S.S. Chadha, J.
(1) This appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment dated September 29, 1978ofD.K.Kapur, J. dismissing the writ petition of the appellant seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the departmental enquiry including the order of dismissal of the appellant from police force.
(2) The appellant was appointed on March 29, 1963 as a Constable in the Delhi Armed Police, Delhi. He was served with a memorandum of charge-sheet dated July 2, 1968 informing him that a departmental enquiry under the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (for short PPR) as applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi is proposed to be held. The allegations on which the enquiry was proposed to be held were set out in the summary of allegations enclosed reading as follows :-
'It is alleged that Const. Khem Chand No. 2152 Dap IIIrd BN'D' Coy while posted at Guard Duty at Rtc Mehrauli on 17.6.68 at 8.10 A.M. was shabbily dressed, and was not got his hairs cut ASl Ganpat Ram checked him and asked him why he was shabbily dressed and had not got his hairs cut. Const. Khem Chand 2152 Dap misbehaved the Asi in presence of Asi Rameshwar Dial and told him to do whatever he likes. Asi Ganpat Ram lodged a report in the daily diary No. 8 dated 17-6-68 at RTC.Mehrauli and brought it into the notice of Ri Sh. Braham Dutt Inspector. This act of Const. Khem Chand No. 2152 D.A.P. amounts to gave misconduct and remissness in the discharge of his duties while on Guard duty and renders him unfit for being a Police Officers. Thus making him liable turn departmental action.'
(3) Inspector Nihala Ram, Enquiry Officer recorded the evidence of Public Witness . 1 to 4 and D.W. 1 to 6 and took the written statement of the delinquent official and came to the conclusion that 'Const. Khem Chand was in shabby dress and misbehaved his superior officers and I, thereforee, hold him guilty as the charge against the defaulter stands proved'. The enquiry report was submitted to the disciplinary authority i.e. Commandant Delhi Armed Police who agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and held that the article of charge was proved. The disciplinary authority provisionally came to the conclusion that the appellant was not a fit person to be retained in service and proposed to impose on him the penalty of dismissal from service. The show cause notice dated October 25, 1968 was issued. The delinquent official filed his representation. The Commandant, Delhi Armed Police in the order dated February , 1969 imposed the punishment of dismissal as proposed in the show cause notice with effect from that date. The appeal filed by the appellant was also dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police in the order dated August 8, 1969. The revision petition was also dismissed by the Inspector General of Police in the order dated March 12, 1970. All these orders were challenged by the appellant in the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
(4) The learned Single Judge noticed the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant as to the validity of the departmental enquiry and other related matters but expressed the opinion that the enquiry is in accordance with Article 311 of the Constitution. He then noticed the argument of the counsel that the mere finding by the Enquiry Officer that the appellant was shabbily dressed and had misbehaved disrespectfully with the Assistant Sub-Inspector was not sufficient to justify an order of dismissal. He construed the provisions of Section 7 of the Punjab Police Act. 1861 and Ppr 16.2. The learned Single Judge felt that the finding of unfitness being purely a subjective matter could not be reversed or reviewed in the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution though his Lordship felt that the penalty was excessive.
(5) The first submission of Mr. Sital A.K. Dar, the learned counsel for the appellant is that there is no evidence on the record to support the finding of the Enquiry Officer of the guilt of the delinquent official. He says that a finding of fact does not become worthy of being left undisturbed merely because it is supported by medium of evidence which is obviously false or unreliable. Reference is invited to the summary of allegations which alleges misbehavior of the appellant in the presence of Asi Rameshwar Dial. Asi Rameshwar Dial as Public Witness .2 does not depose about his presence at the spot but merely states that he was present when Asi Ganpat Ram reported the matter to Shri Brahm Dutt, Inspector, Reliance is placed on a judgment of this Court in 'Delhi Transport Corporations. Delhi Administration etc.' (1971) I S.L.R. 578.
(6) The law is well-settled that a High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the departmental authorities or inferior Tribunals, except where the finding is perverse in law in the sense that no reasonable person property instructed in law could have come to such a finding or there is misdirection in law or view or fact has been taken in the teeth of respondents of evidence or the finding is not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice. Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction to reprise the evidence and to come to a different finding. Even in the case relied upon by Mr. Dar, Deshpande, J. says that 'The modern test, thereforee, is that a finding of. fact even on the merits is reviewable if it is either baseless, i.e., not supported by any evidence at all, or is perverse' i.e., is such as no reasonable person would have arrived at. In the departmental enquiry, Ast Ganpat Ram had appeared as Public Witness . 4 and stated that he found the appellant in a bad turnout and he inspected him vide D.D. No. 2 to properly dressed up and get his hair cut but the appellant was found shabbily dressed inspire of his inspection and that when the witness asked the Explanationn of the constable, he misbehaved and said that 'do whatever you like'. This evidence has been believed by the Enquiry Officer as well as by the disciplinary authority and relied upon to hold the charge as proved. This court, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226, is not sitting as an appellate Court to review the evidence on the record to reappraise or weigh the evidence to come to a different conclusion. The first contention of the counsel is repelled.
(7) The second submission of the counsel is based on a construction of the provisions contained under Section 7 of the Delhi Police Act and Rule 16.2. Section 7 reads as under :-
'7.Appointment, dismissal, etc. of inferior officers. Subject to provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution and to such rules as the State Government may from time to time make under this Act, the Inspector-General, Assistant Inspector-General and District Superintends of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any Police officer of the subordinate ranks whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or unfit for the same; or may award any one or more of the following punishments to any police officer of the subordinate ranks who shall discharge his duty in a careless or negligent manner, or who by any act of his own shall render himself unfit for the discharge thereof, namely- (a) fine to any amount not exceeding one month's pay; (b) confinement to quarters for a term not exceeding fifteen days with or without punishment drill, extra guard, fatigue or other duty; (c) deprivation of good-conduct pay; (d) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument.'
Rule 16.2 reads as under :-
'16.2(1) Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts or misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconducting incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. In making such an award regard shall be had to the length of service of the offender and his claim to pension. (2) An enrolled police officer sentenced judicially to rigorous imprisonment exceeding one month or to any other punishment not less severe, shall, if such sentence is not quashed on appeal or revision, be dismissed. An enrolled police officer sentenced by a criminal court to a punishment of fine or simple imprisonment, or both, or to rigorous imprisonment not exceeding one month, or who having been proclaimed under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure fails to appear within the statutory period of thirty days may be dismissed or otherwise dealt with at the discretion of the officer empowered to appoint him. Final departmental orders in such cases shall be postponed until the appeal of the proceedings have been decided, or until the period allowed for filing an appeal has lapsed without appellate or revisionary proceedings having been instituted. Departmental Punishments under this rule shall be awarded in accordance with the powers conferred by rule 16,1. (3) When a Police Officer is convicted judicially and dismissed or dismissed as a result of a departmental enquiry, in consequence of corrupt practices, the conviction and dismissal and its course shall be published in the Police Gazette. In other cases of dismissal when it is desired to ensure that the officer dismissed shall not be reemployed else-where, a full descriptive roll, with particulars of the punishments, shall be sent for publication in the Police Gazette.'
The learned Single Judge also felt that the penalty was excessive but declined to interfere on the ground that the departmental authority thought the appellant to be unfit for duty and this is purely subjective decision not open to judicial review.
(8) As we read Section 7 and Rule 162, a dismissal can be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct. We will assume that the charge as laid in summary of allegations is clearly established. The appellant was shabbily dressed and had not got his hair cut while posted at Guard duty at at B.TC Mehrauli. He was checked by Asi Ganpat Ram when he misbehaved with Asi Ganpat Ram and told him to do whatever he likes. The averment on the record before the Enquiry Officer of the appellant is that he told the Asi that 'Cutting Karai to Hai' and as regards the shabby dress he said that 'Meri Bhi Waisi Hai Jaisi Auron Ki Hai.' This is certainly an act of misbehavior as also telling the Asi to do whatever be likes. But this misconduct has to be construed for the purposes of punishment within the meaning of Section 7 and rule 16.2. 'Misconduct' is a generic term and means 'to conduct amiss; to mismanage; wrong or improper conduct; bad behavior; unlawful behavior or conduct'. It includes malfeasance misdemeanour, delinquency and offence. The tern 'misconduct' does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. The word 'grave' is used in many senses and implies seriousness importance, weight etc. There is however,a distinction between misconduct and grave misconduct. The objective 'grave' in this context makes the character of the conduct, serious or very serious. The words 'gravest acts of misconduct' are incapable of definition One has to apply one's mind to the words and give a meaning to each of them in the light of the actual deed, situation and circumstances 'Misconduct' in order to earn the epithet of gravity has to be gross or flagrant. Consequently the degree of misconduct of justify dismissal has to be higher or more serious. The use of the superlative 'gravest' and the adverb 'only' is not entirely without significance. To look at the matter exclusively from a grammatical angle, 'gravest' is the highest degree of misdeed as compared to what is just 'grave' This is because to the use of the superlative degree as against the positive or comparative degree. The superlative degree may be used either to denote the highest or maximum degree in a given aggregate, or simply to indicate a supreme or very high degree without definite comparison. In the former sense, particularly when construing a statute, no misconduct can be styled to be of such an extreme degree as to be without a parallel or which cannot be worsted or battered. 'Misconduct' even if of the very worst cannot reach such a peak or depth which cannot be surpassed. Even in the case of superlative degree of misconduct there are grades and degrees. The argument does not admit of serious consideration that the intent the farmers of the rule was, that absolutely the worst misconduct could alone merit dismissal, and so long as, comparatively speaking, there could be a possibility of a still worse conduct, it could not be termed the gravest act of misconduct. Human conduct or behavior cannot be graded and there can be precise scale of graduation in order to arithmetically compare the gravity of the one from the other. In the circumstances, the use of the superlative degree, appears to be interned to indicate a supereminent, or a very high degree of misconduct, and not, that degree should be so high or so low as cannot be outclassed or excelled (See 'Bhagwat Parsad-v. Inspector General of Police and others' 1967 S.LR. 807).
(9) Mr. Dar has gone to the extreme in saying that the Police Rule refers to 'acts' and not to a single 'act of misconduct'. The submission is that there must be plurality of acts of misconduct before, the punishment of dismissal can be imposed on a delinquent official. He relied upon the judgment in C.W.P. 1025/71 decided on September 29, 1980 by B.N. Kirpal, J. and Gurdev Singh v. The state of Haryana and others', 1976 (2) S.L.R. 442. It is not necessary for us to express in this case that the use of word 'acts' may or may not exclude a single act of misconduct. The word in plural number can be construed to mean singular number and the words importing the singular only may be applied to plurality of acts, things or persons. It may be that in order to gauge gravity of misconduct, what matters is not frequency and a single act when grave may result in dismissal.
(10) In the present case the punishment for the misconduct with Asi Ganpat Ram that he can do what ever he likes, cannot be construed as a gravest act of misconduct deserving a dismissal from service. The Deputy Inspector General of Police has come to a conclusion that the charge was of misbehaving in a rude and insubordinate manner and that has been established against the appellant. As we have extracted the allegation of charge and the summary of allegations, it no where state that he behaved in a rude and insubordinate manner. The police is a disciplined force and gravest act of misconduct can be a justification for an order of dismissal. The appellant was shabbily dressed and his hair were not cut. The Asi asked the appellant the reasons for not being properly dressed and why he did not get his hair cat. The appellant did tell the Asi that 'Cutting Karai To Hai' and 'Meri Bhi Vesi Hai Jaisi Auron Ki Hai'. This misbehavior does not warrant an order of dismissal from service. We are satisfied that the punishment imposed is so wholly disproportionate to the misconduct that it picks our conscience.
(11) For the above reasons, the appeal is accepted and the order of the learned Single Judge dated September 29, 1978 is hereby quashed. The writ petition of the petitioner is allowed as prayed. The impugned orders of dismissal of the petitioner from Delhi Armed Police are quashed. The appellant shall be deemed to be in service with all consequential benefits. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no orders as to costs.