Dalveer Bhandari, J
1. In these writ petitions similar question of law arise for adjudication. By this common judgment we propose to dispose of Civil Writ Petition Nos.2895 of 2002, 2904 of 2002 and 2610 of 2003.
2. For the sake of convenience the facts of Civil Writ Petition No. 2895 of 2002 are referred to.
3. The petitioner aggrieved by the issuance of recovery certificate No.FUP 1366/11235 dated 26th March, 2002 issued by respondent No.1, The Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. (hereinafter referred as to `PICUP'), filed this petition before this court. According to the recovery certificate the petitioner is liable to pay Rs.1,41,39,899.56 as on 30.4.2002.
4. The petitioner is the promoter of Premier Polyfilms Limited. The said company approached PICUP for grant of financial assistance. The company executed a loan agreement with PICUP. The loan agreement was executed on 25.4.1996 at Lucknow and was signed by the petitioner, A.K.Surekha.
5. Clause 57 of the agreement deals with the jurisdiction for litigation. The relevant portion reads as under:
57. Jurisdiction for litigation
The borrower and PICUP agree that for all purposes of litigation relating to his agreement this jurisdiction shall be of Lucknow Courts only.
6. The company had undertaken to secure the advance made by PICUP by:
i) mortgage of fixed assets;
ii) charge on other properties and assets;
iii) acquisition of additional immoveable properties;
iv) by personal guarantees of Shri A.K.Surekha (petitioner herein) and A.N.Goenka
7. The petitioner has stood personal guarantee in his individual capacity for repayment of loans and other charges by the company to the respondent under the loan agreement itself. In furtherance to the clause 16 of the loan agreement, the petitioner along with other guarantors also executed personal bond of guarantees dated 26.4.1996. The bond of guarantee was part of the entire loan agreement and was executed by the petitioner being a document necessary for obtaining loan by the company.
8. Clauses 9, 14 & 18 of the bond of guarantee reads as under:
Clause 9: In order to give effect to the guarantee herein contained the corporation shall be entitled to act as if the Guarantors were the principal debtors to the Corporation for all payments and Covenants guaranteed by them as aforesaid to the Corporation.
....
Clause 14: The Guarantors hereby waive all rights which the Guarantors may become entitled to as surety/sureties to compete with the Corporation in obtaining payment of the moneys due or to become due to the Corporation in respect of the said loan in favor of the 'the Corporation' as against the said Company/Borrower.
....
Clause 18: The Guarantors further hereby agree that till such time as the guarantee is not released by the Corporation the Guarantors and the property of each Guarantors jointly and severally land all moneys that belong to either of the Guarantors or jointly to the Guarantors shall be available to the Corporation for the repayment of all moneys which shall at any time be due from the said Company/Borrower subject to the limit aforesaid.
9. The parties under the loan agreement have agreed that for the purposes of litigation relating to the loan agreement the jurisdiction would be of Lucknow Courts only. It would be relevant to mention that identical matter, Civil Writ Petition No.2957/2002 by the same parties titled as Premier Polyfilms Ltd. & Anr. vs. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation, which came up before a Division Bench of this Court was withdrawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner shall seek an appropriate remedy before the forums in the State of Uttar Pradesh. This writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 16.5.2002.
10. Mr.Sandeep Aggarwal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent had taken preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction of this court. He submitted that the petitioner has executed the loan agreement in which the parties have clearly agreed that in case of litigation, only Lucknow Courts will have the jurisdiction and again thereafter a personal guarantee has been executed in which the petitioner in clause 14 has specifically agreed that Guarantors hereby waive all rights which the Guarantors may become entitled to as surety/sureties to compete with the Corporation in obtaining payment of the moneys due or to become due to the Corporation in respect of the said loan in favor of the the Corporation as against the said Company/Borrower. Even then the petitioner has approached this court and challenged the recovery certificate issued by the respondent.
11. Mr.Aggarwal further submitted that the petitioner had full knowledge that this court had no jurisdiction because the earlier petition was withdrawn in order to approach the forum of the State of U.P. This petition has been filed in order to avoid legitimate payment of the respondent. He also submitted that this petition deserves to be dismissed with costs, only on the ground of jurisdiction, apart from the clear terms of agreement between the parties. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that by no stretch of imagination a petition can be maintained in this court. Apart from the judgment of a Division Bench mentioned above, he has also placed reliance on various other judgments. He placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this court in Civil Writ Petition No.1212/92 titled Tirath Chand vs. Deputy Commissioner, Delhi decided on 10.12.1993. In somewhat similar circumstances this court dismissed the petition. The relevant portion of the order reads as under:
' The petitioner had taken loan from UPFC and recovery is sought to be made by UPFC impugned order, Annexure P-15, issued by the Managing Director of UPFC, Kanpur, to the Deputy Commissioner Delhi, and District Magistrate, Ghaziabad for effecting recovery from the petitioner as he had not paid the loan and has been termed as a `defaulter'.
To challenge the recovery, jurisdiction will be with the Allahabad High Court.
Accordingly we dismiss the Writ Petition and relegate the petitioner to approach the Allahabad High Court with the Writ Petition or any other remedies.'
12. Mr.Aggarwal placed reliance on Union of India & Ors. v. Adani Exports Ltd. & Anr. : 2001(134)ELT596(SC) . The Apex Court while setting aside the judgment of the High Court observed :
' We think we cannot deny relief to the appellant solely on the ground that the High Court has chosen to proceed to decide the case on merit. This being a judgment of a court having no territorial jurisdiction, the judgment has to be set aside. However, the special civil applications cannot be dismissed on this ground because it has been the contention of the appellants themselves in the objections filed by them before the High Court, that these applications ought to be transferred to the High Court at Chennai, in the interest of justice, we agree with this plea.'
13. Mr.Aggarwal also placed reliance on Okhla Enclave Plot Holders Welfare Association (Regd.) vs. State of Haryana & Ors. : 97(2002)DLT377 . In this case the court held 'that it is not in dispute that the lands in question are situated in the State of Haryana. It is also not in dispute that the fourth respondent had been granted a license by the first respondent. Such license was issued from Chandigarh, outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Steps for its cancellation are also being taken from Chandigarh which are again outside the jurisdiction of this court.' The Court came to the conclusion that Delhi High Court has no territorial jurisdiction to deal with this matter.
14. In Oil & Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu : (1994)4SCC711 the Apex Court held that the question as to whether the court has a territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, must be arrived at on the basis of averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. The court held that all necessary facts must form an integral part of the cause of action. It observed:
' So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereof at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15.1.1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27.1.1993.'
15. In another case titled Indo Gulf Explosives Ltd. & Anr. vs. UP State Industrial Development Corporation & Anr. : 79(1999)DLT193 the court observed:
' In the instant case also the question arising for determination is of right of the respondents to recover arrears, which have accumulated to the tune of Rs.84,81,022.83. The question whether or not the respondents are within their rights to enforce its demand in terms of the agreement, which was executed within the State of Uttar Pradesh or whether under the terms thereof due to non payment of dues the respondents have, or do not have power of re-entry are such for which neither it is, nor it was, necessary for the appellant to plead service of notice on them by the respondents. The mere fact that the registered office of the appellant is in Delhi where the two communications dated 27.2.1996 and 22.7.1996 were received, will not be an integral part of cause of action for such a petition. In case the appellant has felt aggrieved by the demand raised or that the same is not in consonance with the terms of the agreement or that the respondents do not have any right of re-entry will be for the appellant to approach the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the land is situated or agreement was executed and not this Court. Learned Single Judge not on the same reasoning but on different reasonings on the facts and circumstances of the case concluded that cause of action substantially and materially had arisen within the State of Uttar Pradesh.'
16. The Division Bench of this court in Indian Charge Chrome & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported as 2002 7 AD (DELHI) 205 observed :
' It is abundantly clear that a trivial or insignificant part of the cause of action arising at a particular place would not be enough to confer writ jurisdiction. It is the cause of action mainly and substantially arising at a place which would be determinating factor of territorial jurisdiction as observed by our Division Bench in Sector Twenty-One owners Welfare Association (supra). While exercising the jurisdiction it shall have to be kept in view who are the real persons or authorities sought to be proceeded against or against whom writ be issued by the court.'
17. In Everest Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Coal Controller & Ors. 90 CWN 438, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held that 'In order to maintain a writ application, the petitioner has to establish that within the territorial limit of the Courts jurisdiction prima facie a legal right claimed by him has been either infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the respondents. Such infringement may take place by causing him legal injury or threat thereof. Accordingly, when the impugned act of the respondent takes effect within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court, the Court may entertain the writ petition of the person aggrieved notwithstanding that the respondents have the offices or residences outside its territorial jurisdiction. An order which has been made by an authority or person at a place beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court but is given effect to against the petitioner within the said High Court's jurisdiction gives rise to at least a part of cause of action at the place where it is implemented. An order becomes effective only when it is communicated or served, the service of the order or receipt of a notice thereof would form part of cause of action for filing a writ petition by the person aggrieved thereby.'
18. In Sita Ram Singhania vs. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubhishi Ltd and Others : [1999]3SCR512 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that 'We see no reason why the High Courts in such matters filed by the defendants in suits instituted by the banks before the Debt Recovery Tribunal should more or less as a matter of course grant stay of proceedings before the tribunals. The very purpose of setting up the tribunals will be lost by granting stay merely because there is challenge to the notification constituting the tribunal. In the present case, the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that as the proceedings were initiated in the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Allahabad High Court had no jurisdiction.'
19. Satya Prakash vs. State of U.P. and Others : 2000CriLJ4599 , was a case arising out of the order of this Court refusing to entertain the appellant's application with the prayer that a direction be given to an independent agency to inquire into the matter on the ground that the Delhi High Court had no territorial jurisdiction. The alleged offence, if any, was committed outside the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. In the petition under Article 32, the Supreme Court while dismissing the petition observed that the dismissal will not preclude the petitioner from moving the appropriate Court including the High Court of Delhi, if so advised. Because of this observation of the Supreme Court, the appellant moved the Delhi High Court but this petition was also dismissed. It was contended that the orders of the Supreme Court must be construed as a mandamus from the Supreme Court to the Delhi High Court conferring jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court to entertain and dispose of the matter on merits. When the matter was again taken to the Supreme Court, their Lordships held that 'We are unable to construe the aforesaid two orders passed by the Court conferring jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court to entertain the matter over which it does not possess any territorial jurisdiction, inasmuch, as the offence was, admittedly, committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court.' In this view of the matter, the Court declined to interfere with the order of the Delhi High Court and observed that the petitioner would be at liberty to approach the Allahabad High Court, if so advised.
20. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Ram Kirpal Chakkar & Anr. vs. Union of India & Anr. : AIR1955All468 observed that one important circumstance is that the Courts do not issue writs and injunctions in which they have no power to enforce its jurisdiction. If a writ or injunction is disobeyed, the only way to enforce it is to take proceedings against the guilty party for disobedience of the order. If that party is outside the jurisdiction of the Court, then the Court has no power to enforce obedience of the injunction or writ, issued by the Court. The Courts, thereforee, do not issue writs where they have no power to enforce their obedience. If a writ is issued to some Officer at New Delhi and he ignores it, the Allahabad High Court cannot proceed in contempt against such Officer, as he is outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
21. A Division Bench of Hyderabad High Court in C.Shrikishen vs. State of Hyderabad & Ors. reported as AIR 1956 Hyd 186 observed that a person or an authority against which a writ under Article 226 is sought to be directed must be within the territories as a condition of the High Court being empowered to issue such a writ. Where, thereforee, several of the respondents against whom writs are sought to be issued are residing outside the territorial limits of the High Court, it has no jurisdiction to issue writs against them.
22. A Division Bench of Punjab High Court in Ebrahim Aboobaker & Anr. vs. L.Achhru Ram came to the conclusion that the High Court has no power or authority to issue writ to a person or an authority not within its jurisdiction.
23. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Anr. vs. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. : [1985]154ITR135(SC) observed :
' M/s.Oswal Woollen Mill Limited, having its registered office at Ludhiana in the State of Punjab and a branch office at Calcutta, and Narayan Das Jain, Secretary of the Company have filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court seeking various reliefs against the Union of India (through the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, New Delhi), the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi, the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Amritsar, the Collector of Customs, Calcutta and the State Trading Corporation of India, New Delhi. The primary prayer in the writ petition is to prevent or to quash an apprehended or purported action under Clause 8-B of the Import Control Order. All the other reliefs sought in the writ petition revolve round the principal relief regarding Clause 8-B of the Import Control Order. The other prayers are either ancillary or incidental to the principal prayer or are of an interlocutory character. Having regard to the fact that the registered office of the company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondent against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one would have expected the writ petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or Delhi High Court. The writ petitioners, however, have chosen the Calcutta High Court as the forum perhaps because one of the interlocutory reliefs which is sought is in respect of a consignment of beef tallow which has arrived at the Calcutta Port. An inevitable result of the filing of the writ petitions elsewhere than at the place where the concerned offices and the relevant records are located is to delay prompt return and contest. We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ petition was filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the office of the Company is in the state of Punjab and all the principal respondents are in Delhi. But we do feel disturbed that such writ petitions are often deliberately filed in distant High Courts, as part of manoeuvre in the legal matter, so as to render it difficult for the officials at Delhi to move applications to vacate stay where it becomes necessary to file such applications.'
24. In State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. M/s. Swaika Properties & Anr. : [1985]3SCR598 the court observed:
' It is to be deeply regretted that despite a series of decisions of this Court deprecating the practice prevalent in the High Court of passing such interlocutory orders for the mere asking, the learned Single Judge should have passed the impugned ad interim ex parte prohibitory order the effect of which, as the learned Attorney General rightly complains, was virtually to bring to a standstill, a development scheme, of the Urban Improvement Trust, Jaipur viz. Civil Lines Extension Scheme, irrespective of the fact whether or not the High Court had any territorial jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such arbitrary exercise of power by the High Court at the public expense reacts against the development and prosperity of the country and is clearly detrimental to the national interest.'
25. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association vs. Union of India & Ors. reported as AIR 2001 SC 416 observed:
' The establishment of a permanent Bench at Jaipur and defining its territorial jurisdiction brought out a bifurcation of State of Rajasthan into two for the purpose of division of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court between principal seat and permanent Bench seat. The Chief Justice of the State cannot, thereafter, artificially or indirectly take away the jurisdiction belonging to one and confer it on the other. Conferring a discretion on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in any district within the territorial jurisdiction of permanent Bench at Jaipur shall be heard at Jodhpur cannot spell out a power to define where the cause of action shall be deemed to have arisen in a writ case.'
26. A Division Bench of this Court had occasion to decide a case of almost similar nature in Sector Twenty One owners Welfare Association (STOFWA) vs. Air Force Naval Housing Board & Ors 1996 (1) A D (Delhi) 471. Hon'ble Mr.Justice R.C.Lahoti, who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Court observed as under:-
'13. The law as reflected by the above said decisions is that the emphasis has shifted from the residence or location of the person or authority sought to be proceeded against to the situs of the accrual of cause of action wholly or in part. It is also clear that a trivial or insignificant part of the cause of action arising at a particular place would not be enough to confer writ jurisdiction; it is the cause of action mainly and substantially arising at a place which would be a determinating factor of territorial jurisdiction. So also it shall have to be kept in view who are the real persons or authorities sought to be proceeded against or against whom writ to be issued by the Court would run. Joining of proforma or ancillary parties, and certainly not the joining of unnecessary parties, would be relevant for the purpose of Article 226(1).
27. Mr.Kaul, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has placed reliance on Damomal Kausomal Raisinghani vs. Union of India & Ors. : AIR1967Bom355 . In this case the court observed that there can hardly be any doubt that the place where the consequences of the order fell on the petitioner would be a place where cause of action in part would arise. Mr.Kaul also placed reliance on Navinchandra N.Majithia vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. : AIR2000SC2966 . In this case the court observed that from the provision of clause (2) of Article 226 it is clear that the maintainability or otherwise of the writ petition in the High Court depends on whether the cause of action for filing the same arose, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court.
28. We have examined the relevant clauses of the agreement and decided cases of various courts on question of territorial jurisdiction. If the principles which have been crystalised by the various courts are made applicable to the facts of this case, the conclusion would be irresistible that this court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this petition because in the instant case the respondent had entered into an agreement with the company of the petitioner at Lucknow and in the loan agreement, it was clearly stated that for the purposes of litigation relating to this agreement the territorial jurisdiction shall be of Lucknow courts alone. The petitioner on behalf of the company was signatory to the agreement. Thereafter a separate bond of guarantee was executed. In the bond of guarantee it was clearly agreed that the guarantors herein waive all rights which the Guarantors may become entitled to as surety/sureties to compete with the Corporation in obtaining payment of the moneys due or to become due to the Corporation in respect of the said loan in favor of the the Corporation, as against the said Company. In clause 9, the petitioner has agreed that in order to give effect to the guarantee herein contained the corporation shall be entitled to act as if the Guarantors were the principal debtors to the Corporation for all payments and Covenants guaranteed by them as aforesaid, to the Corporation.
29. In this view of the matter, there was no justification or propriety on behalf of the petitioner to have filed a petition in this court for the relief of staying the recovery certificate. It is indeed unfortunate that most of the companies despite all kinds of clear and unequivocal agreements with the public sector undertaking and banks adopt delaying tactics whenever a case of repayment of loans or dues arises. Unless the Courts adopt strict view of the matter it would be difficult to effectively curb this tendency.
30. On the strength of the law as has been clearly enunciated in aforesaid cases we have no hesitation in arriving at the definite conclusion that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain these writ petitions and the writ petitions are dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.10,000/- each The stay granted by this court is vacated. All interim applications stand accordingly disposed of.