Judgment:
D.P. Wadhwa, J.
(1) RULE-D.B. We have heard the parties at length and proceed to deliver judgment.
(2) The two petitioners, respectively the Chief Engineer and Assistant Engineer in the New Delhi Municipal Committee ('N.D.M.C.' for shorrt), seek quashing of the * departmental enquiry against them. There are five respondents, namely. Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs; Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I.); Enquiry Officer; and Central Vigilance Commission; and the N.D.M.C.
(3) C.B.I, on 12 September 1988 registered an F.I.R. No. RC-47/88-DL.I on the basis of a complaint of one Surinder Kumar, a contractor, alleging that the first petitioner Chetal was demanding a bribe of Rs.10,000.00 from him for favoring him in the award offenders for construction of a school building at Netaji Nagar, New Delhi. During the course of investigation, a trap was laid against Chetal and the second petitioner Gogia for having demanded and accepted Rs.1(),000.00 as bribe from SurinderKumar. It is the case of the C.B.I, that it is Chetal who demanded the bribe of Rs. 10,000.00 and passed on the bribe money to Gogia who was present in his room and the amount was recovered from the pant pocket of Gogia. Gogia in his statement to the police admitted having received the amount from Chetal. The recovery of Rs.10,000.00 from the pant pocket of Gogia was made in the presence of two witnesses, namelv, G.S. Sadari, a Section Officer, and B.L. Murti, a L.D.C., in the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India. The hand-washes of the fingers of Chetal and Gogia confirmed presence of phenolphthalein which showed that money had been demanded and accepted by Chetal who passed on the same to Gogia. At the time of said trap the conversation which took place between complainant Surinder Kumar and Chetal was also recorded in a micro cassette recorder which, it is stated, clearly spoke about the roles played by Chetal and Gogia.
(4) The petitioners were arrested on 12 September 1988 by C.B.I, for having com- mitted criminal offence. On the following day they were released on bail. They were placed under suspension. The suspension order was revoked on 30 July 1990. After the completion of the investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the C.B.I, submitted its report under section 173 of the Code before the Special Judge, Delhi. The report said that owing to certain lacunae and evidence being insufficient, the case was not found fit for recommending prosecution, and that it had been referred for initiation of departmental proceedings for imposition of major penalties on the petitioners. A request was made to the court to accept the report and make orders for return of documents seized during the investigation. The learned Special Judge did not agree. He by his order dated 7.11.1990 took cognizance of the offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('the Act of 1988' for short), and issued notices to the petitioners for I February 1991. The Judge noted that the C.B.I, had submitted a closure report on the four grounds ;- '(i) The demand and acceptance of bribe was not in presence of an independent witness because of situation and conditions were not favorable to plant an independent witness. Alternatively a micro-cassette recorded was used to record the conversation of V.P. Chetal and complainant. The transcription of recorded conversation has gaps and voice of V.P. Chetal could not be identified by witnesses. '(ii) The recovery of tainted money was from pant pocket of M.P. Gogia.. When and how V.P. Chetal passed on the tainted money to M.P. Gogia is not supported by any testimony. (iii) There was unreasonable delay between demand of bribe and lodging of the complaint i.e. 7.9.88 & 12.9.88 respectively. (iv) In tape-recorded conversation there is no demand by V.P. Chetal but initiative has been taken by complainant. ' However, on 14 November 1990, the C.B.I, moved an application before the Special Judge stating that the cognizance of the offences could not be taken without sanction of the concerned authorities. The court, thereforee, noticed that under section 19 of the Act of 1988, cognizance could by taken only after previous sanction was obtained in terms of that section. It, thereforee, modified its earlier order dated 7 November 1990 and directed the C.B.I, to make further investigation in the matter, and withdrew the notices issued to the petitioners for the time being. On 5 January 1993, another Special Judge, who had by this time taken over, noticed the submission of the C.B.I, that the sanctioning authority by its letter dated 29 October 1992 had declined the sanction again. He said whatever might be the merits of the case he was disabled from proceeding with the case, and that the cognizance taken by his predecessor was obviously inadvertent. He, thereforee, consigned the papers to the record room. On that date the learned Judge recorded the presence of the Senior Public Prosecutor for C.B.I. along with the Investigating Officer and also that of an Advocate for the complainant Surinder Kumar.
(5) As far as the petitioners are concerned, the matter had not rested at that. A charge sheet was issued to the first petitioner on 7 December 1989 for initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the Administrator, N.D.M.C. (Disciplinary Authority) on the following charge :- 'That Shri V.P. Chetal while functioning as Chief Engineer (Civil) Ndmc, New Delhi, during the period of September, 1988 failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a public servant and committed misconduct in as much as he on 12.9.88 demanded and accepted Rs.10,000.00 as illegal gratification from Shri Surender Kumar, a contractor of Ndmc as a consideration for showing him favor in award of tender for construction of Primary School Building at M. Avenue, Netaji Nagar and also to help him in other pending payments. Thus, said Sh. V.P. Chetal contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1 )(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Ccs (Conduct) Rules, 1964. ' A charge sheet was similarly issued to the second petitioner on 23 February 1990 by the Administrator, N.D.M.C. (Disciplinary Authority) :- 'That during the period of September 1988 Sh. M.P. Gogia was functioning as Assistant Engineer, Ndmc and while functioning as such in the capacity of a public servant he failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion of duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a public servant and committed misconduct in as much as, an amount of Rs.10,000.00 taken as bribe by V.P. Chetal from Surender Kumar was recovered from his conscious possession on 12.9.88. Thus said Sh.M.P. Gogia contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1), (i), (ii) & (iii) of the Ccs (Conduct) Rules 1964. ' Both the petitioners were supplied with the statement of imputation of misconduct against them, the list of documents and list to witnesses for the purpose of holding enquiries against them. The lists of documents and witnesses are common to both the petitioners. There are seven witnesses and the list of documents is as follows :- 1. Complaint of Sh.Surender Kumar r/o B-16, Vivek Vihar, Phase Ii, New Delhi. 2. Fir of RC47(A)/88 of ACB/CBI/New Delhi. 3. Handing over memo dt. 12.9.88. 4. Memo in Rc 47(A) /88 dt. 12.9.88 at 3.45 P.M. 5. Recovery memo in Rc 47(A)/88 dt. 12.9.88. 6. Seizure memo dated 12.9.88 in RC47(A)/88. 7. One file in seven volumes. 8. Personal search memo dt. 12.9.88. 9. Personal search memo dt. 13.9.88. 10. Seizure memo dt. 13.9.88. 11. Seizure memo dt. 13.9.88. 12. Rough site map in Rc 47(A) /88 dt. 12.9.88. 13. Memo dt. 15.9.88 in Rc 47(A)/88. 14. Memo dt. 16.9.88 in RC47(A)/88. 15. Written transaction of recorded conversation. These charge sheets, as noted above, the petitioners now challenge. By an interim order made on 27 July 1992 departmental proceedings against both the petitioners have since been stayed by this, Court. In this petition we-are not concerned with the truthfulness or otherwise of the charges against the petitioners. Petitioners submit that the disciplinary proceedings cannot continue against them as (1) the sanctioning authority/the employer did not find any prima facie case against the petitioner and did not grant any sanction for their prosecution; (2) the Inquiry Officer cannot review the decision of the sanctioning authority refusing to sanction the prosecution on the same set of facts and that the departmental enquiry was liable to be quashed; (3) both the disciplinary authority, i.e., the Administrator, N.D.M.C., and the C.B.I., had reached the conclusion that there was no evidence against the petitioners for their prosecution. The petitioners, thereforee, said that the disciplinary proceedings were incompetent and that the trap organized by C.B.I, was without jurisdiction and without any authority of law, and that this was on account of the fact that the Act of 1988, came into force on 9 September 1988 and the notification under section 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 specifying the offences which could be investigated by the C.B.I, was , issued by the Central Government only on 29 October 1988 after the trap which was laid on 12 September 1988, and that prior to 29 October 1988 the C.B.I, had no jurisdiction to investigate the case under the Act of 1988.
(6) These grounds of challenge have been denied both by C.B.I, as well as by the N.D.M.C. They say in spite of the fact that there was no sanction for prosecution against the petitioner, the disciplinary authority can nevertheless proceed and that the departmental proceedings are not barred. N.D.M.C. has referred to the raid conducted on the report of Surinder Kumar and the recovery of Rs.10,000.00 which were passed on as bribe to the petitioners. N.D.M.C. says that both the petitioners committed gross misconduct an thus failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and thereby violated the provisions of Rule 3(1), (i), (ii) & (iii) of the Ccs (Conduct) Rules, 1964. It is stated that the criminal case was dropped by the criminal court on the ground for want of sanction and that it was not decided on merits. N.D.M.C. had also filed an application seeking vacation of the stay on departmental proceedings granted by this Court. C.B.I, also said that the sanctioning authority did not give sanction for prosecution of the petitioners as Special Judge consigned the case to the records, but both the petitioners were issued charge sheet for their alleged misconduct in view of the aforesaid facts because the competent authority had also mentioned in the order rejecting the sanction that he agreed with the C.B.I.'s recommendation for initiating departmental proceedings, and that the departmental enquiry was to be conducted by the Commissioner for Departmental Enquiry, Central Vigilance Commission, but it could not be progressed because of stay granted by this Court. C.B.I, has denied that there was any illegality in laying trap and recovering the amount of Rs.10,000.00 as aforesaid.
(7) We do not think that petitioners are right in their submission that merely because the competent authority did not grant sanction of their prosecution, on the same facts disciplinary proceedings could not be initiated against them. Here the competent authority itself while declining to grant sanction for prosecution came to the conclusion that it was a case for initiating departmental proceedings for the alleged misconduct by the petitioners. Merely because criminal prosecution has been dropped for want of sanction under the Act of 1988 is no ground in itself to quash the departmental proceedings against the petitioners. The only point which merits consideration is if the trap which was laid on 12 September 1988 by the C.B.I. was valid in law, and if not, could the evidence collected during investigation not authorised by law be the basis for departmental proceedings and be used there. Mr. Kaira did refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, It 1994 (2) S.C. 107, to contend that where there was an illegality in the procedure the evidence so collected could not be used in a criminal trial. The question before us, however, is if the evidence even if collected illegally during the course of investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure ('the Code' for short) could be used in the departmental proceedings.
(8) In State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. S. Sree Rao, : (1964)IILLJ150SC , the court considered the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with respect to findings of departmental authorities conducting disciplinary proceedings against a public servant. The court said : 'The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant; it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Art. 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. ' The court also observed that where the enquiry officer stated that the judgment of the Magistrate in a criminal trial against the public servant could not always be regarded as binding in a departmental enquiry against that public servant, he did not commit any error. This judgment was sought to show that the enquiry proceedings are independent of any criminal proceedings, and that the court may not be concerned as to how the evidence is collected when the public servant is assured of fair enquiry observing the principles of natural justice and right to cross-examine and to lead his defense.
(9) In Dr. M.C. Sulkunte v. The State of Mysore, : 1971CriLJ519 , the court was hearing an appeal against the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 5(l)(d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ('the Act of 1947' for short). The main contention raised by the appellant was that the sanction to investigate the offence given by the Magistrate was not proper in as- much as he had not recorded any reason as to why he had given permission to an inspector of police to investigate the offence of criminal misconduct of obtaining illegal gratification. The court said that although laying the trap was part of the investigation and it had been done by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, it could not on that ground hold that the sanction was invalid or that the conviction ought not to be maintained on that ground. The court further said that it had been emphasised in a number of decisions of that court that to set aside a conviction it must be shown that there had been miscarriage of justice as a result of an irregular investigation.
(10) In Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil Lines, Nagpur and another v. Ramchandra G. Modak and others, : (1984)ILLJ337SC , one of the questions raised was whether or not the departmental enquiry against the respondents would continue after they had been acquitted in the criminal case. The court said : -
'THIS is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental enquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental enquiry's not taken away nor is its direction (discretion) in any way fettered.'
(11) In Madan Lal v. The State of Punjab, : 1967CriLJ1401 , the accused was charged not only under section 120B but under sections 409 and 477A Indian Penal Code. The sanction was not obtained in respect of the complaint under section 120B. The court said this would not, however, vitiate the trial on the substantive charge under section 409 IPC. The court also observed (in the circumstances of that case) that no prejudice could be said to have resulted to the accused.
(12) In Raj Kumar v. The State of Punjab, 1976 (1) Slr 5, a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court considered the effect of rule 16.38(1) of the Punjab Police Rules framed under the Police Act, 1861. The rule fell in Chapter Xiv of the Rules relating to punishment. It is as under :- '16.38 Criminal offences by police officers and strictures by courts - procedure regarding (1) Immediate information shall be given to the District Magistrate of any complaint received by the Superintendent of Police, which indicates the commission by a police officer of a criminal offence in connection with his official relations with the public. The District Magistrate will decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or made over to a selected Magistrate having 1st class powers.' The court held that the rule was mandatory and that evidence collected in an investigation in derogation of this rule could not be used against a police officer in a criminal prosecution.
(13) In Delhi Administration v. Chanan Singh, 1969 S.L.R. 217, the Supreme Court did not go into the question whether rule 16.38(1) aforesaid was mandatory of directory. In that case departmental proceedings were initiated against a Police Sub Inspector for accepting a bribe of RS.1OO.00 in a case investigated by him. The court observed that the complaint against the police officer fell within the provisions of rule 16.38 and that it was for the District Magistrate to decide who could investigate the case. The court then held as under :-
'No investigation of any kind was made under his directions. Without obtaining his directions, the Superintendent of Police held an inquiry, and passed on order of censure. The order was set aside by the Deputy lnspectorGeneral.ThereafterbyD.O.Ietter No.2165-C, the Superintendent of Police, asked for the sanction of the District Magi state to proceed department tally. Even at this stage, the District Magistrate was not informed that the Superintendent of Police held an inquiry and passed an order of censure and that, his order was set aside by the Deputy Inspector General. The inquiry held by the Superintendent of Police was not authorised by the District Magistrate nor did it receive his approval. The District Magistrate gave his sanction without record- ing any reasons and without applying his mind to the requirement of r. 16.38. In the circumstances, we are constrained to hold the departmental action taken against the respondent is invalid. '
(14) Both these judgments do not help the petitioners in their submission that evidence collected during investigation which was illegal or irregular in criminal cases against the accused could not be used in the departmental proceedings against them.
(15) In H.N. Rishbud and another v. State of Delhi, : 1955CriLJ526 , the Special Judge, Delhi, quashed certain criminal proceedings against the police for alleged offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Act of 1947. Proceedings were quashed on the ground that investigations on the basis of which appellants were being prosecuted were in contravention of provisions of sub-section (4) of section 5 of the Act of 1947 and hence illegal. The High Court in revisional jurisdiction reversed the decision of the Special Judge and the matter, thus, came before the Supreme Court. The court held as under :- ' We are, thereforee, clear in our opinion that section 5(4) and proviso to Section 3 of the Act and the corresponding Section 5-A of Act 59 of 1952 . are mandatory and not directory and that the investigation conducted in violation thereof bears the stamp of illegality. (9)The question then requires to be considered whether and to what extent the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. Now, trial follows congnizance and congnizance is preceded by investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the question. as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an. investigation is provided in Section 190, Cr.P.C. as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. Section 190,Cr.P.C. is one out of a group of sections under the heading 'Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings'. The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading, i.e., Sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While no doubt, in one sense. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that congnizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is thereforee a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under Clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation Section 537, Cr.P.C. which is in the following terms is attracted : 'Subject to .the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, war- rant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless such error, omission or irregularity, has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.' If, therefeore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice.That an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in - 'Prabhu v. Emperor', and - 'Lumbhardar Zutshi v. The King, Air 1950 Pc 26. These no doubt relate to the illegality of arrest in the course of investigation while we are concerned in the present cases with the illegality with reference to the machinery for the collection of the evidence. This distinction may have a bearing on the question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice, but both the cases clearly show that invalidity of the investigation has no relation to the competence of the Court. We are thereforee, clearly, also, of the opinion that where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has preceded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. (10) It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during trial. When the branch of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such re- investigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for.'
(16) Thus, even in criminal prosecution it has to be shown that there has been a miscarriage of justice on account of illegality in investigation for the trial to be set aside. Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules prescribes a detailed procedure for imposing penalties on a public servant. To such an enquiry provisions of the Code and the Evidence Act are inapplicable. The enquiry officer holding enquiry is to be guided by the rules of enquiry as prescribed and of natural justice and is not bound by the formal rules relating to procedure and evidence under the Code or the Evidence Act.
(17) It will be, thus, seen that the evidence collected during investigation in a criminal offence, which investiation is not authorised by any provision of law, could be used in departmental proceedings against the delinquent public servant. The only safeguard that appears to be is that the enquiry officer and the d.iscipli nary authority would be alert that no prejudice is caused to the delinquent officer in the defense of his case in the departmental-proceedings and that procedure as prescribed is followed and rules of natural justice observed in the conduct of the inquiry.
(18) An argument was also raised by Mr. Lal that the investigation in the present case was legal in view of the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. This section 6 is as under :-
'6.EFFECT of repeal. -Whether this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there under; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. '
(19) Then we were referred to sections 30 and 31 of the' Act of 1988 which are as under :- '30. Repeal and waving. - (1) The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947) and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952) are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but without prejudice to the application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), any thing done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the Acts so repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provision of this Act. 31. Omission of certain sections of Act 45 of 1860.- Sections 161 to 165- A (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code shall be omitted, and section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), shall apply to such omission as if the said sections had been repealed by a Central Act. '
(20) We do not think that on a plain reading the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable, to make the investigation in a criminal , offence under the Act of 1988 legal. The Act of 1988 repealed not only the Act of 1947 but also omitted sections 161 to 165-A Indian Penal Code. Under section 31 of the Act of 1988, the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act shall apply to omission of sections 161 to 165-A I.P.C. as if the said sections had been repealed by a Central Act. The effect of section 30, which repealed the Act of 1947, and section 31 of the Act of 1988 would be same as far as the applicability of section 6 of the General Clauses Act is concerned. Notification under section 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, authorising the Delhi Special Police Establishment to investigate offences under the Act of 1988 including offences under section 161 to 165-A Indian Penal Code, was issued only on 28 October 1988. The Act of 1988 came into force on 9 September 1988. During the interregnum period from 9 September 1988 to 28 October 1988 Delhi Special Police Establishment could not investigate the offences committed during that period. It is not that the alleged offences against the petitioners were committed prior to 9 September 1988 which would have authorised the officers of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to investigate the offences irrespective of the repeal of the Act of 1947 and omission of sections 161 to 165-A Indian Penal Code . by virtue of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. But that is not the case here. We may also refer to section 17 of the Act of 1988 which authorises persons to investigate the offences punishable under the Act. It says that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no officer below the rank - (a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, of an Inspector of Police; (b) in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as such under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an Assistant Commissioner of Police; (c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank, shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest thereforee without a warrant. There are two provisos to the section which might not be quite relevant for our purpose. In our opinion, thereforee, section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not validate the investigation of the offences under the Act of 1988 in the present case.
(21) In this view of the matter we do not find any merit in this petition. It is dismissed. Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs.