Judgment:
P.K. Bahri, J.
(1) These two writ petitions pertain to challenging the orders of the appellate authorities by virtue of which appeals filed by the petitioner under the Punjab Municipal Act objecting to the fixation of rateable value of the property bearing No.1, Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi, for the assessment years 1975-76 & 1976-77 had been dismissed.
(2) The main contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the two writ petitions is that the property in question had been admittedly let out prior to June 2, 1944, at the rental ofRs.418.00 per month and thus, by virtue of Section 6A(l)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 the said amount would be deemed to be the basic rent and the rateable value of the property under the Punjab Municipal Act has to be fixed keeping in view the standard rent. I have perused the orders of the assessing authorities and find that the assessing authorities have fixed the rateable value on the basis of the standard rent arrived at taking into account the market value of the land at the time the property was constructed and the cost of the construction. The plea of the petitioner that Rs.418.00 per month has to be treated as the basic rent was completely given a go by and no reasons have been given in the appellate order as to why the same could not be treated as the basic rent in view of Section 6A(l)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
(3) Apart from this fact it is the case of the petitioner that in fact, under the provisions of New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939, the standard rent was fixed at Rs.418.00 per month vide copy of the order annexure 'B' and in appeal the said order was affirmed by the President of the New Delhi Municipal Committee vide copy of the order being annexure 'C' and the assessing authorities have completely ignored the said two orders.
(4) A plea has been taken in the counter-affidavit that such copies of the orders were never placed before the assessing authorities and these orders only amounted to fixing the compensation for the property taken on lease by the Government of India and thus, there was no occasion for the assessing authorities to look into this aspect whether any standard rent has been fixed under the said provisions or not. Whether any standard rent has been fixed under the said provisions or not could be easily known to the New Delhi Municipal Committee because it is the President of the New Delhi Municipal Committee which was the appellate authority under the said Order who had decided the appeal fixing the rent under the said Order.
(5) Be that as it may, Rs.418/ per month being the rent realised prior to June 2, 1944, the same has to be treated the basic rent for the purpose of fixing standard rent inaccordance with Section 6A(l)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Counsel for the respondent has contended that there had taken place structural additions in the property after 1944 and thus the cost of the said new construction has to be kept in view. This has been disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The impugned orders do not make reference to any such additions. However, as the matter has to go back to the assessing authorities for fixing the rateable value in accordance with law, it would be for the assessing authority to take evidence and decide whether any material structural additions had taken place in the property in question after 1944 and if so, what is the value of the same. The impugned orders cannot be sustained as they have completely ignored the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958while fixing the rateable value inasmuch as Rs.418.00 per month has to be treated the basic rent in view of the aforesaid provisions for determining the standard rent.
(6) I allow these two writ petitions, make the rule absolute and quash the impugned orders and remand the case back to the assessing authorities for fixing the rateable value in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made by this Court as above. The parties are directed to appear before the assessing authorities for further proceedings on February 1,1994. The parties are left to bear their own costs.