P.K. Bahri, J.
(1) [ED. facts : In 1976 the plaintiff bought a large plot of land from Dda fur construction of Nehru Place Hotels. For more than 4 years its plans were not being passed on one excuse or the other and the pff. filed a W.P. in High Court which was allowed. The Dda appealed against the same which was dismissed and the D.B. decision is briefly reported at 1983. Raj L.R. 662. The detailed facts mentioned therein are not being repeated and same may be referred to. After that decision pff. applied for sanction of his plans. After lengthy correspondence, frequent meetings and repeated objections the pff. was allowed to build 2 separate blocks for commercial use and the main building of the hotel. Pff. completed the 2 blocks and repeatedly asked high and low concerned to issue the occupancy certificates in respect of the same and on failure filed W.P. in which notice was duly issued to DDA. Afterword pff. withdrew the W.P. on the ground that it intended to file a civil suit and then filed this suit, Pff. applied for interim mandatory injunction that the Dda should issue O.C. and Desu should supply electricity etc. Dda raised a preliminary Objection hat the suit was not maintainable without statutory notice under D.D. Act, and that pff. was not entitled to interim mandatory injunction.] After detailing above judgment is :
(2) In paras 158 to 161 of the plaint the plaintiff has referred to the factum of failing the W.P. claiming the same reliefs as in this suit and the show cause notice being issued in the W.P. and the counter affidavit being filed by deft. in the said W.P. and ultimately the W.P. petition being dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file fresh legal proceedings by the pff. Now, if in law it could be said that service of the notice in the W.P. on the deft. is sufficient compliance with Section 53-B of the Act then, in my opinion, as facts have been given in the plaint with regard to the service of the notice in the W.P. it cannot be said that the plaint does not make necessary averments with regard to the notice. From the facts only a legal inference is to be drawn whether service of the notice in the writ petition does not amount to compliance of provisions of S. 53-B of the Act and what was required to be pleaded in the plaint were the facts and not the legal inferences flowing from the said facts.
(3) The contention of the learned counsel for the deft. that as the W.P. has been dismissed as withdrawn, so it should be inferred that notice, if any, also stood withdrawn is not tenable because the D.B. while dismissing the W.P. as withdrawn has given permission to the plaintiff to take resort to any other appropriate legal proceedings. So, there has been no unequivocal dismissal of the W.P. as withdrawn. In support of the contention that service of the notice in the W.P. amounts to a notice as required by Section 53-B of the Act, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon N. Parameswara vs . State : AIR1986Mad126 . In the said case a W.P. was filed seeking the same reliefs as were sought in a suit filed subsequently. The W.P. was dismissed and the petitioner was granted three months time to seek the remedy by way of suit. The plaintiff filed the suit without serving any notice u/S. 80 of the CPC. The High Court held that the suit is not bad for want of notice presumably treating the notice serviced in the writ petition as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 80 CPC. The learned counsel for the deft. has tried to distinguish this judgment by arguing that in the said case the court had given three months time for instituting the civil suit & suit was instituted accordingly whereas in the present case, no time limit was fixed by the High Court while giving liberty to the plaintiff to institute any other appropriate legal proceedings. I do not think that the judgment can be distinguished on such a fact. After a/I the purpose of giving notice u/S. 80 of the Cpc or u/S. 53-B of the Act is to enable the authorities to examine the claim of the person giving the notice so that the authorities could settle the said claim without the said person being made to institute legal proceedings. In the State Bank of Punjab vs . M/s. Geeta Iron & Brass Works Ltd., : [1978]1SCR746 , it was held that a statutory notice of the proposed action u/S. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code is intended to alert a State to negotiate a just settlement or at least for the courtesy to tell the potential suitor as to why the claim is being resisted. In Ghanshyam Dass vs. Dominion of India Mr. 1984 Sc 1004, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the point to be considered is whether a notice gives sufficient information as to the nature of the claim such as would enable the recipient to avert the litigation.
(4) It is to be emphasised that the reliefs sought in this suit were the same reliefs as were sought in the W.P. and the said reliefs were strongly opposed by the deft. in the W.P. and are being again strongly opposed in this suit & the application. So, the deft. were well aware about the cause of action and the facts on the basis of which the pff. had sought the reliefs in the W.P. and were also aware that permission has been granted to the pff. to take appropriate legal proceedings while the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn and thus, it cannot be said in the present case that the defendants have been taken unaware and had not been given opportunity by the plaintiff to consider the case of the plaintiff in order to avert the legal proceedings. No useful purpose would have been served by the plaintiff serving a notice giving the same facts and the cause of action to the deft because the deft. were not obviously going to concede the claim of the plaintiff which was strongly opposed in the W.P. by the deft. So, in the present case, it must be held that service of the notice in the W.P. amounted to strict compliance with the provisions of S. 53-B of the Act. Hence, I need not give any opinion with regard to the alternate contention raised before me that the suit of the plaintiff is covered by the exception in S. 53-B(1).
(5) In the present case, the issuance of occupancy certificate (OC) has been denied to the plaintiff on the ground that hotel building has not been as yet constructed according to the sanctioned plan. No other reason whatsoever has been given in the letter rejecting the application for grant of O.C. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has vehemently argued that the deft are estopped from raising any other ground for denying the O.C. to the plaintiff. He has made reference to Building Bylaws 1983 in support of his contention. Bylaw 7.5.2 contemplates giving a notice of completion by the owner who has completed the building and bye-law 7.6 lays down that on receipt of such a notice the authority shall inspect the work and communicate the sanction or refusal or objection thereto in the proforma given in Appendix 'H' within sixty days from the date of receipt of notice of completion and it lays down that if nothing is communicated within this period it shall be deemed to have been approved by the authority for occupation. It also lays down that 'where a occupancy certificate is refused, the various reasons shall be quoted for rejecting at the first instance itself. In the present case, admittedly, only one reason was given for refusing the O.C. that the hotel building has not been constructed in accordance with the sanctioned plan. No other reason whatsoever has been given for denying the O.C. The provision above- quoted is mandatory as it requires that various reasons shall be quoted at the very first instance itself. So, the plaintiff is right when it urged that now in the suit the deft. cannot in law come forward with some new reasons in support of their decision that the O.C. was not to be issued in the present case. There is a merit in this contention. After all a party who thinks that he has compiled with the various provisions of the building bye-laws and has incurred lot of money in raising the construction is definitely in urgency to obtain the O.C. so that he could put the constructed building to some use and as soon as an application is moved which conforms with the requirement of building bye- laws a duty has been cast on the authorities to take a decision on such an application within sixty days and if the authority is to refuse the O.C. the authority must communicate the reasons for such refusal to the party concerned at the first instance itself in order to enable such a party to meet with the said reasons and move another application for grant of O.C. It cannot be the intention of the framers of the bye-laws that the competent authority should give one reason for rejecting the O.C. at one time and another reason for denying the O.C. at the other time. If that was the intention, this process would continue ad infinitum. So, it was incumbent on the part of the authority to have given all the reasons possible for rejecting the application for grant of O.C. in the very first instance it-self. So, prima facie, I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the defendants are now estopped from raising any other plea for denying the O.C. to the plaintiff.
(6) It has been argued by the learned counsel for the deft. that as hotel building has not been constructed which was the predominant purpose for which the lease had been granted to the plaintiff and building plans had been sanctioned, the question of grant of O.C. to the plaintiff in respect of the two blocks does not arise. The stand of the Dda has been, before the matter was taken to the High Court by the plaintiff in filing the W.P. earlier, that the plot in question has been leased out to the plaintiff only for purposes of constructing a hotel and not for constructing any commercial complex. The battle was fought tooth and nail by the Dda on this plea but unfortunately for the Dda the High Court held otherwise. The judgment of the High Court given in the L.P.A. is D.D.A. vs. M/s. Nehru Place Hotels Ltd. (1983) 2 Del 187= 1983. R. L.R. 662. The judgment is quite- illuminating with regard to the role of the Dda in granting the lease to the plaintiff in respect of this plot. Certain guidelines initially given were sought to be withdrawn, the execution of the lease deed was delayed by the Dda as the Dda wanted to incorporate certain clauses in the lease-deed which were never agreed upon and after it executed the lease- deed permitting the use of land for ordinary commercial purposes as well, the building plans were not being sanctioned as the Dda was insisting on only hotel complex being constructed on the plot in question. Detailed facts have been given in the judgment as to how the matter progressed from one stage to another and different conflicting orders made by the Dda authorities from time to time. At page 231 the Court formulated the questions which arose for decision in the said W.P. petition. One of the questions which arose for decision was whether a part of the building which was required to be constructed on the plot in question could be used for ordinary commercial purposes like offices or not The second question was as to what is the extent to which the building can be put to non-hotel use The plaintiff had given an undertaking initially to construct 250 bedrooms hotel in addition to using the remaining space for ordinary commercial complex building but the plaintiff on their own later on in negotiations with the Dda agreed to construct 400 bedrooms hotel with the clear understanding that the remaining plot and space would be used by it for constructing ordinary commercial complex building. The D.B. held that on the plot in question the company was obliged to construct a hotel building in which there was to be a hotel of about 400 bedrooms and in which building the remaining floor area could be used for purposes incidental to the hotel and also as ordinary commercial area e.g. commercial office. The directions were given to the Dda for passing the building plans accordingly and building plans were sanctioned and admittedly the two blocks in question have been constructed in accordance with the building plans and they are meant to be used as ordinary commercial area as laid down in the judgment of the D.B. It is nowhere laid down in this judgment that in case the hotel building is not constructed as to what would be the effect of the same. If the plaintiff by not constructing the hotel building is violating the terms of the lease deed the Dda could resort to any legal remedy by cancelling the lease-deed. The Building Bylaws do not contemplate that in case any term of the lease deed is violated by the lessee the authority can refuse to give the O.C. The notice of completion contemplates construction of the building work as described in the building permit. The building permit is the sanctioned plan. It is evident that if the building is not constructed in accordance with the building permit only then objection can be raised by the authority for refusing the O.C. So, on this ground that hotel complex has not been completed the authority could not validly refuse the grant of O.C. if in law the plaintiff is entitled to have the O.C. in respect of the part of the building which is functional in all respects and meets with all (he requirements of the bye-laws. So, it must be held that mere fact that the hotel building has not as yet been completed, prima facie, is no ground for refusing to grant the O.C. in respect of the two blocks in question. I must emphasize that the two blocks in question are self sufficient and functional and stand admittedly constructed in accordance with the bye-laws and also in accordance with the building permit. All necessary forms and certificates, as required by the building bye-laws stand furnished to the Dda by the plaintiff.
(7) The next contention raised before me by the learned counsel for the deft. is that no O.C. can be issued till a clearance is obtained from the Duac as required by bye-law 7.6.2. The said bye-law lays down that in cases where the building scheme requires the clearance of Duac then the authority shall issue the O.C. only after getting the clearance from the DUAC. It is not disputed before me that necessary approval or clearance has already been obtained from the Duac with regard to the building scheme in question. The contention raised before me is that even after obtaining such clearance at the initial stages it is incumbent upon the authority to get another clearance from Duac after the building is constructed. [In para 28 to 30, it is held that S. 12 of Duac Act does not require this].
(8) It has been then urged by the learned counsel for deft. 1 that the bye-laws do not contemplate issuance of any part O. C. It was not disputed before me that the Dua has been granting part O. C. in respect of the portions of the buildings constructed in accordance with the sanctioned plans. Bylaw No. 4. i lays down that singular would include plural and plural would include the singular. Bylaw 5. 1 clearly lays down that no person shall occupy or allow any other person to occupy any building or part of a building for any purpose until such building or part has been granted the 0. C. The notice of completion under bye- law 7.5.2 contemplates giving of information regarding completion of the work described in the building permit. Now, the words 'the work' would not mean that the whole of the work described in the building permit stands completed. This particular bye-law requires furnishing of copy of lease-deed, copy of sewer connection permission, clearance from Chief Fire Officer, clearance from C.C. of Explosives, clearance from Desu, structural stability certificate by the Licensed Architect/Engineer, certificate from the lift manufacturer, and certificate from the air-conditioning engineer. The pff. in the present case, has submitted all these certificates in respect of the two blocks in question which duly stand constructed. Forms 'C' & 'D' as required by bye-laws 7.2.2 & 7.2.3 have also been furnished in respect of these two blocks. There is nothing in the bye-laws which prohibits grant of O. C. In respect of the portion of the building constructed in accordance with the building permit if that portion of building is structurally fit for occupation and fulfillls all other requirements contemplated by the bye-laws enumerated above.
(9) The learned counsel for deft. 1 has, however, contended that before seeking O. C. in respect of the said two blocks, the pff. must give up the right to raise other construction in respect of which the building permit has been granted. I do not understand how such a contention can be even considered. The building permit has been granted in respect of the hotel Complex and commercial complex and there are five blocks of the building which are to be constructed as per the building permit. It is not incumbent on the part of the pff. to give up its right to construct the remaining blocks of the building in order to obtain the O. C. in respect of the said two blocks of the building which duly stand constructed. So prima facie I do not find any merit in this contention.
(10) It has been argued vehemently on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiff has not at all as yet constructed the hotel which was the dominant purpose for which the lease had been granted. As discussed above, it is quite clear that the pff. has a right to construct the building also for commercial purposes independent of the hotel block. If that is so, the question of there being any dominant purpose in the lease deed or not does not arise. The short question is whether the buildings already constructed in accordance with the building permit should be allowed to be occupied or not The bye-laws do not contemplate the construction of the whole of the project sanctioned before the O. C. is to be issued. As mentioned above, the bye-law 7.5.1 clearly contemplates issuance of part O. C. in respect of the part of the building. It is not the case of the deft. that the pff is not at all constructing the hotel project rather I am told at the Bar that the building of the hotel project is also now at some advance stage of construction. Be that as it may, the O. C. in respect of the two blocks cannot be refused on the ground that hotel project has not been completed by the plaintiff. [In paras 34 to 37 contention of Deft. that pff has not come to court with clean hands, as had produced some forged documents in W. P. and had not made their mention in the plaint is negatived].
(11) It has been urged by the learned counsel for the Dda that unless and until the plaintiff pays the amount of penalty imposed for the delayed construction, the plaintiff is not entitled to have the occupancy certificate. He has referred to Section 3 of the Govt. Grants Act in support of his contention that the terms provided in the lease deed which entitle the Dda to impose penalties for delayed construction arc statutory in nature and thus, the pff. is legally bound to pay the said penalty amount. The learned counsel for the pff. on the other hand, has urged that the question whether the pff. is liable to pay any penalty for late construction is foreign to the question of grant of O.C. in consonance with the provision of the Building By laws of the DDA. He has urged that there is no provision in the byelaws that before granting, any O.C. the Dda has to see whether there has been any compliance of the terms of the lease deed or not. In the alternate he has argued that the penalty imposed is totally arbitrary and not in consonance with the guidelines issued by the Dda and is also not in compliance with the orders made by the Lt. Governor from time to time. He has also argued that intact, the pff. has not been guilty of delay in raising the Construction inasmuch as it was the Dda who has been refusing to grant the sanction in respect of the plans submitted by the plaintiff and ultimately the plaintiff had to obtain the orders of the High Court pursuance to which the Dda had sanctioned the plans. So, he has mentioned that up to 5.12.83, there has been no delay attributable to the construction and after 1983, the plaintiff had submitted some revised plans which took time to be sanctioned and there came about a ban for raising any multi-store- yed building by the Central Govt. which remained in force from April 1985 to April- 1988 and thereafter the revised plans were sanctioned by the Dda and the pff. took into hand the construction of the building. So, he has argued that the pff. is not liable to pay any penalty amount whatsoever. I find much force in the contention being raised on behalf of the pff. in this regard. It is quite evident that the Dda was not inclined to sanction the plans as the Dda was insisting that only hotel project could be constructed on the plot in question and no plan which contemplates construction of any ordinary commercial blocks in addition to the hotel project could be sanctioned. I need not refer to the detailed facts which are enumerated in the judgment of the High Court already given between the parties referred to above and ultimately the pff. succeeded and the Dda had to sanction the plans which not only included the hotel project but also included separate ordinary commercial blocks. So, prima facie, I am of the view that no delay could be attributable to the pff. till the plans were sanctioned on 15.12.83. The pff. could be held responsible for delay occurring from 15.12.83 to April 1985 but from April 1985 to April 1988, again, prima facie, the delay could not be attributed to the pff. in construction of the building as due to ban being imposed on high rise buildings by the Central Govt. the Dda was unable to sanction the revised plans of the pff. So, it is clear that the pff. has a strong, prima facie, case in disputing the amount of the penalty being imposed by the Dda with regard to the delayed construction. Under the terms of the lease-deed the pff. was supposed to raise the construction within four years from the date of taking possession of the plot. Counsel for the Dda has argued that under the guidelines the pff. had only seven years period for completing the construction from the date the pff. took possession and the pff. has to pay penalty even though the delay might not be attributable to the pff. in raising the construction of the building. 1 am afraid that it is not possible to countenance such a broad contention being raised on behalf of the DDA. After all if the pff. has not been at all at fault it is not understandable how he could be held guilty of committing any breach of the terms of the lease deed and unless it can be said that the delay in construction of the building is attributable to the pff. question of imposing any penalty on the pff. cannot arse. Be that as it may, it is a question which requires evidence to be led in order to show as to for what period the pff. was guilty of delay in execution of the project.
(12) Counsel for the pff. has stated that the Court may in its discretion require the pff. to deposit with the Dda the reasonable amount of penalty, if any, subject to which the O.C. may be directed to be issued to the pff.
(13) Keeping in view the facts and cirmstances, I am of the view that the plaintiff should be required to deposit Rs. five lakhs as the tentative amount towards penalty with the Dda subject to adjustment in accordance with the final order which may be passed by this Court while deciding the case on merits subject to which the pff. would be entitled to have the O.C. from the DDA.
(14) The learned counsel for the Dda has vehemently opposed the grant of interim relief as prayed by the plaintiff urging that no interim mandatory injunction can be issued in order to bring about new fact situation and the interim mandatory injunction can be granted only to bring about the factual position which existed at the time of the filing of the suit. He has placed reliance on certain case law in support of his contention.
(15) On the other hand, the learned counsel for the pff. has argued that present is the Fittest case for exercising discretion for grant interim mandatory injunction prayed for it order to relieve the plaintiff from extermination hardship as the O.C. is being denied to the pff. by the Dda in flagrant violation of the law. He has also argued that even new fad situation could be allowed to be created in fit case by grant of interim mandatory injunction and he has also referred to certain Judgments in support of his contention.
(16) Reference has been made by the learned counsel for the defendants to Nandi Pictures vs. Art Pictures Air 1956 Cal. 42 which lays down that it is only in very cases that a mandatory injunction is granted on an interlocutory application and instance where such an injunction is granted by mean of an ad interim order pending the decision the application itself are almost unknown. was laid down that such an interim mandate injunction is granted only to restore the status quo and not granted to establish a new state of things, differing from the state which existed at the date when the suit was instituted. He has also referred to Univ. of Bihar vs . Rajendra Singh, : AIR1978Pat144 , which also reiterates the same proposition.
(17) Counsel for the pff. has, on the other hand, referred to Indian Cable vs . Smt. Sumitra Chakraborty, : AIR1985Cal248 , which lays down that if a court is called upon to grant any relief on any interlocutory application which when granted would mean granting substantially the relief claimed in the suit, the court will be very slow and circumspect in the matter of granting any such prayer. It was held that though exercise of such a discretion should be limited to rare and exceptional cases, still at the same time no court should think that in law there is any absolute bar to the court granting such a relief. It was held that in deserving cases, the court should not hesitate to come to aid of a litigant and uphold the cause of justice by granting such a relief. In the said case a tenant who was in peaceful enjoyment of the suit property, was thrown out forcibly from the tenanted premises without taking resort to Rent Act and also by use of the process of criminal court at a point of time when the tenancy was still subsisting in his favor. So, this was a case where even by grant of interim relief facts situation which did not exist at the time of the filing of the suit was brought into existence by the court with a view to uphold the cause of justice by granting interim relief. Next judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff is Mrs. Vijay Srivastava vs . M/s. Mirahul Enterprises, : AIR1988Delhi140 . In the said case, the plaintiff had paid more than 95% of the costs fixed in the agreements in respect of the flats. The pff. had also advanced interest free loan so that the construction of the flats could be completed by the deft. The pff. had instituted the suit seeking permanent injunction restraining the deft. from transferring and disposing of the flats and had moved interim application, inter alia, requiring the direction to the deft to hand over possession of the flats to the pff. The court held that it was a rare and exceptional case where the court should grant interim mandatory injunction requiring the deft. to hand over possession of the flats to the pff. The court, after referring to various judgments including the case of Nandan Pictures (supra) and Indian Cable Co. (supra), held that there is no bar to the courts granting interlocutory relief in the mandatory form though in doing so the courts should act with great circumspection and such powers can be exercised only in rare and exceptional cases and whether or not a case comes in the category of rare and exceptional one is to be adjudged according to the facts and circumstances surrounding it. In the said case also, the court by granting interim mandatory injunction had changed the facts situation which was not existing at the time of the fifing of the suit.
(18) Both counsels have referred to Dorab Cawasji vs.Coomi Sorab : [1990]1SCR332 . The Supreme Court while referring to the basic guidelines which govern the question of grant of interim injunction i.e. (i) the pff. has a strong case for trial, i.e. it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a perpetual injunction; (ii) it is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money; and (iii) the balance of convenience is in favor of the one seeking such a relief, it was laid down being essentially an equitable relief, the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light to facts and circumstances in each case. It was also made clear by the highest court that though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion. So, it cannot be now held that interim mandatory injunction can be granted only to restore the facts situation existing at the time of the filing of the suit. The Supreme Court held that the relief of interlocutory mandatory injunction is granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining, but since the granting of such 1991 RLR 404 an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm courts have evolved certain guidelines. So, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court it cannot be now held that interim mandatory injunction only can be granted to restore the facts situation existing at the time of the filing of the suit. It would depend on the facts of particular case in order to decide whether interim mandatory injunction should be granted or not keeping in view the aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court. In the present case pff. has a strong, prima facie, case in its favor. The balance of convenience obviously is in favor of the plaintiff as by such injunction the deft.-DDA is not likely to suffer any injury whatsoever whereas denial of the grant of such injunction is bound to cause irreparable loss & injury to the piff. as the said two blocks constructed at a considerable cost would remain unutilised and unoccupied for a long period till the trial is completed whereas if they are allowed to be occupied during the pendency of the suit even though the purchasers of the different flats in the said two blocks may come to occupy the said premises, no loss is likely to occur to the Dda of any kind. In case ultimately the Dda, in the event of cancelling the lease of the plaintiff for any alleged breach of conditions of the lease, gets back the properties duly constructed in accordance with law it is not likely to lose monetarily or in any manner by such occupation of the building by third persons. The above guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, in my view, clearly apply to the facts of the present casein favor of pff. and I find that it is one of the rare and exceptional cases where the court should exercise its judicial discretion in granting interim mandatory injunction in favor of pff. It is to be also highlighted that not only Chairman of the Dda in its repeated note directed the Dda to grant the O.C. in respect of these two blocks but the present Chairman of the Dda had also passed order in the file for delinking the question of recovering the penalty for delayed construction from the question of grant ofO. C. and the Dda had prepared the O. C. and made it ready for delivery but later on, the Chairman of the Dda changed his view and made the issuance of O.C. conditional on pff. depositing the penalty amount It is true that the orders made by the Chairman of the Dda in the file do not come into force till they are communicated but while exercising the judicial discretion the court can certainly consider those'orders made in the files of the DDA. [In para 46, it is noted that question of deemed sanction docs nat arise]
(19) The defendants have moved the application for grant of injunction restraining the plaintiff from giving possession of the different flats in the said two blocks to any person till the pff is able to obtain the O.C. Here giving of the possession to the purchasers of the flats does not violate any of the provisions of the Bylaws of the DDA. The building cannot be occupied without the grant of O. C. and in the present case the pff has pleaded that no part of the building has been occupied by any per- son and only possession has been given to some of the purchasers of the flats. As this Court is to grant now relief to the pff. requiring the Dda to issue the O. C. in respect of the said two blocks, the pff. is directed not to allow the building to be occupied by any one till the pff. obtains the O. C. in accordance with this order.
(20) I, hence, dismiss the applications of the defts seeking rejection of the plaint and allow the applications of the pff. and grant the inter- im mandatory injunction.