Mukundakam Sharma, J.
1. The present writ petition arises out of the award passed by the Industrial No. III, Delhi, in I.D. Case No. 276/89. By the aforesaid award passed on April 4, 2001 the Industrial Tribunal answered the reference made to it in favor of the respondent No. 2-workmen holding that the order passed against the workman by the management was by way of termination of his services and the same was illegal and unjustified with a further direction that the workman be reinstated in service with full back wages with continuity of service. Even a cost of litigation of Rs. 1,500/- was imposed against the management. The operation of the impugned award was stayed by this Court while issuing notice on the writ petition with a condition that the management would deposit the awarded amount in this Court. Pursuant to the said order, the awarded amount is lying deposited in this Court.
2. Pursuant to an application filed by the respondent No. 2 dated February 16, 1987 the petitioner sent a letter to him on June 1, 1987 offering him to undergo training as a Field/Trade Trainee in the petitioner organisation under the terms and conditions specifically mentioned in the said letter. By letter dated August 26,1988 the respondent No. 2 was informed by the petitioner that the assessment of his training and the result of the interview held on August 26,1988 before the Board of Confirmation indicated that his performance was poor and accordingly the training period of the respondent No. 2 could not be extended as he did not have an aptitude for the training in the trade of the petitioner. The respondent No. 2 was also informed that the petitioner had decided to discontinue his contract of training with effect from August 31, 1988 and that as per Clause 2 of the contract of training his training could be terminated without notice and without assigning any reason. Being aggrieved by the said order the respondent No. 2 raised a dispute and on the basis of the said dispute the competent authority referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal No. III on the following terms of reference :
'Whether the termination of the services of Sh. Mahant Ram is illegal and /or unjustified and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect ?'
On receipt of the aforesaid reference the Industrial Tribunal received evidence adduced by the parties and thereafter passed the aforesaid award which is under challenge in this writ petition.
3. Counsel appearing for the petitioner assailed the findings and the conclusions of the Industrial Tribunal contending that the said findings and conclusions are illegal, without jurisdiction and are in complete disregard to the settled position of law. It was submitted by the Counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal erred in law and also in fact in holding that the respondent No. 2 was a workman as the said respondent No. 2 was appointed only as a trainee and that a trainee would never come within the ambit of the definition of 'workman'. It was also submitted by him that the respondent No. 2 having received all the pecuniary benefits pursuant to the aforesaid order in full and final settlement of his claim, there was no scope for raising any dispute by the respondent No. 2 and, thereforee, the Tribunal erred in law and also in fact in holding that the receipt executed by the respondent No. 2 was not admissible in evidence. The next contention of the Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the award of the Industrial Tribunal holding that the order of disengagement is stigmatic is also bad and the same is in violation of the settled position of law.
4. Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2, however, supported the findings and the conclusions contending inter alias that no interference is called for as against the aforesaid findings, the same being findings of fact. In the light of the aforesaid submissions of the Counsel appearing for the parties I have considered the records and I propose to dispose of the writ petition giving my decision with reasons thereforee.
5. Reference is made to the letter dated June 1, 1987 issued by the petitioner to the respondent No. 2. The said letter makes it crystal clear that the respondent No. 2 was taken into the petitioner company for being given training on specified terms and conditions. In terms of the said letter he was to be treated as a field/trade trainee with a clear stipulation therein that he would be imparted training in the elevator trade initially for a period of twelve months during which period or at the end of which his training could be terminated without notice and without assigning any reason. It was also stipulated therein that on satisfactory completion of the above training for a period of twelve months his training with the company would continue for a remaining period of two years and during the said training period his progress would be carefully watched and subject to his training being found satisfactory and in the event of there being further vacancies in the organisation he would be offered suitable employment. It was also stipulated that during the training the respondent would be paid a stipend. The aforesaid stipulations and the terms and conditions of his engagement as a trainee clearly prove and establish that the respondent No. 2 was engaged as a trainee in the elevator trade. The training was initially for a period of one year. After successful completion of the same, the respondent No. 2 was to receive further training for a period of two years after satisfactory completion of which and subject to availability of vacancies in the organisation, he would have been offered suitable employment. It is also seen from the records that even before the completion of the first twelve months of his training the petitioner was informed by letter dated May 31, 1988 that from the assessment made it appeared that the performance of the respondent No. 2 was not satisfactory. He was also informed that the petitioner would have terminated his training as per Clause 2 of the letter dated June 1, 1987 but in order to offer him one more opportunity to improve he was allowed to continue so that his performance for the next three months, i.e., up to August 31, 1988, could be observed, and if there was no proper improvement in his performance, the petitioner would be constrained to terminate his training w.e.f. September 1, 1988. Thereafter, the performance of the petitioner was again assessed and an interview was also taken on August 26, 1988. However, the aforesaid assessment and the result went against the respondent No. 2 and his performance was found to be poor and, thereforee, the petitioner discontinued the contract of training of the respondent No. 2 w.e.f, August 31, 1988. While doing so, reference was made to Clause 2 of the contract of training. The aforesaid engagement of the respondent No. 2 was considered by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal and he held that in view of the nature of the engagement of the respondent No. 2 he could be deemed to be a workman as envisaged under Clause (s) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act which defines the clause 'workman'. The aforesaid conclusion and the findings of the Industrial Tribunal is challenged before me.
6. Similar contention of the petitioner that a trainee cannot be called a workman as envisaged under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act was also urged in Kamal Kumar v. J.P.S. Malik, P.O., Labour Court and Ors., : 73(1998)DLT812 . In the said decision it was held that although Section 2(s) of the Act uses the expression 'apprentice', but merely using the word 'apprentice' within the definition of 'workman' would not confer a right on a trainee to be called a 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said decision also related to a person who was similarly engaged as that of the respondent No. 2 herein. There the petitioner was appointed by the company as a trade trainee and the relationship of the petitioner therein and the management was also governed by similar terms and conditions as stipulated in the present contract between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2. Considering the various cases this Court held that as the petitioner therein had failed to prove and establish that he was employed in the respondent company to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory or clerical work for hire or reward, thereforee he was a trainee and not a workman and the writ petition was disposed of In terms of the aforesaid observations.
7. I am of the considered opinion that the facts of the present case are similar to that of the facts of Kamal Kumar (supra) and thereforee the ratio of the aforesaid decision is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. The terms and conditions of engagement in the present case are similar to that of Kamal Kumar's case (supra). In the said case also the interview board of the management assessed the aptitude of the petitioner and submitted its report according to which performance of the petitioner was found to be not satisfactory and, thereforee, the contract was brought to an end. In the light of the aforesaid facts it was held that the petitioner therein was not a 'workman' of the company as the purpose of engagement of the petitioner was only to offer him training under the terms and conditions stipulated above. It was also held that no wage was paid to the petitioner as defined within the meaning of 'wages' under the Industrial Disputes Act. Same is the position in the present case. Here the respondent No. 2 was being paid only a stipend which cannot be termed as 'wages'. In that view of the matter, I hold that the respondent No. 2 would not come within the ambit of the expression 'workman' as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, thereforee, the findings and the conclusions arrived at by the Industrial Tribunal are illegal and void and the same are hereby set aside.
8. Having decided in the aforesaid manner that the petitioner is not a workman, it may not be necessary to deal with the other contentions which are raised in the present petition. However, since arguments have been advanced I would prefer to deal with the said submissions as well in this judgment and order itself.
9. The respondent No. 2 executed a receipt accepting the full and final settlement of the accounts. The said receipt is exhibited as Exhibit WW1 /M-6 which reads as follows :
'RECEIPT
Received Rs. 1,762.50 (Rupees one thousand seven hundred sixty-two and paise fifty only) from M/s. Otis Elevator Co. (I) Ltd., New Delhi, towards the settlement of all final claims and dues including my compensation for retrenchment, reinstatement, notice pay and leave encashment, etc.
I also hereby acknowledge to receive my PF, EPF and Bonus as per the prevailing Acts.'
The receipt is signed by the respondent No. 2 and is dated September 8, 1988. The aforesaid receipt was not accepted as valid by the Tribunal on the ground that it is not written in the said receipt that the same is executed by the respondent No. 2 without any fear, coercion or compulsion. It is also held by him that the said receipt is neither executed as per the law as no stamp duty was paid nor affixed on the same nor the same was registered, and thereforee the same is not admissible in evidence. I am unable to accept the aforesaid conclusion of the Industrial Tribunal. The aforesaid receipt is given by the respondent No. 2 under his clear signature and the legality of the same is also not challenged on the ground that the same was executed by the respondent No. 2 under coercion. The legality of the aforesaid receipt is not challenged by the workman on the ground that it is not registered and the stamp duty is not affixed. The said receipt clearly indicates that the respondent No. 2 accepted all the dues that were payable to him and executed the said receipt in settlement of all his final claims and dues.
10. Having decided the aforesaid issue in this manner I may now proceed to the last contention that is raised, i.e., whether or not the order of disengagement is stigmatic. On reading and perusal of the letter dated August 26,1988 the Tribunal has held the aid letter to be stigmatic. It is apparent on reading the award that the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors., : [1999]1SCR532 , influenced the learned Presiding Officer in coming to the aforesaid conclusion. I have perused the ratio of the aforesaid judgment which was also placed before me. A perusal and close scrutiny of the said judgment indicates that the said judgment was rendered in the peculiar facts of that case. In the said case an inquiry committee was constituted which gave its report and found the employee to be guilty of this deeds like obtaining false signatures. He was also found guilty of inefficient performance of duty and irregular attendance without permission, rude and disorderly behavior and willful insubordination. The said conclusions arrived at by an informal committee against the employee therein were the foundation for passing the impugned order. In view of the aforesaid position, it was held that the order which was passed although was not stigmatic but the foundation being stigmatic the order was illegal and accordingly the same was set aside.
11. The facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable. The petitioner herein was engaged as a trainee and in the said letter of engagement itself which is the contract it was specifically stated that his performance would be observed and that only on satisfactory completion of the training his contract period would be extended for another two years and thereafter on successful completion of the training and in the event of a vacancy being available he would be considered for a suitable employment. Necessarily, thereforee, his performance was assessed by the petitioner during the aforesaid training period of initial twelve months but his performance was not found satisfactory. The same was also brought to his notice and he was asked to improve his performance so as to enable him to avail of the further extension of the training for two years. Thereafter his performance was again assessed and an interview was held and even in the same his performance was not good and thereforee the petitioner decided to discontinue the contract of training in terms of Clause 2 of the contract. In my considered opinion the aforesaid order of disengagement cannot be termed as stigmatic as held by the Industrial Tribunal. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishnadevaraya Education Trust and Anr. v. L.A. Balakrishna, I (2001) SLT 563-2001 (1) L.L.N. 856. In the said decision it was held by the Supreme Court in the case of a probationer that there can be no manner of doubt that the employer is entitled to engage the services of a person on probation and that during the period of probation, the suitability of the recruit/appointee has to be seen. It was further held that if his services are not satisfactory which means that he is not suitable for the job, then the employer has a right to terminate the services as a reason thereof. The Supreme Court further observed that normally services of an employee on probation would be terminated when he is found not to be suitable for the job for which he was engaged, without assigning any reason. The Supreme Court further laid down that mere fact that in response to the challenge, the employer states that he services were not satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that the services of the probationer were being terminated by way of punishment, and that the probationer is on test and if the services are found not to be satisfactory, the employer has, in terms of the letter of appointment, the right to terminate the services. In my considered opinion, the aforesaid ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case and in the light thereof I hold that the order of disengagement which is impugned is not stigmatic.
12. Accordingly, I allow this writ petition, and set aside and quash the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal. The amount which is deposited in this Court shall be returned to the petitioner. There shall be no order as to costs.