Judgment:
Mahesh Cliandra, J.
(1) This revision petition has been filed by the petitioner-defendant No, I against the order dated 11th November, 1983 of the learned Additional District Judge whereby the appeal preferred against the order dated 24th February 1984 of the Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Delhi granting stay of' dispossession till the decision of the suit was dismissed as time barred. The petitioner-defendant No. I feeling aggrieved has come up in revision before this court.
(2) Brief facts giving rise to this revision are that the petitioner Shri P.C. Puri and other had obtained a decree for eviction of respondent No. 2- namely. The Monsento Chemicals of India (.P) Ltd. in respect of Property No. 46, Jor Bag Nursery, New Delhi and the respondent M/s. Polyolefin Industries Ltd. filed a suit for declaration that it was a tenant in possession of the suit property and was not liable to be dispossessed in execution of the said decree and in the said suit an application for ad interim injunction was filed and it was in pursuance of the said application that ad interim injunction till the disposal of the suit was granted to respondent No. I on 24.2.1983. The petitioners feeling aggrieved preferred an appeal which was dismissed on 11th November, 1983 by the learned Addl. District Judge as time barred and hence, this revision petition.
(3) Learned counsel for the petitioners has taken me through the order of the learned appellate court as also through the affidavits filed along with the applications for condensation of delay before the lower court and has urged that there were sufficient grounds for condensation of delay and the appeal should not have been dismissed. Learned counsel for respondent No. I has urged that :the scope of Section 115 C.P.C.is somewhat limited and the facts of the present case d,o not admit of maintainability of this revision petition which should be dismissed. He has drawn my attention to Shri M.L. Sethi v. Shri R.P. Kapur : [1973]1SCR697 in which it has been held by the Supreme Court as follows : 'The jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 Civil Procedure Code is a limited one. The Section is not directed against conclusions, of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved - Section 115 empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity by committing some-error of-procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. And if the High Court is satisfied on these three matters it has no power to interfere because it differs from the conclusions of the subordinate court on questions of fact or law. A distinction must.be drawn between the errors committed by subordinate courts in deciding questions of.law.which have relation to, or are concerned with questions of jurisdiction of the said court, and errors of law which have no such relation or connection. An erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the subordinate court which has no relation to questions of ' ' jurisdictions Of that court, cannot be corrected by' the High Court under Section 115 It was similarly held in The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad and another, V. AJit Prasad Tarway. Manager (Purchase .and Stores)'HinduStan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad' : (1972)ILLJ170SC that 'the High Court should not interfere even'if the order' is right or wronger in accordance with law or not, unless it has exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity'. It would be difficult to say on the facts of this case that the lower appellate court has exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. In Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon : [1964]4SCR409 it was held as follows : 'The power given by the Sec. 115 of the Code is clearly limited to the keeping of the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. It does not comprehend the power exercisable under the writ of Prohibition or Mandamus. It is also not a full power of Certiorari inasmuch as it arises only in a case of jurisdiction and not in a case of error. It has been ruled by the Judicial Committee and also by this court that the section is concerned with jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone involving a refusal to exercise jurisdiction where one exists or an assumption of jurisdiction where none exists and lastly acting with illegality or material irregularity. Where there is no question of jurisdiction in this manner the decision cannot be corrected for it has also been ruled that a court has Jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. But once a flaw of jurisdiction is found the High Court need not quash and remit as is the practice in English Law under the writ of certiorari but pass such order as it thinks fit'. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the principles of law enunciated in the aboverulings. In the face of this situation it would be difficult to say that the order dated 11th November,1983isliable to be modified or revised in this petition. This position apart, even on merits, there is no force in the revision petition.
(4) Learned counselfor'the-respondent No. I has drawn may attention to Shafiq Ahmad and others v. Mst.Shah Jehan Begum : AIR1981Delhi202 which enunciates that it was incumber upon the petitioner to file certified copy of the lower court judgment as required under rule 7 of Chapter I-A Volume 5 as applicable to this, court and failure to file such copy makes the revision incompetent. Certainly certified copy of the order of the lower court has not been filed by the,petitioner,in' the revision and the revision is liable to be dismissed on this score.
(5) It has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondent No. I that each day's delay has to be 'explained. While going through the affidavits dated 5.1.1983 and 16.5.1983 it cannot be said that any effort has been made to explain each day's delay, in particular he has drawn my attention to non-explanation of delay for 8th, 9th and 10th May, 1983. Likewise it has been submitted.that in support of .these applications no medical certificate by the counsel has.been filed which if filed would land great weight to the statement of facts made in the affidavits and for that reason also I find the learned lower appellate court was justified in dismissing the appeal as time barred.
(6) From the perusal of the application for condensation of delay I find that it has not been stated as to what led the learned counsel for the petitioner to file an appeal before the learned Senior Sub Judge. Likewise there is nothing to show as to why the appeal could not be presented on 6.5.1983 when it was returned. It is not the case of the petitioner that the District Judge was not available in the district courts or even at his residence. Considering that the question of limitation was involved it should have been possible for the petitioner to present an appeal even at the residence of the District Judge and no effort appears to have been made in that behalf either- Likewise no effort appears to have been made by the petitioner to file their affidavits as to why they could not file the appeal within time, more so, when their attorney was available all along in Delhi and v,.is on telephone as was the counsel for the petitioner. A perusal of the lower court file shows that written statement of the petitioner is signed by the attorney:so is the appeal signed by the attorney. The attorney holds a general power of attorney on behalf of the petitioner and he could have presented the appeal hi court. All these facts go to indicate that the learned lower appellate court was justified in exercising the jurisdiction the way it has done. Considering that the lower appellate court has considered various dates relevant, for the pti.'poiie, I do not think it is necessary to recall these dates in the order. From whichever angle the matter may be considered, I find no force in :his revision petition which dismissed with no order as to costs.
(7) Parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 20th February, 1989. The records be sent back immediately.