S.N. Kapoor, J.
1. Heard.
2. Grievance of the appellant is that the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (in short the 'Tribunal') has applied multiplier of 25 years, despite the fact that father of the deceased died during the pendency of the claim petition.
3. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that brothers of the deceased could not be said to be dependent on him. thereforee, the amount of the award is on a higher side.
4. First the facts in brief. In an unfortunate accident one Prakash Chand aged 21 years suffered fatal injuries on 9th January, 1982 at 12:30 PM. He was going on his cycle. The accident took place near the bus stand at Africa Avenue Road. Om Prakash, who was driving the bus bearing registration No. DLP-6006. He suddenly started the bus without giving any horn, signal or without looking at the right side of the road. Prakash Chand was going on his correct side. He received injuries, fell down and died later on in AIIMS. Father of the deceased and his brothers filed the claim petition. The deceased Prakash Chand was 21 years of age and was serving in UPSC and earning Rs. 700/- per month. They claimed compensation @ Rs. 1,50,000/-. During the pendency of the case Chinta Mani, father of the deceased, died.
5. Respondent No. 2 K.K. Chaddha, filed written statement and admitted the accident but denied negligence on the part of the driver. The respondent-Insurance Company has pleaded limited statutory liability.
6. The learned Tribunal held the driver Om Prakash rash and negligent in driving the bus and holding him responsible for the accident, fatal injuries and ultimate death. It was also held on the basis of Gujarat State Road Transport v. Raman Bai, 1987 ACJ 561 that the expression legal representatives under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act should be taken in a wide meaning and should not be confined to spouse, children and parents of the deceased. Accordingly, the claimants were held to be entitled to claim compensation. On the quantum of compensation on the basis of evidence led the learned Tribunal took the income of the deceased as Rs. 500/- per month; applied 25 years' multiplier and awarded compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/-.
7. Grievance of the appellant is three-fold: firstly, brothers are not entitled to claim any compensation; secondly, 25 years' multiplier could not have been applied; and thirdly, supposing for the sake of arguments this Court is not inclined to accept that the appeal would lie in view of the judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi & Ors., (2002) ACC 292, even then if the matter is required to be considered in view of the application of 25 years' multiplier, to do substantial justice.
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant, I propose to take up first the question of maintainability of the appeal itself. It is evident that the Insurance Company is not entitled to file any appeal unless and until the provisions of Section 110-C (2-A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are not complied with. This provision read as under:-
'110-C. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.-
(1) xxx(2) xxx[(2-A) Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that--
(i) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or
(ii) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be imp leaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so imp leaded shall thereupon have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made].'
9. It is contended that neither the condition about collusion had been fulfilled nor the permission of the learned Tribunal had been obtained, and as such, the appellants are not entitled to contest the matter on merits. This very question was considered in the judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi & Ors. (supra) in para 26 of the judgment. The Supreme Court referred to the observations made in judgment in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan and Ors., : [1987]2SCR752 as under:-
'In other words, the Legislature has insisted and make it incumbent on the user of a motor vehicle to be armed with an insurance policy covering third party risks which is in conformity with the provisions enacted by the Legislature. It is so provided in order to ensure that the injured victims of automobile accidents or the dependents of the victims of fatal accidents are really compensated in terms of money and not in terms of promise. Such a benign provision enacted by the Legislature having regard to the fact that in the modern age the use of motor vehicles notwithstanding the attendant hazards, has become an inescapable fact of life, has to be interpreted in a meaningful manner which serves rather than defeats the purpose of the legislation. The provision, has thereforee, to be interpreted in the light of the aforesaid perspective.'
10. The Supreme Court after noting the aforesaid observations have quoted it with approval and made the following observations in paras 27 and 28 of the judgment:-
'27. We have noticed the legislative development in regard to third party rights in England and found that the object of those legislations was to protect the interest of third party rights. The 1939 Act as well as 1988 Act both were enacted on pattern of English statute with the object to relive the distress and miseries of victims of accidents and reduce the profitability of the insured in regard to occupational hazard undertaken by them by way of business activities and not to promote business interests of Insurance Companies even though they may be nationalised companies.
28. For the aforesaid reasons, as well as the learned Judges in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra), have failed to notice the limited grounds available to an insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act, we are of the view that the decision in United Insurance Co. (supra), does not lay down the correct view of law.'
11. It is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the matter should be considered by this Court in it as a petition and not as an appeal to do substantial justice in between the parties, for what the law prohibits, I do not think, any Court is supposed to consider that aspect by resorting to the provisions of Article 226 or 227. Consequently, the appeal is not maintainable.
12. As regards the brothers being treated as legal representatives, learned counsel for the appellant may be justified in making the submission that in terms of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act brothers are not class I heirs of the deceased. But two views are possible . The view taken by the learned Tribunal is based on a trend in judgments of the Supreme Court and several High Courts taking into consideration the society in which we are living. In this case one may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahemedabad vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and another, : [1987]3SCR404 . The Supreme Court has held in Para 13 as under:-
'13. Before concluding we may add that although the Act was extensively modified after the receipt of the report of the Law Commission, Parliament did not choose to amend S.110-A of the Act by defining the expression `legal representatives' in relation to claims under Chapter VIII of the Act as `the spouse, parent and children of the deceased' as recommended by the Law Commission. The Law Commission had observed in its 85th report that it would be appropriate to assign to the expression `legal representatives' the same meaning as had been given to the expression `representative' for the purposes of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and that would effectively carry out the purpose of social justice underlying Chapter VIII of the Act, to which the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was the nearest approximation. This recommendation was made after referring to the divergent views expressed by the various High Courts on the meaning of the expression `legal representatives' in S. 110-A of the Act. The fact that Parliament declined to take any action on the recommendation of the Law Commission of India suggests that Parliament intended that the expression `legal representative' S. 110-A of the Act should be given a wider meaning and it should not be confined o the spouse, parent and children of the deceased.'
13. Ours is not an individualistic society where elder brother is not supposed to take care of younger brother. This being a beneficial legislation if it has been interpreted in this way, I would not say that it is wrong. It would be a wrong approach despite the fact that I may be of the opinion that in strict sense they are not legal representatives. They may not be legally entitled to maintenance also, but one has to see the moral, ethical and social dependency. The deceased was 21 years of age. He would have helped his father and his younger brothers also at least so long as he was not married to a great extent and after marriage it could be to a limited extent.
14. As regards the third contention of applying 25 years multiplier, few things have to be taken note of. The deceased was 21 years of age. His income might have gone up several times by now. The learned Tribunal has not taken into consideration the future prospects of the deceased. If the future prospects were considered and income of the deceased was doubled to Rs. 1,400/- per month, even after deducting 1/3rd amount, father and brothers of the deceased would be entitled to claim Rs. 933,33/-. There is no doubt that the father died during the pendency of the claim petition but his younger brothers are alive. But in case this dependency of Rs. 933.33/- per month is calculated, and since according to the Second Schedule 17 years multiplier could have been applied, the amount would come to Rs. 1,90,399.32/-. In case minimum wages are considered at the time when the accident took place, the amount might have been much more. Since only Rs. 1,50,000/- have been awarded as compensation, it is on lower side and not on higher side.
15. In the aforementioned circumstances, I do not think that this Court is supposed to interfere with the impugned award. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.