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Competition Success Review Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and anr. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtDelhi High Court
Decided On
Case NumberC.W. No. 2404 of 2001
Judge
Reported in2003VIIIAD(Delhi)442; 106(2003)DLT469; 2003(70)DRJ690
ActsConstitution of India - Article 226; Indian Post Office Act, 1898 - Sections 9; Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867; Indian Post Office Rules, 1933 - Rule 30
AppellantCompetition Success Review
RespondentUnion of India (Uoi) and anr.
Appellant Advocate S.N. Gupta, Adv
Respondent Advocate Naveen Chawla, Adv.
DispositionWrit petition allowed
Cases ReferredDalbir Singh v. State of Punjab
Excerpt:
postage - concessional rates--newspaper--revised bill enhancing rates--petitioner's monthly publication registered under the press and registration act and also with department of posts for transmission by post on concessional rates--revised bill alleging irregularity in pagination of the publication--non-numbering of advertisement pages, but accounted for in overall pagination as a whole as is evident from contents and index--no irregularity in pagination--petitioner already paid the sum due under concessional tariff--revised bill to be quashed--post office act, 1898, section 9--post office rules, 1933, rule 30--post office guide, part i, clauses 139, 142--constitution of india, 1950, article 226.; in the present case the four pages (54a, 548, 106a and 106b) are accounted for in the.....badar durrez ahmed, j.1. rule. with the consent of the parties the matter is taken up for final disposal.the petitioner publishes, inter alia, the english monthly entitled 'competition success review'. this monthly publication is admittedly a 'newspaper' in terms of the indian post office act, 1898 and the rules made there under. there is also no dispute that the petitioner is registered with the registrar of newspapers for india and has been granted registration no. 10485/64 in respect of its said publication--'competition success review' -- under the press and registration of books act, 1867. the petitioner's said publication i.e.. competition success review (english monthly) is also registered with the department of posts, office of the chief post master general, delhi circle, new.....
Judgment:

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. Rule. With the consent of the parties the matter is taken up for final disposal.

The petitioner publishes, inter alia, the english monthly entitled 'Competition Success Review'. This monthly publication is admittedly a 'newspaper' in terms of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 and the rules made there under. There is also no dispute that the petitioner is registered with the Registrar of Newspapers for India and has been granted Registration No. 10485/64 in respect of its said publication--'Competition Success Review' -- under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867. The petitioner's said publication i.e.. Competition Success Review (English monthly) is also registered with the Department of Posts, Office of the Chief Post Master General, Delhi Circle, New Delhi for transmission by post on concessional rates. This registration has been renewed from time-to-time and continues to be applicable for the period under consideration. The renewal is done under the provisions of Section 9 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 read with Rule 30 of the Indian Post Office Rules, 1933 and Clauses 139 and 142 of the Post Office Guide Part-I.

2. This writ petition relates to the question of grant of concessional rates of postage in respect of the Special January, 2001 issue of the said publication --'Competition Success Review'. The facts in brief are as follows.

3. The petitioner states that around 75 lakh copies of the said publication are posted each month to its subscribers. These are packed in packets and postal charges are levied thereon on the base of weight. The special January, 2001 issue was posted from Delhi on three dates (23.12.2000, 26.12.2000 and 27.12.2000). For the said postal dispatches on the said three dates, a bill dated 1.1.2001 was raised by the Department of Posts for a total sum of Rs. 14,224.75. This bill was paid in full by the petitioner by Cheque dated 12.1.2001.

4. The petitioner thereafter posted the February, 2001 issue of the said publication. A bill was raised for the February issue on 1.2.2001 and the same was also paid by the petitioner. However, on 5.2.2001, a revised Bill was sent to the petitioner by the Department of Posts in respect of the postal dispatches of the Special January, 2001 issue on the said three dates (i.e., 23.12.2000, 26.12.2000 and 27.12.2000). The revised bill was for an amount of Rs. 1,01,900.00 and, after givingcredit for the amount already received i.e., Rs. 14,224.75, the revised bill indicatedthe amount to be paid by the petitioner as Rs. 87,675.24. No reasons for revision ofthe bill were indicated. It is this revised bill which is sought to be quashed in this writpetition.

5. Immediately on receipt of this Bill, the petitioner sent a letter to the respondent on 15.2.2001 requesting the respondent to cancel the revised Bill as it had already fully paid the bill dated 1.1.2001 for Rs. 14,224,75. By a letter dated 27.2.2001, the Department of Posts replied to the petitioner that the bill dated 1.1.2001 had been raised on the basis of concessional rates but that during the course of checking, some irregularities had come to light. The irregularity complained of was that the pagination of the publication was not in order. On the basis of this allegation, the Department of Posts contended that the said Special January, 2001 issue ought to have been dispatched at the periodical rates instead of concessional rates. Since this was not done, the revised bill for Rs. 1,01,900.00 was issued on 5.2.2001. By this letter, the Department of Posts requested the petitioner to pay up the deficient amount of Rs. 87,675.25 immediately.

6. In response to this letter, the petitioner, by a letter dated 13.2001 informed the Department of Posts that there were no irregularities and that the pagination was in proper order. It pointed out that the 'Miss World Calendar-2001' which was a part of the publication comprised two pages. The first page was numbered as 54B and the second page was numbered as 106A. The overleaf page numbers were 54A and 106B respectively. In between, there was a free booklet which was successively numbered from page number 55 to 105, Thus the sequence of numbering was 1 to 54, 54A, 54B, 55 to 106, 106A, 106B and 107 to 160. The page numbering of the calendar was mentioned in the contents page. There were, in total, 164 pages and this was also clearly indicated in the contents page of the issue in question. In this regard, the petitioner submitted that as per the rules, there had been no violation on its part and, thereforee, requested the Department of Posts to cancel the amount of Rs. 87,675.25 purportedly due on them. To this the Department of Posts sent a letter dated 29.3.2001 wherein they indicated that the petitioner's case had been examined once again and that it has been observed that the pagination of the said publication i.e. pages 54A, 54B, 106A and 106B were not admissible as per departmental rules and, thereforee, requested that the deficient amount of Rs. 87,675.25 be deposited immediately. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is stated that in respect of the Special January 2001 issue of the 'Competition Success Review' (English monthly), the postal authority, i.e., D.P.S. (R) Delhi Circle discovered that the said issue comprised a small booklet which was not in perfect binding with the publication, and that '4' pages had been 'irregularly' inserted and paginated and the contents were not indicated in the index in violation of 'Note (i)' below Clause 139 of the Post Office Guide Part-I, 1985 Edition, and hence it was not eligible for transmission on concessional rates of postage.

7. These allegations are not factually correct. The special January, 2001 issue has been placed on record and is at page 43 of the Paper Book. The top of the contents/index page reads as under :

'Vol. xxxvENo. 7 January, 2001

160 + 4 Pages'

From this, it is apparent that it shows that there are '160 + 4 pages'. It is, thereforee, dearly indicated that the publication has a total of 164 pages. Secondly, the 'Miss World Calendar 2001' is indicated thus:

'Colour Feature

Miss World Calendar, 2001 ............54B, 105A'

Thirdly, the free booklet is also indicated as under:

'Free Booklet

2000 At a Glance ..........55 -106'

It is also pertinent to note that pages which have advertisements need not indicate the number of the page although they are counted in the total numbering. This means that, if, for example, there is an advertisement at page 10, this page need not show the number 10. However, the next page, if it is not an advertisement, would show the No. 11. In other words, the page containing the advertisements, though, do not indicate the numbering, are still accounted for and counted in the total number of pages.

8. In the present case, there is no difficulty as regards pages 1 to 54. Page 54A is an advertisement of a Motorcycle of 'Hero Honda'. This is followed overleaf by page 54B which is the top part of the 'Miss World Calendar 2001'. Then there is the free booklet entitled '2000 At a Glance' running from pages 55 to 106. This is followed by the lower half of the Calendar at page 106 A and overleaf is page 106B, which is an advertisement of Indian Airlines. Thereafter, the publication proceeds from page numbers 107 to 160. The dispute is only with regard to pages 54A, 54B, 106A and 106B and it is dear from the above that these '4' pages had not been 'irregularly' inserted and paginated. It is further quite dear that the contents, and in particular the Calendar (pages 54B and 106A), were also indicated in the index page.

9. Despite these facts, Mr. Naveen Chawla, learned Counsel appearing for respondents submitted that these four pages offended Clause 139 and Note (i) there under of the said Post Office Guide Part-I. To examine this submission, it would be necessary to interpret the said Clause 139 which is set out as under :

'139. Definition.--The following is the definition given in the Post Office Act of newspapers which may be registered and posted for transmission by the inland post, as 'Registered Newspapers'--

'Every publication, consisting wholly or in great part of political or other news or of articles relating thereto, or to other current topics, with or without advertisements, shall be deemed a newspaper, subject to the following conditions, namely :

(1) that it is published in numbers at intervals of not more than thirty one days; and

(2) that it has a bona fide list of subscribers.

An extra or supplement to a newspaper, bearing the same date as the newspaper and transmitted therewith, shall be deemed to be part of the newspaper provided that no such extra or supplement shall be so deemed, unless it consists wholly or in great part of matter like that of the newspapers and has the title and date of publication of the newspapers printed at the top of each page.'

Note: Any registered newspaper in which a document of any of the following descriptions in particular is enclosed as a supplement should be treated as a book packed:

(i) an advertisement sheet printed for an advertiser and sent to the publisher of a newspaper for distribution with it;

(ii) an advertisement sheet with an order form attached, a prospectus with an application form attached or a proposal enquiry form;

(iii) any document drawn up in the form of a direct personal communication to the recipient such as printed circular in the form of a letter purporting to be addressed to a person by whom the newspaper in which it is enclosed is received.'

10. This Clause 139, in essence, is an extension of what is provided in Section 9 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898. Section 9 of the said Post Office Act, 1898 reads as under:

'9. Power to make rules as to registered newspaper.--(1) The [a Substituted for the words 'Governor-General in Council' by A.O., 1937.] [Central Government] may make rules providing for the registration of newspapers for transmission by inland post as registered newspapers.

(2) For the purpose of such registration, every publication, consisting wholly or in great part of political or other news, or of articles relating thereto or to other current topics, with or without advertisements, shall be deemed a newspaper, subject to the following conditions, namely:

(a) that it is published in numbers at intervals of not more than thirty-one days; and

(b) that it has a bona fide list of subscribers.

(3) An extra or supplement to a newspaper, bearing the same date as the newspaper and transmitted therewith, shall be deemed to be part of the newspaper:

Provided that no such extra or supplement shall be so deemed unless it consists wholly or in great part of matter like that of the newspaper and has the title and date of publication of the newspaper printed at the top of each page.

Explanation.--Nothing in this section or in the rules there under shall be construed to render it compulsory to send newspapers by the inland post.'

11. Learned Counsel for the respondents also referred to two circulars dated 19.5.1999 (hereinafter, 'first circular') and 25/28.6.1999 (hereinafter, 'second circular'). The relevant portion of the first circular is as under:

'This is regarding treatment of various publications which are registered newspapers in terms of Section 9 of the IPO Act when advertisement sheets are inserted in them.

It has been observed in a few cases that such registered newspapers have pages containing advertisements which are not numbered. However, in the pagination of the publication as a whole these pages are accounted for. In other cases, it has been observed that there are advertisements on both sides of the pages and these pages are not accounted for in the overall numbering of the magazine. In fact this becomes a magazine within a magazine.

After an indepth examination of the matter, I am directed to inform you that in all such cases, the publications should come under non-confessionaltariff rate. This may be brought to the notice of all concerned.'

The second circular, which is, in effect, a clarificatory circular, so much as is relevant, is also set out hereinbelow:

'To determine whether a registered newspaper has infringed the rules on the subject Delhi High Court judgment in civil writ petition No. 607/82 of RDI Print and Publishing Pvt. Ltd. v. UOI in Civil Appeal No. 3517of 1984 is relevant. It has been observed by the Court that one of the ways of finding out whether an infringing document is or is not an integral part of the newspaper or magazine is that consecutive numbering of the pages. Another way of finding out is whether if it is detached from the magazine, the latter would lose any substantial part of what is usually contained in it. Even those pages which have an advertisement on both sides and properly numbered may not perhaps infringe note I below Clause 139 of PO Guide Part 1 1985 Edition, as taking out of such pages may result in enquiries being made as to what was contained on those pages which the readers would be missing.

The provisions of Section 9 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 further require that the contents of the magazine should be wholly or for the greater part, consisting of political or other news. It is possible that some publications violate this requirement by publishing advertisements in excess of such requirements. This should also be kept in mind while deciding on cases of infringement. For determining whether the advertisements contained in a magazine or a publication constitute greater or lesser part of it, it is not necessary that the pages containing advertisements are also to be numbered so long as these pages are accounted for in the overall numbering of pages of the magazine. For example a magazine having 76 pages out of which 25pagesare devoted to advertisements and these pages are not numbered. It is notnecessary to insist on numbering of such pages so long as those 25 pages areaccounted for in 76 pages of the magazine counted consecutively. Example,pages 1-5 news, 6-7-8 (advertisement but not paginated), 9-13 news, and soon.' (Underlining added)

12. Learned Counsel for the respondents in view of the above provisions and circulars relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of RDI Print and Publishing Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr., CWNO.607/1982 delivered on 29.7.1982 wherein, according to the learned Counsel, similar questions had arisen with respect to the 'Readers Digest' magazine and there also some of the pages were numbered as 148a, 148b, 148c, etc., and it had been held that these pages did not conform to the provisions of Note (i) under Clause 132 [1 Sc. This should actually be Clause 139. Clause 132 is entirely different and deals with 'Size and Weight'. However, throughout the Division Bench decision it has been per incuriam been mentioned as Clause 132.] and, accordingly, did not form part of the magazine as such. He further submitted that the Supreme Court by an order dated 25.11.1992 dismissed Civil Appeal No. 3517/1984 (i.e., the appeal preferred against the aforesaid Division Bench Judgment). However, it is pertinent to note that while dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court made the following observation:

'We have heard Mr. Shanker Das, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and Mr. V.C. Mahajan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. We have been taken through the judgment of the High Court. One may not agree with all the reasons advanced by the High Court but taking an over-all view of the matter, no fault can be found with the conclusions reached by the High. We see no ground to interfere with the High Court judgment. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.' (Underlining added)

13. Thus, according to the learned Counsel for the respondents this matter is squarely covered by the decision of the Division Bench as confirmed by the Supreme Court and the question of numbering of pages by giving numbers such as 54A, 54B, 106A and 106B would be an infringement of the relevant provisions and, accordingly, concessional rates would not apply. And, thereforee, the revised bill including the enhanced amount had to be sustained in law.

14. It may be pertinent to note here that in the case before the Division Bench, the question was with regard to an advertisement between pages 148 and 149 and 160 and 163 which had been inserted in infringement of Notes 1 and 2 below Clause 132 [ Sic. see footnote 1.] of the Post Office Guide Part-I. In that case, the contention was as under :

'The impugned communication is dated October 16, 1980 in which it has been said that. September, 1980 issue of 'Readers Digest Magazine' has an advertisement between pages 148 and 149 and 160 to 163 which have been inserted in infringement of notes (i) and (ii) below Clause 132 P&T; Guide, Volume-I. The contention is that by a printer's error some of the copies could not have consecutive page numbers printed on the infringing pages but some issues did have the page numbering. thereforee, the contention raised in the impugned communication is not valid. Secondly, it is urged that consecutive paging is not required under Clause 132 of the Post Office Guide. So long as it is part of the magazine and not distributed through the magazine as a separate paper or page no infringement can be said to have been made by the petitioner.'

15. The Division Bench repelled both these contentions. The Supreme Court while considering the judgment of the Division Bench, categorically observed that while it did not agree with all the reasons advanced by the High Court, but taking an overall view of the matter it found no fault with the conclusion reached at by the High Court. And, thereforee, it did not interfere with the said decision of the Division Bench of the High Court. Thus, in these circumstances, it is to be seen whether the decision of the Division Bench can be regarded as a binding precedent for the facts and circumstances of the present case.

16. In Krishena Kumar v. Union of India, : (1991)ILLJ191SC the Supreme Court held that 'when a Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the same. A deliberate and solemn decision of Court made after argument on questions of law fairly arising in the case, and necessary to its determination, is an authority, or binding precedent in the same Court, or in other Courts of equal or lower rank in subsequent cases where the very point is again in controversy unless there are occasions when departure is rendered necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. It should be invariably applied and should not ordinarily be departed from where decision is of long standing and rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations of public policy demand it.' This sentiment was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P., : (2002)IILLJ841SC , when it held that the doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes confidence in the system, thereforee, there is this need for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court. In Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao, : [2002]2SCR661 ecision and not any finding of facts. It is the principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court hat forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. However, the Supreme Court cautioned that when it decides a principle it would be the duty of the High Court or a Subordinate Court to follow that decision. And, a judgment of the High Court which refuses to follow the decision and directions of the Supreme Court or seeks to revive a decision of the High Court which had been set aside by the Supreme Court is a nullity.

17. What then is a binding precedent? Surely, as indicated by the Supreme Court in Government of India v. Workmen of State Trading Corporation, : (1998)IILLJ40SC , a decision that does not set out the facts or the reason for the conclusion or direction given cannot be treated as a binding precedent. In Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, : (1996)6SCC44 , the Supreme Court explained what constitutes a binding precedent in the following words:

'It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyze a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates -- (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, thereforee, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument or a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi.'

(Underlining added)

From the above decision it is clear that according to the well-settled theory of precedents every decision contains three basic ingredients:

(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts;

(ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and

(iii) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and (ii) above.

Insofar as the parties themselves are concerned, ingredient (iii) is the material element in the decision for it determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation to the subject-matter of the action. It is the judgment that stops the parties from reopening the dispute. However, for the purpose of the doctrine of precedents, ingredient (ii) is the vital element in the decision. This, indeed, is the ratio decideni. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyze a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. The other two elements in the decision are not precedents. The judgment is not binding (except directly on the parties themselves), nor are the findings of facts. This means that even where the direct facts of an earlier case appear to be identical to those of the case before the Court, the Judge is not bound to draw the same inference as drawn in the earlier case [also see: opinion [albeit dissenting on other issues.] of Sen, J. in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, : 1979CriLJ1058 ]

18. Returning to the arguments in the present case, I find that while dismissing the appeal from the said Division Bench decision of this Court, the Supreme Court, as mentioned above, had observed that:

'One may not agree with all the reasons advanced by the High Court but taking an overall view of the matter, no fault can be found with the conclusions readied by the High Court.'

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not indicate as to which reasons it agreed with and which reasons it found to be disagreeable. In this view of the matter, the reasoning of the Division Bench cannot be relied upon as a precedent and that decision which was confirmed by the Supreme Court can only be construed as a decision governing the facts of that case alone. In other words, the Supreme Court merely agreed with ingredient (iii) (i.e., the conclusion or 'concrete decision'). It did not indicate any agreement insofar as ingredient (ii) or the 'abstract ratio decided'was concerned. On the contrary, the Supreme Court categorically observed that it did not agree with 'all the reasons' advanced by the Division Bench of this Court. As such, the Supreme Court did not uphold the ratio of the said High Court decision. Nor did the Supreme Court give its own reasons. Thus, in view of the law as laid down by the various Supreme Court decisions cited above, the said decision of the Division Bench of this Court can only be regarded as a judgment binding the parties thereto and not as a binding precedent governing this case also. thereforee, it would be necessary to examine the relevant provisions de hors the said Division Bench decision and that of the Supreme Court.

19. Apart from this, the said Division Bench decision in the 'Readers Digest' case is also clearly distinguishable on facts from the case at hand. I called for the file of the said case and upon examination of the publication in question found the nature of the questionable pages therein to be entirely different from the four pages that are under scrutiny in the present case. In the Readers Digest case there was an 8-page gatefold advertisement of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. numbered as 148a, 148b,...., 148h, there was also another 8-page advertisement of Canara Bank numbered as 160a, 160b,...., 160h. Both these advertisements were inserted in the publication. There was no mention of these in the contents/index page. They were also not accounted for in the overall page numbering. These pages contained no content provided by the publisher. On the other hand, in the present case the four pages (54A, 5413, 106A and 106B) are accounted for in the overall pagination. They comprise contents provided by the publisher i.e. the calendar. The calendar finds mention in the contents/index page and the page numbers--54B, 106A--are also specifically indicated. The other two pages -- 54A, 106B -- are advertisements of different parties on the reverse of the calendar pages. It is clear, on facts also the Readers Digest case is entirely different and distinguishable from the present case. So, on both counts--(not being a binding precedent and being distinguishable on facts)--the said Division Bench decision of this Court (as confirmed by the Supreme Court) in the 'Readers Digest' case, is of no use to the respondents.

20. Let us now examine the case de hors the said decisions in the Readers Digest case. The argument against the petitioner is that the Special January, 2001 issue contravenes Note (i) under Clause 139 of the said Post Office Guide. It would be instructive to reproduce the said note once again:

'Note: Any registered newspaper in which a document of any of the following descriptions in particular is enclosed as a supplement should be treated as a book packed:

(i) an advertisement sheet printed for an advertiser and sent to the publisher of a newspaper for distribution with it.'

It must be recalled that the above provision has to be construed in the context of the so-called 'offending' four pages--54A, 54B, 106A and 106B. Now, page 54A is an advertisement of 'Hero Honda'. Pages 54B and 106A constitute the 'Miss World 2001 Calendar'.' Page 106B is an advertisement of Indian Airlines. It is nobody's case that any of these pages were printed for 'Hero Honda' (54A) or 'Indian Airlines' (106B) and sent to the publisher (i.e., the petitioner) for distribution with the issue in question. The calendar (54B and 106A) was that of the petitioner itself. In any event, these pages were part of the issue in question and were not in the nature of 'advertisement sheets' printed separately and distributed with the newspaper. In my view, Note (i) under Clause 139 does not come into play at all in the facts of the present case.

21. Moreover, if one were to look at the first circular, it would be apparent that it deals with two situations. First, it deals with the situation where pages containing advertisements are not numbered but, in the pagination of the publication as a whole, they are accounted for. The second situation would be where such pages are neither numbered nor accounted for. It is in the second situation that the circular directs that publications should come under the 'unconcessionaltariff'. In other words, where there are pages in a publication which contain advertisements and which are not numbered, this, ipso facto, would not disentitle the publication from concessional tariff. What would disentitle such a publication from concessional tariff would be the fact that such pages are not accounted for in the pagination of the publication as a whole. If they are accounted for, then, the publication would be eligible for concessional tariff. In the present case, as aforesaid, it is clear that the contents/index page of the issue itself indicates the number of pages as '160 + 4 Pages' which clearly implies that the '4' pages, i.e., 54A, 54B, 106A and 106B have been accounted for in the pagination of the publication as a whole. Furthermore, the calendar (at pages 54B and 106A) itself is mentioned in the contents/index page. Thus, in terms of the first circular dated 19.5.1999 also, the Special January 2001 issue of the publication 'Competition Success Review' would clearly by eligible for concessional tariff.

22. In the second circular issued on 25/28.6.1999 also, this is clearly indicated and reiterated. It is stated therein that 'for determining whether the advertisements contained in a magazine or a publication constitute greater or lesser part of it, it is not necessary that the pages containing advertisements are also to be numbered so long as these pages are accounted for in the overall numbering of the pages of the magazine'. It further provides an example to the effect that a magazine having 76 pages, out of which 25 pages are devoted to advertisements, it is not at all necessary to insist on numbering of such pages so long as these 25 pages are accounted for in 76 pages of the magazine counted consecutively. Thus, pages containing advertisements need not be numbered. The only requirement is that they be accounted for. In the facts of the present case, we find that '4' pages in question being 54A, 54B, 106A and 106B are clearly accounted for in the overall pagination of the said Special January 2001 issue of the publication entitled 'Competition Success Review' (English monthly). Notes (i) and (ii) below Clause 139 of the Post Office Guide Part-I are not at all attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case as indicated above. None of the provisions of Section 9 of the Post Office Act, 1898 are infringed.

23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the revised Bill dated 5.2.2001 (copy of which is Annexure-X to the petition) is illegal and contrary to the applicable provisions and is hereby quashed. The Bill dated 1.1.2001 in respect of the postal dispatches of the said Special January 2001 issue on 23.12.2000, 26.12.2000 and 27.12.2000 for a total amount of Rs. 14,224.75 has already been paid in full by the petitioner and nothing remains owing and due from the petitioner to the respondents on account of the said dispatches.

The writ petition is accordingly allowed as indicated above. There shall be no orders as to costs.


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