Judgment:
Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.
1. In this petition, the order dated 9.11.1999 is sought to be quashed. It is also prayed by the petitioner that the respondents, and, in particular, Respondent No.2 (Delhi Pollution Control Committee - hereinafter referred to as DPCC), be directed to accord formal sanction permitting the petitioner to continue its manufacturing activity as a category ''F'' industry at 4/10, Kirti Nagar Industrial Area, New Delhi.
2. The impugned order dated 9.11.1999 has been issued by the Assistant Environment Engineer (Legal) of the DPCC. The order reads as under:-
'' Sub: IA.No.22 in WP(C) No.4677/1985; M.C. Mehta V/S Union of India and Others in the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.
Sir,
The Hon'ble Supreme Court on 15.5.99 in the above mentioned case has ordered that the DPCC should take suitable action against those industries who have violated the provisions of the law and have restarted as other category of industries after the closure of the `H' category unit without permission from the competent authority.
Since you are operating the unit at the premises of an `H' category of industry, in violation of the above mentioned orders of Hon'ble Supreme Court. You are, thereforee, hereby directed to close the unit with immediate effect.''
3. From a reading of the said order it becomes clear that the same has been issued purportedly in connection with the orders passed by the Supreme Court in the public interest litigation entitled as ''M.C. Mehta v. U.O.I. (WP (C) 4677/1985) which pertains to the issue of hazardous and noxious industries being run within the city of Delhi. It further appears that by an order dated 15.9.1999 the Supreme Court directed the DPCC to take suitable action against those industries which had violated the provisions of law and had ''restarted as other category of industries after the closure of the ''H'' category units'' without permission from the competent authority. Two things are clear from the first paragraph of the impugned order. First of all, the Supreme Court directed the closure of category ''H'' units. Secondly, the Supreme Court directed the DPCC to take suitable action against those industries who, in violation of the provisions of law had restarted as other category of industries after such closure this portion of the order is a general observation.
4. The second paragraph of the order is specific to the petitioner. In this paragraph it is alleged that the petitioner was operating its unit at the premises of a category ''H'' industry and that it was doing so in violation of the afore-mentioned orders of the Supreme Court. In view of this, by virtue of the impugned order the petitioner was directed to close the unit with immediate effect. The second portion of the impugned order assumes that the petitioner is operating its units at the premises which was earlier used by a category ''H'' industry and whose closure was occasioned by the orders of the Supreme Court.
5. Admittedly, the petitioner was running a factory at the aforementioned premises at Kirti Nagar under a license issued by the Respondent No.3 (Municipal Corporation of Delhi hereinafter referred to as MCD). Initially, the petitioner was issued the license for PVC products with manufacturing of brief cases on 17.1.1997. The trade had been changed to ''PVC product with one injection moulding machine'' which was covered by group ''A'' at Sr. No. 41 in the Master Plan of August 1990-01 and the same was allowed to be carried out in Kirti Nagar Industrial Area. The said trade now falls under category ''F'' by virtue of a Central Government Notification dated 20.7.2001 and Kirti Nagar is categorised as a''light industry area'' in the Master Plan 1990-01. These facts are borne out from the counter affidavit filed by the MCD. Thus, it is clear that as of now and in any event with effect from 20.7.2001 the petitioner could carry on the manufacture of PVC products in Kirti Nagar Industrial Area without any limit on the use of power. Prior to 20.7.2001 such manufacturing activity was constrained by the use of power up to 30 KW only.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner made several submissions. However, the most important and compelling argument was that the petitioner was not at all covered by the orders passed by the Supreme Court in the said public interest litigation. It was secondly contended that the petitioner did not at all run any category ''H'' industry in the premises in question and was only running a factory under category ''F'' from the very beginning, i.e. 1990. thereforee, the petitioner's unit was not closed down and it was not a case of restarting under a different category. It was contended that the order dated 8th July, 1996 passed by the Supreme Court was for closure of industries which fell under category ''H'' of the Master Plan. The petitioner never set up any such industry which fell under category ''H'' at any point of time. The order passed by the Supreme Court did not, in any way, affect the petitioner's industry, as since the very inception, the petitioner's industry fell under category ''F'' . The petitioner had started its business in the year 1989 initially at A/21/25 Narayana Industrial Area. Later on, on 4.4.1990 the petitioner shifted its business to the present premises i.e. 4/10, Industrial Area Kirti Nagar, New Delhi. These premises were take on rent from one Shri Sunder Singh. The petitioner installed a plastic injection moulding machine at the said premises for manufacturing of plastic moulding which was an industry falling under category ''F''. It was further submitted that prior to April 1990, a part of the premises in question, i.e. 4/10, Kirti Nagar Industrial Area, New Delhi was in the occupation of a concern under the name of ''Delhi Plastic Industries'' which apparently was running a category ''H'' industry from these very premises. It is contended that when the orders in the said public interest litigation came up for hearing before the Supreme Court, the DPCC submitted a list of industries which purportedly fell in category ''H'' of the Master Plan. This list was submitted in 1996 and it is wrongly mentioned the name of ''Delhi Plastic Industries'' as the unit operating at the premises in question. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that obviously this list might have been prepared on the basis of some old recordswithout physical verification as to whether ''Delhi Plastic Industries'' was at all running any unit at 4/10, Kirti Nagar Industrial Area, Delhi. It was also pointed out that even the Kirti Nagar Police Station had submitted a report (annexure P-21) dated 1.2.1997 wherein it was reported as under:-
'' On investigation it was learnt that Delhi Plastic has shifted form here to B-50 Phase-II, Industrial Area, Maya Puri, Delhi, a number of years ago.''
These facts according to the learned counsel for the petitioner clearly show that the petitioner was not at all covered by the orders of the Supreme Court and, thereforee, the impugned order was without any basis and was liable to be set aside.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner also pointed out that when a notice dated 29.1.1997 issued by the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking in the name of Delhi Plastic Industries was pasted in the premises in question, the petitioner for the first time became aware that the Supreme Court had passed an order dated 8.7.1996 with regard to closure of 513 category ''H'' industrial units in Delhi. The notice was for disconnection of electricity supply and removal of the meter. Pursuant to this notice the petitioner sent a reply to the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking indicating that Delhi Plastic Industries was no longer in occupation of the premises in question and that the same had been vacated by Delhi Plastic Industries prior to April 1990. It was further pointed out that Delhi Plastic Industries had shifted their unit to B-50, Maya Puri Industrial Area, Phase-II. It was further stated in the said reply dated 30.1.1997 that from April, 1990 onwards i.e., for more than six years, the petitioner was in occupation of the premises in question and was a tenant of Shri Sunder Singh. The petitioner enclosed its income tax assessments dated 24.11.1992, 9.12.1993, 27.11.1995 as well as copy of the rent agreement with the landlord. However, the electricity was disconnected and the petitioner was constrained to file a writ petition being CW 414/1997. The same came up for hearing on 18.2.1997 and was disposed of with the following directions:-
'' Mr. Mahajan who appears for the petitioner contends that respondent NO.6 has since shifted to B-50, Mayapuri Industrial Area, Phase-II, New Delhi and the present petitioner is running the industry which does not , in any manner, fall in category 'H', as determined by the Supreme Court. He, however, states that the consent has not been granted to the petitioner and the necessary application has already been submitted to respondent NO.7 on February 10,1997. The said respondent is, thereforee, required to consider such application and pass necessary orders. It is, accordingly, directed that the application of the petitioner shall be considered by respondent No.7 who will pass orders as permissible in law within two weeks from today. No further directions are necessary in this writ petition. The same is disposed of.
Let copy of the order be given dusty to counsel for the parties.''
8. Despite the aforesaid directions, the respondent No.7 in the said writ petition (DPCC) did not dispose of the application and no order was passed within the stipulated period of two weeks. Instead, on 2.10.1999 the DPCC issued a notice to the petitioner to the following effect:-
''The Hon'ble Supreme Court on 15.05.99, in the above mentioned case, has ordered that the DPCC should take suitable action against those industries who have violated the provisions of the law and have restarted as other category of industries after the closure of the `H' category unit without permission from the competent authority.
Since, you are operating the unit at the premises of an `H' category of industries, which was ordered to be closed down by Hon'ble Supreme Court, you are, hereby directed to indicated the activity being carried out and date of commissioning of the unit Along with the relevant documentary proofs to establish the same. The required information should reach this office within 07 days of issue of this letter, failing which suitable action as per the law shall be taken against you.''
It will be pertinent to note that the first paragraph of this notice is identical to the first paragraph of the impugned order dated 9.11.1989 which has been set out earlier. By virtue of this notice the petitioner was directed to indicate the activity being carried out and the date of running the unit Along with relevant documentary proof of establishment of the same. The petitioner immediately replied to the said notice on 8.10.1999 wherein it was categorically stated that ''no industry has been restricted after the closure of an 'H' category industry''. It was further pointed that the ''H'' category unit of Delhi Plastic Industries had shifted from 4/10 Kirti Nagar Industrial Area to B-50 Mayapuri Industrial Area Phase-II, New Delhi in March, 1990 and that with effect from April 1990 the premises in question was occupied by the petitioner's unit which was engaged in the business of Plastic Injection Moulding. In support of the submissions that the petitioner was operating from 4/10, Kirti Nagar Indusrial Area since April, 1990, the petitioner enclosed photo copies of various documents such as Rent Receipt for the month of May, 1990; lease deed with the landlord dated 4.4.1990; copies of income tax assessment orders for 1990-91; a copy of the income tax return filed in August, 1990 showing the address as 4/10, Kirti Nagar Industrial Area; a copy of the Excise Code for the year 1992-93 issued by the Central Excise Department dated 6.5.1992; a copy of the membership receipt No. 3808 dated 8.6.1991 of Kirti Nagar Industries Association and a copy of a telephone bill in respect of the telephone installed at the premises in the year 1995 in the name of one of the partners of the petitioner firm. In the reply it was further stated that in the light of these facts it was clear that the petitioner was operating at the present address since 1990 and, thereforee, it was apparent that it was not a case of closure of category ''H'' industry pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court of 1996. When the Supreme Court passed the order of 1996, there was no category ''H'' industry existing in the said premises. It was, thereforee, requested that the petitioner's name be deleted from the list of industries which had allegedly restarted as a different category in violation of the provisions of law.
9. Despite this reply, the impugned order dated 9.11.1999 came to be passed merely repeating what was stated in the notice dated 2.10.1999 and completely ignoring the submissions of the petitioner and the documentary evidence in support thereof. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the order dated 9.11.1999 was passed upon a complete non-application of mind and in a mechanical fashion.
10. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the MCD drew my attention first of all to the order dated 10.5.1996 passed by the Supreme Court in is No.22 in Writ Petition (C) No.4677/1985 (M.C.Mehta v. UOI: : (1996)4SCC351 ) in particular he drew my attention to paragraph 6 of the order where the provisions of the Master Plan with regard to the hazardous/noxious/heavy/large industries were referred to. Hazardous and noxious industries apparently have been categorised as ''H(a)'' and heavy and large industries have been categorised as ''H(b)''. It was pointed that that hazardous/noxious industrial units were not permitted in Delhi and that existing industrial units were to be shifted within a maximum period of three years. Similarly, no new heavy and large industrial units were to be permitted in Delhi and the existing heavy and large scale industrial units were to shift to Delhi Metropolitan Area and National Capital Region as per plan. Provision was also made with regard to the land-use in respect of the lands which would become available on account of shifting of the hazardous and noxious industrial units as well as heavy and large scale industrial units. It was provided in the master plan that the land which would become available on account of the shifting and relocation would be used for making up the deficiency as per the needs of the community based on norms given in the master plan. It was further provided that if any land or part of land so vacated was not needed for the making up of the deficiency of community services, it would be used as per prescribed land use; however, the land was to be used for light and service industries, even if the land use according to the Master Plan/Zonal Development Plan was extensive industry.
11. The learned counsel then drew my attention to the order dated 8.7.1996 passed by the Supreme Court in the same matter (M.C. Mehta v. UOI). This order is also reported in : AIR1996SC2231 . I may note that while passing this order dated 8.7.1996 the Supreme Court was considering the question as to whether the hazardous/noxious/heavy/large industries operating in Delhi were liable to be shifted/relocated to other towns in NCR. (see paragraph 2). In paragraph 4 of the said order the Supreme Court observed that under the mandatory provisions of the Master Plan the hazardous and noxious industrial units [H(a) industries] are not permitted to operate in Delhi. The Supreme Court further observed that so far as the existing H (a) industries are concerned, they were required to be shifted within a maximum period of three years. That the Master Plan came into force in August, 1990 and H (a) industries should have been shifted by the end of 1993. It observed that it was unfortunate that no action in this respect was taken by the authorities concerned and the Supreme Court observed as under:-
'' We have no hesitation in holding that the H(a) industries are operating in Delhi illegally and in utter violation of the mandatory provisions of the Master Plan. Delhi Administration was under a statutory obligation to prepare a list of H(a) industries. No such list was prepared within the statutory period of three years. It was only under the directions of this Court that the necessary lists were prepared.''
In paragraph 26 of the said order dated 8.7.1996 the Supreme Court held that 168 industries listed therein were hazardous/noxious/heavy/large industries and fell in H(a) and H(b) categories under the Master Plan. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner's firm is not mentioned in the list of 168 industries. In paragraph 27 of the said order dated 8.7.1996 the Supreme Court held that the above-mentioned 168''H'' category industries cannot operate in the city of Delhi and consequently the Supreme Court held and directed that the said 168 industries shall stop functioning and operating in the city of Delhi with effect from 30.11.1996 and they may relocated/shifted to any other industrial estate in the NCR. It was further directed as under:-
''(6) The use of the land which would become available on account of shifting/relocation of the industries shall be permitted in terms of the orders of this Court dated 10.5.1996 in M.C. Mehta.''
The Supreme Court also passed the following directions with regard to 762 industries which did not respond to the public notice published in the various newspapers. The directions in respect thereof are contained in paragraph 29 of the order dated 8.7.1996 which reads as under:-
'' Before parting with this judgment we may briefly deal with 762 industries which did not respond to the public notice published in various newspapers. These industries are included in the list of 1226 industries which were given public notice by publication in the newspapers. These 762 industries did not file objections in response to the public notice. Ordinarily, they should have been declared as `H' category industries under the Master Plan but keeping in view the totality of the circumstance, we are inclined to take a lenient view. A list of these 762 industries has been placed on record by the Committee. We direct the Committee (Delhi Pollution Control Committee) to issue individual notices to these industries within ten days from today asking them to show cause within ten days thereafter why they be not categorised as `H' industries. The objections, if any, shall be decided by the Committee within further ten days and the report indicating the list of `H' industries shall be filed in his Court before 20-8-1996.''
12. By another order dated 6.9.1996, the Supreme Court noted that pursuant to the order dated 8.7.1996 the DPCC issued individual notices and also an additional public notice to 758 industries (4 industries having already categorised). 470 industries did not respond to either of the notices while the remaining 288 industries filed their objections which were heard by the DPCC. The Committee finally rejected the objections of 43 industries and categorised those industries as category ''H'' industries under the Master Plan. It was further noted in the order of the Supreme Court dated 6.9.1996 that the net result was that 513 (470 + 43) industries out of 758 had been ''identified and declared as category ''H'' industries under the Master Plan.'' The list of these 513 industries is set out in the order dated 6.9.1996. Sr. No. 95 of the said list of 513 industries read as under:-
Delhi Plastic Industr, 4/10, Indl, Area, Kirti Nagar, N Delhi -15.
It is clear that the name of Delhi Plastic Industries appeared in this list whereas the name of the petitioner was not to be found. The Supreme Court observed as under:-
'' Having held the above mentioned 513 Industries as ''H'' category Industries, we have no hesitation in holding that these industries cannot operate in the city of Delhi.''
Thereafter, the Supreme Court directed that these 513 Industries cannot be permitted to operate and function in Delhi with effect from 31.1.1997 and that they may relocated/shifted to any other industrial estate in the NCR. The Supreme Court further directed as under:-
'' (6) The use of the land which would become available on account of shifting/relocation of the industries shall be permitted in terms of the orders of this court dated May 10, 1996 in I.A. No. 22 in writ petition (c) 4677/85.''
13. In an interlocutory application moved by the DPCC before the Supreme Court in the said matter (M.C. Mehta supra), the Supreme Court passed an order dated 15.9.1999. The DPCC submitted that after closure of the industries as directed by earlier orders, several of them had restarted as a different category without permission from the DPCC or any other competent authority and, thereforee, they sought permission from the Supreme Court to proceed against them. In this context, the Supreme Court, inter alias passed the following order:-
'' We really fail to understand, when the Legislature have given sufficient authority to the Pollution Control Committee to proceed against those who do not comply with the norms or with the requirements of law why the Committee does not proceed against them and want an order of the Court. On the other hand, the Pollution Control Authority should be taken to task for not having discharged its legal duties and obligations by taking appropriate action. We hope and trust that the DPCC will take such suitable action against those industries who have violated the provisions of law and have restarted as other category of industries without permission from the competent authority and report to this court as to what action has been taken as against them within a period of four weeks from today. The Pollution Control Committee may take such assistance of the Delhi Administration in this regard. The Report be placed before the Court after four weeks. The interlocutory application stands disposed of.''
14. It was pursuant to this order of 15.9.1999 that the notice dated 2.10.1999 was sent to the petitioner and the impugned order dated 9.1.1999 also refers to this order of Supreme Court of 15.9.1999.
15. On 4.12.1996 the Supreme Court passed another order which was clarificatory in nature. The said order is reported in : (1997)11SCC327 . I am concerned only with paragraph 3 of the said order which reads as under:-
'' 3.We see considerable force in the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General on the second point also. The existing hazardous industries having been closed, what remains is the plot, superstructure and the workmen. The occupants of the plots and the owners of the industries which have been closed down shall have to undertake fresh procedure for setting up of a new industry. Needless to say that no industry can be set up which is not permitted under the Master Plan. The procedure required for setting up of a new industry shall have to be followed in every case. We make it clear that Government permission and the consent from the Pollution Control Board/Committee, if required under law, shall have to be obtained. Even fresh electric connection and water connection shall have to be applied for and obtained in the changed circumstances. We have no doubt when approached for necessary permission/license/ water/electric connections the authorities shall expedite in dealing with the applications.''
16. This petition has to be decided in the context of the aforesaid orders of the Supreme Court. On the one hand the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that these orders do not apply to the petitioner whereas on the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents and in particular the respondent No. 2 (DPCC) contends that they do. In fact, Mr. Sanjiv Khanna, the learned counsel appearing for the DPCC was at pains to submit that the orders of the Supreme Court applied to premises. He contented that once the order dated 6.9.1996 had been passed by the Supreme Court showing Delhi Plastic Industries at 4/10, Industrial Area, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi-15 as a part of the list of 758 industries which have been held to be category ''H'' industries an their closure has been directed by the Supreme Court nothing more needs to be done by the DPCC as this order makes the issue final. The learned counsel submitted that the hands of the DPCC were tied. If the petitioner felt that it was aggrieved by this order of 6.9.1996 to the extent that Delhi Plastic Industries had been shown as existing at the premises occupied by the petitioner, it was up to the petitioner to have sought a clarification from the Supreme Court. The next point urged by the learned counsel for the DPCC was that this Court while disposing of CW 417/97 by its order dated 18.2.1997 took note of the fact that it was the petitioner who was operating from the premises in question and that Delhi Plastic Industries had shifted to Maya Puri Industrial Area. Yet, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner therein that the consent had not been granted to the petitioner and necessary application had already been submitted to the DPCC on 10.2.1997. The learned counsel for the DPCC contended that the petitioner cannot be permitted to go behind the order dated 18.2.1997 passed by this Court in CW 414/1997 particularly when no appeal had been filed against this order and the same operated as res-judicata.
17. The learned counsel also relied upon the observations of a single Judge of this Court in the case of Delhi Pollution Control Committee v. Appellate Authority and Another: : 94(2001)DLT212 and in particular the observations contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 which reads as under:-
'' 6. Thus, it would be readily seen that the plea of the Union of India that shifting/relocation and closure were synonymous was accepted and it was held that the utilization of land was to be based on the order dated 10.5.1996 even for industries which were not relocating but were closing down. In the order of 10.5.1996 the Hon'ble Supreme Court made the following finding:
''.......... After leaving a part of the land with the owner for developing the same in accordance with the permissible land use under the Master Plan the remaining land should be surrendered to the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) for developing the same to meet the community needs.'' Thus the Supreme Court clearly emphasized that the land left with the closed identity was to be developed in accordance with the Master Plan.
7. Consequently a change of user in the light of above directions of the Supreme Court in para 3 above has to be equated to the starting of a new industry. Hence the word `shift' in the Master Plan has also to be read to mean `restart', otherwise an anomalous situation would result where the newly starting industry on the existing plot could start an industry other than light or service but the relocating industry could not do so. Acceptance of the respondent No.2's plea that shifting does not include restart as there was no closure would necessarily imply such an untenable interpretation.''
18. After examining the factual documents in the context of the orders of the Supreme Court as also orders of this Court, I find that there is great force in the submissions and contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The orders of the Supreme Court were directed primarily against the closure of hazardous/noxious/heavy/large industries falling under category ''H'' which were operating within the city of Delhi. So, the first question is, whether on the date on which the order of the Supreme Court directing the 168 industries (which incidentally did not include the petitioner) to be closed down was passed, a category ''H'' industry was being run at the premises in question, i.e. 4/10 Kirti Nagar Industrial Area, New Delhi? The answer to this is in the negative. The facts clearly show that the petitioner concern which is admittedly running an ''F'' industry was operating from the premises in question, i.e. 4/10 Kirti Nagar Industrial Area since 1990. Delhi Plastic Industries which was named as category ''H'' unit had left the premises and had shifted to Mayapuri Industrial Area in March, 1990. thereforee, the order dated 8.7.1996 which pertained to 168 industries clearly did not relate to the petitioner. The order dated 6.9.1996 also did not relate to the petitioner although at Sr. No. 95 of the list of 513 category ''H'' industries showed the name of Delhi Plastic Industries at the address occupied by the petitioner. The name of Delhi Plastic Industry was apparently included in the list of 51 industries as, indicated in the order dated 6.9.1996 itself, 470 industries to which notices had been sent did not respond to them. Obviously, Delhi Plastic Industries may not have responded because it was no longer located at 4/10 Kriti Nagar Industrial Area, New Delhi and in any event, was not affected by the orders of the Supreme Court. The name of Delhi Plastic Industries showing the address of the premises in question was included in the list of 513 industries as no response to the notice issue by the DPCC had been received from Delhi Plastic Industries. It is clear from the reading of the order dated 8.7.1996 that with regard to 762 industries, the Supreme Court had directed that individual notices be sent to them before they could be placed in category ''H'' industries. It is clear that if at all a notice was sent it was sent in the name of Delhi Plastic Industries and not in the name of the petitioner. When the notice was sent i.e., in 1996, Delhi Plastic Industries was no longer functioning at 4/10, Kirti Nagar Industrial Area, New Delhi. It had vacated these premises in March, 1990. There is no allegation on record to show that the petitioner had any point of time after April, 1990, when it came to occupy the premises in question, operated any industry falling under category ''H''. Thus, it is clear that the orders dated 8.7.1996 as well as order dated 6.9.1996 do not pertain to the petitioner's unit running at 4/10, Kirti Nagar Industrial Area. The order of closure thereforee, does to affect the petitioner.
19. The next question that arises for consideration is whether, at all, the order dated 15.9.1999 which is the basis of the impugned order of 9.11.1999 would apply to the petitioner. As would be apparent from a reading of the directions given by the Supreme Court on 15.9.1999 which have been reproduced hereinabove, the directions were in connection with restarting under a different category without per mission from the DPCC or other competent authority of an industry which had been closed earlier pursuant to orders of the Supreme Court. The petitioner's concern was not directed to be closed down, as already indicated above, by any of the orders of the Supreme Court. Clearly, thereforee, it was not a case of restarting of an industry under a different category. The order dated 15.9.1999 thereforee, had no application to the case of the petitioner.
20. There is another and most important aspect of the matter and that is that the order dated 9.11.1999 has been passed mechanically and upon a complete non-application of mind. This becomes apparent from the fact that the notice dated 2.10.1999 and the order dated 9.11.1999 are virtually identical. The reply given to the notice dated 2.10.1999 by the petitioner on 8.10.1999 does not even find mention in the impugned order dated 9.11.1999. In the reply of 8.10.1999, cogent reasons have been given by the petitioner to not consider its unit as a category ''H'' unit. Documentary evidence as indicated above in support of the petitioner's contention that it was engaged in the business of Plastic Injection Moulding right from April, 1990 were attached with the reply dated 8.10.1999. There is not a whisper with regard to these documents in the order dated 9.11.1999 although the notice that was sent on 2.10.1999 specifically asked the petitioner to indicate the activity being carried on, the date of commission of the unit Along with relevant documentary proof to establish the same. If this is what was sought and this is what was supplied then the least the DPCC ought to have done while passing the order dated 9.11.1999 was to have discussed the same. There is no such discussion. In fact, there is no mention of the reply dated 8.10.1999 and obviously no mention of the documentary evidence. Clearly, the order dated 9.11.1999 has been passed upon a complete non-application of mind in a purely mechanical fashion. Even in a case having serious consequences and ramifications entailing the closure of the unit with immediate effect, the DPCC did not think it proper to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances and to arrive at a conscious and reasoned decision. This to my mind, smacks of arbitrariness and, thereforee, the order dated 9.11.1999 is liable to be set aside and is so set aside.
21. To this extent, the writ petition is allowed with costs which are quantified at Rs.10,000/- and which shall be borne by the Respondent No.2 (DPCC).