. The award was made in respect of some of the land. The number of that award is 4/77-78 and another award No.36-A was made in respect of 3 bighas and 3 bids was of land and awards No.36-B, 36-C and 36-D were also made in respect of same land.

(15) Award No.36/80-81 was announced on 19th June 1980 and Award No.36-D/86-87 was announced on 19th September 1986. Even according to the proceedings regarding taking of possession of land of the petitioner 61 bighas and 6 bids was of land of the petitioner was left out on the ground that the same was built up and possession would be taken subsequently. The .petitioner (Roshanara Begum @ Naseem Bano) Filed the writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings in respect of land measuring only 9 bighas one bids was situated in the Revenue Estate of Village Lado Sarai, Tehsil Mehrauli comprised in Khasra No.670/27 (2-7), 28(2-2), 29 (4-13). The petitioner claims to have constructed a farm house in the said land spending huge amount and pleaded that according to the land use plan of the Master Plan, this area is shown in Green colour and thus was required to be kept as open space or unbuilt and thus the same would not be needed for any planned development of Delhi although it was designated for compulsory acquisition in view of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act. So, it was pleaded by her that the lapse of 13 years in issuing the notices under Sections 9& 10 of the Act and when possession of the land has not been taken would amount to playing a fraud on the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and there has been unreasonable and unexplainable delay in completing the acquisition proceedings since the date of issuance of notification under Section 4. and declaration under Section 6 of the Act and thus the acquisition proceedings have become illegal and the same amounts to abuse of the power in most arbitrary manner. It was pleaded that if this land stood designated for compulsory acquisition, in view of the Master Plan, then the land should have been acquired without any unreasonable delay and particularly in the period prescribed in Section 55 of the Act. It was also pleaded that before the enforcement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1967, the Jegal position was quite evident that more than one declaration could not have been issued in respect of the land subject matter of one notification issued under Section 4 of the Act. It has been also averred in the writ petition that taking of more than two years period from the dale of the declaration for making the award is by itself unreasonable delay and Parliament had also made this position clear by introducing the amendment in the Land Acquisition Act in 1984 and earlier to that various States have themselves introduced amendments by prescribing the maximum period of two years for making the award from the date of the declaration issued under Section 6. It is pleaded that only object of issuing a notification in 1959 was to peg the price and the same has caused huge loss to the petitioner as a long period of 15 years had elapsed from the date of issuance of declaration in respect of the land of the petitioner and completion of the acquisition proceedings which delay is unconscionable and unexplainable and should lead to inference that acquisition proceedings stood abandoned or at any rate have become illegal.

(16) It is also emphasised that the prices of the land in the market have gone up by 100 times in the year 1981 from what were prevailing in the year 1959 and the petitioner would be deprived of having proper value of his land if the land acquisition proceedings arc not quashed and it was emphasised that money value of the rupee has also gone down to 1/10th in the year 1981 from what. it was in the year 1959. It was emphasised that the statutory discretion conferred on the authority to acquire the land has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and must be exercised within the limit to which an honest man, competent to discharge his office, ought to confine himself. It was also asserted that the petitioner had invested huge funds in establishing modern agricultural farm house under the assurance that the land of the petitioner would not be acquired.

(17) Counter affidavits in opposition to the writ petition have been filed by the Secretary of the Delhi Development Authority and the Land Acquisition Collector. One of the points raised in the reply of the Collector is that the land, subject matter of the writ petition, stands in the name of two ladies namely Roshanara Begum and Naseem Bano whereas in the heading of the petition, Roshanara Begum herself has shown her as having another name as Naseorn Bano which factually is incorrect. This averment has not been controverter by filing any rejoinder and no amendment of the writ petition has been sought but we are of the view that it may not affect the merits of the case because even one of the co-owners can challenge the acquisition proceedings. All the pleas taken in the petition have been controverter and it has been mentioned that a detailed affidavit has been Filed in Civil Writ Petition No.325/81 connected with this case which may also be read as part of the pleadings in this case.

(18) The first question to be decided in all these cases is whether the land acquisition proceedings arc liable to be quashed on account of unreasonable unexplained delay taking place in completing the acquisition proceedings.

(19) The learned counsel for the petitioners had taken us through various provisions of the Master Plan and had referred to a number of judgments in support of their contentions that this unusual and unexplained delay in completing the acquisition proceedings amounts to abandonment of the acquisition proceedings and at any rate would make the act of the authorities illegal as it would amount to fraud on the power and also abuse of the powers to the determent of the petitioners, whose lands are sought to be acquired on prices pegged to the dales of the Notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act.

(20) The Master Plan of Delhi, which came into force in September 1962, had envisaged the development which was to lake place in Delhi in accordance with the said Master Plan in the coming 20 years which indicates as to. what developments are to take place for First 10 years of the period of the plan and Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act also refers to period of 10 years in which the action has to be taken for acquisition of land designated in the Master Plan or Zonal Development Plan for compulsory acquisition of the land.

IT is urged that the authority vested with the discretion to act, has to act in a reasonable period and what could be the reasonable period would depend on the facts of each case. It is urged that if a particular land is notified to be acquired for public purpose, it is incumbent upon the authorities to take all possible steps to complete the acquisition within a reasonable period to achieve the said public purpose. If the authorities allow extraordinary delay and remain lethargic in carrying out the proceedings that would render their acts as illegal.

(22) In exercise of power of eminent domain, the Stale can compulsorily acquire private land for a public purpose. It is no doubt true that provisions of Land Acquisition Act read with provisions of the Delhi Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act 1972 impinge upon the rights of the land owners in a such as they are not free to deal with their land as they wish.

(23) It must be emphasised at this stage that after the decision in the case of Aflatoon (supra), there remained no impediment on the way of the authorities to take prompt steps for completing the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land already notified under various Notifications issued under Section 4 and Declarations issued under Section 6 from time to time for the purpose of planned development of Delhi. As a matter of fact, no plausible Explanationn has been given in the counter affidavits filed in some of the writ petitions for this extraordinary and unreasonable delay which had occurred in issuing notices under Sections 9 & 10 and thereafter in some cases making awards belatedly. The power of judicial review of administrative actions can be exercised when the administrative decision suffers from illegality, irrationality or impropriety in the procedure. In Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v. Minister for the Civil Service 1984 (3) All E L R 935, in the dictum of Lord Diplock, that principle has been highlighted. It was also emphasised that the further development on a case to case basis may in course of time add further grounds, particularly possibility of adoption of principle of 'proportionality' may also be one of the grounds for judicial review of administrative law. This principle was approved by the Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur Vs . Union of India, : 1988CriLJ158 .

(24) It is urged that by taking no action for such a long period, the land acquisition proceedings should be deemed to have come to an end on the principle of desuetude. In Craies On Statute Law, Seventh Edition at page 7, it is mentioned desuetude is the process by which an Act of Scottish Parliament may lose its force without express repeal. It docs not consist merely of obsolescence or disuse; there must also be contrary practice. Moreover, the contrary practice must be of some duration and general application. We do not see how the principle of desuetude can apply to the facts of the present case because there has been no contrary practice brought about.

(25) In support of the contention that administrative action or administrative decision should be taken in a reasonable time and for what should be reasonable time in this context, reference has been made to definition of 'reasonable time' appearing at page 375 in-Words and Phrases Permanent Edition Volume 36 which means such time 'as a prudent man could exercise or employ in or about his own affairs. What is the reasonable time, in any case, depends upon the circumstances of that particular case and also is defined to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case.

(26) It is also emphasised by the learned counsel that every administrative act should be free from the malady of bad faith and unreasonable delay in performing a duty enshrined by the Statute would amount to malice in fact as well as malice in law as defined in Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edition. Malice in law means intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. A malice in fact is presumed from tortious acts, deliberately done without just cause, excuse or justification, which are reasonably calculated to injure another or others. It is urged that the sole purpose of issuing Notifications under Section 4 & 6 in the present cases has been to peg down the prices and the unexplained extraordinary delay in completing the acquisition proceedings could not be termed bonafide and thus this inactivity of the authorities for such prolonged period can be termed as malice in law with a view to harm the interest of the petitioners for pegging their claim only for compensation on the basis of the market value prevailing in the years of the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act.

(27) In Short v. Poole Corporation 1925 All E R 74 it was laid down that no public body can be regarded as having statutory authority to act in bad faith or from corrupt motives and any action purporting to be that of the body, but proved to be committed in bad faith or from corrupt motives, would certainly be held to be inoperative. It was further laid down that it may be also possible to prove that an act of the public body, though performed in good faith and without the taint of corruption, was so clearly founded on alien or irrelevant grounds as to be outside the authority conferred upon the body, and thereforee inoperative.

(28) A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in case of Partap Singh Vs . State of Punjab, : (1966)ILLJ458SC has laid down that the Constitution enshrines and guarantees rule of law and Article 226 is designed to ensure that each and every authority in the State, including the Government, acts bonafide and within the limits of its power and when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to afford justice to the individual.

(29) Reference can be also made to Jaichand Lal Vs . State of West Bengal, : 1967CriLJ520 wherein it has been laid down that a malafide exercise of power does not necessarily imply any moral turpitude as a matter of law. It only means that the statutory authority is exercised for purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended.

(30) In State of Punjab Vs . Gurdial Singh : [1980]1SCR1071 the malafide act was defined by the Supreme Court to mean that if the use of the power is for the fulfillment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment.

(31) In Donald W.Agins v. City of Tiburon, 65 Lawyers Edition U.S.S C R 106, it was observed that the emphasis is on the words 'extraordinary delay' to indicate that if-there is extraordinary delay in the exercise of the eminent domain and there had taken place fluctuation in value during the said process of governmental decision making, then obviously the act of the Municipality could be struck down as amounting to 'taking'.

(32) In Satyendra Kumar v. Union of India 1994 (1) A D (Delhi) 242, placing the reliance on the law laid down in Khadim Hussain Vs . State of U.P, : [1976]3SCR1 Collector (Distt. Magistrate, Allahabad Vs . Raja Ram Jaiswal, : [1985]3SCR995 , it was held where a power was conferred to achieve a purpose, the power must be exercised reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose. The Division Bench of this Court held that there has been unreasonable delay in completing the acquisition proceedings and thus the power has been exercised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations or reasons and there has been no continuity of action from the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act till dale and there has been a deep gap again throwing doubts on the bona fides of the respondent and reliance was placed on Deepak Pahwa Vs . Lt.Governor of Delhi, : [1985]1SCR588 and Hirday Narain Vs . Income-tax Officer, Bareilly, : [1970]78ITR26(SC) where it has been laid down that when a statute invested a public officer with authority to do an act in a specified set of circumstances, it was imperative upon him to exercise his authority in a manner appropriate to the case when a parly interested and having a right to apply moved in that behalf and circumstances for exercise of authority were shown to exist. The Division Bench also relied on case of Ram Chand v. Union of India J.T 1993 (5) S C 465 where the Supreme Court had adversely commented upon the delay in making the award after declaration had been made under Section 6 of the Act. The Division Bench quashed the acquisition proceedings as there has occurred unexplained inordinate delay in completing the acquisition proceeding's.

(33) We may now refer to all important judgment being relied upon by both the sides which dealt with the same notifications as arc in dispute before us and in the writ petitions reference was made to this case which was admitted for hearing by the Supreme Court in order to get the writ petitions admitted in this Court and for obtaining the interim orders as were given by the Supreme Court. This judgments given in cases of Ram Chand & Others v. Union of India, and Ved Prakash & Others Vs . Union of India, : (1994)1SCC44 . In para 3 of the judgment, the power to acquire private properly for public use as an attribute of sovereignty which is essential to the existence of a Government and the power of eminent domain of the sovereign Stale to acquire the property of a citizen for public good without the owners consent were highlighted. In para 5, it was emphasised that the framers of the Land Acquisition Act enjoin that after publication of notification under Section 4, further proceedings should betaken as early as possible.

(34) In this judgment, reference was made to case of Stale of Gujarat Vs . Palel Raghav Natha, : [1970]1SCR335 wherein it was held that if for exercise of power no lime limit has been Fixed, the authority who has to exercise power can exercise the same at any time but such lime must be reasonable lime and the length of the reasonable lime must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised, and reliance was placed on Mansarani Vs . S.P.Pathak : [1984]1SCR139 . Reference was also made to Ambalal Purshottam Vs . Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, : [1968]3SCR207 where also emphasis was that land acquisition proceedings should be completed without any unreasonable delay.

(35) Reference was made to the Khadim Hussain (supra), where it was laid down that if an unreasonable delay between a declaration and Section 4 notification is shown to exist, it may raise a suspicion about the existence of the declaration itself or about the bona tide of the acquisition proceedings. Reference to Craies on Statute Law Seventh Edition page 282 was made which lays down that powers conferred by Act of Parliament must, as a general rule, be exercised within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court also referred to the decisions in Tiverton and North Devon Rly. Co. v. Robert Francis Loosemore 1884 (9) Ac 480, Grice v. Dudley Corporation 1957 (2) All E R 673 and Birmingham City Corporation v. West Midland Baptist (Trust) Association 1969 (3) All E R 172 which also lay down that Courts have been consistently impressing tht the land acquisition proceeding should be completed within a reasonable time failing which the whole proceedings may stand vitiated.

(36) The amendment introduced in the Land Acquisition Act was noticed which prescribes now the limitation for completing the acquisition proceedings from stage to stage. Article 31-A of the Constitution was also taken note of by the Supreme Court which prohibits making of any law which does not contain the provision of payment of compensation at any rate which shall not be less than the market value in respect of the estate which is subject to Land Tenure Act. The Supreme Court also noticed that due to escalation in prices of land during the preceding two decades, in reality, the market rate on the date of notification is a mere fraction of the rate prevailing at the time of its determination in the award.

(37) On the question of delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, it was held that the same has to be considered along with the inaction on the part of the authorities who had to. perform their statutory duties. The Supreme Court also noticed that after the decision in case of Aflatoon on August 23, 1974, there had again taken place extraordinary and unreasonable delay in completing the acquisition proceedings as no effective steps were taken till 1980-81 and in some cases till 1983. The Supreme Court also noticed that any amount determined as market value of the land acquired with reference to the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 at the rate prevalent 15-21 years prior to the date of making of the award cannot be in compliance of the mandate regarding payment of the market value of the land so acquired under the Constitution and the Act.

(38) In para 25 of the judgment, the Court then found force in the contentions of the petitioners that the object of the respondents was to peg the prices of the land acquired from the different cultivators to a distant past and not to proceed further because if the award had been made soon after the declarations under Section 6, the respondents had to pay or tender the compensation to the claimants, which for some compulsion, respondents were not in a position to pay or tender them. But, nonetheless, the exercise of power in the facts and circumstances of the cases by the respondents has to be held to be against the spirit of the provisions of the Act, tending towards arbitrariness.

(39) The Supreme Court then laid down that in such a situation, the Supreme Court, in exercise of power under Article 32 and the High Court under Article 226 could have quashed the proceedings. But instead of quashing the proceedings, the Supreme Court held as follows:-

'BUT,taking into consideration that in most of the cases, Delhi Administration and Delhi Development Authority have taken possession of the lands and even developments havebeenmade, it shall not be proper exercise of discretion on the part of this Court to quash the proceedings because, in that event, it shall affect the public interest. Moreover, third party interests created in the meantime are'likely to be affected and such third parties are - not imploded. The relief of quashing the acquisition proceeding having become inappropriate due to the subsequent events, the grant of a modified relief, considered appropriate in the circumstances, would be the proper course to adopt. The High Court or this Court can grant a modified relief taking into consideration the injury caused to the claimants by the inaction on the part of respondents and direct payment of any additional amount, in exercise of power under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution.'

(40) In para 27, the Supreme Court laid down that after the decision in Aflatoon's case on August 23, 1974, the reasonable time for making the award was about two years from that date and beyond two years the time taken for making of the award will be deemed to be unreasonable and as such after expiry of the period of two years, some additional compensation has to be awarded to the cultivators. The Supreme Court then proceeded to award additional compensation @ 12% per annum after the expiry of two years from August 23, 1974 till the date of making of the awards by the Collector to be calculated with reference to the market value of the lands in question on the date of the notifications under sub-section (1) of Section 4.

(41) This judgment, in our view, clinches this question of delay in these acquisition proceedings pertaining to the same notifications but still elaborate arguments have been advanced by the counsel for the petitioners to somehow convince this Court that the relief which has been moulded by the Supreme Court cannot be granted by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(42) This judgment, no doubt, clearly lays down that extraordinary unreasonable delay had occurred in acquisition proceedings' pertaining to these notifications and the proceedings are liable to be quashed normally but the Supreme Court, in public interest, had chosen not to quash the proceedings but to mould the relief in order to grant additional compensation to the aggrieved persons, whose lands arc being acquired.

(43) Hence, we have no difficulty in holding that the respondents have been guilty of unreasonably delaying the acquisition proceedings which would amount to abuse of the power. But we are considering the question as to whether to quash these proceedings or whether this Court should also mould the relief, as was done by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases.

(44) Learned counsel for the petitioners have vehemently argued that this relief has been moulded by the Supreme Court by taking resort to power given under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which power is not available to the High Courts. It is true that this Court does not enjoy the powers conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution on the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in the aforesaid case, has not changed the date of notification for determining the market value but has moulded the relief under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and has categorically laid down that the High Court also has power to mould the relief while exercising discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. So, it cannot be said that by moulding the relief in the same manner as has been done by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, this Court would be transgressing the law or any provision of the Constitution.

(45) Learned counsel for the petitioners have vehemently argued that the Supreme Court had exercised this discretion in moulding the relief by granting additional compensation instead of quashing the acquisition proceedings noticing certain factors which are not present in these cases. It. is urged that in these cases possession has not been taken, third party interest has not been created and as possession of the land, subject matter of these petitions, has not been taken, so, the has taken place no development and no public interest would be violated in case the acquisition proceedings are quashed.

(46) We do not agree. The Supreme Court has noticed that development has taken place. It does not mean that development has taken place on the land of the petitioners in those cases. The development is being carried out by the authorities under various schemes and out of the large tracks of land notified under various notifications, possession of most of the land has been taken and development has taken place in those lands with so many new colonies having been built by the Delhi Development Authority itself and only land, subject matter of these petitions, remains to be developed after taking possession. As the development has taken place around the surrounding areas and development schemes could not be implemented fully as the possession of the small portions of the land could not be taken due to stay orders granted by this Court, so quashing the acquisition proceedings would mean that public purpose of planned development of Delhi would stand frustrated.

(47) Moreover, thc Supreme Court has by now delivered a number of judgments rejecting the challenge to the acquisition proceedings in respect of the same notifications after the judgment was given in the case of Ram Chand (Supra). Copies of the said judgments have been placed on the record. In case of C.A.N.1738/81, Mandir Sitramji Vs Lt. Governor, Union Territory of Delhi, decided on July 20, 1993, by the Supreme Court, the challenge was to the notification issued under Section 4 on November 13, 1959 and declaration issued under Section 6 dated June 2, 1966. The award was made on June 19, 1980. The challenge before the Supreme Court was sought to be raised that the acquisition proceedings should be quashed inasmuch as there has taken place delay in making the award. The Supreme Court held that the question of delay making the award on which the appeal had been mainly supported need not be gone into as the grounds on which the writ petition was filed were rejected by the High Court rightly. It was pleaded that no notice had been received by the petitioner under Section 12 of the Act and thus, the proceedings ought to be quashed. This ground was also negatived and it was held that that notice was required to enable the petitioner to make reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for enhancement of compensation and no prejudice would be deemed to have been caused for non-service of prior notice.

(48) However, Writ Petition No.1100-1108/81, Bharat Singh Vs Union of India, came to be decided by the Supreme Court on July 30, 1993. The challenge was to the notification issued under Section 4 on April 16,1964 and the declaration issued on June 15, 1965 and the award made on February 6, 1981 and the ground of chailenga was the inordinate delay in making the award. The challenge was negatived as the petition was Filed after the award had been made. Reliance was placed on Ramjas Foundation Vs Union of India 1993 (Supp.) II Scc 20.

(49) Then there is a judgment given in Writ Petition No.1.3647-63 of 1984, Jalan Singh Vs Union of India, decided on July 21, 1993. The challenge m this case was to the notification dated April 4, 1964 and declaration dated December 7, 1966 and the award dated November 29, 1980. The petitioners continued to be in possession of the said land. The challenge was negatived although the plea was taken before the Supreme Court that petitioner has no intimation of the award being made as it was found as a fact that the petitioners had responded to the notices issued under Section 9 of the Act and filed the petition belatedly. Another plea taken was that built-up area under the policy of the Government could not be acquired which plea was also negatived.

(50) The Writ Petition Nos.7213 & 7214/82, Mamtesh Prasad Vs Union of India came to be decided on July 21, 1993. Here the challenge was to the notification dated November 13, 1959 issued under Section 4 and declaration dated January 14, 1969, issued under Section 6 of the Act and the petitioner had filed the petitions on receiving of the notice under Section 9 of the Act in September 1982. The plea was that there has been inordinate delay in completing the acquisition proceedings. The Supreme Court held that on this ground the acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed as petitioners chose to wait for considerable time beyond the period they considered to be reasonable for completing the acquisition for approaching the court for the grant of this relief.

(51) In the present cases also the position is similar. There were two judgments given by a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos.1908, 1917, 1918 & 1938/87 decided on September 11, 1991. The award had been given within two years of the coming into force of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 which brought in Section 11A and modified Section 23 to give more compensation to the owners of the land as the acquisition proceedings had remained pending for many years. The contention raised before the Division Bench was: as there was unreasonable delay of 18 years in completing the acquisition proceedings the award giving compensation on the basis of the market value of the date of publication of notification under Section 4 -of the Act is illegal and is liable to be set aside. The challenge was negatived and it was held that the Parliament has amended the statute and has given the necessary compensation to the land owners because of such delayed acquisition and thus, validity of the acquisition cannot be challenged on the ground of laches. The Special Leave Petitions were filed against these judgments which are Special Leave Petition Nos.11232, 11396, 11397, 11398 & 11399 of 1987 in which notices were issued, confined to the question as to whether the petitioner should be given enhanced amount of compensation in view of inordinate delay in making the award but later on all these SLPs came to be dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated May 4, 1995.

(52) It is not necessary for us to refer to various other judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of their contentions that there has taken place inordinate unexplained delay in completing the acquisition proceedings. We have already held that there has taken place inordinate delay in completing the acquisition proceedings but we must point out that because of this unusual and unexplained delay taking place in completing the acquisition proceedings for the land which was sought to be acquired for the Delhi Development Authority, the Parliament had intervened in 1984 and the Land Acquisition Act was amended which made it clear that in respect of notifications issued prior to the enforcement of the Amendment Act the acquisition proceedings must be completed within two years of the coming into force of the Amendment Act and in respect of the future notification the time limit was also prescribed for making the award. The legislature has chosen to provide for more compensation in solarium and in interest for the awards which were to be made after 1982 but the Parliament had deliberately not provided for any additional compensation to the cases where the awards have been made prior to 1982. Where the Parliament has itself taken notice of the delays occurring in acquiring the land which had been notified years ago and has prescribed for the time limits, we are of the view that court has no jurisdiction to prescribe any other time limits for completing the acquisition proceedings.

(53) We may refer to the case of Gujarat State Transport Corporation Vs Valaji Moolji Sonaji, : [1979]3SCR905 . There was delay of about 15 years between notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6. The challenge was made for quashing the said notification and declaration on account of inordinate delay. The Supreme Court referred to the amendment made in 1967 which gave the period of two years for issuing of declaration in respect of the notification issued prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act. The question which was posed by the Supreme Court was as to when a statute confers a power and prescribes lime within which it can be exercised, could it ever be said that even though the power is exercised within the statutory period yet the court can examine the question of delay and record a finding that there was an unreasonable delay in exercise of power and thereforee, the exercise of power is bad. It was held by the Supreme Court that this approach would defeat the very purpose for prescribing a short period of limitation on exercise of power. It was held that when a period is prescribed for exercise of power it manifests the legislative intention that the authority exercising the power within the prescribed time would not atleast be accused of inaction or tethering and thereforee, such exercise of power could not be said to be bad or invalid on the only ground that there was unreasonable delay in the exercise of power. It was further observed that the very prescription of time inheres a belief that the nature and quantum of power and the manner in which it is to be exercised would consume atleast that much time which the statute prescribes as reasonable and thereforee, exercise of power within that time could not be negatived on the only ground of unreasonable delay. Same ratio was laid by the Supreme Court in the cases of Stale of Gujarat & Another Vs Patel Naranbhai Nathubai & Others, : AIR1990SC1232 and Kaliyappan Vs State of Kerala, : AIR1989SC239 .

(54) It was also urged on behalf of the respondent that mere fact that issuance of notification results in freezing the land of the owners is not fatal by itself if the land is needed for a public purpose. In Leela Devi Vs Union of India, : [1976]1SCR341 . It was held that the fact.that the notification had the effect to freeze the price of the land of the owner would not in any way affect the validity of the notification.

(55) The learned counsel for the petitioners have vehemently argued that Ram Chand's case (supra) lays down the law which is binding on this court and in view of Article 141 of the Constitution, the High Courts and the subordinate courts were bound to quash the acquisition on account of inordinate delay taking place in completing the acquisition proceedings and this court cannot come to any different conclusion. Reference is made to Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs Dr.Karan Singh , where it was held that the principle is that if the language in ment is plain and unambiguous and can be reasonably interpreted in only one has to be understood in that sense and principle of artificial construction has avoided. Reference was also made to Assam Sillimanite Limited Vs . Union of lndia : AIR1977Delhi193 where it has been laid that the court has to find our the ratio decidendi when the decision is based on various grounds, some wide and others narrow.

(56) There is is no dispute about these principles laid down for interpreting the judgments. However, in the present case the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chand while emphasizing the question of inordinate delay taking place in acquisition proceedings in respect of the same notifications as are before us had categorically laid down that acquisition proceedings arc not to be quashed and one of the reasons given was that it would not be in public interest to quash the said acquisition proceedings inasmuch the land is required for the planned development of Delhi. It is true that the Supreme Court also referred to other factors such as in most of the cases the possession had been taken and third party interest had been created and development, in the land had taken place and some of such factors are not present in the cases before us, but one of the important factors which weighed with the Supreme Court was that it would not be in public interest to quash these acquisition proceedings which have been launched since 1959 onwards for the same purpose of planned development of Delhi. The said public purpose still subsists in respect of the present cases which pertain to the same notifications. The Supreme Court itself has in the case of Ram Chand laid down that instead of quashing the acquisition proceedings which have been pending since long on the ground of inordinate delay which has not been explained, the relief could be moulded by taking resort to Article 32 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court also laid down that High Court has the power under Article 226 of the Constitution also to mould the relief in the similar manner. Thus, there is no legal bar in this court also moulding the relief in the similar manner by taking resort to Article 226 of the Constitution as has been done by the Supreme Court by taking resort to Article 32 of the Constitution.

(57) In view of the above discussion, we conclude that the acquisition proceedings in these cases are not liable to be quashed on the ground of inordinate delay but following the ratio given in the case of Ram Chand (supra) we, while upholding the acquisition proceedings, have to give the same relief as has been given in the case of Ram Chand (supra) i.e. the petitioners in whose cases the awards have been made prior to 1982 would be entitled to have additional interest of 12% per annum commencing from two years after the decision given in Aflatoon's case till the date of the award but such additional benefit would not be available in the cases where awards have been made subsequently.

(58) However, we may mention that Dr.Sidhu, the learned counsel for one of the petitioners, had contended that under Article 31A of the Constitution of India we should hold that in respect of the land forming part of estate which is sought to be acquired the market value which is prevalent at the time of the award should be given otherwise the provisions of Section 23 which restricts the market value to be paid on the date of the notification would be vocative of Article 31A of the Constitution.

(59) Before the amendment of the Constitution of India in 1979, Article 19(1)(f) conferred a fundamental right on all the citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of property and Article 31(1) laid down that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law and Article 31(2) also provided that no property shall be compulsorily acquired for a public purpose unless proper compensation is paid to such a person. In 1955 the Constitution was amended and Article 31(2) laid down that the law providing for fixation of compensation could not be questioned in any court on the ground that the amount so fixed or determined is not adequate. Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act had laid down that the market value as prevalent on the date of the notification issued under Section 4 would be payable and validity of Section 23 was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Aflatoon (supra). However, by amendment of the Constitution, Article 19(1)(f) was deleted from the Constitution and thus, the citizens had been left with no fundamental right with regard to holding of the property. Article 31 was also abrogated and in its place Article 31A, B, C & D were introduced.

(60) Article 31A provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law providing for acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges in any way the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19 but Second Explanationn to this Article which is being strongly relied upon by Dr.Sidhu in support of his contention runs as follows: 'Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.'

(61) The contention of the learned counsel is that in the present case the petitioners are having their small holdings which arc part of the estate and thus, the compensation to be given to the petitioners could not be less than the market value and where the acquisition proceedings have protracted because of lapses of the respondents, giving market value of the date on which notification under Section 4 was issued 15-18 years back would be not the market value as envisaged in the above provision of the Constitution and thus, he has urged that Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act should be read down to mean that where the proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution is applicable, there Section 23 should mean that the market value has to be paid not on the market rate prevalent at the time of the issuance of Section 4 notification under the Land Acquisition Act but on the rates prevalent at the time of atleast making of the award if not at the time of taking of possession by the respondents.

(62) The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, has contended that the second proviso in Article 31A does not confer any fundamental right on the petitioners which can be enforced in law as it only makes out an exception to the main Article and the only effect is that if there is any law violating the second proviso to Article 31A the result would be that said law could be challenged under Article 13 of the Constitution being vocative of Article 14 or Article 19 of the Constitution. In the alternative it is contended that Article 31A(2) defines 'the estate* as in relation to any local area having the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent as in the existing law relating to land tenure in force in that area. It is urged that the land tenures have relevancy to the various Land Tenancy Acts prevalent in various States of India including Delhi and if the estate does not fall within the Land Tenancy Act pertaining to the tenures of the land, the second proviso would not be applicable.

(63) In Ram Chand (supra) the Supreme Court had noticed Article 31A which provided for market value and had declined to quash the notifications and in order to compensate the owners whose land was being acquired belatedly the Supreme Court thought it advisable to grant interest @ 12% per annum in addition to what the land owner would have been entitled to strictly by the provisions of Section 23 of Land Acquisition Act. It would mean that giving this additional benefit would be sufficient and would accord with the market value of the land envisaged in second -proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution.

(64) So we hold that these land acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed on the ground of delay and laches which had occurred m completing the acquisition proceedings in respect of the aforesaid notifications and declarations except for moulding the relief in consonance with the judgments of the Supreme Court noticed above.

(65) In most of the cases, out of the land mentioned in particular declaration issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, more than one award had been made or awards are yet to be made. The question which has been agitated before us is as to whether the Land Acquisition Act contemplates making of more than one award in respect of the land, subject of the declaration issued under Section 6. Prior to the Amendment of 1967 introduced in the Land Acquisition Act, there was no provision. enabling the authorities to issue more than one declaration in respect of the land notified under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act.

(66) Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act lays down that whenever it appears to the Government that land in any locality is likely to be needed for any public purpose a notification to that effect is to be issued and published in the official gazette. Thereafter the officers can enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality and perform acts like setting out boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and also carry out the survey. Section 4 does not contemplate issuance of a notification in respect of any particular land. After hearing objections, if any, under Section 5A filed by any interested person with regard to Section 4 notification the Government is entitled to issue a declaration under Section 6 of the Act under which the particular land is to be indicated which is needed for a public purpose.

(67) Any such declaration has also to be published in the official gazettee and said declaration is to be treated as conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose etc. and thereafter the Government is to acquire the land in the manner provided in the statute. There was no limitation Fixed in the statute for issuing the declaration. Earlier more than one declaration used to be issued in respect of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. The challenge was taken to the Supreme Court with regard to more than one declaration being issued in respect of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act and the Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs Vishnu Prasad Sharma, : [1966]3SCR557 , dealt with this question and laid .down that there is nothing in Section 4, 5A and 6 to suggest that Section 4 is a kind of reservoir from which the Government may from time to time draw out land and make declarations with regard to it successively. If that was the intention behind the said Sections, one would have found some indication of it in the language used therein. After reading those Sections the Supreme Court held that once Section 4 particularises the locality in which land's to be acquired for public purpose. Section 6 only requires specifying the particular land needed for public purpose and after such specification has been done by issuing a declaration under Section 6 that would complete the process and notification under Section 4 cannot be further used thereafter. It was further held by the Supreme Court that while construing Section 4,5A & 6 it must be kept in view that the Act provides for acquisition of land of persons without their consent. In such a case the provisions of the statute must be strictly construed, secondly, in interpreting these provisions the court must keep in view on the one hand the public interest which compels such acquisition and on the other hand the interest of the person who is being deprived of his land without his consent and it is open to the appropriate Government to issue as many notifications as it deems fit under Section 4 even with respect to the same locality followed by notification under Section 6. Even if the government is not able to make up its mind all at once about its requirements of land, there is nothing to prevent the Government from issuing another notification under Section 4 followed by a notification under Section 6. The Supreme Court also laid down that as the Act is an expropriatory Act, that interpretation of it should be accepted which puts the least burden on the expropriated owner.

(68) It has been contended before us by Sh.P.N.Lekhi, Sr.Advocate on behalf of some of the petitioners, followed by other counsel in whose cases same points of challenge have been raised, that the reasoning given by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case should also be applied to the legal proposition now raised before us that Section 6 declaration cannot be used as a reservoir for making one award after another award and as soon as one award has been made in respect of some land subject-matter of one declaration issued under Section 6 .of the Act, the acquisition proceedings with regard to the said declaration should be deemed to have come to an end and no more awards can be made in respect of any remaining land subject-matter of Section 6 declaration if one award has been already made in respect of some portion of the land out of the same declaration.

(69) We are afraid that analogy of Sections 4 & 6 cannot be made applicable to the further proceedings of acquisition for making awards. Section 4, 5A & 6 stand on a different footing from other provisions of the statute which we shall presently examine. After a declaration under Section 6 has been issued in respect of particular land it is evident that the land which is particularised under Section 6 may comprise of various khasras of various revenue estates and may be belonging to one holding or hundreds of holdings owned by a large number of persons. Section 7 contemplates that after land has been so notified in the declaration issued under Section 6, then an officer of the appropriate Government shall direct the Collector to take order for the acquisition of the land. Section 8 then requires the Collector to mark out the land and get it measured and get prepared the plans of the land so notified under Section 6 of the declaration. Thereafter the Collector has to issue public notice stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land and the claims for compensation by all interested person in such land may he made to him. The notices have to specify the particulars of the land and the persons interested are to be given opportunity to appear personally or through agent before the Collector and they are to state their ownership or their interests in the lands, put their claims for compensation. The Collector is also required to serve notices on the occupiers, if any, of such land. Section - 10 enables the Collector to direct any person to make or deliver to him a statement containing as far as may be practicable the name of every other person possessing any interest in the land. Under Section Ii the Collector has to then make an inquiry and has to then make an award in respect of the relevant area of the land and the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land. Such award is to be made with the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise.

(70) Section 11(2) contemplates that that if all the persons interested in the land, who have appeared before him, have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award the Collector may without making further inquiry make an award according to the terms of the agreement made with the appropriate Government but Section 11(3) lays down that determination of compensation for any land under sub-section (2) shall not, in any way, affect the determination of compensation in respect of other land in the same locality or elsewhere. Section Ii itself contemplates making of more than one award in respect of the land notified under Section 6 declaration. Section 11 prescribes the two years limitation for making of the award from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period the entire proceedings shall lapse.

(71) The aforesaid provisions make it evident that award cannot be made in respect of any particular land till inquiry contemplated by Section 11 has been gone through. Where there are different land holdings and different land owners of the land notified under Section 6 obviously notices have to be issued to all of them and also to the persons having interest in the said land. It is, hence, not possible to say that Collector can make only one award in respect of the holders of land particularised in Section 6 declaration. The language of Section Ii does not contemplate making of only one award in respect of the land notified under Section 6 of the Act. As already mentioned Section 11 contemplates making of more than one award, one in respect of one set of same land if the owners of the said land in agreement with appropriate Government want a particular award to be given then that award can be given but that compensation given under sub-section (2) on agreement is not binding on other land owners or even on the appropriate Government and for that purposes the Collector has to make the award under Section. 11 of the Act.

(72) It has been urged before us that the Legislature has, after the judgment given by the Supreme Court in the case of Vishnu Prasad Sharma amended the Land Acquisition Act and it now provided that more than one declaration can be issued out of the one notification issued under Section 4 of the Act. It is urged that if the Legislature wanted some amendment could have been also made in Section 11 of the Act to enable the Collector to issue more than one award out of the one declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act. It is urged that as no such amendment has been made, so the ratio laid down in the case of Vishnu Prasad Shanna (supra) should apply in support of the principle that more than one award cannot be made in respect of the land particularised in one notification issued under Section 6 of the Act.

(73) As already discussed above, the provisions of Section 4, 5A and 6 have a scheme under which before the amendment of the Land Acquisition Act, it was held by the Supreme Court that the said scheme does not envisage issuance of more than one declaration under Section 6 out of one notification issued under Section 4 of the Act. But that ratio cannot be made applicable when we construe the provisions of Sections 7 to 11 because Section 11 by itself contemplates making of more than one award from the same declaration.

(74) It is also to be emphasized that award is only an offer made by the appropriate Government to pay compensation to the owner of the land for acquiring his land compulsorily. It is an executive action and the owner to whom such an offer is made in the shape of the award is not bound to accept such offer and such an owner can seek reference to the Land Acquisition Court for determining the compensation under Section 18 of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondents has brought to our notice a large number of judgments of different High Courts and also of this Court which have laid down that more than one award is possible and is valid from the same declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act.

(75) In the Corporation of Calcutta Vs Omeda Khatun Bewa, : AIR1956Cal122 , the Division Bench of the said High Court had held that as the true area of land under the ownership of different persons and the compensation to be allowed to different persons must be different according to the nature and extent of their interest, there can be no doubt that where the land declared under Section 6 belongs to different persons the Collector is required to make different awards in respect of each. It was further laid down that it is also possible to conceive of cases where though the land is under the ownership of a single individual the acquiring authority is, after the acquisition of a portion of the land has been completed, prevented by an injunction of a competent court or by a decision of a superior court from proceeding with the acquisition of the remainder. One of the reasons given for holding that separate awards are possible was that it is only when the claims have been received that it may transpire that different parts of the land are held in different ownerships or to put it in another way, separate groups of interests are attached to separate parts and then it may be found necessary for the practical convenience of making awards to split up the whole into parts, according to the interests attached to them, and make them the subjects of separate awards and such splitting up will not detract from the extent of the acquisition which will remain an acquisition of the whole.

(76) Reference may be also made to Abdul Karim Vs State of Madhya Pradesh through Collector, Bilaspur, : AIR1964MP171 . In this judgment reference has been made to Prag Narain Vs Collector of Agra , which has laid down the law that the Land Acquisition Act does not appear to contemplate that where more than one person is interested in a parcel of land there should be more than one award relating thereto, but this does not mean that the whole of the land at any one time to be acquired under the Act must necessarily be dealt with in one award, but only that any one piece of land (forming part of the whole) in which more than one person has an interest for which he can claim compensation, ought not to be made the subject of more than one award. In nutshell, what has been enunciated is if there is one owner of a particular land holding then in respect of his particular holding more than one award ought not to be made. Obviously when there are various holdings and various owners, the possibility of making more than one award cannot be ruled out and there appears to be no provision in the statute prohibiting making of more than one award in respect of the land so declared under Section 6 notification. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court also considered the question in the case of Bose Manna &. Company Pvt. Ltd, Vs Additional Land Acquisition Officer & Anolher AIR 1974 Cal 7. In the cited case, there were three plots belonging to the same person in respect of which separate awards were being made and he challenged the award in respect of one plot on the ground that more than one award was not contemplated by the Act. The Division Bench held that it seems that there is no warrant for the proposition that more than one award cannot be made in respect of one acquisition proceedings. Reliance for this proposition was made on the basis of the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Prag Narain (supra and also another case of the Calcutta High Court reported in Omeda Khatun Bewa (supra). The reasoning for holding that more than one award is possible has been culled out from a judgment given by the Calcutta High Court in Omeda Khatun Bewa (supra) which is as follows: 'The real point in the objection against piecemeal acquisition, however, is not that it involves a plurality of awards, but that it involves a succession of awards, each relating to a portion of the same land held in the same ownership for which there is no warrant in the Act. Nor is there any warrant for successive acquisitions by successive proceedings of different portions of the land covered by a declaration under Section 6, although such portions may belong to different owners. There maybe, and indeed have to be separate award cases and separate inquiries with regard to claims concerning different parcels of land belonging to different owners, where the land covered by the declaration comprises such parcels. Such separate inquiries may also be needed in respect of separate holdings owned by the same person. But such separate cases are all parts of one acquisition proceedings, stemming out there from after the stage of Section 9 of the Act, carried on simultaneously as far as possible and covering between themselves the entirety of the land when they terminated in awards. The plurality of awards made in such circumstances which is coupled with simultaneity can furnish no argument in favor of separate acquisition proceedings, each relating to a portion of the land, initiated at successive points of time and producing a succession of awards.'

(77) In the case of Malankara Rubber & Produce Co.Ltd Vs State of Kerala and others, : AIR1983Ker248 , the Court after considering the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act held that a declaration under Section 6 of the Act is not exhausted untill it leads to an award or awards covering the total area declared. It cannot be said that in no case can piecemeal awards be made and there arc two exceptions noticed in Corporation of Calcutta Vs Omeda Khatun Bewa Air 1956 Cal 722, for making piecemeal awards i.e. where ownership of different individuals is concerned or acquisition is held up by circumstances beyond control of acquiring authority, but the exceptions should not be limited to those two cases and in different but equally relevant sets of circumstances further exceptions can also be contemplated.

(78) A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Aflatoon & Others Vs Lt.Governor & Others , also quoted with approval the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Omeda Khatun Bewa (supra) and upheld the making of more than one award as it was found that the two awards were not of the same holding but were of the land belonging to different persons. A Single Judge of this Court in Lal Singh & Others Vs Lt.Governor, Delhi & Others , held that there may, however, be more than one award in exceptional circumstances provided the said awards are not inconsistent decisions regarding the parcel of land, but constitute one decision in respect of the parcel of land. Another Single Judge has also taken similar view in the case Civil Writ No.307/72 decided on November 26, 1982.

(79) After all making of more than one award on the face of it docs not in any manner prejudice the owners of the land particularised in one declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act. As far as possible in respect of one piece of land belonging to one person or group of persons, there has to be, in our view, one award but for some good reasons there can be more than one award in respect of one holding otherwise the act of the respondent may be termed as arbitrary but where there are more than one holdings subject-matter of one declaration, we see no reason to hold that there ought to be only one award in respect of the said holdings. Hence, we negative this contention raised before us.

(80) Another important point which is common in some of the cases is with regard to the interpretation of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act 1957 in L.P.A. No.16/78 which is filed by Union of India against the judgment of a Single Judge of this Court, the decision of the Single Judge has been challenged on the ground that the same is not in consonance with law. The Single Judge, while interpreting Section 55 of the Act, has held that if the land is sought to be acquired for the planned development of Delhi, the provisions of Delhi Development Act immediately come into play and the development of such land can take place only in accordance with the Master Plan and Zonal Plans to be framed under the Delhi Development Act. Issuance of a notification seeking to acquire a land for the planned development of Delhi under action 4 of the Land Acquisition Act read with the Master Plan prepared under the Delhi Development Act 1957 and also taking into consideration the provisions of Section 15 of the Delhi Development Act, it has to be inferred that land which was notified under Section 4 of the Act for the planned development of Delhi is the land designated for compulsory acquisition, as contemplated by Section 55 of the Act and if such land is not acquired within six months of the service of notice, after the expiry of period of 10 years of the coming into force of the Master Plan, then such land goes out of the compulsory acquisition and would be deemed to have been released from acquisition.

(81) Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act lays down where any land situated in any area in Delhi is required by the Master Plan or a Zonal Development Plan to be kept as an open space or unbuilt open or is designated in any such plan as subject to compulsory acquisition, then if at the expiration of 10 years from the date of operation of the plan under Section Ii or where such land has been so required or designated by any amendment of such plan from the date of operation of such amendment, the land is not compulsorily acquired, the owner of the land may serve on the Central Government a notice requiring his interest in the land to be so acquired. Section 55 (2) lays down that if the Central Government fails to acquire the land within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the notice, the Master Plan or, as the case may be, the Zonal Development Plan, shall have effect after the expiration of said six months as if the land were not required to be kept as an open space or unbuilt open or were not designated as subject to compulsory acquisition.

(82) In order that Section 55 could come into operation, the first element which must be established is that the particular land is designated in Master Plan or the Zonal Development Plan for compulsory acquisition. It is admitted fact that in the present cases no Zonal Development Plans have been prepared for the localities where the land in question, subject matter of the present cases, is located. So, we have to see whether the learned Single Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that land, which has been notified under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition for planned development of Delhi, can be deemed to be designated in the Master Plan for compulsory acquisition.

(83) The Master Plan is prepared under Section 7 of the Act. The Master Plan is to define the various zones into which Delhi may be divided for the purpose of development and indicate the manner in which the land in each zone is proposed to be used (whether by carrying out thereon of development or otherwise) and the stages by which any such development shall be carried out and shall serve as a basic pattern of framework within which the Zonal Development Plans of the various zones may be prepared. The Master Plan can provide for any other matter which is necessary for the proper development of Delhi. The Master Plan was prepared under the said provision and was put into force w.e.f. 1st September 1962.

(84) SH.P.N.LEKHI, senior counsel, has urged before us that looking to the various 'pages of the Master Plan, particularly page Iii and pages 3, 5, 10 to 22, 38, 39, 42, 71 and 86, it would be quite clear as to what land was required for compulsory acquisition for carrying out the development and thus any notification issued either prior to the enforcement of the Master Plan or after the enforcement of the Master Plan for acquiring the land for the planned development of Delhi would mean that the said land stands specified in the Master Plan for compulsory acquisition.

(85) He has referred to the meaning of the word 'designated' appearing in the Oxford Dictionary, Words and Phrases. In nutshell the meaning of the word 'Designated' is to mark, point out, indicate or specify or describe. Same meaning appear also in Black's Law Dictionary which indicates that the word means to mark, trace, denote by indication, to point out, to -particularise. We have gone through the various pages of the Master Plan and we find that the Master Plan had generally indicated the land which is under use for different purposes and land which may be generally required for development purposes. It is not possible to hold that particular land has been specified or earmarked or pointed out or indicated for compulsory acquisition in Delhi by the Master Plan. Only indication in the Master Plan is in general way and not in particular or specific way as to which land is to be required for compulsory acquisiton. Section 55 does not say that if any notification had been issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land for public purpose of planned development of Delhi, then the said notification would lapse if the said land is not acquired within the stipulated period after the interested person had given any notice. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act also does not require the authority to specify any particular land. Only requirement is to indicate the locality in which the and is sought to beacquired. It is only if the declaration issued under Section 6 in respect of a specific land that it can be said that a particular land has now been earmarked for compulsory acquisition but that also would be under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. May be the notifications under Section 4 & 6, if issued for the planned development of Delhi, would mean by inference that the land so sought to be acquired would be developed in accordance with the Master Plan and the Zonal Plans to be brought into existence under the provisions of the Delhi Development Act. But it cannot be said with any rationality that the said kind would be* deemed to have been so designated for compulsory acquisition for the purposes of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act. Mere fact that in the Master Plan no area has been so designated for compulsory acquisition would not mean that Section 55 of the Act required any such designation being made in the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan and if no such* designation had been made, the land canned be acquired for planned development of Delhi.

(86) It may be also emphasised that notification issued in 1959 for planned development of Delhi was upheld by the Supreme Court in case of Aflatoon and it was noticed that some interim plan had been prepared in respect of development in Delhi and land so sought to be acquired as per notification issued in 1959 would be needed for the development of Delhi in accordance with the said interim plan. But that would not mean that the land so notified under the Land Acquisition Act would be deemed to be designated for compulsory acquisition in the Master Plan itself. Unless and until in the Master Plan itself the land is designated meaning thereby is specified, particularised, earmarked or pointed out, provisions of Section 55 would not come into play at all and such designation should be also indicated in the Master Plan itself that it was for compulsory acquisition

(87) MR.LEKHI has also urged before us that the scheme of the Master Plan, the Delhi Land Restriction on Transfers) Act 1972 would indicate that there was inbuilt limitation of 10 years for completing the first phase of the Master Plan and if any notifications had been issued for acquiring the land for planned development of Delhi in 1959, 1963, 1964 or 1965, they would be deemed to have been issued for completing the First phase of the Master Plan which was to come to an end in the year 1972 or if they have been issued for the second phase of the Master Plan, then such notifications would have to be utilised only till the period of 20 years which was the lifespan of the First Master Plan and notices, if issued under Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, requiring the authorities to complete the acquisition proceedings, the law contemplates that such acquisition proceedings should have been completed within six months from the service of such notices and if such proceedings had not been completed, it would mean that the land is no longer required for compulsory acquisition for the planned development of Delhi.

(88) It should not be forgotten that development is a continuous process. It is not that when a Master Plan has been put into operation, the authorities are debarred from changing the Master Plan at any time in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Delhi Development Act or from framing new plan after the expiry of the first plan. Whether a particular notification issued under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6 should be quashed for delay and laches is a separate question which has been dealt with by us in the earlier part of the judgment. But it would not be possible to countenance the argument that even though there is no N indication or specification of any land for compulsory acquisition in Delhi in the Master Plan, even then by inference, this Court should hold that the moment any notification is issued under the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring any land for planned development of Delhi, the Court should hold that the said land stands now designated for compulsory acquisition in the Master Plan itself.

(89) In order to know whether particular land has been designated, specified, indicated, traced out or marked for compulsory acquisition or not, the Court has only to see the Master Plan and no other document. It would be too much to say that even though in the Master Plan no such land is designated for compulsory acquisition, even then the Court should hold that acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, although for the purpose of planned development of Delhi, still it should be inferentially held that the land is so designated for compulsory acquisition in the Master Plan. If the Legislature intended that such a meaning to be given to the notifications being issued under Section 4 & 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Legislature could have easily indicated its mind by using appropriate language in Section 55 of the Act itself. It may be also mentioned that earlier the provisions of the Delhi Development Act itself contemplated acquisition of land for the purposes of development in accordance with the Master Plan and procedure prescribed in the Delhi Development Act was more expeditious then the procedure prescribed in the Land Acquisition Act. But later on the Parliament amended the law and left the acquisition to be carried on under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act even for the purpose of the planned development of Delhi, as contemplated by provisions of the Master Plan framed under the Delhi Development Act.

(90) It is also significant to mention that under Section 55, the language used is that if the land is so designated in the Master Plan is not acquired within the stipulated

(91) SH.P.N.LEKHI has referred to Sahab Singh Vs . Union India : 38(1989)DLT127 which judgment has followed the law laid down by the Single Judge in the case, which is subject matter of the Letters Patent Appeal which is being heard by us. No independent reasons have been given in this judgment for holding that land notified for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act could be deemed to be designated for purpose of compulsory acquisition in the Master Plan itself.

(92) Reference was made to Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs . Dr.Hakimwadi Tenants' Association : [1988]2SCR21 . In the said case, provisions of Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act 1966 came up for .consideration. In the said case, there was no plea taken that the particular land did not come within the purview of Section 127 of that Act which is worded differently from Section 55 of the present Act. In nutshell, Section 127 of that Act lays down that if any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified in any plan under that Act is not acquired by agreement within 10 years from the date on which the final regional plan and final development plan comes into force or if proceedings for the acquisition of such land under this Act or under the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced within such period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve notice on the Planning Authority, the Development Authority or, as the case may be, the Appropriate Authority to that effect. And if within six months from the date of the service of that notice, the land is not acquired or no steps, as aforesaid, are commenced for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed and thereupon the land shall be deemed to be released from such reservation, allotment or designation and shall become available to the owner for the purpose of development or otherwise, presumably in the case of adjacent land under the relevant plan. The point involved in that case was with regard to the date on which the period of six months was to commence.

(93) It is evident in view of the provisions of Section 127 that if the land had been designated in the Master Plan for a particular compulsory acquisition, the provisions of the said Section would come into play on service of a notice. This judgment is of no help in deciding the question whether a particular Master Plan. designates a particular land for compulsory acquisition or not.

(94) Reference was also made to Mahanshi Dayanand Co-operative Group Housing Society Limited Vs . Union of India, : 51(1993)DLT554 . In the cited case, a notification was quashed by the Court as the land was not acquired within six months of issuance of a notice, as contemplated by Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, and another notification was issued for acquiring the land for the same purpose of planned development of Delhi. The Division Bench held that repeated notification cannot be issued for the same purpose when the first notification had been quashed. A question was sought to be raised with regard to the interpretation of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act. The Court has declined to go into this question as previous notification had been quashed in an earlier writ petition and which decision was not challenged by the Government by filing any appeal against that judgment. So, this judgment would not help us in deciding this point with regard to the interpretation of Section 55 of the Act.

(95) In case of Madan Lal Mittal Vs . Union of India, : 46(1992)DLT325 , a Single judge has followed the law as laid down by other Single Judges of this Court in earlier cases that land would go out of the scope of compulsory acquisition under Section 55 of the Act if the acquisition is not completed within six months of the service of notice. No detailed discussion has been made with regard to interpretation of Section 55 of the Act in this judgment. It appears that in all these cases which have been referred to in this judgment, it was taken as settled legal position that once a notification under Section 4 or declaration under Section 6 are issued under the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land for planned development of Delhi, the provisions of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act would come into operation and land so notified would be deemed to be designated for compulsory acquisition for purposes of Section 55 of Delhi Development Act.

(96) MR.MADAN Lokur, Standing Counsel for Union of India, has contended that the word 'or' appearing between the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan in Section 55 should be read as 'and'. He has urged that if we look into the purpose of Section 55 of the Act and the object for which the land is to be required for compulsory acquisition, then it is evident that the Court should hold that if land is designed for compulsory acquisition either or both in Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan. then notice could be given by the interested person for acquiring land expeditiously within six months of the service of notice only after the expiry of 10 years of coming into force of the Zonal Development Plan as well and where only Master Plan has come into force and Zonal Development Plan is yet to be framed under Section 8 of the Delhi Development Act, the period of limitation for issuing a notice under Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act shall not commence. It is only when Zonal Development Plan had also come into operation that 10 years period shall commence from the date of enforcement of the Zonal Development Plan and thereafter on expiry of 10 years a notice can be given by interested person if the land's so designated for compulsory acquisition either in Master Plan and/or in Zonal Development Plan for compulsory acquisition. He has urged that if the word 'or' is not read as 'and', it would result in completely defecting the object for which the land is to be utilised i.e. for proper development of Delhi in accordance with the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plans to be prepared under the provisions of the Delhi Development Act. It is urged that if the word 'or' is not read as 'and', an absurdity would also result because once the land has been released from compulsory acquisition or it being not acquired within the stipulated period of service of the notice on the expiry of 10 years from the date of the enforcement of the Master Plan, then even though in the Zonal Development Plan same land is also specified or designated for compulsory acquisition, even then such land cannot be acquired again by issuing a subsequent notification under Section 4 for acquiring the land for planned development of Delhi.

(97) In support of his argument that word 'or' can be read as 'and' in a particular provision in order to avoid the absurdity of interpretation of a particular provision in the statute, he has referred to Rao Shig Bahadar Singh Vs . The Stale of Vindhya Pradesh, : 1954CriLJ1480 in which it has been laid down that it is incumbent on the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application.

(98) He has also referred to J.K.Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Lid. Vs . State of Uttar Pradesh, : (1961)ILLJ540SC which refers to the rule of interpretation, as quoted from Craies on Statute Law on page 206 Sixth Edition that the rule is that whenever there is a particular enactment and the general enactment in the same statute and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply. This rule of interpretation is not strictly attracted to the provisions of the said Section.

(99) In Siraj-ul-Haq Khan Vs . The Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U.P, : [1959]1SCR1287 , it was laid down that it is well- settled that in construing the provisions of a statute, courts should be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective, an attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. In such a case,it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of it effective and operative.

(100) In Hameedia Hardware Stores Vs . Mohan Lal Sowcar, : [1988]3SCR384 , the Supreme Court, in order to avoid the absurd results, had supplied the word 'and' between the two sub-clauses while interpreting the provisions of T.N.Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960.

(101) He has also referred to certain judgments were the Court has read the word 'or' as word 'and* in order to avoid any redundancy or absurdity if the word 'or' has been given its literal meaning. He has relied on Ishwar Singh Vs . Slate of U.P, : 1969CriLJ19 in which it was held that some times to carry out the functions of the Legislature, it is found necessary to read the conjunctions 'or and 'and' one for the other.

(102) The Supreme Court in M.Satyanarayana v. State of Karnataka A.I.R. 1986 S C 7762 has laid down that a statute cannot be construed merely with reference to grammar. Statute, whenever the language permits, must be construed reasonably and rationally to give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature. The expression *and* has generally a cumulative effect, requiring the fulfillment of all the conditions that it joins together and it is the antithesis of 'or.

(103) If the Legislature intended that the land should be only specified in a Master Plan for compulsory acquisition and not in the Zonal Development Plan, then the Legislature would have used some different expressions in Section 55 of the Act. By having mentioned both,, the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan, in Section 55, the intention of the Legislature is obvious that if a particular land has been designated for compulsory acquisition in the Master Plan, the same would normally be also designed so in the Zonal Development Plan which is a more detailed plan specifying various purposes for which a particular land in that particular zone is to be used. The Master Plan only generally indicates the different zones for purposes of various activities like residential, industrial, residential-cum-commercial or commercial and for institutional purposes. So, the Land Use Plan, which is prepared under the Master Plan, indicates generally the purposes for which land so indicated is to be used. It is only in the Zonal Development Plans that details are worked out and specifications are made for use of the said land even if the Land Use Plan of the Master Plan shows a residential area, it is the Zonal Development Plan which would indicate as to what sort of commercial and institutional places are to be indicated for more beneficial use of the residential area. So, keeping in view the object and purpose of preparing the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plans which is in pursuance to the object of having a planned development of Delhi indicates that if the particular land had been designated for compulsory acquisition, it is so designated not only for purpose of the Master Plan but also for the purpose of the Zonal Development Plan and in order to give full meaning to the object which was in view of the Legislature while drafting Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, we are of the view that the word 'or' appearing in between 'the Master Plan' and 'the Zonal Development Plan' in this Section should be read as 'and'.

(104) Assuming that the argument advanced by Mr.Lekhi is correct that once the land is notified for compulsory acquisition in Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition . Act, it would be deemed to have been so designed in the Master Plan, even then the provisions of Section 55 would not come into force till the Zonal Development Plan is also prepared and thereafter 10 years period had lapsed and the land so designated is not acquired within the stipulated period after service of notice, only in that situation, it may be possible to say that the land has gone out of the expression 'compulsory acquisition' used in Section 55 of the Act. It is not possible to agree with the contention that if the land is deemed to be designated for the purpose of the Master Plan, it would not be deemed to be designated by same inference for the purpose of the Zonal Development Plan.

(105) It is well settled rule of interpretation that the words used in particular provision should be given their natural meaning and court is not empowered to legislate. It is only where there is some ambiguity in the words used by the Legislature that the court has to give meaning to those words keeping in view the object for which the legislation was brought into existence. (See in this connection Shri Ram Vs State of Maharashtra, : [1961]2SCR890 , Shiv Ram Anand Vs Radha Bai Shanta Ram, : [1984]2SCR750 , S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and another, : [1982]2SCR365 , and Stale of Kerala Vs Mathai Verghese 1986(1) Scc 746, Keeping in view the plain language of Section 55. it has to be held that the Master Plan itself if indicated particular land for compulsory acquisition, only then Section 55(2) would be applicable.

(106) The authorities had deliberately not shown any particular land in the Master Plan for compulsory acquisition although notifications have been issued from time lo time for compulsory acquisition of the land for purposes of pl Ranned development of Delhi which, of course, has to be in accordance with the Master Plan or the Zonal Development Plan as the case may. But it cannot be said that once the notifications have been issued under Section 4 and declarations under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land subject-matter of such notifications and declarations would be deemed to be shown in the Master Plan as designated for compulsory acquisition. Looking to the constraints of limitation prescribed under Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act the authorities might have advisably thought fit not to show any particular ld whatsoever in the Master Plan as designated for compulsory acquisition. Whether the authorities had, due to their inertia or negligence or deliberate omission, led the things to remain status quo and they have no good Explanationn for not completing the acquisition proceedings in a reasonable time even then the ground of challenge to such acquisition proceedings could not be on the basis of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act which can be resorted to only if a particular land had been clearly designated in the Master Plan for compulsory acquisition.

(107) In view of the above discussion, we hold that in the present cases before us, Section 55 was not at all invokable as n o land has been at all designated in the Master Plan for compulsory acquisition.

(108) A contention was raised before us that the life span of the Master Plan was 20 years and any notifications issued earlier, if the acquisition proceedings arc not completed the notifications have lost their value and ought to be declared unenforceable and void. As already 'discussed above, the planning is an on-going process. Mere fact of delay having occurred in completing the acquisition proceedings expeditiously or within reasonable time by itself is not sufficient to hold that the public purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired has disappeared. The fact should not be lost sight of that large tracks of land was sought to be acquired for purposes of constructing huge residential colonies and commercial areas and delay is bound to occur in completing the acquisition proceedings and the Legislature became aware of such delay taking place and thus, in its wisdom amended the Land Acquisition Act to redress the grievances of the land owners whose lands were subject of such delayed acquisition proceedings and the Legislature put the time frame in completing the acquisition proceedings so that the land owners may not lose the market value of their lands sought to be acquired compulsorily.

(109) In some of the cases before us, factual averments were made that notifications issued under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 have not been published in accordance with the provisions of the statute and thus those notifications be declared as void. It was contended before us that it was incumbent upon the respondents to have produced the record Along with their returns in these writ petitions to show that in fact the due compliance of the provisions of statutes were made in issuing notification under Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act. It is urged that in the petitions it has been averred that no such notifications were given publicity in the local areas at all and records having been not produced in that respect the inference could be drawn that averments made by the petitioners in the writ petitions arc correct. It is correct that in case notifications have not been published under Sections 4 & 6 of the Act in accordance with the provisions of the statute the said notifications arc void ab initio.

(110) The question which arises for consideration is whether such a challenge could he allowed to be made belatedly by the petitioners when these notifications were published in the official gazette many years ago.

(111) It is not possible to countenance that the petitioners in the present cases would not have come to know about the issuance of such notifications which have been admittedly published in the official gazette. It has been held by the Supreme Court in a number of judgments and by this Court in quite a few judgments that if the challenge to the notifications issued under Sections 4 & 6 is not brought expeditiously by the aggrieved persons then belated challenge by filing Writ Petitions is to be negatived. (See Pt.Girdhran Prasad Missir. & Another Vs State of Bihar & Another (1980)2 Scc 83, Aflatoon & Others Vs Lt. Governor of Delhi & Others, : [1975]1SCR802 , Babu Singh & Others Vs Union of India & Others : AIR1979SC1713 , Babu Singh & Others Vs Union of India & Others. : AIR1979SC1713 , Hari Singh & Others Vs State of U.P. & Others Vish was Nagar Evacuees Plot Purchasers Association & Another Vs Under Secretary, Delhi Administration & Others, : AIR1990SC849 , State of Haryana & Others Vs Sukhdev & Others : AIR1994SC1255 and Smt.Shakuntala B.Moda Vs Union of India & Others. 1991(3) D L 301.)

(112) It is evident that if challenge is made belatedly to such notifications obviously it would become difficult for the authorities to meet such a challenge as the records of such old notifications may not be available and also if challenge had been made expeditiously and some deficiencies were found in publicizing the notifications, the notifications could have been withdrawn and fresh notifications could have been issued. By allowing such notifications to remain unchallenged for years together the petitioners had allowed the authorities to proceed on the basis that there would not be any challenge to such notifications. Mere fact that in some cases acquisition proceedings have not been completed and possession had not been taken would not entitle the petitioners to get the notifications set aside on such a ground. Even if there is no counter filed in some of the cases rebutting the factual averments with regard to notifications being not published in the locality as required by law even then the respondents are not debarred from taking the plea in arguments that the writ petitioners in challenging these notifications belatedly arc guilty of laches and delay. In the case of Ramjas Foundation & Others Vs Union of India & Others. 50(1993) Dlt 23 (SC), on similar grounds the belated challenge was negatived. So there is no merit in such a pica and such challenge has to be negatived.

(113) In some of the cases, the plea taken was that notices under Sections 9 & 10 have not been served and thus the acquisition proceedings have become void. In the case of Jalan Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has held that even if there has been no service of notices under Sections 9 & 10 which are meant only for taking proceeding for determining compensation even then the same would not affect the acquisition proceedings.

(114) It appears that in most of the cases the awards have been made after the filing of these writ petitions. About 211 awards came to be made just a day before the time of two years was to elapse from the enforcement of the Amendment Act of 1984. The Act gave two years time for completing the acquisition proceedings for giving the award in all those cases where notifications had been issued prior to the said amendment. A number of points have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners particularly Mr.P.N.Lekhi, Senior Advocate, that making of the awards in such a hasty and on one particular day is a fraud on the exercise of power. He has pointed out that there have been many errors in the awards as is apparent from a perusal of the details of the awards given by counsel for the respondents in the shape of a compilation and it is urged that there has been non-application of mind not only by the Collector who made the awards but also by the authorised officer who was to give the prior consent for making the awards. It has been pointed out that under Section 11 first proviso no award can be made by the Collector without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf. It was pointed out by Mr.Lekhi that in the present cases the so-called authorised officer had affixed his signatures mechanically on the awards themselves which shows total non-application of mind as at first in the normal way the drafts of the awards ought to have been sent to the said authorised officer and after he had given his previous approval thereafter the awards should have been made by the Collector and should have been then entered in the appropriate register, giving the Seriall numbers. He has made reference to State of U.P & Others Vs Rajiv Gupta & Another, : (1994)5SCC686 . In the cited case the award was in accordance with the limitation prescribed in Section 11A ought to have been made on or before December 21, 1992, the Collector had sent the proposed award to the Commissioner for his prior approval. However, that prior approval was not given before the expiry of the said period of two years. In that situation it was held that as the award has not been made within the prescribed period, thus, the entire proceedings stood lapsed. It is no doubt laid down in this judgment that prior approval as contemplated by proviso to Section 11 is mandatory before making the award.

(115) Before dealing with the contentions raised before us, we may notice the purpose of the award and the object of having prior approval from the authorised officer. It is urged by Sh.Ravinder Sethi, Senior Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondents that award is mere determination of the Collector on behalf of the Government with regard to the compensation which is to be offered to the person whose land is sought to be acquired. Once the award is signed by the Collector after having the necessary approval of the Government, the Government cannot change the said amount determined as compensation in the award and the award is to be communicated to the persons concerned to enable them to either accept the award or to seek reference to the court concerned for enhancement of the compensation. It is urged that the owners have no locus standi whatsoever to challenge the award on the ground that the prior approval given was not in accordance with law or there has been no application of mind by the Collector in making the award. Because the making of the award does not in any manner prejudice the rights of the persons to whom the offer is to go in the shape of the award for accepting the compensation and if they choose not to accept the same, they are only to seek reference to the court concerned for enhancement of the compensation. We find merit in these contentions.

(116) In Ezra Vs Secretary of Slate for India in Council, and Others (1905) L.R. 32 I A 93, it was laid laid down that the Collector under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act while determining the compensation is holding administrative proceedings and although the award is conclusive against the Government but it is subject to the land owner's right to have the matter referred to the court. It was held that the award cannot be declared void merely because the Collector had availed himself of information supplied to him without the land owner's knowledge and even not disclosed during the inquiry being held by him for determining the compensation.

(117) In Asstt.Development Officer Vs Tayaballi Allibhov Bohori Air 1933 Bom 361, it was held that the acquiring officer's award is, of course, strictly speaking not an award at all but an offer. It is based on inquiry and inspection and officer responsible for it is usually a man of experience and local knowledge. He may take evidence but he is not bound to do so and his proceedings are administrative rather than judicial. But if his award is not accepted and the matter is taken into court, the proceedings are thenceforward judicial in character.

(118) In Jehangir Bomanji and others Vs C.D.Gaikwad, : AIR1954Bom419 , it was again reiterated that inquiry under Section 11 of the Act is administrative inquiry. In this case it was also indicated that issuance of notice under Section 12 of the Act with regard to the making of the award is only for the purpose of limitation which could be available to the aggrieved person to seek reference under Section 18 for enhancement of the compensation and failure to give detailed notice under Section 12 is not fatal and does not confer any right on the claimant and the only right that a claimant has is to apply for a reference. If the reference is barred, the failure to give immediate notice can hardly confer any right on the claimant.

(119) In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs Deputy Land Acquisition Officer & Another, : [1962]1SCR676 , it was held by the Supreme Court that Section 12 only Fixes the period of limitation in which the aggrieved person should seek reference on the receipt of the notice of the making of the award or on his coming to know of the making of the award whether actually or constructively. It was also held in this very judgment that award made by the Collector is in a sense a decision of the Collector in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested. But legally the award cannot be treated as a decision. It is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer, no further proceeding is required to be laken. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer, Section 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by the Court. In view of this nature of the award, the Supreme Court opined that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or an offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner. The Supreme Court commented that for purpose of seeking reference under Section 18, the consideration would arise as to when the making of the award was known to the parly concerned actively or constructively. This judgment does not lay down any proposition of law as was sought to be canvassed before us that unless the award is communicated to the person concerned, there is no award in fact in existence. We may refer to Kaliyappan Vs State of Kerala, : AIR1989SC239 , where the Supreme Court has clearly held that under Section 11A of the Act, the words 'the Collector shall make the award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration' mean that the Collector is empowered to make an award till the expiry of the last date of the period of two years irrespective of the date on which the notice of the award is served upon the person interested in the land. It was emphasized that to make an award in this Section means to sign the award. The judgment given in the case of Raja Harish Chander (supra) was also referred by the Supreme Court and was distinguished. So it was made clear that giving of a notice of the award under Section 12 is meant for a different purpose and it is not to be confused with the words appearing in the Section 11A with regard to making of the award. The award would stand made when it is signed and the question of communication of award is only to enable the aggrieved person to seek reference to the court for enhancement of compensation within the period stipulated. In a large number of cases like M.Dodia Malliah & Others Vs Stale of Andhra Pradesh, : AIR1964AP216 , The Collector, Raigarh Vs Chaturbhuj Panda & Others, : AIR1964MP196 , Smt.Sumatra Bai Vs State of Madhya Pradesh, : AIR1966MP65 , Special Land Acquisition Officer Vs Natverlal Jamnadas Muni. : AIR1968Bom31 , N.Bommon Behram & Another Vs The Government of Mysore & Others, Air 1970 Mysore 89, and State of Tamil Nadu & Another Vs P.Kanagamani & Others, : AIR1975Mad303 , the law laid down was that the award is merely an offer or tender of the compensation to the land owner and the Collector acts only administratively in ascertaining the compensation.

(120) It is true that if a particular administrative order or decision affects any legal rights of a person then such an order is amenable to the writ of certiorari. The earlier view that writ of certiorari was possible only in respect of judicial or quasi-judicial decision now no longer holds the field. The extent of the certiorari jurisdiction is now widened to include administrative decisions affecting adversely the legal rights of persons but the award of the Collector is neither a judicial nor a quasi judicial nor an administrative order which can be deemed to affect adversely the legal rights of any person. It is in the nature of an offer of compensation which is not binding on the person concerned and thus, no prejudice is caused to such person even if amount of compensation is determined by the Collector without application of mind.

(121) In N.Bommoa Behram(supra) an argument was raised before the Supreme Court that there were no guidelines for the approval tO be given to the award under the proviso to Section 11 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that this submission was erroneous as the Government in approving the award has to lake into consideration the provisions of the Act and any grievance with regard to the quantum of compensation or any other grievance on account of compensation is capable of being remedied under the provisions of the Act. So, even if there arc glaring errors committed by the Collector in making the awards and there has been non-application of mind or even mechanical signing of the award by the Collector and before that by the authorised officer on behalf of the Government in giving prior approval would not mean that the awards have not been made within the stipulated period because if the awards are not acceptable to the aggrieved persons, they can always seek reference to the courts concerned for enhancement of the compensation. The awards so made which come into existence on signing of the awards by the Collector are valid and enforceable against the Government whose authorised officer had appended his signatures on the award giving the prior approval. That in our view would meet with the requirements of law and the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the awards on the ground that prior approval has been given in a mechanical manner and the awards have been signed by the Collector also in a mechanical manner without application of mind. A large number of judgments lay down that non-service of notices under Sections 9, 10 or under Section 12 of the Act do not vitiate the acquisition proceedings. (See Ezra Vs Secretary of State (supra ),Kasturi Pillai Vs Municipal Council Air 1920 Mad 417, ShivdevSinh Vs State of Bihar & Others, : AIR1963Pat201 , Prasanna Kumar Dass & Others Vs State of Orissa 1956 Orissa 114, Yousuf Begam Vs State of Andhra Pradesh & Others, : AIR1969AP10 , P.KShaikh Vs Stale of West Bengal & Others, : AIR1976Cal149 , Lakhbir Chand Vs Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi & Others, : AIR1979Delhi53 , Slate of Punjab Vs Gurdial Singh & Another, , Manakchand Sarupchand Lunavat & Others Vs Stale of Maharashtra & Others, : AIR1989Bom339 and and Dr.G.H.Grant Vs State of Bihar. : [1965]3SCR576 .)

(122) The purpose of introducing the proviso in Section 11 was that the Collector should not make the award at his whim and fancy and Government may not be burdened with unusual high amount of compensation which may not have any bearing with the market value of the land in question and thus, this proviso was introduced so that an authorised officer of some rank on behalf of the Government should scrutinize the award before it is made and give his approval. This particular provision has been made obviously for the benefit of the Government and not for the benefit of anyone else or of the land owners whose land was sought to be acquired. So, the petitioners cannot, in our view, challenge either the grant of prior approval or the making of the award on the ground already mentioned above.

(123) In the case of Dr.G,H.Granl (supra) in para 16, same ratio of law was laid down that an award by the Collector is strictly speaking an offer made to the person interested and it is open to the Government even after the award is made, to withdraw from the acquisition of any land in exercise of the power conferred by Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is, thereforee, not the award of the Collector which is the source of right to compensation; the award quantifies the offer of the appropriate Government which is made because the Government has taken over or intends to take the land of the owner under the authority conferred by the Land Acquisition Act. The title of the owner extinguishes in the land when the Government takes possession of the land after the award of compensation is made.

(124) SO. we negative the challenge to these awards as these awards have been made within the limitation prescribed. There are a number judgments which have taken the view that award is made when it is signed by the Collector and communication of the award and giving of notice under Section 12 is not sine qua non for making of the award. ( See Nader Chand Mallick Vs Slate of West Bengal & Others Air 1952 Cal 67, Jehanagar Bomanji & Others Vs C.D. Gaikwad, : AIR1954Bom419 ,)

(125) In a recent judgment in the case of Sharadchandra Ganesh Mulcy Vs Stale of Maharashtra & Others, : AIR1996SC61 , the Supreme Court has laid down that.signing of the award on a particular date is conclusive evidence of making of the award. So, service of notice under Section 12 is not mandatory and even if no notice is served under Section 12 the award would remain valid and only limitation for seeking reference for enhancement of the compensation would commence when the aggrieved person comes to know about the making of the award.

(126) In some of the cases it was urged before us that as awards have not been made even within two years from the date of the amendment of the Land Acquisition Act prescribing the limitation under section 11A of the Act, the land acquisition proceedings should be quashed. However, under Section 11A the limitation gets extended because as per Explanationn given in that Section in computing the period of two years the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of the court shall be excluded. In all these cases where the orders regarding status quo have been obtained or the stay of dispossession has been obtained, obviously the period in which such stay remains in operation is to be excluded while computing the period of two years. The acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed in such cases where the awards have not been made and stay granted by the court is still in operation because the period in which the stay remained in operation has to be excluded while computing the period of two years. (See Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya Vs State of Gujarat & Another, : AIR1991SC2153 . wherein in para 8 it has been laid down that the said Explanationn is in the widest possible term. It was clarified in this judgment that benefit which is to accrue to the landlord would become available to him if the land owner who seeks benefit has not obtained any order from a court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6. It was held that the Explanationn covers only those cases of the land holders who do not obtain any order from a court which would delay or prevent making of the award or taking possession of the land. In Palel Virchandbhai Madabhai Vs State of Gujarat & Another, : AIR1991Guj152 , it was made clear that if there is order obtained restraining taking of possession of land that amounts to stay of action or proceeding as contemplated by Explanationn to Section 11. It is evident that if stay of dispossession or order of status quo has been obtained the authorities are inhibited from completing the acquisition proceedings and the law requires if the award is, made they have also to deposit the amounts of compensation with the Collector and that amount would remain unutilised for years together till the judicial case is decided and slay is vacated. So, it has to be held that once such an order is made by which the constrain is put on the authorities of whatsoever nature by an order of the court the period in which the stay remains in operation has to be excluded in computing the period of two years prescribed in Section 11A of the Act. In Gandhi Grab Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. etc. Vs State of Rajasthan & Others, : 1993(66)ELT47(SC) , the -same ratio of law has been laid down. So, we reject this contention also.

(127) Another point urged before us by Sh.P.N.Lekhi, counsel for some of the petitioners, is that the awards which have been made in one go in 1986 pertaining to large number of cases stand vitiated because there were no funds available with the Government for paying the. compensation and he has referred to the minutes of the meetings held on 14th March 1986, 1st May 1986 and 10th June 1986 of which copies have been furnished by the learned counsel during the course of the arguments. These meetings were held between the officers of the various Departments of the Government in order to meet the deadline for making of the awards in respect of the notifications already issued before the 1984 amendment and in nutshell the minutes of these meetings show that the departments were finding it difficult to have the necessary funds which may have to be deposited with the Collector on the making of the awards.

(128) It is urged by learned counsel that frantic efforts were being made by the authorities to raise the huge funds in order to make the awards before the limitation was to expire and thus, he would like us to hold that, in fact, funds were not available with the authorities at the time the awards were made in 1986 and he has referred to Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act which makes it incumbent for the Collector to tender the payment of compensation to the interested persons just on making of the award.

(129) The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,, have contended that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners in this respect are conjectural as there is no instance in which on the making of the award the Collector was not in a position to pay the compensation. It is urged that in absence of any specific pica, it would be too much to hold that provisions of Section 31 in this respect have been violated. It is urged that mere fact that huge amount was needed for payment as compensation does not mean that the authorities would not have been able to arrange the funds at the requisite time when-the awards were made.

(130) We find much force in the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents. Mere fact that anterior to making of the awards the various officers representing different departments of the Government were holding meetings in order to arrange for the funds which would be required for making payment on making of the awards does not lead to any inference that the funds were not available on the date the awards were made.

(131) It was urged before us by counsel for the petitioners in some of the cases that awards were invalid for want of notice under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. We have already dealt with this point. It was urged before us. by learned counsel for petitioners that notices under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act arc mandatory and unless the notices of making of the award are received by the petitioners, the awards cannot be deemed to have been made.

(132) However, the Supreme Court has already spoken on this point in case of Kaliyappan (supra) that date of signing of the award is the date of making of the award and we have expressed our view that purpose of serving a notice under Section 12 is only to enable the aggrieved interested person to decide whether the compensation' given in the award is to be accepted or reference is to be made to the Court concerned for enhancement of the compensation and non-issuance of a notice soon after making of the award does not vitiate the award in any manner which is only an offer of payment of compensation for the land sought to be acquired.

(133) On behalf of the petitioners, reliance has been placed on Bachhillar Singn Vs, State of Punjab. : AIR1963SC395 . This judgment was dealing with the provisions of Article 311(2) and Article 166 of the Constitution. Under Article 166 the point was as to when it was to be deemed to be the order of the State Government. It was held that under Article 166, the order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor and before a particular opinion of the Minister can amount to a decision of the Government, it must be communicated to the person concerned.

(134) Then, reliance was placed on the judgment given incase of Raja Harish Chandra (supra). In case of Kaluyappan (supra) as far as making of the award is concerned, it has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court that it is the date of the signing of the award which amounts to making of the award and communication of the award is not sine qua-non for making of the award. So, nothing more need be said on this point.

(135) It was also urged on behalf of the petitioners that large tract of land already acquired by the D.D.A. have been encroached by unauthorised persons and the D.D.A, which docs not have the machinery to protect its land, should not clamour for having more land for development purposes. It was urged that if the authorities are serious in carrying out the development in accordance with the Master Plan, the authorities should first strictly use the land, so encroached upon, for developing such land after evicting the encroachers for public purpose of planned development of Delhi. It is to be emphasised that the development of Delhi in a planned manner was a dream or a vision envisaged by the authorities and every endeavor has to be made by the authorities to realise the said dream. But there can be failures here and there. That would not lead to the conclusion that the public purpose which is enshrined in the Master Plan is to be given up and the authorities should not go on making efforts to acquire the land for laudable object of planned development of Delhi. On this ground that some land of the authorities had been trespassed illegally by a large number of persons would not, in our view, furnish any valid, legal ground to the petitioners for challenging (he acquisition proceedings in question.

(136) It was also urged before us that some of the land of the petitioners is shown in green colour in the Master Plan of Delhi and it is nol made clear by the respondents as to for what purpose the said land is to be acquired. It was pointed out to us from the Land Use Plan of the Master Plan by the counsel for respondents that the land shown in green colour is meant for recreational facilities and thus it cannot be said that the same is not needed for planned development of Delhi inasmuch as recreational facilities are very important features of the development of any area. Nothing turns on this contention of the petitioners that as the land is shown in green colour in the Land Use Plan of the Master Plan, so no more development is required to be carried on in such land after it is acquired by the authorities.

(137) One of the contentions raised before us was that as the first Master Plan has come to an end, the acquisition proceedings for acquiring land for the planned development of Delhi stand lapsed.

(138) In case of P.S.GUl v. Union of India LL.R. 1979 (Delhi) 601, a contention was raised before Division Bench of this Court that as there is no Master Plan prepared in respect of the Cantonment Area, the land cannot be acquired for planned development of Delhi. In this judgment,, it was held that it is not necessary that there should be a Master Plan in force before land could be acquired for planned development of Delhi. The provisions of the Delhi Development Act, particularly Section 15(2) to 15(7) before amendment of the Delhi Development Act were examined along with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and also the provisions of the Indian Works of defense Act and the conclusion was reached that the land could be acquired for planned development of Delhi de hors the provisions of the Delhi Development Act. We need not repeat the reasoning given in this judgment with which we entirely agree.

(139) Reference may be also made to Gandhi Gruh Nirman Sahkari Sumiti Ltd v. State of Rajasthan & Others, : 1993(66)ELT47(SC) , where provisions of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act came up for consideration and it was held that it is not necessary for the State Government to frame a detailed scheme or development plan before exercising powers under Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act. It was laid down that it is sufficient if a decision in that respect is taken and the detailed scheme is left to be worked out at the stage of the execution of the plan. Under Section 52 of the said Act, land could be acquired lor making improvements. The Supreme Court has held that mere taking a policy decision to acquire the land for public purpose is sufficient without there being any detailed scheme as to how the improvements were to be made being prepared.

(140) One of the contentions raised before us was that the D.D.A. would be needing some land for ati activity or purpose which is not in consonance with the Master Plan and thus the respondents must be directed to place on record the various schemes, if prepared by them, for utilising the land which is to he acquired in these acquisition proceedings.

(141) As already discussed above, it is not necessary that the Schemes for utilisation of the land should be in existence at the time of issuance of notifications and completion of the acquisition proceedings. It is suffice if the public purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired is still in existence and the Court cannot then hold that absence of detailed schemes till the completion of the acquisition proceedings would vitiate the acquisition proceedings. Even if some amendment of the Master Plan would be needed by the D.D.A. to carry out their schemes for planned development of Delhi with regard to the land, which is subject matter of these proceedings, it cannot be urged with any rationality that at first the Master Plan should be got amended and thereafter proceeding should he taken for acquiring the land for the object of planned development of Delhi. Where it is necessary to amend the Master Plan. the authorities can initiate the process even after the completion of the Acquisition proceedings. Such an argument was also urged before a Division Bench of this Court in case of Munni Lal v. Lt.Govemor of Delhi LL.R. 1984 (Delhi) 469 and the Division Bench held that the initiation of the acquisition proceedings is not vitiated when the exercise for amending the Master Plan has not been yet completed..' We agree with this view.

(142) In some of the cases, contentions were raised that improvements have been already made and the constructions have already been raised and the authorities would not be justified in acquiring the said land as they would be only demolishing the constructions and making the land available for raising other constructions. In case of Jalin Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has already held that the acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed on mere fact that certain constructions have been raised after issuance of a Section 4 notification. So, this contention has no merit.

(143) It was also urged before us that the Government had taken a decision vide a Circular D.O. No.F9/l/86-L & B/LA/6482 dated August 19, 1986 that built up area would not be acquired unless there is a vacant land of hectare or above available in the built-up area then such land could be acquired on priority basis.

(144) This circular was no doubt acted upon by one of us (P.K.Bahri,J) incase of Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Lid. v. Union of India, : 42(1990)DLT332 in quashing the acquisition proceedings but this judgment was not approved by the Division Bench in case of Sh.Bhagwan v. Union of India 1991 (2) D L 59 where it was discovered as a fact that the circular was not acted upon by the authorities. In detailed discussion, it was held I hat question of promissory estop el does not apply and such inter-department instructions could always be withdrawn by the authorities and no vested right had accrued to the persons whose land was sought to be acquired on the basis of such a circular.

(145) We are of the view that reasoning given by the Division Bench in this judgment is quite sound and does not call for any interference by us. Hence, mere fact that certain areas have been built up or improved upon by 'the persons concerned would not in any manner vitiate the acquisition proceedings.

(146) In case of Gandhi Grab Nirman Sahkari Samiti Lid. (supra), one of the contentions raised was that the land sought to be acquired is already being used for public purpose and has been properly developed and thus the notifications issued for acquisition of such land for public purpose be quashed. The Supreme Court held that once it is clear that the acquisition is for public purpose, no fault can be found with the proceedings on the ground that land is already being used for some beneficial purpose. So, even if some land has been developed by the land owner according to his own notions and may be the construction raised by him on the said land is also serving some public purpose, still that cannot be a substitute- for planned development of Delhi which object is visualised by the authorities. If the public object for which the land is sought to he acquired by the authorities is justified, it cannot be frustrated because the land owner has developed the land and is utilising the land for some other public purpose. So, this is contention also docs not survive in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court.

(147) In Civil Writ No.325/82, Ram Phal & Others Vs Union of India, an application (C.M.No.5036/95) has been moved by the petitioners mentioning that the Central Government has issued an order under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act withdrawing the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land subject-matter of this writ petition and thus, on this basis the land acquisition proceedings be quashed. This application is holly contested by the respondents. It is pleaded that infact, no order has been made by the Central Government for withdrawing from acquisition of land in question and due to some misreading of the orders made in the File the officials had wrongly issued, the communication to the petitioner that the petitioner's land stands withdrawn from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act. Mr.Madan Lokur, Standing Counsel for the Union of India, has also gone to the extent of urging that if this court was to infer that any such order has been made by the Central Government the same be deemed to be honest and be declared as void and illegal and arbitrary as it is not based on any reasons particularly when the land is sought to be acquired for planned development of Delhi and with regard to the same notification issued under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6, there are other land owners who have also filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition proceedings in respect of whom no such order has been made under Section 48 of the Act.

(148) It is contended before us that an order under Section 48 of the Act could come into play only when the same is published in the official gazette in the same manner in which notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 had been published in view of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. So, it is urged that as no such order has been published in the official gazette even if it is inferred that some order has been made withdrawing from acquisition in respect of the land in question even then the same is of no effect.

(149) Section 48 of the Act lays down that Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. The original record in which the Minister concerned had made the order was produced before us which we have perused and as a matter of fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed on record the photocopies of the nothings on which the order of the Minister has been accorded. It is evident that if this Court is to come to the conclusion on reading the said record that in fact no order has been made by the Minister concerned which amounts to withdrawing from acquisition, mere communication of the misconstrued order by the officials would not have the effect of an order of the Government withdrawing from the acquisition.

(150) In Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay Vs M/s.Godrej & Boyce, : [1988]1SCR590 , while construing the provisions of Section 48 of the Act the Supreme Court has laid down that so long as the possession is not taken over the mere fact of a notification under Section 4 or declaration under Section 6 having been made does not divest the owner of his rights in respect of the land or relieve him from the duty to take care of the land and protect it against encroachment and such notification does not either confer on the State Government any right to interfere with the ownership or other rights in the land or impose on it any duty to remove encroachment there from or in any other manner safeguard the interest of the original owner. Section 48 gives an opportunity to the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition at any stage before possession is taken and such power can be exercised unilaterally and there is no requirement that the owner of the land should be given an opportunity of being heard and the State Government cannot also be compelled to give any cogent reasons for a decision not to go ahead with its proposal to acquire a piece of land.

(151) It appears that in this case representation was made by the land owner praying for release of the land from acquisition proceedings. The noting in the file shows that on January 9, 1995, it was indicated that as the property had been acquired at the instance of the Delhi Development Authority for the planned development of Delhi a report be obtained from the Delhi Development Authority with regard to the aforesaid representation but no report was received as per further noting in the File. In the meanwhile another representation was received from Shri Moti Goel on behalf of the petitioners and noting dated April 20, 1995, shows that matter was already under consideration and report from the Delhi Development Authority was still awaited and a reminder was required to be issued. On May 19, 1995, the noting shows that response has been received from the Delhi Development Authority and the Delhi Development Authority appears to be showing no interest in acquisition of this particular land and it was indicated that reference has been made in the representation that land belonging to Hamdard Dawakhana, which was subject-matter of the same notification, had been already released. However, the noting of the Director shows that he opined that perhaps the reply of the Delhi Development Authority is not clear as it has not given any categorical comments whether the land was required or not required for planned development of Delhi. Mr.J.P.Singh has then made a noting on the file mentioning that previous note be considered and then he had added with hand that the Hon'ble Minister has the power to release the land under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Then the matter was sent to the Private Secretary of the Minister who made the following noting which was approved by the Minister on July 7, 1995 'UAEM has observed that even though the Delhi Development Authority has mentioned this land is a part of its residential scheme known as 'Sarita Vihar and Jasola, they do not appear to have made any effort to get possession of land for these shames for nearly three decades. Delhi Development Authority has also not clearly stated for what purpose they intend to use the land. UAEM is, thereforee, of the view that this old pending case can be closed. However, the land so released will be used by the owner for the purpose earmarked in the Master Plan/approved layout plan. In view of the above, UAEM has directed that the matter may be taken up with Government of Nct Delhi for identifying and release of the land immediately. UAEM may kindly scc before the File is sent to the office.'

(152) The learned counsel for the petitioners have argued that reading of this particular note in the background in which it was made it is quite evident that the Minister who had the power to release the land under Section 48 of the Delhi Development Act has passed the order for releasing the land and it was only a clerical act which was to be performed later on by the Government of Nct Delhi lor identifying and lor releasing the land. If that clerical act has not been carried out the order already made for releasing the land does not become ineffective or unenforceable. So, he has urged that the communication received by the petitioner intimating that the Government had withdrawn from the acquisition under Section 4S of the Act is in consonance with the order made by the Minister quoted above.

(153) On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Union of India, has urged that there is no categorical order made by the Minister that the land he released from acquisition. The Minister had desired the release of the land and had left the question of release of the land to be decided by the Govt. of Nct Delhi. It is urged that till any order has been made in the File for releasing the land and for identifying the same by the Govt. of Nct Delhi, it cannot be said that any enforceable order under Section 45 of the Act has been made. We have carefully perused the aforesaid noting which has been approved by the Minister. We find that only a view has been expressed by the Minister that the old pending case m question can be closed and Minister had directed that the matter be taken up with the Nct Delhi for identifyingand for release of the land immediately. It would mean that the Minister had not herself passed the order for releasing the land from acquisition. If the Minister wanted to pass such order the language oi the aforesaid noting would have been different and it appears that Minister was perhaps taking the prima facie view that land should be released from acquisition and left the decision to be made in this respect with the Govt. of.NCT Delhi. It is true that the noting in the File further shows that when the draft Order was prepared the same was checked by the officers and corrections were also made before it was issued and on August 4, 1995 the noting of the Additional Secretary, Shri M.P.Singh shows that objections were raised by an officer of the Delhi Development Authority with regard to withdrawing from acquisition oi the land in question and thus, it was noticed that a mistake has been made in sending the communication to the petitioner when in fact no specific order had been made in the file by the Minister directing the release of the land. So, the communication sent to the petitioner was withdrawn. It appears that there has taken place some confusion in construing the order made in the file by the Minister and with the result the communication was sent to the petitioner terming it to be an order under Section 48 of the Act for withdrawing the land in question from acquisition. Such order lacing communicated on misreading of the order made in the file in our view, would not mean that any legal order has been made by the Central Government under Section 48 of the Act for withdrawing from acquisition in the present case.

(154) The counsel for Union of India has also contended that the order which has been communicated to the petitioner purported to have been made under Section 48 oi the Act having been not published in any Official Gazette has no legal validity. Taking resort to the provisions oi Section 21 of the General Clauses-Act, he has urged that as the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 are required by the Statute, in order to be effective legally, to be published in Official Gazette, so in view of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act for cancellation of such notification and declaration by issuance of an order under Section 48 of the Act, the cancellation could take place only if the order made under Section 48 is also published in the like manner in the Official Gazette.

(155) Section 21 of the General Clauses Act lays down as follows:- 'Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, if any to add to amend vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so

(156) In Slate of Bihar v. D.N.Ganguly,A.I.R. 1958 Supreme Court 1013 and question which arose for decision was as to reference made under Section 10(1) o the Industrial Disputes Act could be later on got cancelled by taking resort to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Sect ion 21 of the General Clauses Act which embodies a rule of construction could apply to provisions of a particular Statute only depending on its subject matter, context and the effect of the relevant provisions of the said statute. It need not be emphasised that Section 21 by itself gives a power to cancel the notifications and orders in the same manner as they are issued. Whereas Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act independently entitles the appropriate authority to issue an order for withdrawing from the acquisition proceedings. If there has been no such power conferred under Section 48 of the Act, then the question would have arisen that if notification is to be cancelled, should the same be cancelled only in the manner it was published in view of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.

(157) Section 48 by itself does not require publication of such an order in the Official Gazette. As a matter of fact, there is no repugnancy between the provisions of Section 48 of the Act as read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. The purpose of issuance of publication of notifications and declarations under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act in Official Gazette are that public at large should become aware of the factum that the land so notified is to be acquired for public purpose so that people at large should not suffer any monetary loss or any other inconveniences in entering into any deals in respect of such land, subject matter of compulsory acquisition. As an analogy of the purpose enshrined in notification issued under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6 for their publication in Official Gazette is also, in our view, linked to the order which is made under Section 48 of the Act for withdrawing from such acquisition and unless the same is also published in the manner as the original notifications, the said object could not be achieved i.e. of giving public notice to the public at large.

(158) Reference was made on behalf of the petitioner to The Bullion and Agricultural Produce Exchange (Pvt) Lid. v. Forward Markets Commission, : AIR1979All332 . This judgment does not help in deciding the point because what came for consideration in the said case was whether the provisions of General Clauses Act could be invoked for reviewing an order by an authority exercising judicial or quasijudicial power. Keeping in view the provisions of Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, the Division Bench of the said High Court came to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act would not apply inasmuch as that Section obviously does not confer a power of review on any authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power. An order which is issued under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act is purely an administrative order.

(159) Reference was also made to Management of Assam Railway and Trading Co. Ltd, v. Ram Labhaya A.1.R. 1964 Ass 51. While construing the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, the Division Bench of that Court held that the said Act does not confer any power Oh the appropriate government to cancel or supersede a reference under Section 10(1) and such a power also cannot he claimed by implication on the strength of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.

(160) We do not understand how anything said in this judgment would help us in deciding whether an order under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act should or should not be published in the Official Gazette as it virtually amounts to cancellation of the notification issued under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act which are required to be published in the Official Gazette.

(161) It was held by the Supreme Court in Lachmi Narain v. Union of India : [1976]2SCR785 that Section 21 embodies only a rule of construction and the nature and extent of its application must be governed by the relevant statute which confers the power to issue the notification. In the said case, it was-held that the source from which the power to amend the Second Schedule, comes is Section 6(2) of the Bengal Act and that power had to be exercised within the limits circumscribed by Section 6(2) and for the purpose for which it was conferred and thus , was held that for interpreting the Section 6(2) of the Bengal Act, provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked. However, in the present case, as already discussed above, keeping in view the object for which notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 are issued and the object for which an order under Section 48 is made, we reach the conclusion that an order under Section 48, which amounts to withdrawal from the acquisition proceedings, must be in the same manner published in Official Gazette as notifications under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 are published in the Official Ga/.ette.

(162) A Division Bench of this Court in case of Union of India v. Lachmi Narain rightly held that Section 21 gives power to the Central Government to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notification, etc. provided the power to do so does not run counter to the policy of the legislature or affect any change in its essential features. There is no such eventuality, in our view, present while interpreting Sections 4, 6 and 48 of the Land Acquisition Act.

(163) In case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, : [1966]3SCR557 , the Supreme Court clarified that apart from power under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Government has the power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to withdraw from the acquisition by cancelling the notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Act. If that is so, there being no repugnancy between the provisions of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, it is all the more essential that power which is exercised under Section 48 should be exercised in the same manner in which notifications under Section 4 and declarations under Section 6 are published ip the Official Ga/.ette in view of the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.

(164) Reference was made to Kartar Kaur Vs, Stale of Punjab which, in our view, is of no assistance in support of the contention that order under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act is not required to be published in the Official Gazette before it becomes legally effective.

(165) In Jasraj Vs, State of Rajasthan , a Single Judge has held that the effect of an order under Section 48 of the Act is to completely take away Section 4 notification and the order issued under Section 48 did not require for its validity to be published in the Official Gazette as it would become operative from the date the order was passed and was communicated to the person concerned as there could be no subsequent withdrawal or rescission of such an order. Similar provision, as couched in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, appears in Section 22 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act. However, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that it is no requirement of law that an order issued under Section 48 must be published in Official Gazette before it could become valid.

(166) We have not been able to, with respect, agree with the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge for coming to this conclusion. The case of Vishnu Prasad Sharma (supra) decided by Supreme Court has not dealt with this question, so the Single Judge could not have drawn any support from the said judgment for the view taken by him.

(167) Some support was sought to be taken from the judgment given in case of Atmaram Matya v. Stale of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1984 Bom 77. We Find that this judgment does not deal with the question which we have to decide in the present case.

(168) When we find no repugnancy between the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and provisions of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act and also keeping in view the provisions of Sections 4 & 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the object for which they arc published, we have come to the conclusion that if any withdrawal from land acquisition proceedings is to lake place by taking resort to Section 48 of the Act, then such an order must be published in the Official Gazette in order to be valid in the same manner as notifications under Sections 4 and 6 are required to be published in the Official Gazette.

(169) We need not express any view on the submission made by learned counsel for Union of India that every order of the authorities must be leased on reasonableness as unchannelled and arbitrary discretion is patently vocative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution which principles have been enunciated by the Supreme Court in large number of judgments namely P.N.Kaushal V's. Union of India, : [1979]1SCR122 ; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, : [1978]2SCR621 ; B.B.Rajwanshi v. Stale of U.P, : (1988)IILLJ238SC .

(170) Thus, we conclude that the communication sent to the petitioner purporting to be an order issued under Section 48 of the Act, in fact, is not valid inasmuch as the same had been issued by misconstruing the order made by the Minister concerned in the the and also for the reason that the same having been not published in the Official Gazette.

(171) The learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn our attention to the National Policy with regard to housing issued by the' Central Government which contemplates a major role of private sector in constructing houses in urban areas. Although there is no mention of this policy in any of the nothings which were made on the representations of the petitioner seeking cancellation of the notifications, yet it was sought to be urged that the order issued by the Minister being in consonance with the National Policy of housing cannot be considered to be arbitrary in any manner. An order which has not been issued on the reasons given in the order or in the file cannot become, in our opinion, valid by the petitioner giving some. more reasons to show that the same is valid.

(172) We may refer to case of Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar : [1985]1SCR579 where land belonging to a particular family was sought to be released by taking resort to provisions of Section 48 of the Act when Government required vast track of land belonging to several persons for public purpose and had chosen to release some land belonging to a particular family. The Supreme Court struck down such an order issued under Section 48 as vocative of Article 14 of the Constitution and treated the said order as non-est.

(173) Thus, we hold that the communication sent to the petitioner purporting to be an order under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act is invalid and the land acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed on the basis of such invalid communication.

(174) Now we shall deal with the individual cases.

(175) L.P.AS. 14/78, 16/78 & 40/78 In Lpa No.40/78 counsel for the respondents also urged that one of the respondems, namely, Meer Singh had died and intimation was given to counsel for the Union of India, yet no application has been moved for bringing on record legal representative of deceased Meer Singh and thus, the appeal stands abated. There is no merit in this contention because the appeal was brought against Kirpa Ram who died and his legal representatives, one of whom was Meer Singh, were brought on record. With the death of one of the said legal representatives i.e. Meer Singh, the appeal cannot be considered abated as the estate is well represented by other legal representatives of Kirpa Ram-respondent.

(176) Another plea raised in the writ petition was that the constructions have been raised in the land. So, the said constructions should be regularised. We have already dealt with this point, which arises in other writ petitions as well.

(177) In view of the reasons already given with regard to interpretation of Section 55 of the Delhi Development Act, the judgments given in the writ petitions Nos.621/74, 721/74 and 1347/73 dated December 5, 1977, of the Single Judge are liable to he set

(178) LPAS are allowed and judgments of the Single Judge in all these mailers are set aside and we hold that the acquisition proceedings are not liable to quashed on any of the grounds raised in writ petitions.

(179) C.W.NO.1280/80 Besides raising common points for challenging the acquisition proceedings which we have dealt with in earlier part of the judgment, the petitioner in this case has Urged that the Government has already regularised certain unauthorised colonies and there is no reason why the constructions raised by the petitioner in the land in question should not be regularised . In the case of Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd, Vs Stale of Rajasthan & Others, : 1993(66)ELT47(SC) , it has been laid down that the constructions raised on the land in respect of which notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 had been issued would not entitle the petitioners to challenge the acquisition proceedings. It is true that the Government has regularised certain unauthorised colonies but the same has been done subject to certain terms and conditions. In the present case. It is not made out by the petitioners that they had made any representation to the Government for regularising the colony raised by the petitioners by offering to abide by any conditions which have been imposed for regularising the other illegally constructed colonies. No such material has been placed on the record by the petitioners which could enable this court to examine the challenge of the petitioners to the acquisition proceedings in question on this ground. In case the petitioners are covered by any Government policy of regularising the unauthorised colonies the petitioners are well advised to make any representation to the Government in that connection and if the claim to the petitioners is not found tenable by the Government for any invalid reasons, the petitioners are at liberty to challenge such a decision of the Government by filing fresh writ petition. Hence,the acquisition proceedings are not liable to be quashed in this Will Petition.

(180) C.W.NO. 1556/80 All the points raised in this writ petition and urged before us by Dr.K.S.Sidhu, Senior Advocate, have been dealt with in the main judgment. Additional point raised by Dr.Sidhu was that two khasra numbers 364/21 and 388/77 of Village Masudpur were not mentioned in the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act but award in respect of the said khasra numbers have been made. We do not Find any merit in this contention. Firstly, no such point has been urged in the body of the writ petition. secondly, we Find that in the copies of the notifications Filed by the petitioner, there have appeared some mistakes with regard to description of these khasra numbers. The learned counsel for the Central Government has placed on record the copies of declaration pertaining to the land of the petitioner and we find that these two khasra numbers stand duty notified in the declaration issued under Section 6 and admittedly they were also mentioned in Section 4 notification. No other point arises for consideration in this writ petition. So, the acquisition proceedings are not liable 16 be quashed.

(181) C.W.I 753/80 &C.M.8269;/93 Most of the points raised in this writ petition arc common with the main points already discussed by us. However, Mr.G.L.Sanghi, Senior Advocate, who appeared for the applicant in C.M .8269/93 has urged that the land in question has been developed into a sports complex and modern amenities have been provided and it would be national waste in allowing such constructions to be demolished.

(182) It is urged that the applicant has acquired this land in 1969 before coming into force of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 and thus, there was no bar in the transferee raising constructions. However, it is admitted fact that all these constructions have been raised after issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. These constructions have been raised obviously with complete knowledge of the fact that this land is liable to be acquired for public purpose. It is true that transferee of the land such as the applicant is entitled to same benefits and rights as the transferor (See Smt.Gunwant Kaur & Others Vs Municipal Committee Bhatinda & Others, : AIR1970SC802 ). However, unless and until it is shown that public purpose for which the land was sough to be acquired by issuing a notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 has elapsed, it would not be possible for this court to hold that mere fact that land has been developed by the petitioner/applicant should lead to the conclusion that public purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired has been achieved. It is pointed out to us that this particular land is required for the residential scheme of Vasant Kunj. So, it cannot be said that the sports complex built up by the applicant in the land in question is in consonance with the public purpose for which the land has been earmarked in the scheme of the Government. Thus, we do not think that the petitioner/applicant can legally get the notification quashed on any valid grounds in the present matter. However, the petitioner/applicant is at liberty to make any representation to the authorities for getting the land released and it is for the authorities to examine whether in view of the modern sports complex having been brought into existence in the land in question could it serve the public purpose of acquiring this land for that particular scheme or the scheme is liable to be modified or amended in respect of the land in question. However, the acquisition proceedings are not liable to be quashed on any such plea.

(183) Civil Writ Petition No.9/81 Besides the common points raised in this petition for challenging the acquisition proceedings, which have been already dealt with, the petitioner has taken up an additional ground that appropriate Government has .not recorded its satisfaction, as required under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, in respect of the land of the petitioner, thus the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act is null and void.

(184) In our view, this plea is no longer open io the petitioner in view of the fact that 'the writ petition has been filed challenging the acquisition proceedings, particularly the declaration under Section 6 after lapse of 15 years. So, on the ground of delay and laches, the challenge to the validity of Section 6 declaration has to be negatived, So, in this writ petition also, the acquisition proceedings are not liable to be quashed.

(185) Civil Writ Petition No.6/81 In this case, the additional point urged before us was that the land, subject matter of this writ petition, was sought to be acquired for the purpose of Indian Spinal Injuries Centre and, in fact, that Centre has already come into existence in the adjacent land and the land of the petitioner is no longer required for the purposes of the said Centre. An affidavit has been filed by Ram Sarup Kathuria dated July 1995 along with the photographs of the said Centre.

(186) However, it has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that the public purpose for which the land in question has been sought to be acquired, still subsists and there has not taken place any change in the public purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired. Mere fact that main building of the Centre has come into existence in the adjacent land cannot lead us to hold that the public purpose for which the land of the petitioner is sought to be acquired no longer subsists:

(187) So, the acquisition proceedings are not liable to be quashed in this petition as well.

(188) Civil Writ Petition Nos.2882/81& 2335/86 The additional point raised in these petitions is that there has been given an assurance by the Special Secretary, Land & Building, that the land in respect of these writ petitions would not be acquired. Sh.M.Ahmed has filed an affidavit dated September 22, 1995 m which he has narrated the correspondence exchanged and the interview he held with the authorities on different dates.

(189) We have gone through this affidavit and find that at no point of time any assurance has been given to the petitioners of these cases that the land of the petitioners would not be acquired. It appears that the authorities were to set up some botanical garden in that area and the land of the petitioner was also required for the said purpose. The only thing which has been mentioned in the official files is that as the petitioners have set up some Nursery in the land in question, the possession of the same shall not be taken for the present but shall be taken only after the announcement of the award which may take considerable time.

(190) Reference has been made to some replies given by the Hon'ble Minister in the Delhi Legislative Assembly in March 1995 mentioning that at present there is no proposal of laying Botanical Garden in Village Lado Sarai. So, it is urged before us that Firstly the land is being used for Nursery purposes which meets with the public purpose and secondly the scheme for setting up Botanical Garden in that area stands abandoned and as such the public purpose for which the land of the petitioner was sought to be acquired no longer subsists.

(191) It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that the land has been notified to be acquired for the planned development of Delhi and not for any specific purpose of setting up a Botanical Garden. It is urged that the planned development of Delhi is a comprehensive public purpose and the schemes for use of I he land to be acquired for the public purpose would show the particular use of this land for the public purpose i.e. planned development of Delhi and there is no bar in the authorities using the land in question for any particular purpose which comes within the ambit of planned development of Delhi

(192) It is urged that the public purpose of planned development of Delhi has not ceased to exist. We are of the opinion that mere fact that the authorities, at the present, are not considering setting up any Botanical Garden in the area in question would not mean that the public purpose i.e. planned development of Delhi for which the land of the petitioners is sought to be acquired no longer subsists. So, the acquisition proceedings are not liable to be quashed in these cases as well.

(193) Civil Writ Petition No-783/81 In this Petition, the notification under Section 4 is dated 13th November 1959 and declaration under Section 6 is dated 2nd January 1969. The award had been given on 17th January 1983. The land use prescribed in the Master Plan is zonal park and in the revised plan is District Park. In the original notification dated 13th November 1959, it Is mentioned that it would not cover the evacuee land. The petitioner, had purchased this property from its previous owner on 6th August 1962. However, on the date of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, this land was evacuee property and vested in the Custodian and stood excluded from the said notification. The time of the previous owner is Kailash Chand Gupta.

(194) Reliance is placed on a judgment of Single Bench of this Court given in Civil Writ Petition No.155/83, Harbans Kaur v. Land Acquisition Collector decided on August 12, 1991 in which, on similar facts, it was held that as the original notification issued under Section 4 excluded its application to the evacuee land, mere fact that the land ceases to be evacuee after the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act would not validate the subsequent proceedings taken under Sections 6 and 11 of the Act for acquiring the land as notification under Section 4 did not pertain to the evacuee land.

(195) It is quite evident that if there is nu notification issued under Section 4 of the Act pertaining to a particular land, then any declaration issued under Section 6 would be by itself not valid in respect of the land which was not subject matter of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act.

(196) It has been urged before us that the writ petition has been brought belatedly as Section 6 declaration had been issued in 1969 whereas the writ petition had been filed in 1981. It is not the case where any defect in the Section 4 notification is being highlighted like that the same was not published in accordance with the provisions of the Act. What has been pointed out is that the notification issued on 13th November 1959 did not at all pertain to the land in question as it was evacuee land at that time. If the notification on the face of it is not applicable to the land in question, the same is honest and any proceedings taken for acquiring the land on the basis of such a notification issued under Section 4. which did not pertain to the land in question, would be void ah initial and without jurisdiction.

(197) In our view, once it is shown that there was no notification issued under Section 4 pertaining to the particular land, the subsequent proceedings being void, the petitioner would not be debarred from challenging such proceedings even belatedly. So, this petition is liable to be allowed.

(198) Civil Writ Petition Nos. 1399/82 & 88/83 Both these writ petitions also have the same point and so they have also to be allowed.

(199) In these cases, the notifications under Section 4 were issued earlier in 1956 pertaining to the land of the petitioners but those notifications lapsed and no further proceedings were taken in respect of those notifications. A Section 4 notification was then issued in 1959 which according to the petitioners did not include the land of the petitioners. The notifications which had been issued under Section 4 in 1959 only had given the blocks which have been delineated on the map attached with the notification.

(200) The learned counsel for the petitioner has pinpointed the land of the petitioners from the map furnished by him which makes it clear that this land of the petitioners is not covered by any of the blocks mentioned in the maps published along with Section 4 notification.

(201) Hence, we come to the conclusion that the notification in question issued under Section 4 of the Act did not pertain to the land of the petitioners and thus sub-sequent declaration issued under Section 6 and the award made on the basis of the said declaration are null and void and thus these writ petitions are liable to be allowed and the acquisition proceedings of the said land of the petitioners are liable to be quashed.

(202) C.W.P.NOS.377/83,2256/83 & 1543/82 In the first two cases, the notification under Section 4 had been issued on 13th November 1959 while in C.W.P. No.1543/82, the notification had been issued on 23rd January 1965 but notifications themselves excluded the evacuee lands. It is evident that on the date of the notifications, the land of these petitioners was evacuee land and it is only later on that the land has been auctioned or transferred by the competent officer in favor of the petitioners. It is, hence, evident that notification issued under Section 4 could not possibly apply to the land of these petitioners when at the time of the notification, the land in question was evacuee land or composite land. The land obviously belonged to thc Government and in case the Government needed the land for public purpose, they could have easily retained the possession of the land and there was no need to resort to Land Acquisition Act for acquiring this land. At any rate, when the land of the petitioners, being evacuee land, was not covered by the notifications issued under Section 4, any subsequent proceedings of acquisition taken in respect of the said land on the basis of the said notification under Section 4 were on the I ace of it illegal.

(203) Hence, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land of these petitioners are liable to be quashed.

(204) Civil Writ Petition No-1541/82 Notification under Section 4 in this case was issued on 23rd January 1965 and declaration under Section 6 was issued on 13th January 1969 and the award was made on 31st January 1983. The additional point urged in this petition is that the petitioner had purchased the land, subject matter in this case, from Hamdard Dawakhana in 1974 whereas the adjoining land of Hamdard Dawakhana, which was also notified for acquisition, was released from acquisition on the representation received from Hamdard Dawakhana on the ground that the same was Wakf land. It has been urged .before us that if the Wakf land was to be released, there is no reason why the land which has been sold by the Wakf to the petitioner could not be released. It is urged that it is a clear case of discrimination. It is also pointed out that it was only a private Wakf which owned the land and no valid reasons have come forward on record for releasing the said land to a private wakf.

(205) May be, the authorities were not justified in releasing the land from acquisition which was required for planned development of Delhi to Hamdard Dawakhana, but there is no petition Filed in Court for challenging the such arbitrary release of land in favor of Hamdard Dawakhana. So, this Court cannot quash the said release of the land in favor of Hamdard Dawakhana as no such prayer has been made in the writ petition and Hamdard Dawakhana has not been made one of the respondents in this case.

(206) The question which arises for decision is whether an illegal release of a land in favor of a particular party could furnish any good ground for getting released any land of another party which is similarly situated. An illegality, in our view, committed by the authorities could not be the basis for granting a relief to another parly on the same lines, as granted to the other party, by the authorities by illegal exercise of discretion. It is quite evident that the public purpose i.e. planned development of Delhi has not ceased to exist, so it cannot be held that because the land has been released in favor of Hamdard Dawakhana which is adjacent to the land of the petitioner and as the land of the petitioner is also from the same Hamdard Dawakhana's ownership, so the Court should quash the notification and release the land of the petitioner.

(207) 'RELIANCE is placed on the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of D.KJain v. State of Haryana 1995 A.I.H.C. 4227. ln that case,a big chunk of land had been released leaving small pockets of land which could not be independently developed, so the Court directed that either the authority acquire the whole land, if not, then return the said small pockets of land as well. On facts, the case is distinguishable because it is not shown that the land of the petitioner cannot be developed for planned development of Delhi even though adjacent land had been released.

(208) It is to he remembered that the authorities have not released the land of Hamdard Dawakhana on the ground that the public purpose for which the land was sought to he acquired has ceased to exist. It cannot he held by entrance that as the authorities have released the land of Hamdard Dawakhana, it should he assumed that public purpose for which the land of the petitioner is sought to be acquired has ceased lo exist.

(209) So, on this ground, the acquisition in question cannot be quashed.

(210) Civil Writ Petition No. 130/81 Notification under Section 4 was issued in this case on 4th February 1965 and declaration under Section 6 on 26th December 1968. Notices under Section 9 and 10 were issued in November 1976. It appears that the petitioner wrote a letter dated 23rd November 1978 to the Land Acquisition Collector in order to Find out whether the land of the petitioner is to be acquired or not as sufficient time has lapsed since the issuance of notification under section 4 of the Act. The Naib Tehsildar had sent a reply dated 7th December 1978 that presently the acquisition of the land of the petitioner is not under contemplation. But at no point of time, any order had been issued and notified under Section 48 of the Act withdrawing the notification under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act. Even the Naib Tehsildar has not mentioned in the reply that the said notification issued under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6 are to be considered cancelled or revoked. What has been intimated by him is that presently the immediate acquisition of the petitioner's land is not contemplated.

(211) It is to be emphasised that Naib Tehsildar was not the competent officer to give any assurance to the petitioner whether the notification issued under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 are to be revoked or cancelled or the land is still to be acquired for the public purpose indicated in the notification and the declaration or not. So, nothing turns on this plea of the petitioner that petitioners' land is liable to be released from acquisition proceedings.

(212) Civil Writ Petition No. 1967/87 It appears that the notification under Section 4 was issued on 14th July 1980 whereas the petitioner had purchased this land in October 1979 after obtaining some no objection under Sections 3 and 4 of the Delhi Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act 1972. It is not understood how such a No Objection Certificate would affect the notifications issued subsequently under Section 4 and declaration issued under Section 6 afterwards for the same public purpose of planned development of Delhi.

(213) We have already come to the conclusion that' this planned development of Delhi is a continuous process and it has not been extinguished by lapse of so many years. Hence, it cannot be said that the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed in this case as well.

(214) Civil Writ Petition No. 1136/82 In this writ petition and in many other writ petitions, a plea has been taken that constructions had been raised in the land notified for acquisition under Section 4 of the Act and large number of illegally constructed colonies have been regularised by the Central Government, by the Delhi Administration and by the Municipal Corporation from time to lime and the process of regularisation of unauthorised colonies is still continuing and it is really unjust on the part of the authorities to not to regularise the constructions raised by the petitioners in the land, subject matter of their petitions. It is urged that it amounts to unreasonable discrimination by not regularising the illegal constructions raised by the petitioners when such illegal constructions have been regularised on large scale by recognising the said illegally constructed colonies.

(215) It is true that from lime to time the Government had be,en regularising the illegally constructed colonies on account of varied reasons as large number of people might have spent their last penny in raising the houses which were allowed to be constructed without any objection and such colonies remained in existence for sufficient long time that a policy decision was taken by the Government to regularise such illegally constructed colonies and the Government itself had been reviewing the dates prior to which colonies so constructed arc to be regularised on certain terms and conditions. The Government had regularised quite a few such colonies. It is one thing to say that certain illegally constructed colonies have been recognised by the Government and it is another matter to be considered whether constructions raised by individuals in the land, subject matter of acquisition, should be regularised.

(216) In case the petitioners constructions fall in a particular illegally constructed colony, it is for representatives of the said colony to make their representation to the authorities praying for getting the same regularised and if such a prayer is declined by the Government for invalid reasons, only then a cause of action could arise on the part of the owners of a particular colony to approach the Court for proper relief. In the present cases, we do not find that any plea has been taken that any such approach has been made for any particular colony to be regularised on the same pattern as Other colonies have been regularised.

(217) In case of Gandhi Grah Nirman Samili (supra), the Supreme Court has already held that acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed on the sole ground that the land owners have raised illegal constructions on the kind, subject matter of acquisition, after issuance of Section 4 notification. So, in the present proceedings, we are of the view that acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed on such a plea. The petitioners are at liberty to take appropriate steps, as indicated above, for getting proper relief from the Government at the first instance and challenge the decision of the Government, if any, if the same is adverse and illegal by filing any proceedings in Court of law as they may feel advised.

(218) C.W.P. N08.783/81, 1399/82, 88/83, 377/83, 1543/82 and 2256/83 These writ petitions arc allowed and rule is made absolute and acquisition proceedings arc quashed. Parties arc left to bear their own costs.

(220) We have already come to the conclusion that the land acquisition proceedings are not liable to he quashed in respect of the land, subject matter of these petitions. However, in view of the judgment given by the Supreme Court in case of Ram Chand (supra), where the award has been made prior to 30th April 1982, in consonance with the directions given by the Supreme Court, the petitioners in such cases would be entitled to additional interest @ 12% per annum from the date of expiry of two years from August 23, 1974 till the date of making of the award. Where the awards have been made subsequent to the said date or are yet to be made, the additional interest is not to be paid as in. such cases, the Parliament has already granted the necessary relief in shape of additional solarium and additional interest and their writ petitions would stand dismissed and the other writ petitions would also stand dismissed with the above directions.

(221) The interim orders stand vacated.

Subject	Property
Court	Delhi High Court
Decided On	Dec-01-1995
Case Number	Letters Patent Nos. 14, 16, 40 of 1978 and Civil Writ Petition Nos. 307 of 1972, 1280, 1556, 1753, 1
Judge	P.K. Bahri,; Arun Kumar and; S.D. Pandit, JJ.
Reported in	61(1996)DLT206; 1996(36)DRJ34
Acts	Delhi Development Act, 1957 - Sections 55; Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 11
Appellant	Roshanara Begum
Respondent	Union of India
Advocates:	P.N. Lekhi,; Subhash Mittal,; S.L. Watel,;
Cases Referred	S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and

Roshanara Begum Vs. Union of India - Court Judgment