Judgment:
Mukul Mudgal, J.
1. Rule. With the consent of all counsel, the writ petition is taken up today for final hearing.
2. The question involved in the present writ petition is whether the existence of a remedy under Section 8 of the Delhi Schools Education Act, 1973(hereinafter referred to as `the Act') bars an approach to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition filed by the petitioner sought the quashing of a notice dated 7th January, 2003 issued purportedly under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act seeking to retrench the petitioner's services. The petitioner's main plea is that the impugned notice has been passed without prior approval of respondent No. 1, Director of Education, NCT of Delhi as required by Section 8(2) of Act. This Court issued notices in the writ petition and passed an Order dated 6th February, 2003, restraining the termination of the services of the petitioner.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent has cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shashi Gaur vs . NCT of Delhi & Ors. Reported as : (2001)10SCC445 to contend that even the purported retrenchment challenged by this writ petition would fall under jurisdiction of Section 8 of the Act and thereforee there is no bar to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the following position of law in Shashi Gaur's case (supra):-
'7. This judgment and the interpretation put to the provisions of Sub-sections (2) & (3) of Section 8 undoubtedly, is of sufficient force. But, the question for out consideration would be that, would it be appropriate for us to give a narrow construction of Sub-section (3) of Section 8, thereby taking the teachers whose services were terminated not by way of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank but otherwise, out of the purview of the Tribunal constituted under Section 11 of the Act. The statute has provided for a Tribunal to confer a remedy to the teachers who are often taken out of service by the caprices and whims of the management of the private institutions. The Governmental authorities, having been given certain control over the action of such private management, if an appeal to the Tribunal is not provided to such an employee, then he has to knock the doors of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution which is a discretionary one. The remedy provided by way of an appeal to the Tribunal is undoubtedly a more efficacious remedy to an employee whose services stand terminated after serving the institution for a number of years, as in the present case where the services are terminated after 14 years.
8. In this view of the matter, we are persuaded to take the view that under Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act, an appeal is provided against an order not only of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, which obviously is a major penalty in a disciplinary proceeding, but also against a termination otherwise except where the service itself comes to an end by efflux of time for which the employee was initially appointed. thereforee, we do not find any infirmity with the order of the High Court not entertaining the Writ Application in exercise of its discretion, though we do not agree with the conclusion that availability of an alternative remedy oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. '
4. Thus the above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court makes it clear that while the petitioner may be directed to approach the Delhi Schools Tribunal nevertheless in suitable and appropriate cases, the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not ousted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the correct interpretation of Section 8 of the Act requires that it be widely construed so as to bring also within its ambit such termination of services which are otherwise than by way of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Thus there is no reason why the petitioner who challenges the termination of his services by the proposed retrenchment ought not approach The Delhi Schools Tribunal for relief under Section 8 of the Act. Accordingly, the petitioner is permitted to withdraw the present writ petition and seek an appropriate remedy under Delhi School Education Act to ventilate the grievances sought to be raised in this writ petition, i. e. , the proposed cessation of the services of the petitioner by way of retrenchment.
5. The interim order dated 6th February, 2003 passed by this Court restraining the dispensation of the petitioner's services will continue until 15th September, 2003 so as to enable the petitioner to approach the Delhi Schools Tribunal and pray for an appropriate interim relief.
6. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly with the above directions.