Jaspal Singh, J.
(1) The facts giving rise to this writ petition need to be recapitulated in some detail.
(2) It appears that in December 1983 since there were posts of Horticulture Assistants/Plant Protection Assistants, the Employment Exchange was asked to sponsor names, consequent upon which the names of the respondents were forwarded. They were selected on July 17, 1984 and all of them joined between August 1, 1984 and August 9, 1984. The appointments, however, were as daily paid workers. They continued to so work till the year 1987 when the Department took the decision to appoint them on adhoc basis till regular appointments were made. This appointment on adhoc basis was up to February 28, 1989. Much before the said date, the respondents had made representations for being treated as regular/permanent employees from the date of their joining service. However, since the representations were found unpalatable, they gave birth to dispute regarding their regularisation and by order dated January 12, 1987 the Delhi Administration referred the same to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The terms of reference were as under:
'WHETHER the nonregularization of S/Shri Yoginder Singh, Satya Kumar, Rajinder Singh, Ramesh Chand Rana, Ram Avtar, Som Vir Singh, Harvir Singh, Bijendra Singh, Raj Pal Singh, Suresh Kumar, Mishri Lal Yadav, Inder Singh, Sri Chand Sharma, Ashok Kumar, Dalip Singh, Devender Kumar in the pay scale of 425-700 from the date of joining the service is legal and justified and if not what directions are necessary in this respect?'
(3) On November 26, 1988 the Industrial Tribunal passed the Award which was notified in the Delhi Gazette on January 11, 1989. It was held that the respondents No.1 to 15 were entitled to be regularised from the date of their initial appointment. The Award was made accordingly. Needless to say the Delhi Administration is aggrieved by the said Award. Hence this writ petition.
(4) It was contended by Mr.Poddar, who appeared for the petitioner Delhi Administration, that the reference itself was bad in law in as much as the dispute referred to for adjudication fell neither under the Second Schedule nor under the Third Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act and that as the Tribunal itself had admitted in the Award that the matter fell within Schedule V of the said Act, it had no jurisdiction to traverse on the matter. In support my attention was drawn to paragraph 10 of the Award which runs as under: 'The legal position is well settled by the rulings of Hon'ble Supreme Court that the employment of persons as daily rated or muster roll labour on jobs of permanent nature for lengthy periods is not proper or desirable. Moreover, Section 2(ra) of I.D. Act, 1947, Item No.10 of 5th Schedule specifies that to employ workers as Badlies, Casuals or temporaries and to continue them for years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen is an unfair labour practice.'
(5) It was also argued that the Industrial Tribunal had in any case no jurisdiction to pass a blanket order of regularisation and in support reference was made to the following judgments of the Supreme Court: Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration : (1992)IILLJ452SC , State of Haryana v. Piara Singh & Others, : (1993)IILLJ937SC .
(6) Yet another argument advanced by Mr.Poddar was that as the Recruitment Rules prescribe a certain procedure to be followed and as in the matter of appointment of the respondents the said Rules were not followed inasmuch as their selection was not made by a
(7) Selection Board duly constituted under the Rules and further as the respondents did not have the requisite experience, thereforee, they could not be regularised from the date of their appointment.
(8) Lastly, it was argued that as the Delhi Administration had formulated a scheme on the directions of the Supreme Court, thereforee, regularisation could be ordered only as per the terms of the said scheme.
(9) Needless to say Mr.A.K.Gupta, the learned counsel for the respondents, found the arguments so advanced by Mr.Poddar as totally unacceptable. As per him neither the reference was bad nor the Award suffers from any infirmity or illegality.
(10) Time now to examine the nuts and bolts of the contentions raised.
(11) Coming to the first contention of Mr.Poddar, sub-section (1) of section 7A of the Industrial Disputes Act provides that the appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals 'for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter, whether specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule' Obviously, then, if the matter is not specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, the Tribunal so appointed shall have no jurisdiction to adjudicate. But then, was the matter referred to the Tribunal not covered by either of the two Schedules? And then, can I sit over the legality of the reference?
(12) Let me answer the second question first. The first can wait.
(13) As regards the second question, the relevant passage of the Award already stands reproduced. I do not think, and I say so after having gone through the passage in and out of context, that it anywhere lays down that the matter referred to fell within the ambit of Schedule (V). What has been observed is by way of lending support to the reasons advanced for making the Award. The passage is thus merely persuasive, a mere indication of thought process, argumentative, and not a finding that the matter is foreign either to the Second or to the Third Schedule.
(14) The basic question thus remains: Was the matter referred beyond the ambit and scope of either the Second or the Third Schedule? Before I venture to answer, let us have a look at the said two Schedules. Here they are: 'THE Second Schedule (See Section 7) Matters Within The Jurisdiction Of Labour Court 1. The propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing orders; 2. The application and interpretation of standing orders; 3. Discharge or dismissal of workmen including reinstatement of, or grant of relief to, workmen wrongfully dismissed: 4. Withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege; 5. Illegality or otherwise of a strike or lock- out; and 6. All matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule.' The Third Schedule (See Section 7-A) Matters Within The Jurisdiction Of Industrial Tribunals 1. Wages, including the period and mode of payment; 2. Compensatory and allowances; 3. Hours of work and rest intervals; 4. Leave with wages and holidays; 5. Bonus, profit sharing, provident fund and gratuity; 6. Shift working otherwise than in accordance with standing orders; 7. Classification by grades; 8. Rules of discipline; 9. Rationalisation; 10. Retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment; and 11. Any other matter that may be prescribed. '
(15) Undoubtedly, the Third Schedule is not attracted. Even Mr.A.K.Gupta had no doubt about it. We are thus left with the Second Schedule. Does it apply? Undoubtedly, and admittedly too, the first five items of this Schedule do not stand attracted. However, it is the sixth item which requires to be meditated upon.
(16) What does residuary item 6 of the Second Schedule read with section 7-A mean when it says: 'all matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule' shall be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal?
(17) I may hasten to add that the fact that what had been referred to the Tribunal was an 'industrial dispute' within the meaning of section 7-A of the Act was never in dispute. The dispute, and I am repeating it lest there remains any doubt, was only to the extent as to whether it was 'relating to any matter' specified in the Second or the Third Schedule. And, it is this which takes me back to the residuary item 6 of the Second Schedule. The words of the item are general and have to be construed keeping in mind the object to be attained and served, the things of the same kind as those specified in the Third Schedule and the other remaining items of the Second Schedule besides the ambit and scope of the expression 'industrial dispute' deployed in section 7-A and as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act.
(18) As we all know, the expression 'industrial dispute' has been the subject matter of numerous decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts and though during arguments, Mr.Gupta was at pains to go through some of them, I need hardly make a reference to them for the simple reason that, (and as already noticed above) at no stage was it disputed that the dispute was within the ambit and scope of the expression and to my mind rightly so, as the demands raised were connected with the terms of employment or the condition of labour. Surely then, by holding otherwise, we would be mutilating the 1st and comprehension of the expression as envisaged in Western India Automobile Association v. The Industrial Tribunal, Bombay 1949 Llj 245 and numerous other subsequent judgments. And, this being the position and keeping in view the object of the provision and so also construction of the other items in the Second Schedule, it cannot be said that the dispute referred to the Tribunal did not fall within the scope and sweep of item No.6 in the said Schedule. In support reference may be made to two judgments, one coming from the Supreme Court and the other from Gujarat High Court. In the judgment reported as R.B. Bansilal Abir Chand Mills v. Labour Court, Nagpur, : (1972)ILLJ231SC , question arose as to whether lay-off which was not expressly covered by either of the two Schedules would be covered by item 6 of the Second Schedule. The Court observed: 'Under Section 7-A the appropriate Government may, by notification, constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter, whether specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule. In the Second Schedule are set forth certain matters in Items 1 to 5 which are within the jurisdiction of a Labour Court and Item 6 gives the Labour Court jurisdiction to deal with 'all matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule'. The Third Schedule contains 11 items of which Item 10 reads: 'Retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment.' Lay-off is not expressly covered by either of the two Schedules. It would thereforee be a matter covered by the Second Schedule under Item 6 thereof.'
(19) In the latter judgment, though earlier in point of time, reported as Sindhu Resettlement Corporation, Ltd. v. I.T. 1965 (2) Llj 268, the worker who was claiming reinstatement, was neither discharged nor dismissed. Item No.3 in Second Schedule was thus not attracted. Questions arose as to whether dispute fell within the scope of its item 6. It was held: 'Section 7 empowers an appropriate Government to constitute labour courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in Sch. Ii and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under the Act. Under S. 7A, the appropriate Government has the power to constitute industrial tribunals for adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in Sch. Ii or III. Thus, whereas a labour court can adjudicate an industrial dispute relating to matters in Sch. Ii, a tribunal can adjudicate disputes relating to matters in both Schs. Ii and III. Under S. 10(1), the appropriate Government has been empowered to refer a dispute or any matter connected with or relating to such a dispute to a labour court for adjudication if it relates to any of the items in Sch. Ii, and under Clause (d), to a tribunal where such a dispute or matter relates to any of the items in Sch. Ii or III. The first proviso to Sub- sect. (1) of S. 10 lays down, however, that where the dispute relates to a matter specified in Sch. Iii, if it is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, it can be referred to a labour court. Thus, whereas questions arising under Sch. Ii can be adjudicated both by a tribunal and labour court, questions arising from matters in Sch. Iii can be referred for adjudication to a tribunal alone unless the case falls under the said proviso. The policy, thereforee, of the legislature while enacting these sections was to confer jurisdiction to adjudicate questions arising from items in Sch. Ii to the labour court as also the tribunal, while it wanted to give jurisdiction to the tribunal alone on matters arising from the items enumerated in Sch. III. In other words, except for matters enumerated in Sch. Iii the legislature wanted to confer jurisdiction upon both the labour court and the tribunal in cases of industrial disputes arising from or relating to the rest of the matters and thereforee, while framing Sch. Ii it included therein the residuary item 6 whereunder except for matters specified in Sch. Iii, in respect of which the tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction, both the labour court and the tribunal would have jurisdiction to adjudicate. This construction, in our opinion, is consistent with and is in consonance with the provisions of Ss. 7, 7A and 10 and the two schedules and the policy of the legislature indicated in the division of jurisdiction of the two bodies constituted under Ss. 7 and 7A. In this view, though the demand referred to the tribunal may not strictly fall under item 3 in Sch. Ii, it would certainly fall under the residuary item 6 in that schedule.'
(20) This much with regard to the second question.
(21) Can I sit over the legality of the reference? This, it may be recalled, was posed as the first question. Since, the legality was challenged only on the ground that the dispute was not covered either by the Second or the Third Schedule and as I have answered it by holding that it was covered by item 6 of the Second Schedule, the entire edifice falls to the ground reducing the question to a mere academic exercise easily avoided. However, it may be said, and I am saying so since the question was raised and needs to be answered, that the Tribunal gets jurisdiction in terms of section 7-A over a matter raised as an industrial dispute and further if the said industrial dispute relates to any of the matters specified in the Second or the Third Schedule and where it is not so the question of want of jurisdiction may be raised. In the case before me, the dispute raised being an 'industrial dispute' covered by item 6 of the Second Schedule, the Reference was not bad. I need say no more.
(22) This leads me to the question as to whether the Tribunal had the jurisdiction or not, to pass the order of regularisation. And, before I proceed to deal with this question, a few facts need to be noticed for they, I feel, would have a great bearing on the point in issue.
(23) It must be kept in view that as far as the respondents are concerned, their appointment in no way can be termed as back-door entry. What is more important is that admittedly at the time of their appointment there were as many regular vacancies as the appointments made. It needs also to be mentioned that the recruitment was on the basis of registration in the Employment Exchange. As already noticed, names were invited from the Employment Exchange which sponsored the respondents for consideration.
(24) It was strenuously contended by Mr. Poddar that the appointments were not made as per the Rules and that, even otherwise, the respondents did not have requisite experience.
(25) As regards the objection regarding experience, it was not raised before the Tribunal and as it raises disputed question of fact requiring a probe, I wonder if it can be agitated at this stage and in these proceedings. Any how, it may be noticed that in support of his argument Mr. Poddar had sought to place reliance on certain documents which admittedly were not placed before the Tribunal. It need hardly be mentioned that in considering the finding arrived at by the Tribunal the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution needs to consider the materials which were made available to the Tribunal. As per the Supreme Court in Karnani Properties Ltd. v. State of West Bengal : (1994)IIILLJ378SC , 'fresh or further materials which were not before the Tribunal should not normally be allowed to be placed before the Court'. Significantly, the petitioner has not shown why the said documents were not produced before the Tribunal. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the Tribunal had precluded it from producing them. Add to it the fact that not only the petitioner was aware of them but was rather in possession of them all along. For these reasons as well the Award is not open to reconsideration.
(26) Even if the documents are taken into consideration, they do not, to my mind, lead the petitioner any where.
(27) To substantiate the allegation that the respondents did not have the requisite experience of two years my attention was drawn to column 11 of the Attestation Form which is as under : '11. If you have at any time, been employed, file details. Designation of Period Full address of Full reasons post held or From to the office, firm for description of institution leaving of work service. No.
(28) A bare perusal of the column reproduced above would show that it does not specifically ask for experience. It merely asks for information regarding previous employment, if any, and the reasons for leaving it. Experience, I think, and hope correctly, is not gained by employment alone. In any case, the petitioners having worked satisfactorily and for years together in the department concerned, the objection raised by Mr. Poddar sounds too technical to come in the way of delivery of justice.
(29) As regards the objection that the petitioners were not selected by a Selection Board as required by the Rules, admittedly those Rules were not placed before the Tribunal. In any case, the respondents in their statement of claim had asserted in clear and unambiguous terms that their appointment was on account of selection by the Selection Board. True, in the written statement the Department did assert that the appointments were not through the Selection Board but it did not plead that their appointment was bad on that account or on account of the same being contrary to Rules. In fact, and as already noticed above, no reference was made to the Rules at all. It would thus be not open to the petitioner to challenge the legality of their appointment. In any case, it was asserted by Mr. Gupta that during the proceedings before the Tribunal whereas the present respondents had filed an affidavit by way of evidence in support of the assertion that they were selected by the Selection Board, the present petitioner had neither led any document nor any affidavit by way of evidence in support of its assertion. Mr. Poddar did not challenge this assertion.
(30) Anyhow, to show that the selection was not by the Selection Board, Mr. Poddar had drawn my attention to Annexure P-16 purported to have been issued by the Deputy Director (Horticulture). It runs as under: .lm2' .ls1 'Office of the Deputy Director (Horticulture) 11th Fllor, M.S.D. Building, New Delhi-110002 No.__________ dated the 31/7/84 Mr. As at back is hereby asked to submit his consent whether he is ready to work as a daily paid worker at the rate of Rs.18.40 (Rupees Eighteen and paise forty only). However, he should note that this is a purely temporary arrangement and he will have no claim whatsoever for regular appointment in future. (Dr.Murari Lal) Deputy Director (Horticulture)
(31) It was said, and said with great emphasis, that the letter showed conclusively that the appointments were not through Selection Board. I confess I am stumped, for I see no such thing. Not even obliguely. The letter, as I see it, merely asks for consent to work as a daily paid worker. Nothing less, nothing more. Wherefrom do we get that the selection was not through the Selection Board? Anyhow, while dealing with this question this is what the Tribunal says: 'The plea that only employees selected by Staff Selection Board are entitled to regular employment has not been substantiated by any proof. Assuming that for recruitment the management has rules for selection being made after interview by Staff Selection Board and that in the present case the interviews were conducted by Deputy Development Commissioner and not by Staff Selection Board, yet the employee cannot be made to suffer for this defective procedure of management when the management after such interview has employed them and is taking work of regular nature as Horticulture Assistant/Plant Protection Assistant etc.'
(32) I join my voice with the voice of the Tribunal.
(33) Could the Tribunal pass the order of regularisation from the date of appointment of the respondents and that too in the face of the Scheme alleged to have been adopted by the petitioner? I think this is the only question that remains and craves for an answer.
(34) As already noticed above, Mr.Poddar, in support of his case, had leaned heavily on two judgments. It is time to examine them.
(35) The first judgment in point of time is Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Admn. Delhi & Ors. : (1992)IILLJ452SC . It so happened that, in the said case, the workers had been given employment under a particular scheme which had a limited object of providing income to those who were below the poverty line and particularly during the periods they were without any source of livelihood and, thereforee, without any income whatsoever. It was found that to claim on the basis of the said employment a right to regularisation would have frustrated the scheme itself. The Court thus said: 'It is wrong to approach the problems of those employed under such schemes with a view to providing them with full employment and guaranteeing equal pay for equal work. These concepts, in the context of such schemes are both unwarranted and misplaced. They will do more harm than good by depriving the many of the little income that they may get to keep them from starvation. They would benefit a few at the cost of the many starving poor for whom the schemes are meant. That would also force the State to wind up the existing schemes and forbid them from introducing the new ones, for want of resources. This is not to say that the problems of the unemployed deserve no consideration or sympathy. This is only to emphasise that even among the unemployed a distinction exists between those who live below and above the poverty line, those in need of partial and those in need of full employment, the educated and uneducated, the rural and urban unemployed etc.'
(36) It was further observed: 'Apart from the fact that the petitioners cannot be directed to be regularised for the reasons given above, we may take note of the pernicious consequences to which the direction for regularisation of workmen on the only ground that they have put in work for 240 or more days, has been leading. Although there is an Employment Exchange Act which requires recruitment on the basis of registration in the Employment Exchange, it has become a common practice to ignore the Employment Exchange and the persons registered in the Employment Exchanges, and to employ and get employed directly those who are either not registered with the Employment Exchange or who though registered are lower in the long waiting list in the Employment Register. The courts can take judicial notice of the fact that such employment is sought and given directly for various illegal considerations including money. The employment is given first for temporary periods with technical breaks to circumvent the relevant rules, and is continued for 240 or more days with a view to give the benefit of regularisation knowing the judicial trend that those who have completed 240 or more days are directed to be automatically regularised. A good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchanges for years. Not all those who gain such backdoor entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs. Though already employed elsewhere, they join the jobs for better and secured prospects. That is why most of the cases which come to the courts are of employment in government departments, public undertakings or agencies. Ultimately it is the people who bear the heavy burden of the surplus labour. The other equally injurious effect of indiscriminate regularisation has been that many of the agencies have stopped undertaking casual or temporary works though they are urgent and essential for fear that if those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 or more ys they have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works are time-bound and there is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public interests are thus jeopardised on both counts.'
(37) The next judgment which found favor with Mr.Poddar is State of Haryana v. Piara Singh : (1993)IILLJ937SC . In the said case, over a period of several years the State of Punjab and Haryana had made a large number of appointments to class Iii and Iv services on ad-hoc basis, that is, without reference to Public Service Commission or the Subordinate Services Selection Board and without adhering to employment exchange requirements. Having continued in service for years together steps were taken to regularise them subject to certain conditions. Those who satisfied the conditions were regularised but it so happened that quite a good number of them did not and as such, though they continued to serve, none of them was regularised. This unhappy lot approached the High Court which expressed the view that continuing employees on adhoc basis for more than one year without regularising them was arbitrary and unreasonable. This principle was also held applicable to other categories of employees like daily wagers, casual labour and others, who were 'workmen' as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. In short a blanket direction was issued that all those abhoc/temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised. The Supreme Court while not agreeing with the blanket order of regularisation said that such an order may create number of problems like not leaving any post for regularly selected persons even if they are selected. It may also encourage unhealthy practice of employment of unqualified persons or back-door entry without sponsorship by the Employment Exchange etc. In paragraph 33 of the judgment the court observed: 'Now coming to the direction that all those adhoc/temporary employees who have continued for more than a year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every adhoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him - which means creation of a vacancy (b) he was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back-door (c) he was not eligible and/or qualified for the post at the time of his appointment (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are in addition to some of the problems indicated by us in para 25, which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for a regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no 'rule of thumb' in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfillling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. Judged from this standpoint, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable.'
(38) What further needs to be noticed is what was said in paragraph 50 of the judgment. This is how it goes: 'The proper course would be that each State prepares a scheme, if one is not already in vogue, for regularisation of such employees consistent with its reservation policy and if a scheme is already framed, the same may be made consistent with our observations herein so as to reduce avoidable litigation in this behalf. If and when such persons is regularised he should be placed immediately below the last regularly appointed employee in that category, class or service, as the case may be.'
(39) To my mind, the judgments referred to above do not have a bearing on the facts and circumstances of this case.
(40) As already noticed, in the first case relating to Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union, employment had been provided under a limited scheme and for a limited purpose. The very scheme and its object would have been frustrated by regularisation of employment and that was a major reason leading the Supreme Court to observe: 'No Court can be a party to such exercise'. In the case before me, the workers were not given employment under any such scheme. Moreover, it appears that in the said case recruitment was not made on the basis of registration in the Employment Exchange. However, as already observed, in the case in hand recruitment was on the basis of registration with and sponsorship by, the Employment Exchange. Their employment was thus neither a 'back-door' entry nor for 'illegal consideration'. Rather, they were appointed against existing vacancies and sanctioned cadre posts were already there.
(41) This leads me to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Piara Singh's case (supra)
(42) As would be apparent from what has been noticed above, the facts and circumstances in Piara Singh's case too were clearly distinguishable. The present is not a case of non-fulfilment of any condition. Vacancies were already there. Names were called from the Employment Exchange and appointments are not proved as having been made against the Rules. Reservations for Scheduled Castes were made. No appointment was made outside the cadre and question of increase of strength does not arise. Add to it the fact that the reference was specifically with regard to the question of regularisation and the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to deal with it.
(43) Besides the factual position distinguishing the case in hand from the cases cited above, it needs also to be kept in view that the Industrial Tribunal is not bound by the rigid rules of law. The process which an Industrial Tribunal employs in coming to a decision is not a judicial process. It may confer rights and privileges on either party which it considers reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of any existing document. It may even create new rights and obligations which it may consider essential for keeping industrial peace. (See Bharat Bank, Ltd. 1950 LlJ 921. It is for this reason that it is said that the Award of the Tribunal may contain provisions for settlement of a dispute which no court could order if it was bound by ordinary law, but the Tribunal is not fettered in any way by these limitations. [See Western Indian Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal 1949 Llj 245. It may also be remembered that if found to be warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case, the Industrial Tribunal may even grant relief from a date anterior to the date on which the dispute is raised (See: Sarva Shramik Sangh v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd : (1993)ILLJ965SC . This, then, is the power of the Industrial Tribunal.
(44) In the case before me the Industrial Tribunal had the jurisdiction. What has been decided falls within its jurisdiction, and not outside it. Add to it the fact that the Award suffers not even from an error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Why should, then, I interfere?
(45) It was said that a scheme had been formulated for regularisation but the Tribunal ignored the same. Admittedly no such plea was raised before the Tribunal and admittedly again, no such scheme was laid before it. Even I have not been apprised of the contents of any such scheme. What has been brought to my notice is a letter issued by the office of the Development Commissioner dated March 28, 1989. This is what it says:
'THE Deputy Observatory of Forests, Delhi. Sub: Increase In The Emoluments Of The Daily Rated Casual WORKERS. Sir, In view of the judgment of Supreme Court delivered on 29th September, 1988 in the Writ petition No.9609-10 of 1983 filed by Shri Niadar and others vs. Delhi Administration and others that casual workers working in the Soil Conservation Deptt. be paid the salary or wages at the rate equivalent to the minimum salary paid to a regular employee, I am directed to convey the sanction of Competent Authority to pay the wages to the daily rated casual workers at the rate of Rs.750.00 (fixed) per month plus D.A. only w.e.f. 1.10.1988 as admissible under the rule. This issues with the concurrence of F.D. vide their D.O No. 3636 A dated 27.3.89. Yours faithfully, sd/- (U.K. WORTH) Dy. Dev. Commissioner'
(46) I fail to see how it helps. It relates to the Soil Conservation Department. It talks of no scheme.
(47) It is, I think, time to draw the curtain. I do so by dismissing the writ petition. No Costs.