Judgment:
H.C. Goel, J.
(1) This is an appeal by Shri Bine Chand Jain, appellant, against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal affirming the order of the Additional Rent Controller by which he dismissed the application of the appellant under O.1 R. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure with the prayer that he may be allowed to be joined as one of the respondents in the eviction petition as filed by Keshav Chandel; Chadha, respondent No. I, against RC. Jain and others, respondents 2 to 7-lRespondent No. I had filed a petition for eviction of respondents 2 to 7 from the demised premises on the ground of non-payment of rent/ personal bona fide requirement and on the ground that respondents 2 to 7 had acquired vacant possession of a suitable alternate accommodation The case of respondent NoJ is that the premises had been let out to Chetan Lal Jain, predecessor-in-interest of respondents 2 to 71 some time in the year 1955. Chetan Lal Jain died in April, 1977 and/ on his death respondents No.2to7 became the tenants-in-common by operation of law . A written statement purporting to have been filed on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 was filed before the Additional Rent Controller wherein they purportedly contested the eviction petition and long thereafter the/appellant moved an application under O. 1 R.10 of the. Code of Civil Procedure for his being imp leaded as a party to the eviction petition/ Respondent No. 1 landlord contested this application No reply to the application was filed on behalf of respondents No. 2 10117. Respondents No. 2 to 7 have not participated in eviction proceedings subsequently. The appellant in his application has alleged that the premises had been let out by respondent No. I to him and to shri Chetan Lal Jain as joint tenants in the very beginning. It is furthers stated in the application that after the death of Chetan Lal Jain in the year 1977, respondent No. I, landlord, visited the appellant and agreed to transfer the tenancy rights in respect of the said premises in favor of the appellant solely on the consideration that the appellant agrees to enhance the rent to 'Rs. 300/ per month as against the earlier rate of Rs. 225/ per month which was agreed to by the appellant. It was also stated in the last para of the application, namely para 13, that Chetan Lal Jain and the appellant were joint tenants in respect of the suit premises and on the death of Chetan Lal Jain the tenancy rights survived to the appellant alone and respondents No. 2 to 7 had nothing to do with the suit premises after the death of .Chetan Lal Jain. It is stated in the application that the appellant as such has become the sole tenant of the suit premises after the death of Chetan Lal Jain to the exclusion of respondents No. 2 to 7 and as such he should be allowed to defend the eviction petition as filed by respondent No. 1 129 against respondents 2 to 7 by his being imp leaded as a party to the eviction petition. Respondent No. I in his reply controverter the said allegations of the appellant.
(2) The appellant as also respondent No. 1, landlord, filed some documents on the record in support of their respective claims on the question as to whether the appellant was a joint tenant with Chetan Lal Jain and/or was accepted by respondent No. 1 as his sole tenant in the suit premises after the death of Chetan Dass Jain. The Additional Rent Controller, as also the Rent Control Tribunal, have taken note of the material as produced on the record by the two sides and of the facts and circumstances of the case as appearing on the record. The Additional Rent Controller in his order observed that the documents produced by respondent No. 1 prima facie showed that Chetan Lal Jain was the sole tenant of the demised premises and that after his death respondents No. 2 to 7 became the tenants in common in the premises and that the appellant does not appear to be a co-tenant in the premises Along with Chetan Lal Jain. It was observed by him that the mere fact that the appellant may have been in possession of the demised premises as a brother of Chetan Lal Jain did not go to show that he was a joint tenant with Chetan Lal Jain, On this view of the matter the Additional Rent Controller dismissed the application of the appellant holding that the same was not a bona fide application. The Rent Control Tribunal took the view that respondent No. 1, landlord, who is the dominus lIT is to the eviction proceedings, could not be forced to implead the appellant as a party to the eviction proceedings against his wishes and further that if the appellant was to assert his independent right to remain in the premises, he can do that by filing objections under S. 25 of the Delhi Rent Control Act in the execution proceedings, but he was not entitled to be imp leaded as a party in the eviction petition against the wishes of respondent No. 1.
(3) Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that for a proper and effectual decision of the alleged rights of the appellant it was proper, rather necessary, that the appellant was allowed to be joined as a party to the eviction petition. He submitted that in case the appellant is not allowed to be joined as a party to the eviction petition it may so happen that respondent No. 1 may secure the eviction of the appellant from the demised premises in the execution of the order of ejectment that he may obtain against respondents No. 2 to 7 causing great damage and hardship to the appellant in which case the appellant may only be left with the remedy of seeking restoration of his possession by taking appropriate proceedings in that behalf including filing of objections under S 25 of the Act. It was submitted that thus the proper thing that out to have been done by the authorities below was to have allowed the application of the appellant.
(4) After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and on being taken through the record of the case I am inclined to agree with the view taken by the Rent Control Tribunal. Respondent No. I is the dominus lIT is to the eviction proceedings as initiated by him by filing the eviction petition. The question for determination in the eviction petition is as to whether Chetan Lal Jain was the sole tenant of respondent No- I qua the premises in question. This matter can effectually and completely be adjudicated upon by the Rent Controller without the appellant being joined as a party to the eviction petition. In that sense 0. 1 R. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not attracted to the case of the appellant. It is not a case in which the appellant claims to have derived his right to remain in possession through Chetan Lal Jain. He is asserting his right to remain in possession and to contest the eviction petition in his independent right as a co-tenant with Chetan Lal Jain and after his death as a sole tenant of the premises. The appellant may seek his remedy by filing objections under S. 25 of the Act if any such eventuality arises. The fact that he may be in a more advantageous position by now being imp leaded as a co-respondent with respondents No. 2 to 7 is by itself no ground on which the appellant may be considered to be entitled to be imp leaded as a party to the eviction petition.
(5) Appeal from all this there are facts and circumstances borne out on the record from which it appears that the application is not a bona fide one and has been filed with a view to cause delay in the disposal of the eviction petition and to cause vexation therein.
(6) The first thing to note is that the appellant has in fact taken some what contrary stands in his application as regards his alleged right to remain in possession of the premises as a sole tenant. The averments of appellant in paras I to 9 the application are to the effect that the appellant was a joint tenant along with Chetan Lal Jain. In para 10 of the application the appellant has stated that on the death of Chetan Lal Jain the petitioner i.e. respondent No. I contacted the appellant and agreed to transfer the tenancy rights in respect of the said premises in favor of the appellant solely on consideration of the appellant having agreed to pay enhanced rent at the rate of Rs. 300.00 per month as against the earlier agreed rate of rent of Rs. 225.00 per month. This averment impliedly means that the tenancy rights of Chetan Lal Jain had passed on to his heirs besides the appellant being a co-tenant in the premises, but that respondent No. I agreed to do away with the rights of respondent Nos. 2 to 7 in the premises and accepted the appellant as the sole tenant therein. This version of the appellant is no the face of not tenable as in case respondents Nos. 2 to 7 succeeded to the tenancy rights of Chetan Lal Jain respondent No. I was not empowered to put an end to their right and he could not constitute the appellant as the sole tenant of the premises. Then in para 13 of the application it has been stated that on the death of Chetan Lal Jain the tenancy rights survived to the appellant exclusively. This averment is thus in conflict with the aforesaid averment as made in para 8 of the application, inasmuch as if the appellant automatically became the sole tenant on the death of Chetan Lal Jain by survivorship, then where was the question of the appellant having been constituted as the sole tenant on respondent No. l's agreeing to that on consideration of the appellant's enhancing the monthly rent. It may also be stated here that so far as the plea of the appellant having become the sole tenant on the death of his co-tenant Chetan Lal Jain is sought to be taken it is a settled law that when two persons take any premises on lease in common with each other their status in the eye of law is that of tenants in common and they may be called as joint tenants in common parlance only. The rights of such tenants are not personal rights but they are heritable rights. On the death of either of such persons his rights are succeeded by his legal heirs and they do not devolve on the surviving tenant by survivorship. By saying sol may not be deemed to have expressed any final opinion in this regard. In support of my above said view that the application has been filed wrongly with the object of causing delay in the disposal of the eviction petition and to cause vexation therein. The next important thing to note is that the order sheet entry dated May 3,1982 purports to bear the signatures of Shri B.C. Jain in token 131 of his being preset before the link Additional Rent Controller on that day as the Presiding Officer in whose court the case was pending was on leave on that day. The order sheet dated November 2,1982 specifically records the presence of Shri B.C. Jain appellant on behalf of respondent i.e. respondent Nos. 2 to 7 herein. I was also referred to an application filed by respondent No. 2 before the Additional Rent Controller on March 11,1986. In this application respondent No. 2 stated that Bine Chand Jain, appellant, who is the real brother of her husband once took a vakalatnama from her for being filed in the case for contesting the same, but that thereafter she has not known anything as to what had happened to the case. She further stated that it was wholly wrong that she bad colluded with respondent No. 1 as was alleged in the application under 0. I, R. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure as filed by the appellant. She also cancelled the power of attorney given by her in favor of Shri S.K. Tiwari, Advocate by this very application. From all this it certainly appears that the appellant was in the know of the pendency of the eviction from its early stage, but did not take any step to be imp leaded as a party for a considerable long period and filed the application under 0. I R. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure at a very late stage. Thus having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above I am of the view that the authorities below were right in dismissing the application. There is thus no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.