Santosh Dnggal, J.
(1) The appellants in this second appeal are two daughters, now married, of the original tenant, Shri Shiv Kumar Sharma, who died on 28th May 1982.
(2) A brief resume of the facts reveals that the respondents, who are owners/landlords of the premises being shop No. 23/10, East Patel Nagar, New Delhi, filed an eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of rent in March 1985, impleading the widow and three sons of the deceased tenant as respondents. The said respondents contested the matter, but after hearing the parties and taking note of the pleadings, an order under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short 'the Act') was passed. Pursuant to non-compliance of the order, on the part of the respondents, passed under Section 15(1) of the Act, an order u/Section 15(7) striking out the defense of the respondents was passed on 19.3.1986, followed by an eviction order, on the ground of non-payment of rent, passed on 21.4.1986.
(3) The appeal filed by the judgment-debtors met with failure, having been dismissed by order dated 10.10.1986 by the Rent Control Tribunal. The landlords thereafter took out the execution proceedings, and it was then that two out of the four daughters of the deceased tenant, named, Renu Sharma and Kavita Sharma filed objections under Section 25 of the Act contending that the tenancy premises being of commercial nature, the tenancy rights were inherited by all the legal heirs of the deceased tenant, namely, the widow, three sons as well as four daughters, but neither notice of demand had been served on the objectors, nor they were imp leaded in the eviction petition. They further alleged that the eviction order was suffered by their mother and three brothers in collusion with the landlords and that they were kept in the dark and were not bound by the eviction order.
(4) These objections were dismissed after three years of their pendency by order dated 3.11.1989. The matter was pursued with tenacity by the said two daughters, inasmuch as first appeal was filed before the Rent Control Tribunal. That was dismissed and then second appeal filed in the High Court, which also met the same fate and then they went to Supreme Court by way of special leave petition. That was also dismissed by the Supreme Court by order dated 26.4.1991 repelling their contention of not being bound by the eviction order, on the view that the legal heirs, who were in possession, and had been paying rent, as per records, to the landlords had substantially represented the interest of all the legal heirs, and that there was no merit in the contention that the objectors having inherited the tenancy rights, were necessary parties.
(5) Within almost a month of the dismissal of objections on the aforesaid two daughters of the deceased tenant, the present appellants, who are other.two daughters, since married, came up with similar objections, which are the subject matter of the present appeal.
(6) A reading of the impugned order as well as the first order passed by the Addl. Rent Controller reveals that the same contentions, as had been raised earlier by Renu Sharma and Kavita Sharma, were advanced by the present objectors, and the two Courts below have held concurrently that the position has been put at rest by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of the two daughters who filed objections earlier, and that the present objectors/appellants could not be permitted to advance same contentions all over again. In this second appeal, the main contention raised is that the appellants have an independent right, as heirs of the deceased tenant, in view of the settled position that the tenancy rights are heritable in the case of commercial premises. Reliance is also placed in support of this proposition on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported as 1985 Raj L24598, Gian Devi Anand v. Jeewan Kumar Mr. Maheshwar Dayal very vehemently canvassed this contention urging that the appellants having inherited the tenancy rights .were equally entitled to protect their interest in the demised premises, and that their rights have been prejudiced by their not being imp leaded as respondents in the eviction petition. He went to the extent of saying that, in fact, even the notice of demand of rent, which was alleged to be in arrears, had necessarily to be served on the appellants also, as heirs of the deceased tenant, being equally interested in the tenancy rights, and that a great prejudice has been caused to them by denial of an opportunity to save the tenancy rights by paying rent, which they could have done on receipt of notice.
(7) On being asked whether the appellants had, at any time, been in actual physical possession of the tenancy premises after the death of their father, or whether they had at any time paid rent or contributed the same to their mother or brothers, the learned Counsel replied in the negative. He reiterated his contention that nevertheless it was open to the appellants to pay the rent when faced with notice of demand on threat of eviction, after the order under Section 15(1) of the Act was passed.
(8) Another grievance made by Mr. Maheshwar Dayal was that of denial of opportunity to prove the allegations made in the objections regarding fraud and collusion between the landlords on the one hand and their mother and brothers on the other which, according to him, was manifest from the fact of their not-complying/with the orders under Section 15(1) of the Act. Mr. Maheshwar Dayal pleaded that in normal course, no one would suffer an eviction order .In respect to commercial premises by not paying the rent even when an order under Section 15(1) had been passed, and that itself was indication .of the existence of fraud or collusion between the judgment-debtors and the landlords. The learned Counsel repeated his plea that all this could have been proved if right of evidence had been conceded to the appellants, and that the Courts below erred in dismissing the objections without affording any opportunity to the appellants to prove their contentions.
(9) The short answer to all these contentions raised on behalf of the appellants is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of their own sisters reported as : [1991]2SCR517 , Miss Renu Sharma and Another v. Mrs. Raghbir Kaur Bhatia and Others. A reading of this judgment, dismissing the special leave petition, reveals that the Court repelled the contention that the provisions of Section 19 of the Hindu Succession Act invested legal heirs of the deceased tenant with the status of being tenants-incommon, holding that this was between heirs inter se, and not vis-a-vis outsiders having superior and distinguishable rights like the landlord of the tenancy premises.. The Court further held, taking note of the fact that the other two daughters who were then before the Court, had never paid rent, and the same had been paid always by the mother or the brothers, it was a case where the said mother and brothers can be taken to have represented the interest of all the legal heirs of the deceased tenant vis-a-vis the landlord. This a finding which has to be treated almost as being inter partes, because the present appellants stand on an identically the same footing, as their other two sisters, and identical contentions stand concluded by the aforesaid judgment.
(10) Mr. Maheshwar Dayal tried to make out a case of the present appellants as being distinguishable from the other two sisters by contending that the Court was primarily swayed away by the fact that they were young-unmarried girls and were being looked after by their elders, which was not the case with the present objectors, who are married, and are independently settled and are in a position to pay rent. That may be so, but that does not make their position any better than the other two sisters in so far as the representation of interest of all the joint tenants in the eviction petition is concerned. The basic fact is common to the effect that these appellants, like the other two sisters, had never paid rent, and it was because of this that the landlords had taken a consistent stand that only the mother and brothers have been in actual physical possession, and having paid the rent, were the necessary parties. The position is not different because these two appellants have also not shown to have ever paid rent or having ever enjoyed physical and actual possession of the property. It is also very noteworthy that they are, on their own showing, now married and living separately in different cities. The addresses of both of them are nowhere disclosed on record, but Shri Maheshwar Dayal stated that one of them was earlier residing in Chandigarh and the second was somewhere in Delhi. It is not shown as to how the two of them have common interest in saving the tenancy rights of the shop as the husbands of both of them are in government or other service, and posted at separate stations, and neither of the two appellants even aver about -being in business, much less in tenancy premises. If the other two sisters were deemed to have been represented by the mother and brothers, being young girls, and on account of being looked after by the elders; the present appellants, who are now married, are in no better position to claim any independent right, for the reasons discussed above it is also pertinent to note as pointed out by Mr. Rohagi from the order in appeal passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, that even these two appellants were unmarried at the time, the eviction petition was filed. Mr. Rohatgi rightly contended that the objections had been filed in the execution, and the executing Court could not go behind the decree or eviction order, by re-examining the fact as to what was the actual position, and that the facts recorded in the Tribunal's order that the present objectors were, like other sisters, unmarried at the time the eviction petition was filed, and they enjoyed no distinguishable rights than the other two sisters, is final, as a finding of fact. That being so, there is no reason why the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of other two sisters should not be applicable in their case also.
(11) The contention that no opportunity had been afforded to the appellants to substantiate the allegations of fraud or collusion by producing evidence, also does not cut much ice for the reason that no particulars of the fraud or collusion have been set out in the objections. The allegation is that the mother and brothers had colluded with the landlords. If that was so, then the least that was expected was that the appellants join the other two sisters, when they filed objections after the execution was taken out by the landlords, and then it could legitimately have been alleged that the interest of the four daughters had not been looked after by the mother and brothers, and that they formed one block, and wanted to protect their interest. There is no indication on the record about existence of any collusion between the mother and brothers on the one hand and the landlords on the other.
(12) If there was any collusion, that unmistakably can be discerned to have existed between the judgment debtors and the present appellants as also their other two sisters, as revealed from following facts. The eviction order became final on 10.10.1986 with dismissal of the appeal by the Tribunal, and after the execution was taken out, the objections were filed through the two unmarried daughters of the deceased tenant, and that was as far back as on 5.11.1986. These attained finality only by judgment and order of the Supreme Court dated 26.4.1991, that is after a period of 4' years. It is a very curious situation that within almost a month of that, these appellants became wise and acquired knowledge of the eviction order. The allegation is that of collusion between the mother and brothers with the landlords and not between other two sisters also. In the absence of any allegation that the two sisters, who had fought their objections strenuously up to the Supreme Court and thwarted the execution of the eviction order for almost five years, had also colluded with the landlords, and against the appellants. As already noted, the contention absolutely lacks credibility, in view of the fact that the interest of the four sisters being common, there is no reason as to why those two sisters would not disclose .this fact to their elder sisters. The fact that the mother and brothers must have been instrumental in the act of filing of objections by two unmarried daughters, is evident from the fact that there is a finding of the Supreme Court that the girls did not have any income of their own. If that was so, the question would arise who was meeting the cost of litigation on their behalf? The inescapable answer is : the judgment debtors. Apparently, it is they, who after the Supreme Court judgment put up the present appellants-the other set of daughters.
(13) It is thus a very glaring case where the judgment-debtors are putting up daughters, one set after the other, to thwart execution of the eviction order, and the Courts below adopted a correct approach in dismissing the same in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of other two sisters, particularly when on a reading of the order it becomes apparent that the contentions were almost identical, and no new point was being urged, which required to be put to evidence. The appellants were only feigning ignorance.
(14) The plea for right of evidence cannot be entertained for another reason also, as already noted, that in the absence of any particulars of fraud or collusion, which must be set out in detail, no evidence could be entertained. The provisions of Order 6 Rule 4 Civil Procedure Code are very clear to this effect, namely, that in all cases where a party pleads or relies on allegations of misrepresentation, fraud or undue influence etc. then complete particulars must be set out with date and items, if necessary. In the objections filed on behalf of the appellants, not a single date was mentioned as to when they first came to know about existence of collusion or through what source. They have come up with allegations of fraud and collusion against their own mother and brothers, without a whisper in the objections that they had strained relations or that they had not visited their mother and brothers during the last five years, which is the time gap between passing of the eviction order and their filing of the objections. The judgment of a learned Single Judge in the case reported as 1976 Rcr 133, Ganga Per shad and Another v. Smt. Tribeni Den & Others, on which Mr. Maheshwar Dayal placed reliance to contend that under the .provisions of Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act, all the heirs inherit the, rights in tenancy as co-tenants has been clearly overruled by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of appellants' own sisters, quoted above. The other two judgments, on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Maheshwar Dayal, have already been considered in the judgment of Miss Renu Sharma (supra) and the two Courts below have also taken note of all the judgments cited and rightly came to the conclusion that the objections were without any substance, particularly in view of the judgment in the case of Miss Renu Sharma (supra). thereforee, do not find any merits in this appeal and the same is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 1000.00 .