Santosh Duggal, J.
(1) The appellant herein was defendant in the suit (S. No. 108(80), instituted by the respondent in respect to a plot of land bearing No. E-2, Bali Nagar, New Delhi, which was alleged to have been let out to him under an agreement dated 22nd May, 1971 initially for a period of 11 months and extended from time to tims up to 22nd February, 1976. The suit was for recovery of possession on the plea that she tenancy of the defendant (appellant herein), had come to an end by efflux of time, having nut been renewed after 22nd of February, 1976 but nevertheless as a measure of abundant caution, the plaintiff also served a notice of termination of tenancy on the defendant with effect from 22nd March, 1977, by means of notice dated 28th February, 1977 duly served upon him, and that since the defendant had refused to surrender possession despite this notice, the suit was necessitated.
(2) The suit was contested on a number of pleas, including denial of status of the plaintiff as landlord, and also assailing the enforceability of the lease deed on the ground that it was in the name of plaintiff's father who was dead at the time the lease deed was executed and consequently no legal document could be said to have come into existence. The main defense, however, was that the subject matter of the suit was not a plot of land, but 'premises' within the meaning of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and as such, civil suit for recovery of possession was not maintainable, and the same was barred under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. The legality and validity of the notice of termination of tenancy was also questioned.
(3) The trial court upheld the plea of the tenant as to the nature of the property which was subject matter of the rent note dated 22nd May, 1971 and held it to be 'premises' as contended by him, and accordingly recorded the finding that jurisdiction of the civil court was barred, and thus dismissed suit of the plaintiff.
(4) On appeal being filed by the landlord, the finding on issues No. 4, 5 and 7, which covered the contention as to the nature of the premises as also the jurisdiction of the civil court, was reversed and the suit for possession decreed ; directing the defendant to deliver vacant possession of the plot to the plaintiff after removing the super structures existing on the land, which were found to have been put up by the tenant, after taking the property on rent.
(5) The appellant has assailed the finding of the first appellate court recorded by means of judgment dated 17th January, 1983 primarily in respect to issues No. 4, 5 and 7. Other contentions raised in. the suit have also been reiterated; which would be noticed subsequently.
(6) The main contention, as pressed during the hearing, is in respect of the portion of the judgment, whereby the trial court's finding on the real nature of the property which was subject matter of the tenancy, and which in turn affected the jurisdiction of the civil court was reversed. The three pertinent issues are reproduced below for proper appreciation of the controversy:
4.Whether the suit premises was a vacant plot of land as alleged by the plaintiff OPP
5,Whether the suit premises was a premises and super structure as alleged in para 5 of the preliminary objection of the W.S. existed at the time of the let out OPD
7,Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try the suit OPD
(7) The main thrust of Mr. Malik's arguments, appearing on behalf of the appellant, was on the recitals in the rent note itself, which has been proved on record of this case by certified copy Ex.PW/1; the original having been filed in another suit between the parties, for recovery of arrears of rent. Shri Malik endeavored to show, by referring to various clauses of this rent note dated 22nd May, 1971, that the property which was let out was in fact 'premises' and that the parties understood it to be so and that 'premises' connoted existence of structures, and could never mean vacant land, and thus the demised property fell within the definition of 'premises' as contained in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and that in view of the provisions of section 50 of the said Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred and the trial court had rightly dismissed the suit.
(8) Shri Malik contended that the first appellate court had to appreciate the real content of this rent note and the question being of construction of a document, whereupon rights of the parties are based, has to be constructed as a question of law, which the second court of appeal can certainly look into. The learned counsel pleaded, thereforee, that he could seek from, this court, in this regular second appeal, an interpretation of the deed of rent dated 22nd May, 1971 and cited Sir Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and ., : AIR1962SC1314 in support of his plea that construction of a document of title or of a document which is the foundation of the rights of the parties, necessarily raises a question of law. He argued that since the rights of the parties in this case flow from this rent note; the question can. certainly be mooted as to what was the real subject matter of this document. He made reference to another Judgment of the Supreme Court in Jadu Gopal Chakravarty, (dead) after him his legal representatives vs. Pannalal Bhowmick and others, : [1978]3SCR855 , holding that construction of basic documents, which go to the root of the matter, is a question of law, According to him, the entire controversy is concentrated on the question as to what was the subject matter of letting by means of this rent note dated 22nd May, 1971 and there being a reversal of finding of the trial court on this issue by the first appellate court, this court has to go into this question in this appeal.
(9) Mr. Malik then proceeded to point out various clauses of rent note Ex. Public Witness 1/1 where at places the demised property is described as 'premises'. He contended that in spite of the fact that initially the property was described as a vacant plot is the opening recital; subsequently when it came to material terms and clauses, the description is given as 'premises', and that this reflects the actual position which existed at the time of letting, namely, there were super structures on the plot, which converted the nature of the property into 'premises'. Within the. meaning of Delhi Rent Control Act.
(10) He further contended that the real question before the court was as to what was the character of the property at the time of inception of tenancy and that the oral evidence led by the appellant, as defendant, by examining himself on oath as well as the property agent through whom the deal was finalised, has to be taken into consideration and that the terms of the lease deed coupled with the oral evidence led to a positive finding that the rented property was 'premises', as governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act. He cited certain judgments of the Supreme Court to fortify his plea that the provisions of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act could not be a bar to the admissibility of oral evidence in this regard, and that evidence which could even 'have the effect of varying the terms of the document, can be taken into consideration in given cases. One such judgment relied upon by him is Smt. Krishnabai Ganpatrao Deshmukh v. Appasaheb Tuliaramrao Nimbalkar and others Air 1979 S.C. 1880(3).
(11) Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Advocate appearing for the respondent countered the pleas advanced by Mr. Malik and contended that the document, namely, the rent note was unambiguous in its terms and on a reading thereof, no inference is possible, other than the fact that only a vacant plot of land was let out; granting liberty to the tenant to put up any temporary structure for the purpose of his proposed business, namely, repair work for all types of cars and vehicles. He pointed out that what was being considered were terms of the documents, in the sense that the whole dispute rested on the fact, as to what was let by means of this rent note. and that there is a complete bar in considering any oral evidence which has the effect of varying terms of this document. He urged that even the Supreme Court judgment in Smt. Krishnabai Ganpatrao Deshmukh (supra) recognises this limitation as laid down by section 92 of the Evidence Act and all that has been said in this case is that this provision prohibits only the varying of terms of documents, not a memorandum or recitals of facts, bereft of dispositive terms; particularly when the correctness of whole or part of the recital is in question. He pointed out that the clear dictum is that evidence can be considered in respect of recital of facts or memorandum in a document but not touching on the dispositive terms of the document. The learned counsel argued that as to what is the subject matter of tenancy, certainly constitutes this 'dispositive term' of a document, and thus any evidence to vary or contradict the terms thereof, has to be excluded, even if the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel is taken into consideration.
(12) Mr. Bawa then read out the material terms of the rent note, and contended that the property has been described as a 'plot' in the opening paragraph, and also in the paragraph regarding delivery of possession to the tenant under this rent note. as also while setting out the measurements of the demised property. He further pointed out that it is to be borne in mind that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were present when this document was typed out because it is the admitted case of the parties that the property agent Shri Madan Mohan Bhalla had by himself got it typed and then gave it to the parties to put their signatures and that in fact the landlord signed it on 23rd May, 1971, as revealed from the document, and thus it cannot be pleaded by the tenant by any stretch of reasoning that the use of the expression 'premises' was intentional or deliberate, so as to imply the existence of super structures, on the plot at the time of letting. He submitted that had it been so, detailed description of the property, would also have been recorded such as boundary wall or gate or any other structure, as now contended by the appellant.
(13) On a careful consideration of the respective contentions canvassed by the; learned counsel on both sides I find it to be a case where the appellant herein has raised a false and dishonest defense, as to the nature of the property, and that was apparently motivated by the fact that a. suit had been brought. after service: of notice on the tenant, for possession in a civil court, and there being no other defense open, to a suit for possession, the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act were invoked, by taking this plea as to the nature of the tenanted property. I say so, because the demised property is a plot of land, measuring 300 sq. yd., commercial in nature, where admittedly the appellant has set up a regular service station by putting up super structure of different types, and his reluctance to part with the property on rent with him for a modest amount of Rs. 300 p.m. is understandable.
(14) The fact that the defense is unsustainable is clear on a cumulative reading of the terms of the rent note. The opening recital, containing description of the property, refers to it as ft vacant plot. Then follow the terms and conditions of the tenancy. The first clause lays down the terms as to the regular payment of rent by stipulated date. The next clause reads as Under :
'2.That the said premises have been taken on rent for the commercial (all types of cars and vehicles repairings)'.
(15) Clause 5, however, which refers to the physical delivery of the tenant, also refers to the property as plot,, representing the number as well as the measurement. The description as 'premises' is in other two clauses where right is granted to the appellant to put up temporary additional alternations and then in clause 6 the recital is that the tenant shall deliver vacant possession of the tenanted 'premises' without any objection. It is thus, clear that in half. of clauses the property has been described as a plot, and in the other half of the clauses, the reference is as 'said premises' or tenanted premises. The document thus cannot be said to be unambiguous in its terms, so as not to involve any question of interpretation. To that extent, Mr. Malik is right in contending that it is a case. where construction and interpretation of the document is called for, and that this court even in second appeal can do so, considering the fact that it is a basic document, from which rights of the parties emanate.
(16) However, that interpretation can be given, on a reading of the document itself, and to my mind reference to the provisions of section 92 of the Evidence Act was misplaced, as no oral agreement or statement which may have the effect of varying the terms of this document is being set up and thus the provisions of section 92 of the Evidence Act do not come into play either way. All that is sought to be established by the appellant is that the property let out to him was 'premises' governed by the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, and suit or simple possession could not be filed in a civil court. The fact that whether he is right in so contending has to be determined from a reading of the rent note itself, because the evidence which has been adduced in the nature of statement of the appellant, as defendant, and that of the property agent as DW2 is only on a question of fact as to the situation existing at the time of inception of tenancy, and there is no reference to any other supplementary or ancillary agreement. I, thereforee, proceed to determine this question on the construction of the document itself, and interpretation of the terms used therein.
(17) The property is referred to as a plot in the rent note where the description, the measurement and factum of delivery of possession to the tenant are recorded. There is no recital in existence of any boundary wall, gate or any other temporary structure. Whenever there is reference to the property as 'premises', it is as 'said premises' or 'tenanted premises' .
(18) It is pertinent to note that the term 'premises' as contained in section 2(i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act means:
'ANY building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose, and includes.....................'
(19) The Act, however, does not define the term 'building' or part of a building'. The ordinary dictionary meaning of this term is 'a structure on a land of any type'. The term 'building' has been defined in the New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language as : .
'Astructure, usually with a roof and four walls, generally intended for use as a working or dwelling place'.
(20) It is thus clear that the property in order to be 'premises' within the contemplation of Delhi Rent Control Act has to be in the nature of a roofed structure, or containing such structures thereon. Any property which is described as a vacant plot simpliciter, in the document witnessing the transaction, cannot, in the absence of any internal evidence furnished by the said document, to the contrary, be regarded as a building.
(21) The rent note in question does not, at all, contain any recital that there was any existing structure on the plot at the time of letting. There is also no suggestion that such a description was kept back with any ulterior motive or oblique intention. The landlord appears to be a person not very much conversant with the legal intricacies, so much so that even when his father was dead, at the time this property was let out; he let his name typed as landlord and signed for him. The appellant tried to take advantage even of this innocent error by setting up a plea, that the rent note was not a legally enforceable document being in favor of a dead person, and that the plaintiff was not landlord qua him. The fact that this description in deceased father's name was incorporated, in the opening clause as well as the description of the landlord, and the plaintiff simply signed it as for the recorded owner, namely, his deceased father Bakshi Gopal Chand, leads to the unmistakable inference, that he is not a person who is conscious of legal implications of expressions used, or recited in a document.
(22) Consequently, the fact that in certain clauses the expression 'premises' was got typed by the property agent, cannot be allowed to give rise to an inference that it was deliberately used in recognition of the fact that there were certain structures on the property. Such a plea cannot be entertained in the absence of any reference to any such structure in the rent note itself.
(23) It is also in evidence that inspire of the fact that the defendant has temporarily put up structures on the plot and has expanded his business to that of a regular motor workshop whereas he had taken the plot for simply repair of cars and other vehicles; the appellant was never asked for increase of rent.
(24) The inference that the place taken up by the appellant as to the nature of the property is deliberately false, can also be drawn from the fact that whereas in his evidence in court, both he As well as the property dealer say that there was a boundary wall with gate in it, as well as a 'kacha' room; in the written statement the only reference is to that of a 'kacha' room, having been there at the time of letting out. There is absolutely no reference to any boundary wall anywhere in the written states ment. In the reply sent by him through counsel to the notice given by the respondent for termination of the tenancy (Ex. Pw 112) he does not, at all, allege the existence of any structure on the property. It is asserted, on the other hand, in this reply that at the time of letting out of the plot there were pits in the land, about 10 deep and that the plot was made usable by the tenant by spending about Rs. 50001- and he also raised the boundary wall to the height of 10' and also constructed workshop and started working as servicing station involving an expenditure, in all, to the tune of Rs. 45,000.00 . There was no whisper of a suggestion in this reply that there was any existing structure on the plot. Rather the description given suggests that it was an uneven plot, and the tenant had to spend a huge amount in making it unable and had also raised structures of the nature of a workshop and a service station. The reference is, throughout in this reply, to the property as 'said plot'.
(25) It is thus clear that the appellant has been trying to change his position, and improve the same at every stage ever since the landlord took steps to have possession of the property back, and whereas in reply to the notice the only contention raised was that he had spent huge amounts in improving the plot and putting up some structures thereon; in the written statement a 'kacha' room, was asserted without any reference to the boundary wall, or gate therein, but in the evidence given in court, boundary wall was also added. It is also to be noticed that although reply Ex. Public Witness 1/7 has been proved by Shri Chander Bhan Arya, Advocate, to have been given under instructions of the appellant, sent through a mechanic from his workshop, when examined as a witness in court; the appellant denied even receipt of the notice in evidence. Mr. Bawa has rightly pointed out that this denial was for the reason that in the reply there is no assertion about the existence of any super structures at the time of the tenancy, or about the property being in the nature of 'premises', as defined by the Delhi Rent Control Act and as now asserted.
(26) Having regard to these inherent inconsistencies in appellant's stand, it is not possible to attach any credence to his oral evidence, and that of his solitary witness. The fact that this man, namely, Madan Mohan Bhalla is not a person of any standing in his property agent's business is apparent from his admission that he is having no regular place of business. There was even a suggestion, that he had been transacting business from the place where the appellant had his workshop. This suggestion was no doubt denied but the fact remains that this person has become available to the appellant, to say whatever he wished by way of his defense. As a property agent, it was his duty to have incorporated the factual position in the document itself. He does not explain as to why, if there was any super structures on the clot; he did not get that mentioned in the rent note. The only inference is that there was none. There is also evidence on record that this man has no scruples and he can even go to the extent of giving his name differently; because although he has signed the rent note as Madan Mohan Bhalla, simply because the landlord I plaintiff in the witness box referred to him as Madan Lal, he came in the witness box and without hesitation gave his name as Madan Lal, without explaining as to why he had witnessed the rent note as Madan Mohan Bhalla. I, thereforee, do not find him to be a person worthy of reliance, so as to lend sustenance to the defense case that the tenanted property was not a 'plot' at the time of letting.
(27) The stand taken by the appellant is also falsified by another piece of evidence which lies been brought on record, namely, notice served by the Delhi Municipal Corporation. under section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, giving notice of enhancement of the property tax for the assessment year 1971-72. The notice has been placed on record in defendant's evidence as Ex. D-4 and the reason for enhancement is given as 'new construction'. The said new construction has been described as repairing-cum-service in the nature of one room 9' X 10', one temporary shed 30' X 10', tarpaulin roof compound and boundary wall. This is based on a survey conducted on 1st September, 1971. This document is a clinching proof of the fact that tinshed with tarpaulin roof was also noted, as a new construction in the survey, along with other room. The position stated by the appellant in his written. statement that there was a 'kacha' room in the nature of shed with a 'tarpaulin' roof at the time of letting, is thus belied. The only person who could throw light on this subject as to on what basis the structure had been considered as new, was the Inspector who conducted the survey, and although the onus of proving this fact as to whether the property was in the nature of 'premises', namely, with buildings at the time of letting, was on the appellant, as defendant, he has not taken any steps to prove the fact by best possible evidence, of the surveyor who recorded inspection note of 1st September, 1971.
(28) According to the frame of the issues, all that the plaintiff had to show was that the property was a vacant plot of land, and this he has been able to show from the recital in the rent note. which described the property in all material clauses as 'vacant plot'. The defendant in order to show that the property constituted 'premises', has chosen to place on record municipal record, . which on the face of the documents shows that structure, with reference to which the notice for enhancement of property tax was given, were new as on 1st September, 1971. i.e. after the date of tenancy. The best evidence was the municipal record and the survey report, which the defendant has failed even to summon. The presumption has to be drawn against him that had such evidence been summoned, it would have gone adverse to his case.
(29) On a cumulative consideration of these facts, namely; the basic description of the property being 'vacant plot' and there being no incorporation of any type of recital about the existence of any structures, coupled with the fact that there is a clause that the tenant was to restore vacant possession of the property; the only inference that commends itself is that the property was a vacant plot, and whatever structures existed at the time of institution of the suit, they were put up subsequently by the tenant, as per the permission granted to him under the terms of the lease.
(30) In this setting, the only significance that could be accorded to the expression 'premises' as used in the rent note, is the meaning assigned to this term: in English as well as in legal terminology, namely, in the sense of: what precedes in the given document. It is pertinent to note that the description in all the three different clauses of the rent note is 'said premises' of 'tenanted premises'. This expression occurs after describing the property as 'vacant plot'.
(31) The only construction which is possible to this expression is that the term 'said premises' had been employed in the ordinary Sense of : foregoing or preceding recital of a document. This is the meaning assigned to the term 'premises' in Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, Volume 4, where it is recorded at page 325 that one of the meanings of the term: 'premises' is 'things before mentioned'. It is elucidated as under:
'THE word 'premises', although in popular language it is applied to buildings, in legal language means, the subject or thing previously expressed.'
It records farther:
'AS stated in Sheppard's Touchstone, 7th cd. p. 74... .................the word 'premises' may some tunes mean all; the foreparts of the deed antecedent to the habendum. that is, the premises or preceding parts of the deed..............................Or it may mean the thing demised or granted by the deed. The meaning of the word must depend on the language actually employed in the deed and the relevant context'.
(32) Same meaning has been assigned to the term 'premises' in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary at page 1998 where it is recorded that 'the word 'premises' infact signifies what has gone before (Beacon Assurance v. Gibb, 1 Moo P.C.N.S. 73); and thereforee may with propriety be used in relation to any preceding subject or subjects.'
(33) In this view of the matter, the only meaning that can be ascribed to the expression 'said premises' as used in the rent note Ex. Public Witness 1/1 is that it is referable to the earlier description of the demised property as vacant plot and it is for this reason that the term used is not as premises simplicities but 'said premises', that is referable to the plot hereinbefore mentioned.
(34) I have, thereforee, no hesitation in holding that on a true construction of the document Ex. Public Witness 1/1, it is not possible to uphold the contention of the appellant that the property had any structures of any nature at the time of letting, and on a totality of facts I find it has to be held to be in the nature of a vacant plot, at the time of letting.
(35) That being so, the relevant time for the purpose of determining the forum where action for recovery of possession or ejectment can be brought, has to be determined by reference to the property that was actually let out. I say so, despite a reference by learned counsel for the appellant to a Full Bench judgment of Kamataka High Court reported as: Gobinda Naik G. Kalghatagi v. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. : AIR1980Kant95 because learned counsel for the respondent has referred me to two judgments of the Delhi High Court which I am bound to follow.
(36) The first judgment is in case Ram Prakash Chawla v. Amrit Kaur, : 20(1981)DLT145 (5) where it has been specifically observed by the learned Single Judge of this Court that for the purpose of determining as to whether the property included in the tenancy is 'premises' with-. in the meaning of section 2(i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, it has to be seen as to what was actually let out by the landlord in the particular case. It was held further that where only a plot of land was let out, and erection of the super structure by the tenant was after the letting out; Delhi Rent Control Act would not apply. There is another Division Bench judgment of this Court reported as: Noor Elahi v. Shaikh Abdul Gafar 1982 RLR 192(6) where the same proposition has been enunciated, namely, that for the purpose of determination as to whether the property is 'premises' or not, what was actually let out in a particular case at the time of letting, is the determining factor.
(37) In this case, earlier the landlord had instituted a petition before the Rent Controller, but Realizing the mistake withdraw the same. Even then the Division Bench held that this will not act as an estoppel in the way of the landlord for going to the correct forum, and showing that his first attempt by going to the court of Rent Controller was wrongly made. This authority establishes that it was the firm view of the Bench that it was the nature of the property at the time of letting which was the governing factor in deciding the forum for instituting action for recovery of possession of the demised property. It is this judgment which has formed the basis of the judgment of the first appellate court which is now under appeal before me.
(38) I thereforee find that the learned Additional District Judge has taken correct view and the appeal has no merits on this score and thus the points of law as formulated in this appeal by the appellant as grounds G and I are answered against him. .
(39) Although there were other issues which were joined between the parties, but at the outset of the hearing .of this appeal, Mr. S. C. Malik, Advocate made a statement at the Bar that the relationship of landlord and tenant or validity of the lease agreement as such were no longer disputed. He further stated that the arrears of rent, including the amount which was subject matter of another appeal, Rsa No. 146181, which arose out of a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and which was also listed for hearing along with this appeal, stood paid. and the appeal was withdrawn. These disputes, thereforee, do not survive.
(40) The contention regarding notice of termination of tenancy was also rather feebly argued. The notice has been proved by copy Ex. Public Witness 1/2 shown 'to have been received by the appellant vide A.D. receipt. Ex. Public Witness 1/4. The reply sent by him through Counsel, is Ex. Public Witness 1/7. Mr. Bawa contended that apart from the legal position that a notice addressed at the correct address, and not received back unserved, has to be presumed to have been delivered to the addressee; otherwise also, the appellant has not denied the service vide A, receipt Ex. Public Witness 1/ 4, presumption also arises in terms of section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, as reiterated in R Division Bench judgment of this Court, reported as : Miss Mohinder Kaur v. The Punjab National Bank Ltd. and others 19 (1981) DLT 41, (7) laying down the proposition that letters sent at proper address by registered post and the A.D. receipt signed by some person received back, and there was nothing to suggest interruption of usual course of business, the presumption was that the letter was received by the addressee. Apart from this legal presumption, it has already been observed that denial of the reply. Ex. Public Witness 1/7, although sent on his behalf by a lawyer, who was examined by the plaintiff, as a witness, was only for the reason that there was no controversial in this reply of the fact that demised property was a vacant plot, and that no assertion had been made therein that there existed any super structure thereon at the time of letting. It is also pertinent to note that in the written statemet, the receipt of the notice as such was not denied. The only challenge was to its legality and, validity, as per paragraph 3 of the written statement on merits. Thus service of this notice dated 28th February. 1977 as per Ex. PW1/2, has to be taken as admitted, as well as presumed. The month of tenancy commenced from 22nd of the month. The tenancy was terminated by means of this notice, given on 28th February, 1977, by calling upon the tenant to hand over thc vacant possession by 22nd March, 1977. It has thus given a clear 15 days notice for vacation of the premises before the expiry of the month of tenancy, and thus fully conforms to the legal requirements of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It has been held in a very recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Burmah Shell Oil Distributing now known as Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v Khaja Midhat Noor and others, : [1988]3SCR811 that when a lessee continue? to retain possession of the property after expiry of the original period of the tenancy, then he is only in possession by holding over. and not by way of continuation of the old tenancy. and that in such an event, the original tenancy has to be taken to have been determined and that in such circumstances, a notice given by the owner to the lesses terminating the lease and requiring him to hand over vacant possession by giving clear 15 days, was in full conformity with the requirements of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. As such, notice in this case was a valid notice.
(41) Otherwise also, there is a concurrent folding of the two courts below in so far this issue is concerned: namely, that the tenancy of the defendant stood determined by efflux of time, and no notice was required and in any case, the notice served validly terminated the tenancy, in terms of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and this question cannot now be re-agitated further. Nevertheless having been allowed to be argued, the finding already recorded in favor of the landlord/respondent. is hereby confirmed.
(42) In the result, the appeal fails and the judgment dated 17th February, 1983 of the Additional District Judge, Delhi is upheld, with the result that the suit for recovery of possession stands decreed. in favor of the plaintiff, respondent herein), in respect of plot No.E-2,. Bali Nagar, New Delhi with direction that the appellant shall hand over vacant possession of the property to the respondent after removing all the super structuures, at his own cost. As the appellant has already gained a period of more than 8 years, inasmuch as the suit as filed in the year 1980, it is directed that vacant possession in terms of the appellate decree shall be handed over within two months from today. The respondent is also held entitled to costs throughout.