ORDER
Usha Mehra, J.
1. The petitioner has been working with respondent No. 3, State Council of Education Research and Training (in short SCERT). He was appointed as Senior Lecturer with SCERT on 25th March, 1989. The post of Senior Lecturer falls in the category of academic staff of the SCERT. Respondent No. 3 informed the petitioner that he would stand superannuated at the age of 60 years which happened to be on 31st January, 1999. The petitioner in this petition has assailed the order of superannuation passed by respondent No. 3, inter alia, on the ground that the staff of SCERT shall have the same terms and conditions of service as are available to the National Council of Educational Research & Training (in short the NCERT). The academic staff of NCERT has to superannuate at the age of 62 years whereas petitioner has been made to retire at the age of 60 years. Petitioner's service conditions and tenure being the same as that of the NCERT hence he cannot be denied the age of superannuation as is being enjoyed by his counterpart in the NCERT i.e. 62 years.
2. Respondent No. 3, the SCERT, is a Society registered under the Socie- ties Registration Act. It was created by the Administration of Delhi in the year 1986 with the sole object to provide better opportunities and facilities in all spheres of education and at all stages. To provide best education in schools/colleges, and for research and development in the education system on the basis of modern techniques, scientific research and improvements in the institution. To achieve this object the SCERT is funded by the Government of NCT of Delhi beside generating funds from other resources.
3. The service condition of the staff of the SCERT including that of the academic staff are to be governed by the memorandum of Association, Rules & Regulation as framed by respondent No. 3. Regulation 67 of the said Rules and Regulations of the SCERT provides:
67. Terms and Tenure of service of Academic Staff.
The terms and tenure of service of the academic staff at the council shall remain the same as available for the academic staff of the National Council of Educational Research & Training.
4. The NCERT vide its order dated 11th November, 1998 raised the age of superannuation of its academic staff working in Universities and Colleges from 60 to 62 years. This was done by the NCERT on the basis of circular issued by the Ministry of Human Resource Development dated 27th July, 1998.
5. Relying on the regulation No. 67, the petitioner represented to the respondent No. 3 that since the age of superannuation of academic staff of NCERT has been raised to 62 years, hence his tenure basing on the notification/order of NCERT be raised to 62 years. Since his counterparts working in NCERT have been given this benefit of increase in age of retirement the same benefit should be made available to the academic staff of SCERT. As his request has been rejected hence he preferred this writ petition.
6. Notice of this petition was issued to the respondents. Respondent No. 3 resisted this writ petition thereby raising objections which can be summarised thus that: (i) SCERT is not an instrumentality of the State, thereforee, not amenable to writ jurisdiction; (ii) that the order of the Ministry, dated 27th July, 1998 followed by notification of NCERT do not apply to the academic staff of SCERT, because the academic staff of the SCERT is not governed by UGC pattern; (iii) that the petitioner cannot take any advantage of the term and condition including tenure of service applicable to the academic staff of the NCERT. The terms and conditions of NCERT mutates-mutants will not apply to the staff of the SCERT.
7. The first question which arises for consideration is whether SCERT is an instrumentality of the State. The word 'the State' as per Article 12 of the Constitution would include Government and parliament of India and the Government and Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. The expression 'instrumentality of State' would include not only the Executive and Legislative organs of the Union & State but also Local bodies and 'other authorities'. What is an 'other authority' came up for interpretation in the case of R.D. Shetty Vs . International Airport Authority of India : (1979)IILLJ217SC . The Apex Court therein laid down the parameters and principles to ascertain whether the body or the authority is 'the State'. These parameters or tests can be summed up thus; (i) when the authority is fully financed by Government and its share capital is held by Government; (ii) All pervasive control of the State; (iii) Monopoly status of a Corporation; (iv) if it was a Department of the Government and even after registering as Society of Corporation it remains attached to the Government or adjunct of the Government. In Ajay Hasia Vs . Khalid Mujib Sehrawardi : (1981)ILLJ103SC , the Supreme Court observed that Government may act through natural or judicial person to carry out its function and it is not necessary that it is a creation of a statue. The observation of Justice K.K. Mathew in Ajay Hasia's case (supra) were reiterated by Apex Court in the case of M.C. Metha Vs . Union of India : [1987]1SCR819 , wherein it has been held that:-
'The Corporation may be a statutory Corporation created by a statute or it may be a Government Company or a Company formed under the Companies Act, 1956 or it may be a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or any other similar State. What is really to be determined for whether a body is or not 'other authority' is who created the body and why-what are its aims and objects, how is it running, the extent of Government financial aid or grant to it and its dependency on the Government and the latter's control over it.'
8. thereforee, the relevant consideration is whether SCERT is a department of Administration of Delhi and weather NCT of Delhi has control over it. From the objects, Rules and Regulations of SCERT, it cannot be said that Administration of Delhi has control over SCERT or that it is a Department of NCT of Delhi. The object, Rules and Regulations of SCERT and that of NCERT are almost identical. In the case of Chander Mohan Khanna Vs . The National Council of Educational Research & Training & Ors. : (1992)ILLJ331SC , the Apex Court after analysing the objects, rules and regulations of the NCERT observed that it is not a State. For arriving at this conclusion the Court took note of the fact that NCERT is to be governed by its own Memorandum of Association, Rules & Regulations. It is free to act within the frame work of its Rules & Regulations. Beside Government grants, it generates funds from other sources i.e. by collecting funds and by selling its assets and by receipts. Government control is confined only to proper utilisation of its grants. Hence NCERT has been held to be an autonomous body. There is no all pervasive control of the Government, thereforee, it has not been held to be a State. Relying on these observations of the Apex Court Mr. Ajay Kapur, counsel for SCERT contended that the case of SCERT stand on the same footing as that of NCERT. In fact SCERT has literally lifted the salient features of objects, Rules & Regulations of NCERT and incorporated those as its objects, Rules & Regulations. To illustrate he drew our attention to the salient objectives of SCERT provided in clause (3) of SCERT. These are almost identical to those provided in clauses 3.1. & 3.2 of the NCERT namely to assist and advise the Administration of Delhi in the implementation of its policies and major programmes in the filed of education. Clause (3) also empowers the SCERT for the realisation of these objects to undertake several kinds of programmes & activities inclusive of research, extension service, training of teachers and other personnel, undertake, assist, promote and coordinate research in all branches of education, develop educational technology for use of the teaching and learning activities, to provide pre-service and in-service training of teachers of all levels of school education, collaboration in educational programmes, develop, adopt, produce curricular materials, and other related instruction materials, provide guidance and educational materials to the disadvantage group, to experiment, develop and/or to disseminate improved educational techniques and practices in school. To assist and advise various agencies of mass media for the propagation of education. Like NCERT the Memorandum of SCERT in clause (5) provides that the income and property of the council, however, derived shall be applied towards the promotion of the objectives thereof as set forth in the Memorandum of Association. The income so derived cannot be disposed of by the council by way of dividends, bonus etc. thereforee, it is clear that the income derived by it, the council is free to utilise it in order to achieve its object as it consider fit. The only condition imposed by clause (5) is with regard to the grant given by Administration of Delhi. It will be utilise subject to the limitation imposed by Administration of Delhi. Clause (6) of SCERT is paramateria the same as that of NCERT i.e. the Government could review the work and progress of the Council and take appropriate action to give effect to the reports received on enquiries. In addition Government could at any time issue directions to the Council on important matters of policy and programmes. Like Rule 3 of NCERT, the Rule 3 of SCERT also deals with the Constitution of the Council which consists mainly of various government officials and also includes senior fellow from NIEPA, Director NCERT or his nominee and nominated members by Secretary (Education) Delhi Administration from amongst the academic staff of Directorate of Education, Delhi Administration, Delhi University, NCERT, NIEPA, JNU, Jamia Millia Islamia, CBSE & Ministry of Human Resource Development. Rule 7 deals with the duration of Membership of the Council. Council's affairs are conducted by the Executive Committee which is so provided in Rule 26. It includes beside various Government servants, Director NCERT, Director SCERT, Director NIEPA, Rule 42 provides that Executive Committee shall have control over the management of affairs of the Council and shall have the authority to exercise all the powers as delegated by the Council from time to time. Under Rule 40 powers have been given to the Chairman to refer question of sufficient importance for the decision of the Government of India. Regulation 43 empowers the Executive committee to frame and amend regulations not inconsistent with the rules. Regulation 45 empowers the Executive Committee to enter into arrangements with the Administration and other public or private organisations or individual for furtherance of its objectives, for implementation of its programmes and for securing and accepting endowments, grant-in-aid, donations or gifts to the council on mutually agreed terms provided such conditions of grant-in-aid, donations or gifts are not inconsistent or in conflict with objectives of the council. Regulation 60 provides, like Regulation 57 of the NCERT, that the funds of the Council shall consist of: (i) grants made by the Administration of Delhi/Delhi State & Government of India for furtherance of the objects of the Council; (ii) contribution from other resources; (iii) income from assets and publication of the Council and (iv) Receipts of Council from other sources. If we analyze the above objects, rules, regulations as quoted above, we can safely conclude and hold as has been held in Chander Mohan Khanna's case(supra) that since the Council is free to apply its income and property towards the promotion of its objectives and implementation of the programme coupled with the fact that the Government control is confined only to the proper utilisation of the grant, hence SCERT is largely an autonomous body and not a State. The SCERT is a Society registered under Societies Registration Act. Its object being to assist and advise the Administration of Delhi in implementation of its policies and major programmes in the field of education at all levels. Its activities and programmes are connected with the coordination of research extension service and training, dissemination of improved educational programmes. Such activities in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna (supra) have already been held not wholly related to Governmental functions, hence not an instrumentality of the State. Like NCERT the functions of SCERT are conducted by its Executive Committee which is free to enter into arrangements with Government, public and private organisations, individuals. This the SCERT will do in furtherance of the objectives for implementation of programmes. Council is not running its affairs solely and wholly on the funds of Administration of Delhi. It generates its own funds from contributions, income from assets etc. Thus the control of the NCT of Delhi is not all pervasive. Administration of Delhi's control is confined only to the proper utilisation of its grants.
9. On the other hand, Mr. Bisaria contends that there are distinguishable features of the rules and regulations of NCERT and that of SCERT. According to him the SCERT is 100% funded and controlled by the Administration of Delhi. SCERT before being registered as society was a civil department of the Delhi Administration and it still remains adjunct to the Government of NCT of Delhi, whereas NCERT sprung up as a new autonomous body. It has no link with any department of the Government of India, nor remained adjunct to the Government of India. This he tried to support his argument by drawing our attention to Regulation 66 of the SCERT which deals with the dissolution. Regulation 66(b) provides that in case of dissolution of the Council the liabilities and assets of the Council shall be taken over at book value by the Administration of Delhi. From this analysis of the Memorandum of Association, Rules and Regulations according to him it can safely be concluded that it does fulfill the test of 'other authority' as laid down in R.D. Shetty's case (supra). Hence it can be said that SCERT is a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
10. We are afraid the distinction which Mr. Bisaria tried to draw hardly exists. In Chander Mohan Khanna's case (supra) one of the consideration for declaring it to be not a State was that NCERT was free to apply its income and property towards the promoting of its objectives and implementation of the programmes and Government control was confined only to the proper utilisation of its grants. These observations aptly apply to SCERT. It is also free to utilise its income and property in any manner it likes for achieving theses objects. thereforee, it cannot be said that since SCERT is funded by the Administration of Delhi beside generating from its own sources hence NCT of Delhi has all pervasive control over it, nor it can be said that it is department of NCT of Delhi. After it was created as a Society and registered under the Societies Registration Act it acquired autonomous status. Its functions are performed by its Executive Committee which is free to enter any arrangement with Government, public or private organisations, individuals etc. So far as the power to dissolve the council is concerned, these powers vest with the 2/3rd majority of the Members of the Council itself and not with the Administration of Delhi. thereforee, on the mere assumption that after dissolution of the council since the liability and assets would be given to the Administration of Delhi or Government of NCT of Delhi it' cannot be presumed that it is a Department of NCT of Delhi or adjunct of Delhi State. If it had been a Department of Delhi Administration, it would not have its own Memorandum of Association, Rules & Regulations. The Memorandum of Association, Rules & Regulations of the SCERT are framed by the Council itself and not the creation of any Statute. thereforee, if the Council itself decides to dissolve the council, in that case it will do so by passing special resolution by majority of 2/3rd Members of the Council. In that eventuality its and assets and liabilities will be taken over by the Administration of Delhi. In fact it is not a statutory provision notified by the Government of Delhi or the Government of India. In fact it is on the basis of the Regulation of the Society. It cannot, thereforee, be said that SCERT is a Department or adjunct of the Delhi State. Like NCERT the Rules, Regulations and objectives of the SCERT governing the functions and its Executive Committee are the creation of the Rules & Regulation framed by the Society itself. The SCERT may have been a Civil Department of the Delhi Administration but after having registered as a Society it is no more adjunct of the Delhi State. In fact after the creation of the SCERT in 1986 it is not performing any functions which are related to governmental functions. The activities of the SCERT pertaining to programmes and activities connected with co-ordination of research, extension in service and training cannot be called governmental functions. The freedom given to it by rules to enter any arrangement with anyone shows it is an autonomous body and not an instrumentality of the State.
11. Having held that SCERT is not an instrumentality of the State, the question arises; whether the relief claimed is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution? Article 226 provides:-
'226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs (1) Notwith-standing anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories direction, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part-III and for any other purpose.'
12. Admittedly, the language of Article 226 does not admit any limitation on the power of the High Court. The language of Article 226 shows that power can be exercised by the High Court when a body or authority exercises its power in the discharge of its public duty and the petitioner is aggrieved by the same. The terms 'person' and 'authority' used in Article 226 came up for interpretation before Supreme Court in the case of Praga Tools Corpn. Vs . C.A. Imanual : (1969)IILLJ479SC , wherein it has been observed that:-
'20. The term 'authority' used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non fundamental rights. The words 'any person or authority' used in Article 226 are, thereforee, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owned by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.
21. A mandamus can issue, for instance, to an official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statutes under or by which the society is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the statutes authorising their undertakings.
22. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commending on the development of this law, professor de Smith states: 'To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract'. We share this view. The judicial control over the fast-expending maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found'. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, thereforee, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition.'
13. Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Anadi Mukta S.M.V.S.S.J.M.S. Trust Vs . V.R. Rudani, : (1989)IILLJ324SC , while interpreting the expression 'authority' under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that this expression in the context is different from that appearing under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Court in Shri Andi Mukta's case (Supra) was dealing with the case of retrenched teachers of a private aided college run by public Trust affiliated to University. Teachers sought writ of mandamus for compelling the college management to pay them terminal benefits and arrears of salary due. The Apex Court while granting them relief observed that when any person or authority performs public duty and owes positive obligation to the affected person, then such an authority or person is amenable to writ jurisdiction. Duty on the person or authority need not be imposed by statute. It is only if the doing of that duty is of a public function and is having public character. The duty has to be adjudged in the light of positive obligation owed by the authority to the effected party. It is immaterial by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.
14. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sri Kanaseema Coop. Central Bank Ltd. v. N. Seetharama Raju, reported in AIR 1990 A.P. 171, while considering the question whether a writ petition would lie against a co-operative society and if so, in what circumstances, observed that:-
Even if a society could not be characterised as a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12, even so a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty which an employee is entitled to enforce against the society. In such a case, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the society is being treated as a 'person' or an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution. What is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon it and the Court is to enforce such statutory public duty.
15. In the case of U.P. State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. Vs . Chandra Bhan Dubey , the Apex Court while considering the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India with regard to judicial review as to whether it is limited to the field of public law and not private law observed that:-
'Prima facie from the language of Article 226 there does not appear to exist such a divide between public law and private law. Article 226 while empowering the High Court for issue of orders or directions to any authority or person, does not make any such difference between public functions and private functions. Article 226 speaks of direction and orders which can be issued to any person or authority including, in appropriate cases, any government.'
16. While defining 'person' the court took aid of clause (1) of Article 367 of the Constitution to say that, 'General clauses Act 1997 shall subject to any adaptation and modifications that may be made therein under Article 372, apply for the interpretation of the Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of legislature or the Dominion of India. 'Person' under Section 2 of the General Clauses Act shall include any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. When any person or citizen is wronged, the High Court will step in to protect him, be that wrong be done by the state, an instrumentality of the state, a company or a cooperative society or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or even an individual, Right that is infringed may be under Part-III of the Constitution or any other right which the law validly made might confer upon him. This is subject to the condition that the High Court does not interfere when an equally efficacies alternative remedy is available or when there is an established procedure to remedy a wrong or enforce a right. A party may not be allowed to by-pass the normal channel of civil and criminal litigation. thereforee, the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is vast'.
17. There are, however, self-imposed limitation in exercise of these vast powers but that does not take away the power of the High Court to issue a prerogative right where a person is wronged by the Society. In the case in hand there is a positive obligation of SCERT to act according to its Memorandum of Association, Rules & Regulations. Regulation 67 as quoted above provides that the term and tenure of its employees will be the same as are available to the NCERT. Since the NCERT has raised the age of superannuation hence the same benefit when deprived to the petitioner, to our mind, the petitioner would be the person wronged at the hands of respondent No. 3. It is the SCERT which has failed to discharge its obligation under the rules. As said in Praga Tools Corporation's case (supra) mandamus can be issued, for instance, to an official of a Society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statutes under or by which the society is constituted or governed and to compel it to carry out its duties placed on it by that statue authorising the said undertaking. Since the society itself has laid down in its Regulations that for the terms, conditions and tenure its employees will avail the same terms and conditions as that of NCERT, hence the denial of the same definitely would give right to the petitioner to seek mandamus, which in the facts of this case cannot be denied to him. Hence, mandamus can be issued against Respondent No. 3 Society compelling it to adhere to its obligations arising under its Rules and Regulations.
18. Now turning to the second limb of Mr. Ajay Kapur's argument that even if relief sought by petitioner is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this court, still the petitioner being one whose case is not covered under UGC pattern hence not entitled to the benefit of enhanced age of superannuation. Before we deal with this aspect of Mr. Kapur's argument, we may point out that when there is an interest created by the Government in an organisations to impart education, the teachers who impart education get the element of public interest in the performance of their duties, when element of public interest is created and the organisations is catering to that obligation and the teacher being the arm of the institution is entitled to fair treatment. In the case of Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others Vs . State of Andhra Pradesh : [1993]1SCR594 , the Apex Court observed that private educational bodies receiving grant from Government and the said grant being public fund such bodies are obliged to act fairly and in consonance with Part-III of the Constitution as well as Rules and Regulations framed by it. The element of public character necessarily means a fair conduct in all respects consistent with the Constitutional mandate of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The function which the respondent No. 3 is discharging are public duty which requires the respondent No. 3 to act fairly. Violation of its Rules & Regulations would act adversely to the interest of its staff. It would infringed his right granted under the Constitution and in particular Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution. Respondent No. 3, SCERT, by assisting and imparting education at all levels in fact perform public duty. thereforee, any violation of its rules and in particular in the teeth of Regulation 67 would deprive the benefit flowing there from to its employees.
19. In order to appreciate the objection of respondent No. 3 to this claim as to why the petitioner cannot be accorded the benefit of enhanced age, the SCERT has taken the plea that its academic staff is not covered by UGC pattern, hence not entitled to retire at 62 years. We find no force in this submission of Mr. Ajay Kapoor. A glance to the order issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development, dated 27th July, 1998 which was the source and out of which sprung the notification dated 11th November, 1998 of NCERT would show that the word 'UGC pattern' means scale of pay only. The order dated 27th July, 1998 and Notification of NCERT dated 11th November, 1998 are reproduced as under:-
No. F. 1-22/97-U.I.
Government of India
Ministry of Human Resource Development
(Department of Education)
New Delhi, the 27th July, 1998
To,
The Secretary,
University Grants Commission,
Bahadurshah Zafar Marg,
New Delhi-11002.
Subject: Revision of pay scales of teachers in Central Universities following the revision of pay scales of Central Government employees on the recommendations of the Fifth Central Pay Commission.
Sir,
I am directed to say that the Government of India have, after taking into consideration the recommendations made by the University Grants Commission, decided to revise the pay scales of teachers in the Central Universities. The revision of pay scales of teachers will be subject to various provisions of the scheme of revision of the pay scales as contained in this letter and the regulations to be framed by the UGC in this behalf. The revised pay scales and other provisions of the Scheme are as under:-
1. (i) Pay Scales:
A statement showing the existing and revised scales of pay is attached as Annexure.
The revised scales of Demonstrators/Tutors is for the existing incumbents only. No fresh recruitment shall be made to the cadre of Demonstrators/Tutors.
(vi) Age of Superannuation:
The age of superannuation of University and colleges teachers would be 62 years and thereafter no extension in service should be given. However, it will be open to a University or colleges to re-employ a superannuated teacher according to the existing guide-lines framed by the UGC up to the age of 65 years.
2. In the meantime, the revised scales of pay including arrears of salary may be given to teachers pending issue of the regulations by the UGC.
4. These orders are subject to the conditions as contained in para 4 of Ministry of Finance O.M. No. 7 (34)/E.III-A/97 dated 2.12.1997 on pay revision of employees of quasi-Government/autonomous organisations statutory bodies etc., set up and funded by the Central Government.
6. Anomalies, if any, in the implementation of the Scheme may be brought to the notice of the Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development for clarification.
Faithfully yours,
Sd/-
Director'
No. F.15-2/98/EC (Vol.II)
National Council of Educational Research and Training
Sri Aurobindo Marg, New Delhi-110016.
(ESTABLISHMENT COORDINATION SECTION)
Dated: 11.11.98
NOTIFICATION
Subject: Age of retirement of the Academic Staff of Council-Regarding.
In terms of the Govt. of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development's Notification No F.1-22/97-UI dated 27th July, 1998 and approval of the President, NCERT, and subsequent clarifications obtained from the MHRD vide letter No. F.1-26/90 School 4 dated 30.9.1998 regarding the revision of pay scales of University Teachers on the recommendation of the Central Pay Commission, the age of retirement of academic staff governed on the UGC pattern as per the provision in Regulation 41 of the council has been enhanced from 60 years to 62 years w.e.f. 27.7.98, the date of notification issued by the MHRD and adopted by the Central Universities. In other words the academic staff falling in this category retiring on 31.7.98 or thereafter will get the benefit of enhanced age of superannuation of two years. Prior to the date of MHRD's notification, the retiring employees will not get the benefit.
This issues with the approval of the competent Authority of the Council.
Sd/-
(S.K. BHATIA)
UNDER SECRETARY
20. The service conditions and extent of their protection as well as the set of employees in respect of which these may be prescribed and protected are mentioned. in Regulation 67 of SCERT. Hence when Rules extend protective umbrella to its employees such rule cannot be faulted so long as there exists a rational nexus with the objects sought to be achieved namely, parity of service condition between the staff of SCERT and that of the NCERT. Since NCERT pursuance to the Government of India's order dated 27th July, 1998 raised the age of superannuation for its staff holding the post of Lecturers, Readers and Professors, hence on parity the staff of SCERT holding identical posts i.e. of Lecturers, Readers and Professors cannot be denied the benefit of the enhanced age of superannuation. By trying to deprive them this benefit would be iniquitous and indefensibly unjust. It violates Article 14 of the Constitution since it would treat otherwise equal as unequal. It would discriminate against the two equal sets of holder of identical posts. UGC pay scales may as such be not applicable to the post of Lecturers in SCERT which is a creation of the Administration of Delhi. But if that be so, then the staff of SCERT would never be able to avail the same service condition and benefits which are available to the staff of NCERT. That would make Regulation 67 redundant. This, to our mind, was not and could not have been the intention when the rules and Regulations of SCERT were framed. No rule should ordinarily be allowed to be made redundant. There is always a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of an enactment, nor can a beneficial rule be allowed to be made redundant and thus deprive the benefit flowing there from to its employees who are to be benefited by the same. We have to presume that the SCERT while framing these rules and regulations and in particular Regulation 67 understood and clearly appreciated the needs of its staff. thereforee, we cannot lose sight of the fact that SCERT was free at the time of framing of these rules to chose its own terms and conditions for its staff rather than allowing them to be governed by the service conditions available to the staff of NCERT. thereforee, now SCERT cannot be allowed to urge that the terms and conditions and in particular age of superannuation available to the staff of NCERT cannot be made applicable to the staff of NCERT on account of pay scale on UGC pattern. If it is allowed it would discriminate against the petitioner because the Lecturer of SCERT are performing identical functions as are being performed by the Lecturers of NCERT. The academic staff of NCERT is imparting education to B.Ed. and M.Ed. students whereas the academic staff of SCERT impart education to ETE i.e. Elementary Teachers Education. So there is no difference in the performance of duties and functions of a Lecturer of SCERT and that of the NCERT. The petitioner being academic staff of the SCERT and being a Lecturer on parity with NCERT is entitled to the benefit of the same age of superannuation as applicable to the staff of NCERT.
21. For the reasons stated above, we allow this writ petition and direct that the petitioner shall retire at the age of 62 years like his counter-part in the NCERT. Rule made absolute. No order as to costs.