ORDER
Arijit Pasayat, C.J.
1. Expressing concern at the scurrilous manner in which an article has been published, in a journal named 'Wah India,' scornfully denigrating Judges putting question marks on their integrity and competence, these petitions have been filed. According to the petitioners the article in obnoxious and is 'judge bashing'. As the petitions involve almost identical prayer, they are taken up together for disposal. It is alleged that in the name of freedom of press and fair journalism, borders of decency and respect for the judiciary have been overstepped and a distorted version has been presented which has lowered the image of judiciary and thereforee attracts stringent action. In the article in question, certain statements have been made which tend to cause aspersions on the integrity and capability of Hon'ble Judges of this Court. It is highlighted that without any material to support or even proper verification of the statements purported to have been made by some members of the Bar, the article has been published which tends to show members of judiciary in a very poor light and it would result in consumer of justice losing faith on the members of judiciary and corrode credibility of the institution. It is pointed out that the article is full of mis-statements. The lack of accuracy and truth, it is pointed out, is apparent from the fact that fifty 'senior counsel' have been described as one-tenth of the total strength of the Delhi High Court Bar. As to who the so-called senior lawyers are have not been indicated and how they have been described as 'senior lawyers' is shrouded in mystery. It is emphasized that even if any lawyer(s) gave any statement of expressed his/her opinion, the same cannot be stated to be view of the Bar and thereforee Delhi Bar Council, the Apex statutory body of lawyers has filed one of the petitions i.e. Criminal Contempt Petition 8/2001. The other petition being 9/2001 also takes strong exceptions to the article. Prayer made is that sinister designs aiming at lowering the image of judiciary and showing the Judges in poor light should be sternly dealt with under the contempt of Court Act, 1971 (in short the Act) and Article 215 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the Constitution)
2. Unqualified apology has been tendered by the Editor-in-chief and other respondents who are Printer, Publisher and Editor, Creative Director, Sub Editor and Special Correspondent of the magazine by filing two affidavits each. It has been indicated in the affidavits of apology that there was no intention to show slightest disrespect to the members of the judiciary; that it was now meant to cause any aspersion on the institution or the Hon'ble Judges and it was then not realised that it would be regarded as derogatory to the judiciary, but that it is not realised to be a serious error on their part and thereforee unconditional apology has been tendered. It has been stated that the deponents do not subscribe to any statement or expression of opinion in the article, and in particular the appraisal of Hob'ble Judges. Further, the appraisal is not the representative view of the whole Bar and once the date was tabulated no further verification was carried out to ascertain the correctness of the result and it was never suggested that the deponents had satisfied themselves about correctness of the appraisal. Shri Ashok H Desai, Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents contemners submitted that apology has been tendered unconditionally at the threshold and thereforee should be accepted, more particularly when contemners have not tried to justify the publication and have owned up their mistake. The Learned Attorney General who, pursuant to our desire, appeared as amices curiae, stated that it was unfortunate that an article of the nature has been published. According to him freedom of press cannot be stretched to absurd levels and there should not be any abuse of that freedom. So far as the apology is concerned, he submitted that if it is tendered bonafide and sincerely at the threshold of the proceedings; not after some arguments are advanced to justify the publication, and not as an attempt to get out of the contempt proceedings, the same can be accepted. To put it differently, he stated that apology should be bonafide and not a camouflage to avoid consequences flowing from contempt proceedings. Mr. R.K. Anand and Mr. B.L. Wadhera appearing for the petitioners however resisted the prayer for accepting the apology of the ground that it would amount to first throw mud on the judiciary, and then come to the court with apology and get away with it. According to them it is a fit case where stringent action is called for and any act of leniency is bound to be misunderstood as a weakness of the institution. They submitted that though in a genuine case apology of the nature tendered can be accepted, the present case is not one of them. The language used in the article is sarcastic, contemptuous, and sole object of the article was attacking the credibility of the institution and defaming it.
3. The press plays a vital role in the administration of justice. 'It is the watchdog to see that every trial is conducted fairly, openly and aboveboard. But the watchdog may sometimes break loose and has to be punished for misbehavior'. In the words of Judge Lord Denning, M.R in his book Road to Justice, (1955) at page 78 which have become locus classicus. But a watchdog should not become a blood hound. Press occupies a vital place in the modern society. It is a necessary instrumentality for strengthening the process of democracy. In this country it has risen to great heights in the past. When we were under foreign domination, press on the one hand awakened human consciousness toward their rights to freedom and liberty and on the other hand possed a threat to the foreign rulers of being exposed wherever they did any act of highhandedness. Yet any institution when misused is bound to do more harm than good. Press too in the zeal of either helping the victim of oppression, or in exposing the oppressor enters into the field of investigations or trial of a pending case. It was here that conflict with the judiciary came and cases for contempt of court were started. In 1954, a Press Commission was appointed, which enquired into all matters connected with the working of Press and all aspects of journalism. One of the matters considered was contempt of Court and contempt of Legislature.
4. The freedom of the press is basically the freedom of the individuals to express themselves through the medium of press. This implies that the freedom of press is not superior to that of an individual. In fact this freedom is fundamental to the life of an individual. In the words of William Blackstone, 'The liberty of the Press is indeed essential to the nature of a free State. Every free man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiment he pleased before the public, to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press. But if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal he must take the consequences of his own temerity'. (See Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol IV at pages 151, 152). In early nineteenth century Lord Ellenborough observed in Rex v. Cobbet: (1804) 29 H St. Tr.1
'The law of England is the low of liberty, and consistently with this liberty we have not what is called an imprimatur, there is no such preliminary license necessary but if a man publishes a paper he is exposed to the penal consequences as he is in every other act if it be illegal'
5. There is guarantee of the Constitution of India that there will be freedom of speech and writing, but reasonable restriction can be imposed. It will be of relevance to compare the various suggestions as prevalent in America and India. It is worthwhile to note that all utterances against a Judge or concerning a pending case do not in America amount to contempt of Court. In Article 19 the expression 'reasonable restrictions' is used which is almost at par with the American phraseology 'inherent tendency' or 'reasonable tendency'. The Apex Court of America in Bridges v California (1911) 86 L Ed. 192 said:
'What finally emerges from the clear and present danger cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.'
The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt of Court. The fires which is kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of Court's atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament are, thereforee required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of Court's environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. To similar effect were the observations of Lord Morris in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers 1974 AC 273 . It was observed that when unjustifiable interference is suppressed it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of administration of justice are concerned for their own dignity, it is because the very structure of ordered life is at risk if the recognised Courts of the Land are so flouted and their authority wanes and is supplanted.
6. The press does nt have the right, which is its professional function, to criticize and to advocate. The whole gamut of public affairs is the domain for fearless and critical comment and not least the administration of justice. But the public function which belongs to the press makes it an obligation of honour to exercise the function only with the fullest sense of responsibility. Without such a lively sense of responsibility a free press may readily become a powerful instrument of injustice. It should not and may not attempt to influence Judge before they have made up their minds on pending controversies. Such a restriction, which merely bars the operation of extraneous influence specifically directed to a concrete case, in no way curtails the fullest discussion of public issues generally. It is not suggested that generalized discussion of a particular topic should be forbidden, or run the hazard of contempt proceedings, merely because some phrases of such a general topic may be involved in a pending litigation. It is the focussed attempt to influence a particular decision that may have a corroding effect on the process of justice, and it is such comment that justified the corrective process. To similar effect was the observation of Frankfurther, J. in Pennekampt v. florida: (1946) 90 Law Ed. 1295.
7. There is no doubt that the Court like any other institution does not enjoy immunity from fair criticism. No Court can claim to be always right although it does not spare any effort to be right according to the best of the ability, knowledge and judgment of the Judges. They do not think themselves to be in possession of all truth to hold that wherever others differ from them are in error. No one is more conscious of his limitations and fallibility than a Judge. But because of his training and the assistance he gets from learned counsel he is apt to avoid mistakes more than others. While fair and temperate criticism of the Court even if strong, may not be actionable, but attributing improper motives or tending to bring Judges or Courts into hatred and contempt or obstructing directly or indirectly with the functioning of Courts is serious contempt of which notice must be will be taken. Respect is expected not only from those to whom the judgment of the Court is acceptable but also from those to whom it is repugnant. Those who err in their criticism by indulging in vilification of the institution of Court, administration of justice and the instruments through which the administration acts, should take heed for they will act at their own peril. To similar effect were the observations of Hidayatullah, C.J., (as the learned judge was then) in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India : [1970]3SCR530 .
8. The freedom of press under our Constitution is not higher than that of citizen and that there is no greater privilege attaching to the profession of the press as distinguished from the members of the public. To whatever height the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, and if an ordinary citizen may not transgress the law so must not the Press. That the exercise of expression is subject to the reasonable restriction of the law of contempt is borne out by clause(2) of Article 19 of the Constitution. It should be well to remember that the Judges by reason of their office are precluded from entering into any controversy in the columns of the public press, nor can they enter the arena and do battle upon equal terms in newspapers, as can be done by ordinary citizens. In this context comes to mind views of Lord Denning expressed in the following words:-
'All we would ask is that those who criticize us will remember that from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticism. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into, political controversy. We must reply on our conduct itself to be its own vindication. Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism, nothing which is said by this person or that nothing which is written by this pen or that, will deter us doing what we believe is right; nor I would add from saying what the occasion requires provided that it is pertinent to the matter in hand. Silence is not an option when things are ill done. (See. R.V. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex. p. (1968) 2 All. E.R. 3(9).
9. There is an abundance of empirical decisions upon particular instances of conduct which has been held to constitute contempt of Court. We shall now refer to a few. Lord Russel of Killowen, L.C. J, has laid down in Reg v. Gray 1900(2) QB 36 as follows:
'Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court.'
It cannot be denied that judgment are open to criticisms and in the said case it was observed
'Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or public good, no Court could or would treat that as contempt of Court'. Indeed, Section 5 of the Act now provides that a person shall not be guilty of contempt of Court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of any case which has been heard and finally decided. But, if such a defense is taken, it is always open to test whether the publication alleged to be offending was by way of fair comment on the merits of the case or was personal scurrilous abuse of a Judge as a Judge, for abuse of a Judge or a Court or attacks on the personal character of a Judge are clearly punishable contempt. As stated in para 2 at page 21 of Volume-9 of Halsbury's Laws of England; Fourth Edition, 'The punishment is inflicted, not for the purpose of protecting either the Court as a whole or the individual Judges of the Court from a repetition of the attack, but of protecting the public, and specially those who either voluntarily or by compulsion are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribunal is undermined or impaired.'
The view was echoed by the Apex Court in D. Saxena v. CJI : 1996CriLJ3274 In the same volume of Halsbury's Laws of England at para 27 it is stated thus: 'Any act done or writing published which is calculated to bring a Court or a Judge into contempt or to lower its authority or to interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Court, is a contempt of Court.'
The above proposition has been approved and followed by Lord Atkin in Andrew Paul Terence Ambrad v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, AIR 1936 PC 141. It was observed as follows:
'No wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercised the ordinary right of criticism in good faith in private or public the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is public way, the wrong headed are permitted to err therein, provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impart the administration of Justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men':
Lord Justice Donovan in Attorney General v. Butterworth:1963(1) QB 696 after making reference to Req. V. Odham's Press Ltd ex parte A.G.: 1957(1) QB 73 said: 'whether or not there was an intention to interfere with the administration of justice is relevant to penalty not to quit'. This makes it clear that an intention to interfere with the proper administration of justice is an essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of court and it is enough if the action complained of is inherently likely so to interfere. In Morris v. Crown Office: 1970(1) All E.R. 1079 , Lord Denning M.R. said: that the course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Those who do it strike at the very foundations of our society. In the same case, Lord Justice Salmon spoke:
'The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to give our courts the power effectively to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be obstructed or prevented.'
Frank Further, J. in Offutt v. U.S.: 1954(348) U.S. 11 expressed his view as follows:
'It is a mode of vindicating the majesty or law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage.'
In Jennison v. Baker : 1972(1) All E.R. 997 it is stated:
'The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope.'
10. Chinappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench in Advocate General Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries: 1980(3) SCC 3111 citing those two decisions in the cases of Offutt and Jenison (supra) stated thus:
'.....It may be necessary to punish as a contempt a cause of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and so it is contempt of Court not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against Contempt of Court may seem to suggest but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public and the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with.'
Krishna Iyer, J. in his separate judgment In re. S. Mulgaokar: : [1978]3SCR162 , while giving broad guidelines in taking punitive action in the matter of contempt of Court has stated:
'.....If the Court considers the attack on the judge or judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, the strong arm of the law must, in the name of public interest and public justice, strike a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its source and stream'
11. In the case of Brahma Prakash Sharma and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh: : 1954CriLJ238 , the Apex Court after referring to various decisions of the foreign countries as well as of the Privy Council stated thus:
'It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court's administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmative that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely or tends in any way to interfere with the proper administration of law.'
12. It may be noted here that in the illustrated case Re: S. Mulgaokar (supra) it was held that the judiciary cannot be immune from criticism. But, when such criticism is based on obvious distortion or gross mis-statement and make in a manner which seems designed to lower respect of the judiciary and destroy public confidence in it, it cannot be ignored.
13. Though certain imputations against the Judge may be only libelous against that particular individual, it may at times amount to contempt also depending upon the gravity of the allegations. In Brahma Prakash Sharma's (supra), the Apex court held that a defamatory attack on a Judge may be a libel so far as the judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libeler in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such Court, it can be punished separately as contempt. The same view has been taken in Perspective Publications (P) Ltd v. The State of Maharashtra : 1971CriLJ268 ; and C.K. Daphtary and others v O.P. Gupta and others 0065/1971 : 1971CriLJ844 . thereforee apart from the fact that a particular statement is libelous, it can constitute criminal contempt if the imputation is such that the same is capable of lowering the authority of the Court. The gravity of the aforesaid statement is that the same would scandalize the court.
14. The right to criticize an opinion of a court, to take issue with it upon its conclusions as to a legal proposition, or question its conception of the facts, so long as such criticisms are made in good faith and are in ordinarily decent and respectful language and are not designed to willfully or maliciously misrepresent the position of the Court, or tend to bring it into disrespect, or lessen the respect due to the authority to which a Court is entitled, cannot be questioned. The right of free speech is one of the greatest guarantee to liberty in a free country like ours, even though that right is frequently and in many instances outrageously abused. If any considerable portion of a community is led to believe that either because of gross ignorance of the law or because of a wrong reason, it cannot reply upon the courts to administer justice that portion of the community, upon some occasion, is very likely to come to the conclusion that it is better not to take any chances on the courts failing to do their duty. Judiciary is the bed rock and handmaid of democracy. If people lose faith in justice parted by a Court of law, the entire democratic set up would crumble down. In this background, observations of Lord Denning M.R. in Metropolitan Properties Ltd. v. Lennon (1968) 3 All E.R. 304 are relevant: 'Justice must be rooted in confidence, and confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking - the Judge is based.'
15. There can be no doubt that Press is a necessary instrumentality for strengthening the forces of democracy. But every freedom is subject to reasonable restrictions. As we have already pointed out, it is in the public interest to see that allegations or criticism which would scandalize or tend to scandalize or tend to lower authority of the Courts is not permitted because in the functioning of democracy an independent judiciary to dispense justice without fear or favor is necessary and its strength is the faith of the public in general in the institution. That cannot be permitted to be undermined because that will be against public interest. The public interest in ensuring both fair trial and freedom of speech necessitates a delicate balancing exercise.
16. As observed by the Apex Court in Sewak Ram Sobhani v R.K. Karanjia and others: : 1981CriLJ894 , the freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject and to whatever lengths the subject in general may go so also may the journalist but apart from statute law, his privilege is no other and no higher. In T. Deen Dayal v. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh: : 1997CriLJ4080 the Apex Court observed as follows:
'We have extracted the allegations constituting the contempt in the beginning of this Order. We are satisfied they are ex facie contumacious and the scurrilous attack was intended to scandalize the court within the meaning of criminal contempt under section 2(c) of the act. Such attack as seen above, is punishable as contempt for the reason that it tends to create distrust in the popular mind and impairs confidence of the people in courts which are prime, importance to the litigants in the protection of their rights and liberties. This Court in re: S. Mulgaokar : [1978]3SCR162 observed as follows:
'The sixth consideration is that after evaluating the totality of factors, if the Court considers the attack on the Judge or Judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits the strong and of the law must, in the name of public interest and public justice, strike a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its source and stream.'
17. Considered in the light of the aforesaid position in law, a bare reading of the article in question makes it clear that the statements made amount to a scurrilous attack on the integrity, honesty and judicial competence and impartiality of judges. It is offensive and intimidating. The contemners by their conduct as well as by making such scandalising statements and invective remarks have interfered and seriously shaken the system of administration of justice by bringing it down to disrespect and disrepute. It impairs confidence of the people in the Court. Once door is opened to this kind of allegations, aspersions and imputations, it may provide a handle to the disgruntled litigants to malign the Judges, leading to character assassination. The article seems to have been published with doubtful intentions, oblivious of the implications it would have on the general public the institution of judiciary and the administration of justice, which is despicable. A good name is better than good riches. Immediately comes to one's mind Shakespeare's othello, Act II, Scene 3, 167:-
'Good name in man and woman, dear my Lord
Is the immediate jewel of their souls;
Who steals my purse, steals trash;
its something, nothing;
'T was mine, its his, and has been slate to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.'
18. It is often said that to err is human but to forgive is noble and to forget is divine. Majesty of Law continues to hold its head high notwithstanding such scurrilous attacks made by persons who feel the law Courts will absorb anything and every thing, including attacks on their honesty, integrity and impartiality. But it has to be borne in mind that such divinity and magnanimity is not its weakness but its strength. It generally ignores irresponsible statements which are anything but legitimate criticism. It is to be noted that what is permissible is legitimate criticism and not illegitimate insinuation. No Court can took with equanimity on a publicity which may have tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. Power of press is almost like nuclear power, it can create and it can destroy. When it is aimed at the judiciary, it finds a soft target because it has neither the power of the purse nor the sword, which other wings of democracy possess. Pen is mightier than sword, it is said. Pen used by the press should not be dipped in poison, it should be used for creativity not destruction. Judiciary should not be like flies in the hands of wanton boys. Judge bashing is not and cannot be a substitute for constructive criticism. While a responsible press is a boon to the society, and irresponsible one is a menace. It needs no reiteration that on judiciary millions pin their hopes, for protecting their life, liberty, property and the like. Judges do not have any easy job. They repeatedly do what rest of us (the people) seek to avoid, make decisions, said David Pannick in his book 'Judges'. Judges are mere mortals, but they are asked to perform a function which is truly divine.
19. What is contempt of Court has been stated in lucid terms by Oswald in Classic 'Book on Contempt of Court'. It is said:
'To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and demonstration of law into disrespect and disregard or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses during the litigation.'
'Contempt in the legal acceptance of the term, primarily signifies disrespect to that which is entitled to legal regard, but as a wrong purely moral or affecting an object not possessing a legal status, it has in the eye of the law no existence. In its origin all legal contempt will be found to consist in an offence more or less direct against the sovereign himself as the fountainhead of law and justice or against his palace where justice was administered. This clearly appears from old cases.'
20. Lord Diplock, speaking for the Judicial Committee in Chokolingo v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (1981) 1 All E.R. 244, summarized the position thus: 'Scandalizing the Court is a convenient way of describing a publication which, although it does not relate to any specific case either part of pending or any specific Judge, is a scurrilous attack on the judiciary as a whole which is calculated to undermine the authority of the Courts and public confidence in the administration of justice. Thus, before coming to the conclusion as to whether or not the publication amounts to a contempt, what will have to be seen is, whether the criticism is fair, temperate and made in good faith or whether it is something directed to the personal character of a Judge or to the impartiality of a Judge or court. A finding, one way of the other, will determine whether or nor the act complained of amounted to contempt.'
21. Mahajan, J in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, : AIR1953SC75 , observed as follows:-
'No objection could have been taken to the article had it merely preached to the Courts of law the sermon of divine detachment. But when it proceeded to attribute improper motives to the Judges, it not only transgressed the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but had a clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of this Court..... It is obvious that if an impression is created in the minds of the public that the Judges in the highest Court of the land act on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, the confidence of the whole community in the administration of justice is bound to be undermined and no greater mischief than that can possibly be imagined..... We would like to observe that it is not the practice of this Court to issue such rules except in very grave and serious cases and it is never over-sensitive to public criticism; but when there is danger of grave mischief being done in the matter of administration of justice, the animadversion cannot be ignored and viewed with placid equanimity.....'
The article under consideration in the case at hand has conceptually great similarity with one considered by the Apex Court in the last mentioned case and we hold that prima facie, the respondents have committed contempt of Court. Nothing can be more serious than public statements calculated to diminish or destroy public confidence in courts of justice, and no offence calls for or deserves more swift or more summary punishment.
22. It may be relevant here to recall that the freedom of press has always been regarded as an essential prerequisite of a democratic form of Government. It has been regarded as a necessity for the mental health and the well being of the society. It is also considered necessary for the full development of the personality of the individual. It is said that without the freedom of press truth cannot be attained. The freedom of press is part of the freedom of speech and expression as envisaged in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Thus, the freedom of press is included in the fundamental right of freedom of expression. The freedom of press is regarded as the 'mother of all other liberties' in a democratic society. Further the importance and the necessity of having a free press in a democratic constitution like ours was immensely stressed in several landmark judgments of the Apex Court e.g. Indian Express Newspapers v Union of India : AIR1986SC872 AP Sen J, (as he then was) described the right to freedom of press as a pillar of individual liberty which has been unfailingly guarded by the Courts. But why the 'mother' is acting like a step mother to judiciary is baffling.
23. It is thus needless to emphasise that a free and healthy press is indispensable to the functioning of a true democracy. In a democratic set up there has to be an active and intelligent participation of the people in all spheres and affairs of their community as well as the State. It is their right to be kept informed about current political, social, economic and cultural life as well as the burning topics and important issues of the day in order to enable them to consider and form broad opinion about the same and the way in which they are being managed, tackled and administered by the Government and its functionaries. To achieve this objective the people need a clear and truthful account of events, so that they may form their own opinion and offer their own comments and viewpoints on such matters and issues and select their further course of action. The primary function, thereforee, of the press is to provide comprehensive and objective information of all aspects of the country's political, social, economic and cultural life. It has an educative and mobilising role to play. It plays an important role in moulding public opinion and can be an instrument of social change. It may be pointed out here that Mahatma Gandhi in his autobiography has stated that one of the objectives of the newspaper is to understand the proper feelings of the people and give expression to ti; another is to arouse among the people certain desirable sentiments; and the third is to fearlessly express popular defects. It thereforee turns out that the press should have the right to present anything which it thinks fit for publication. But it has to be remembered that this freedom of press is not absolute, unlimited and unfettered at all times and in all circumstances as giving an unrestricted freedom of speech and expression would amount to an uncontrolled license. If it were wholly free even from reasonable restraints it would lead to disorder and anarchy. The freedom is not to be misunderstood as to be a press free to disregard its duty to be responsible. In fact, the element of responsibility must be present in the conscience of the journalists. In an organized society, the rights of the press have to be recognised with its duties and responsibilities towards the society. Public order, decency, morality and such other things must be safeguarded. The protective cover of press freedom must not be thrown open for wrong doings. If a newspaper publishes what is improper, mischievously false or illegal and abuses its liberty it must be punished by Court of law. (See. In re Harijai Singh and another, : 1997CriLJ58 ) The editor of a newspaper or a journal has a greater responsibility to guard against untruthful news and publications for the simple reasons that his utterances have a far greater circulation and impact than the utterances of an individual and by reason of their appearing in print, they are likely to be believed by the ignorant. That being so, certain restrictions are essential even for preservation of the freedom of the press itself. To quote from the report of Moons Lopez to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations' If it is true that human progress is impossible without freedom, then it is no less true that ordinary human progress is impossible without a measure of regulation and discipline. It is the duty of a true and responsible journalist to strive to inform the people with accurate and impartial presentation of news and their views after dispassionate evaluation of the facts and information received by them and to be published as a news item. The presentation of the news should be truthful, objective and comprehensive without any false and distorted expression.
24. At this juncture, the observations of the Supreme Court in C. Ravichandran Iyer vs. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee : (1995)5SCC457 comes to mind. It was, inter alia, observed as follows:
'The Advocates Act, 1961 gave autonomy to a Bar Council of a State or Bar Council of India and Section 6(1) empowers them to make such action deemed necessary to set their house in order, to prevent fall in professional conduct and to punish the incorrigible as not befitting the noble profession apart from admission of the advocates on its roll. Section 6(1)(c) and rules made in that behalf. Section 9, 35 36, 36B and 37 enjoin it to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll. The members of the judiciary are drawn primarily and invariably from the bar at different levels. The high moral, ethical and professional standards among the members of the Bar are preconditions even for high ethical standards of the Bench. Degeneration thereof inevitably has its eruption and tends to reflect the other side of the coin. The Bar Council, thereforee, is enjoined by the Advocates Act to maintain high moral, ethical and professional standards which of late is far from satisfactory. Their power under the Act ends thereat and extends no further. Article 121 of the Constitution prohibits discussion by the members of Parliament of the conduct of any Judge of the Supreme Court or of High Court in the discharge of his duties except upon a motion for presenting an address to the President praying for the removal of the Judge as provided under article 124(4) and (5) and in the manner laid down under the Act, the Rules and the rules of business of Parliament consistent therewith. By necessary implication, no other forum or a platform is available for discussion of the conduct of a Judge in the discharge of his duties as a Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, much less a Bar Council or group of practicing advocates. They are prohibited to discuss the conduct of a Judge in the discharge of his duties or to pass any resolution in that behalf.'
25. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that any one who intends to tarnish the image of judiciary should not be allowed to go unpunished. By attacking the reputation of Judges, the ultimate victim is the institution. The day the consumer of justice loss faith in the institution that would be the darkest day for mankind. The importance of judiciary need no reiteration. It was fairly accepted at the bar that in the past whenever there was any attack on the press, they have rushed to the Courts and have described the judiciary as their saviour. It is strange that the very institution which has come to its rescue, has been attacked thereby corroding its credibility. A messiah suddenly finds himself treated as a pariah. A common man may start losing confidence in judiciary by saying that the judgment delivered in his case is not above board, and 'condonable limit' of publication Mulgonkar's case (supra) would be exceeded. Ultimate sufferer would be the society.
26. It has been rightly submitted by learned Attorney General and learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that an apology cannot be accepted unless it is really intended to be an apology and not merely a pretext to escape the consequences. An apology must be genuine, honest and bona fide. inspire of the seriousness and gravity of the act of the respondents in publishing the article in question, we would not like to sound as vindictive or revengeful. Unconditional apologies tendered by the respondents at the outset, as noted above, deserve acceptance. The respondents are journalists of standing and repute. We have two reason to doubt their bona fides about tendering the apologies nor have we any reason to doubt the genuineness of apologies. The respondents have expressed a feeling of remorse. In the fact and circumstances of the case with particular reference to the respondents before us acceptance of apology will comparatively be better atonement for the respondents for their impugned act as compared to award of punishment in the form of fine or imprisonment or both. We accept the apologies offered. We feel it necessary to point out that proper care and caution should have been exercised by the contemners before the publication. If there is recurrence of the amiss either by the respondents or any other person it shall be sternly dealt with. News reports have much in common with the person in the generic shooting accident who 'didn't know the gun was loaded'. News and commentary on the printed, page on the television, and over radio take unexpected turns that every reader or viewer finds surprising, shocking or distressing. The loaded gun analogy springs from three key points. They are:- (1) News content is not the same as news influence, (2) The way news is collected helps to determine what is reported, and (3) Potential consequences of coverage are weak criteria for news decision-making. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent contemners has undertaken that an appropriate apology shall be published if so directed. Let the same be published within two weeks from today in five national dailies, published in English, and copies thereof be filed in the Registry of this Court within three days of such publication. If it is not done the matter shall be listed for further orders. If it is done, the matter shall be treated as closed. The petitions are accordingly disposed of. The interim direction regarding sale/or other modes of disposal of the concerned issue of the magazine without the offending article is made absolute. Before parting with the cases, we feel it proper to record our appreciation for the fair manner in which learned counsel for the parties have assisted the Court in trying to give a decent burial to the unwarranted controversy.
Anil Dev Singh, J.
I have gone through the judgment proposed by the Hob'ble Chief Justice. While I respectfully agree with his Lordship's view that the respondents have committed contempt of court by the publication in question, I have not been able to persuade myself to accept the apologies of the contemners.
The publication starts with the caption 'Judged out!'. It professes that the judges have been evaluated by fifty senior lawyers. According to the publication the alleged evaluators constitute nearly ten percent of the total strength of the Delhi High Court Bar. It mentions that it is not meant to cast any aspersion on the competence of the judiciary, but is a small and humble attempt to hold a mirror to it. Quite contrary to the assertion, in the so called mirror it depicts a distorted image of the judges of this court. To compound the impudence it attempts to pass on the profanity as factually true by stating that 'it might make some judges uncomfortable, but truth sometimes does'.
The publication is a scurrilous attack on the credibility and competence of the judges of this Court. It undermines the majesty, respect and dignity of the court and tends to create an apprehension in the minds of people regarding the integrity and ability of the judges. The publication also tends to erode the authority of the court. It, thereforee, clearly constitutes contempt of the court. In case the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively, its dignity and authority must be respected and protected at all costs. The Supreme Court in Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra, : 1995CriLJ3994 , while highlighting the rationale behind the purpose for which the superior courts are entrusted with the power to punish for their contempt observed as follows:-
'39. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. The Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. Hence judiciary is not only the third pillar, but the central pillar of the democratic State. In a democracy like ours, where here there is a written Constitution which is above all individuals and institutions and where the power of judicial review is vested in the superior courts, the judiciary has a special and additional duty to perform, viz., to oversee that all individuals and institutions including the executive and the legislature act within the framework of not only the law but also the fundamental law of the land. This duty is apart from the function of adjudicating the disputes between the parties which is essential to peaceful and orderly development of the society. If the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted to it, the dignity and authority of the courts have to be respected and protected at all costs. Otherwise, the very cornerstone of our constitutional scheme will give way and with it will disappear the rule of law and the civilized life in the society. It is for this purpose that the courts are entrusted with the extraordinary power of punishing those who indulge in acts whether inside or outside the courts, which tend to undermine their authority and bring them in disrepute and disrespect by scandalising them and obstructing them from discharging their duties without fear or favor. When the court exercises this power, it does not do so to vindicate the dignity and honour of the individual judge who is personally attacked or scandalised, but to uphold the majesty of the law and of the administration of justice. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability, to deliver fearless and impartial justice. When the foundation itself is shaken by acts which tend to create disaffection and disrespect for the authority of the court by creating distrust in its working, the edifice of the judicial system gets eroded.'
In E.M. Sankaran Namboodiripad v. t. Narayan Nambiar : 1970CriLJ1670 , the Supreme Court held that maintenance of dignity of the courts is one of the cardinal principles of the rule of law and when criticism results in lowering the dignity of the courts, it must be held repugnant and punished. It was further held that no court can look with equanimity on a publication which may have a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice.
The publication in question scandalises the judges. It attempts to rob the High Court of its honour and prestige and thus tends to shatter the faith and confidence of the public in the judiciary and the administration of justice and majesty of law. The contemners cannot be allowed to tamper with the stream of justice which must flow pure and unhindered. thereforee, the conduct of the contemners cannot be ignored. At this stage it may be pointed out that the power of contempt is not being exercised to vindicate the honour of the individual judges who are attacked or scandalised, but is being exercised to uphold the majesty of law. This power flows from Article 215 of the Constitution as a necessary attribute of a superior court of record (see Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and others, : 1991CriLJ3086 . The fact that such a power is comprised in the Constitution itself shows the importance attached to the dignity and respect of the high courts. The basic objective of the press is to give news, views, comments and information on matters of public interest in an accurate and fair manner. The freedom of press under the Constitution is not higher than the freedom of a citizen and is subject to the restrictions imposed under Article 19(2) thereof. So long as the freedom of press and liberty of speech does not transgress these restrictions and does not impinge upon the dignity of the courts, it must prevail. But in the grab of the freedom of press the reputation of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be destroyed. 'Wahindia' appears to be a new periodical. By indulging in sensationalism at the cost of the prestige of the judiciary the contemners may succeed in increasing its circulation but that is a very heavy price to pay. The judiciary is the bulwark of out democratic set up and the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen against excesses of the State, individuals and authorities. the entire democratic fabric of the country is liable to crumble if the respect for the judiciary is undermined.
The contemners have acted as if they are above law. They cannot be allowed to commit contempt of court in the grab of criticism. In case such a trend is allowed to grow, the respect and authority commanded by the courts of law, which is essential for dispensation of justice and smooth functioning of the courts, will suffer. Such publication have the lethal effect of discrediting the courts and destabilizing the system of administration of justice thereby adversely affecting the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. If the judiciary is to protect and promote rule of law and resolve disputes effectively, the dignity and authority of the courts must be upheld otherwise the rule of law will perish giving way to the rule of the jungle. The duties and functions of the court are of a very delicate nature. when parties and their counsel seek the intervention of a court for resolution of a dispute, each side may think it has a cast iron case. But both the sides cannot win. The side which finds the decision to be against its interests cannot be allowed to ascribe motives to the court. Disgruntled elements cannot be permitted to tarnish the image of the judiciary. In order to protect the rule of law we cannot allow the trust and confidence of people in the judiciary to be forfeited in this manner.
The publication is not only insulting but is also reckless in nature. This is so because of a variety of reasons. Firstly, fifty so called unnamed senior lawyers do not constitute ten percent of the total strength of the Delhi High Court Bar. The Delhi High Court Bar, as is apparent from its directory, consists of more than four thousand members. Secondly, the publication loses sight of the fact that the Advocates Act, 1961, classifies legal practitioners as Senior Advocates and Advocates. Senior Advocates are to ones who are designated as such by the Supreme Court and the High Courts on the basis of their ability, standing at the bar or special knowledge and experience in law. There is no category of 'senior lawyers'. We have not been told who the senior lawyers' were who allegedly acted as evaluators and what was the criteria used to determine their seniority. Thirdly, in the apologies filed by the respondents it is stated that once the date was tabulated, no further verification was carried out to ascertain the correctness of the results. The apologies tendered by the contemners reveal that the contemners did not satisfy themselves about the correctness of the alleged appraisal of the judges. In this view of the matter it was highly improper on the part of the contemners to suggest in the publication that what was stated therein was true.
While there is no doubt that healthy press is indispensable to the functioning of the democracy and the freedom of press is guaranteed under article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution; at the same time this freedom is not unbounded or without a parameter. It is subject to the provisions of Article 19(2) of the Constitution which, inter alia, includes law relating to contempt of court. The freedom of press comes to an end when in encroaches upon the honour of the court. In Re: Harijai Singh and another and In Re: Vijay Kumar, : 1997CriLJ58 , the Supreme Court while emphasizing that a free and healthy press is indispensable to the functioning of a true democracy, at the same time it struck a note of caution that the freedom of press is not absolute, unlimited and unfettered, and the press is not free to disregard its duty to be responsible. Looking to the publication in question its is manifest that the contemners have disregarded their duty to be responsible and fair. In the matter of Hiren Bose, Contemner, : AIR1969Cal1 , it was held by the Calcutta High Court that though the press is free to criticise the judicial system under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, it cannot commit contempt of court under the cover of criticism. Again in Lok Nath Mishra v. State of Orissa, 1999 Crl. L.J. 4719, the Orissa High Court held that it was in public interest to ensure that allegations which are scandalous in nature, or tend to scandalise, or tend to lower the authority of a court are not permitted. It also observed that in a democracy an independent judiciary is to function without fear or favor and its strength is the faith of the people in its impartiality and can dour. It seems to me that any injury to that faith of the people by a publication or by an oral utterance amounts to contempt of court and must be put down in case the institution has to be saved from that injury.
The fall out of the publication in question, though this is not being held against the contemners, is that some of the newspapers carried articles on the assumption that what was published by the contemners was true. This was not objective reporting, but this may have served the cause of solidarity of the press. Some of the article while justifying the offending publication called it a 'fair criticism'. Some even went to the extent of calling the action initiated by us 'reprehensible'. The contemners themselves have now admitted before us thatthey did not subscribe to any statement or expression of opinion in the publication and in particular the appraisal of the judges of this Court. They have also admitted that the appraisal in the publication is not the representative view of the whole of the bar. thereforee, it was unfair and unreasonable on the part of those who were swept by sympathy wave to have acted in such an irresponsible manner. I will, however, leave this aspect for their introspection.
The Press Council has enunciated guide-lines to regulate to conduct of the press. At this stage it would be convenient to set out some of the norms of journalistic conduct:-
'xx xx xx
Accuracy & Fairness
1) The press shall eschew publication of inaccurate, baseless, graceless, misleading or distorted material. All sides of the core issue or subject should be reported. Unjustified rumours and surmises should not be set forth as facts. Pre-publication Verification
2) On receipt of a report or article of public interest and benefit containing imputations or comments against a citizen, the editor should check with due care and attention its factual accuracy - apart from other authentic sources with the person or the organisation concerned to elicit his/her or its version, comments or reaction and publish the same with due amendments in the report where necessary. In the event of lack or absence of response, a footnote to that effect should be appended to the report. xx xx xx'
It appears to me that these guide-lines have been clearly violated by the contemners. They passed on conjectures and surmises as truth. The publication in question was not only published in 'Wahindia' but it was also put on the website to be viewed and down loaded by the world at large. The pernicious effect of the article goes beyond the frontiers of this country. Surely the freedom of press does not extend to scandalising the court and bringing it into disrepute. During the pendency of the proceedings the articles published supporting the cause of the contemners show the extent to which the freedom of press has been misused. It is well settled that once the court proceedings have begun the media has no role to play in the administration of justice. But even this principle was thrown to the winds. We cannot allow the course of justice to be deflected by succumbing to the fear of bad publicity. It is needless to point out that the publications which are made to influence the result of a case also amount to contempt of court. It is only after a judgment is delivered that the press can criticise the same, but the criticism must be fair and within the bounds of law. It cannot impute motives to the judge rendering the judgment. The press has to be reminded that the smooth functioning of the legal system is as important as freedom of press. While it is correct that a judge dispensing justice must possess impeccable integrity, at the same time no one is allowed to question his/her integrity in a casual manner and on the basis of conjectures and surmises. A judge can function only if he/she has the moral authority. In case his/her reputation is sullied by unfounded allegations he/she can never exercise that authority.
In the circumstances, a question arises as to whether the law should sit limply and helplessly and be a mere spectator to the damage caused to the administration of justice. To my mind it must not be so. It should act firmly and decisively since the publication has the propensity to deter people from placing reliance upon the court and tends to shake their faith in the judiciary. The instant case is the rarest of the rare cases in which the court must intervene to protect the faith of the people who have abiding interest in the administration of justice.
The publication shows that the contemnors were conscious were conscious of the fact that the publication amounts to contempt of court. The offending publication was not made by the contemnors in ignorance of the consequences. This is evident from the following snide remarks contained therein:-
'....As even staring too hard at 'The Lordships' could amount to contempt of court, we at Wahindia decided it was time to bring into open the impression senior lawyers have while facing them...'
From the above it is clear that it was not an innocent publication. It appears to me that the apologies have been tendered to avoid punishment and are not genuine. Besides, contempt of court committed by the contemners is of a grave nature and tends to substantially interfere with the due course of justice.
In the circumstances, thereforee, I am unable to accept the apologies of the contemners. The apologies, however, can be considered as a mitigating circumstance. thereforee, the contemners are directed to appear in court on a date to be fixed by the Registry for further proceedings.
Sd/ A.D.SINGH, J.
O.P. Dwivedi, J.
I have had the benefit of pursuing an enlightening and erudite judgment recorded by Hon'ble the Chief Justice holding that the impugned article published in a magazine 'Wah India' issue April 16-30,2001 under the caption 'Judged out' is a scurrilous attack on the integrity and efficiency of Judges of this Court which scandalises and lowers the authority of the Court and interferes with the administration of justice and this act of the respondents amounts to criminal contempt of the Court within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. I respectfully agree with the view taken by Hon'ble the Chief Justice in this regard.
Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 have tendered un-conditional and unqualified apologies at the threshold by filing affidavits dated 2nd May, 2001 and 9th May 2001. In their affidavits dated 2nd May, 2001 the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 have deposed that they do not subscribe to any opinion expressed in the said survey and in subsequent affidavits dated 9th May, 2001 they have further deposed that the appraisal in the impugned article is not the representative view of the whole Bar. Neither any verification was carried out to ascertain the correctness of the result nor was it so suggested in the impugned article. It is further averred that the similar articles are published abroad and that they did not realise that it could be regarded as derogatory to the judiciary. But now they realise that there has been a serious error on their part and hence these un-conditional apologies. Shri Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the respondents have realised their mistake and have tendered un-conditional apologies at the very threshold so the same should be accepted and the matter need not be pressed further. Shri Soli Sorabji, learned Attorney General of India, submitted that the apology can be accepted if it is genuine and honest and there is no attempt to justify the contents of or the opinion expressed in the impugned article. On the other hand, Mr. R.K. Anand, learned senior counsel for the petitioners and Mr. B.L.Wadhera, advocate, who appeared in person as petitioner contended that the apologies tendered by the contemners are neither genuine nor honest or bonafide and have been offered only as a poly to escape the punishment so the same should not be accepted.
Having bestowed my thoughtful consideration to the respective submissions of the learned counsel and learned Attorney General of India and also to the contents of article in question, I am firmly of the view that the apologies tendered by the contemners are neither genuine nor made in good faith. An apology can be said to be honest if it is made in good faith. A genuine apology would mean that the respondents have realised their mistake and are really repetant, contrite for their conduct. The article in question can be read in two parts. The first part consists of findings of the alleged survey which are contained in the tabular form. The second part consists of the editorial comments thereon at the end of the article which reads as under:-
'The survey is by no means an attempt to cast any aspersion on the competence of the judiciary, but is a small and humble attempt to hold a mirror to it. It might make some judges uncomfortable, but truth sometimes does. We would imagine it should be an eye opener to some of the judges to learn what lawyers who appear before them every day, think of them. As even staring too hard at 'The Lordships' could amount to contempt of court, we at wahindia decided it was time to bring into open the impression senior lawyers have while facing them. Though the survey did come up with certain startling findings, it would be justified only if it can bring about some meaningful changes in the functioning of the higher judiciary.'
The first part purports to be an index of the opinion of the Bar as revealed from the alleged survey whereas the second part re-produced above is the editorial comments thereon. It is the second part namely 'editorial comments' which belies respondents' assertion in the affidavit that they do not subscribe to the view expressed in the said article.
If the respondents did not subscribe to the opinion expressed in the article how could they 'hold a mirror' to us? Their further assertion that 'it might make some judges uncomfortable but truth sometime does' amply demonstrates that what has been published was believed to be true. Knowing fully well that 'even staring too hard at 'The Lordship' could amount to contempt of Court', they dared us to look into the mirror and face the uncomfortable truth. Although in the comments re-produced above, it is asserted that the survey is by no means an attempt to cast aspersion and this has been re-asserted in the affidavits dated 2nd May, 2001, what they have done by publishing the alleged survey and the editorial comments thereon is exactly the opposite. The impugned article and the editorial comments thereon were written with a free mind. It is not the respondents case that the impugned article was written or the editorial comments were made under any sort of pressure. By making these comments they have already given their verdict on the results of the survey with an open mind after evaluating the data and believing it to be true. it is their own opinion expressed with a free mind. thereforee, it does not lie in their mouth now to say that they do not subscribe to the opinion expressed in the impugned article or there was no attempt to cast any aspersion on the judges of this Court. The editorial comments belie their assertion that the apology is being tendered in good faith.
Another important feature which need to be taken note of in this regard is that in the impugned article appearing at page 044 of the aforesaid magazine, the caption has been given as 'Judged out' but at page 2 which enumerates the contents of the issue, the caption given reads as '...ges on their integrity' with an exhortation 'get ready for the party'. This indicates that the original caption was intended to convey that the article in question is a judgment on our integrity. This is amply proved from the fact that the Hon'ble Judges have been individually graded on personal integrity, depth in law and quality of judgment delivered. In face of all this, it is not possible to believe that the apologies have been tendered in good faith. Proper analysis and understanding of the contents and tenor of the article in question is enough to prove this. No proof or any precedential authority is needed to justify this conclusion of mine.
On the point of genuineness also, the apologies do not impress me. Mere parrot like repetition of regrets in almost identically worded affidavits does not convince me that the respondents are really remorseful or repentant. Even on the last date of hearing there was an attempt to justify the offending publication with reference to some material. We would like to examine it and face it. When there is an attempt to justify the contents of the offending article even after filing affidavits of apology such apologies can be said to be anything but genuine. I am, thereforee, inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Attorney General that it is only a ploy to escape the punishment.
Accordingly, I hold that the apologies tendered by the respondents-contemners are neither genuine nor made in good faith. thereforee, I am not inclined to accept the same. I order accordingly.
Sd/O.P. Dwivedi, J
We unanimously hold that prima facie contempt has been committed by the respondents. However, so far as acceptance of apologies is concerned, in view of the conclusions of the majority, the directions contained in paragraph No. 26 are to be carried out.