Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.
1.The petitioner is a cooperative society registered under the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and has been running a coffee house on the second floor of Mohan Singh Palace Building, Baba Kharak Singh Marg, New Delhi in terms of a license granted by the respondent No. 1 - NDMC. The original license was for a period of 10 years from 01.05.1969 to 30.04.1979 and the same was extended twice by 5 years each in 1979 and 1984 and was to come to an end on 30.04.1989. A draft license deed was sent by respondent No. 1 to the petitioner in case the petitioner was desirous of extending the period of license. The said license deed contained an additional clause 20-A apart from the earlier terms, which is as under:-
'20- A That the licensee shall obtain information and shall make all arrangements and provisions for fire detection safety/fighting arrangements as may be prescribed by the Chief Fire Officer or any other code/standard practice or any other competent authority in this behalf with the prior approval of the Licensor within 30 days of the grant of license or occupation whichever is earlier.'
2.The petitioner sent the license deed duly typed on non-judicial stamp paper along with an additional security amount vide letter dated 22.08.1989, but did not include the said clause 20-A.
3.The respondent No. 1 sent a letter dated 28.08.1989 informing the petitioner that the nominated authority appointed under the Delhi Fire Prevention and Safety Act, 1986 ( hereinafter to be referred to as, `the said Act' ) had served a notice under Section 4(1) of the said Act read with Rule 7(2) of the Delhi Fire Prevention and Fire Safety Rules, 1987 ( hereinafter to be referred to as, `the said Rules' ) on respondent No. 1 for providing fire safety / fire preventive measures and the estimated cost for the same for the building in question was worked out to Rs.29,37,091/-. The petitioner was, thus, asked to pay a sum of Rs.3,32,490/- being the proportionate share latest by 20.10.1989. The petitioner, however, did not pay the amount. Reminders were sent by respondent No. 1 dated 25.10.1989, 05.12.1989 and 24.01.1990, but to no avail.
4.The petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking quashing of the notice / demand dated 04.10.1989, for restraining the respondents from demanding any amount in contravention of the said Act and for a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 to execute a fresh license deed without inserting the proposed clause 20-A.
5.In the present writ petition, which has been pending since 1990, stay of recovery of the impugned demand has been directed vide Order 20.07.1990, which interim orders were subsequently confirmed. It is stated at the bar that the necessary work has already been carried out by respondent No. 1 at its own cost since the demand was relating to the whole building.
6.In order to appreciate the rival contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it is necessary to consider the scheme and provisions of the said Act.
7.The Statement of Objects and Reasons states that the existing provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 had been found to be inadequate for purposes of providing fire safety measures, particularly in multi-storeyed buildings and to compel owners of the buildings to carry out necessary measures for prevention of fire.
8.Section 2 of the said Act is the definition clause and ' occupier' is defined in Section 2(j), which is as under :-
'2(j) ' occupier' includes -
(i) any person who for the time being is paying or is liable to pay to the owner the rent or any portion of the rent of the land or building in respect of which such rent is paid or is payable;
(ii) an owner in occupation of, or otherwise using his land or building;
(iii) a rent- free tenant of any land or building;
(iv) any person who is liable to pay to the owner damages for the use and occupation of any land or building;'
1.Section 6 of the said Act provides for notice to the owner or occupier of the building or premises to take remedial measures regarding fire prevention and is as under :-
' 6. Provision regarding certain buildings and premises. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Chief Fire Officer may enter and inspect any building, the construction of which was completed on or before the 6th day of June, 1983 (being the date on which the current building bye-laws had come into force) or any building which was under construction on such date if such inspection appears necessary for ascertaining the adequacy of fire prevention and fire safety measures in such building.
(2) The entry and inspection under sub-section (1) shall be done by the Chief Fire Officer in the manner laid down in section 3.
(3) The Chief Fire Officer shall, after inspection of the building or premises under sub-section (1), and after taking into consideration -
(i) the provisions of the building bye-laws in accordance with which the plan of the said building or premises was sanctioned;
(ii) the conditions imposed, if any, by the local authority at the time of the sanction of the plan of the said building or premises; and
(iii) the minimum standards for fire prevention and fire safety measures specified for such building or premises as may be specified by rules framed under this Act,
issue a notice to the owner or occupier of such building or premises stating therein the inadequacy in regard to the fire prevention and fire safety measures in it and direct the owner or occupier to undertake measures for rectifying the said inadequacy within such period as he may consider just and reasonable.'
2.Section 16 of the said Act empowered the Administrator to make rules by notification in the Official Gazette and in exercise of such power, the rules were framed and published.
3.Rule 8 of the said Rules deals with liability and is as under :-
' 8. Liability.- (1) Where any building or premises is owned or occupied by more than one person, the responsibility for providing the fire safety and preventive measures as per the directions of the nominated authority or the Chief Fire Officer in the whole building will be shared in proportion to the area occupied or owned by individual owner or occupier as the case may be.
(2) The expenditure incurred by Chief Fire Officer as referred to in section 7(2) of the Act shall be recoverable from the occupier irrespective of the fact whether he is the owner of the premises or not unless the owner, in those cases where occupier is different from the owner, agrees to pay in full or in part the expenses thus incurred by the Chief Fire Officer.'
4.The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Statement of Objects and Reasons shows that the object was to fasten the liability on the owners of the building. It is further submitted that though the definition of ' occupier' under Section 2(j)(iv) includes a licensee in occupation of any land or building, Section 6 provides for a notice to the ' owner or occupier'. It is, thus, contended that first the owner is liable failing which only the occupier will be made liable.
5.Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that there was no license deed in existence between the parties as on the relevant date because the earlier license deed had come to an end on 30.04.1989. Further, license deed had not been executed in view of the dispute about inclusion of clause 20-A, which would fasten the liability for such demands under the said Act on the petitioner. It is, thus, contended that in the absence of any contract between the parties and in view of the amount already having been paid by the respondent No. 1, there is no question of the demand being raised on the petitioner. It is submitted that in case the respondent No. 1 wants to recover any amount from the petitioner, it is open to the respondent No. 1 to file an appropriate civil proceedings.
6.Learned counsel for respondent No. 1, on the other hand, contends that reading of the aforesaid provisions of the said Act and the said Rules makes it clear that both the owner and the occupier are liable. It is submitted that reading of the aforesaid sections shows that in case the property is self-occupied, the owner would be naturally liable. However, in case of a tenant or a licensee, it is the occupier who has to be made liable, though the concerned Department need not wait to make recovery only from such occupier and it is open to make recovery from the owner or the occupier. A reference was specifically made to rule 8 of the said Rules to contend that where measures have to be taken as per the directions of the Fire Officer, the same is liable to be shared in proportion to the area occupied or owned by the individual owner or occupier. This is what was sought to be done in terms of the impugned notice dated 04.10.1989. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 further contends that the petitioner has continued to occupy the premises in question even though the license had expired in view of the pendency of the matter and never vacated the premises. It is, thus, contended that it was open to the petitioner to have vacated the premises if the terms and conditions were not acceptable to the petitioner and mere recovery of the charges pending consideration of the writ petition for this period of time would not create any special equities in favor of the petitioner.
7.I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties.
8.In order to appreciate the contentions, the very object of bringing into force the said Act has to be seen. The object was to provide for fire safety norms and measures, which were not being enforced by owners and occupiers of building, especially in respect of multi-storeyed building where there was a greater requirement of such preventive measures. The object of the said Act was, thus, to compel compliance of such preventive measures by the owners and the occupiers. The mere use of the word ' owner' in the Statement of Objects and Reasons would not mean that the ' occupier' is not liable. This is clear from the provisions of Section 6 of the said Act, which provides for a notice to the owner or occupier to take necessary remedial measures. The word ' occupier' has been defined in Section 2(j) of the said Act and as per Section 2(j)(iv) thereof, a licensee in occupation of land or building is an ' occupier '. The petitioner was, thus, admittedly an occupier of the building in question. The liability, in my considered view, cannot be fastened only on the owner.
9.Needless to say that if the building is self- occupied, it is only the owner who is liable. However, where the occupier is in existence either as a tenant or as a licensee or in any capacity as defined under Section 2(j) of the said Act, the occupier would also be liable. The mere fact that the owner has paid the amount does not imply that the occupier is absolved of the liability to make the payment.
10.Rule 8 itself clarifies that where in a multi-storeyed building, there are different portions, which may be in occupation of different persons, the liability would be shared proportionately. The impugned notice dated 04.10.1989 informed the petitioner of the share of his liability. It may also be noticed that the license in favor of the petitioner expired on 30.04.1989. The petitioner was specifically asked to execute a license deed including clause 20-A, which the petitioner failed to do. The petitioner has yet continued to be in occupation of the premises in question during this period of time. This contention has to be appreciated keeping in view the prayer made by the petitioner in the writ petition seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 to execute a fresh license deed excluding the said clause 20-A.
11.A reading of the earlier license deed would show that clause 26 has been incorporated in the said deed, which is as under :-
' 26. That the licensee shall be bound to abide by all the provisions of the P.M. Act and the bye laws made there under from time to time, the provisions of the prevention of Food Adulteration Act as applicable in Delhi and such other Central or Local laws and rules and regulations existing herein or to be enacted or introduced hereinafter.'
12.Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, thus, contended that clause 20-A was a matter of abundant caution since clause 26 itself provides that in case of any legislation coming into force, the law in latest in this behalf would apply.
13.In my considered view, the reading of the said Act and the Rules itself makes it clear that liability will be on the petitioner whether such a clause was or was not incorporated in the license deed.
14.It would be trite to contend that the petitioner should be permitted to enjoy the benefit of the interim orders of this Court and now be permitted to contend that it is a matter of contract and that the respondent No. 1 should make recovery of the amount expended by the said respondent against the petitioner in civil proceedings. It was the duty of the petitioner as an occupier to pay the proportionate charges for the necessary preventive measures to be carried out in terms of the directions of the concerned authority under the said Act and the petitioner cannot be permitted to absolve itself from such liability. The respondent No. 1 was left with no option, but to incur this amount in view of the interim orders granted by this Court since the issue did not relate only to the portion occupied by the petitioner, but to the whole building.
15.I am, thus, of the considered view that challenge to the impugned notice dated 04.10.1989 by the petitioner is misplaced. No direction can also be issued against the respondent No. 1 to execute a fresh license deed without inserting the proposed clause 20-A as claimed by the petitioner.
16.No ground is made out for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
17.Dismissed.
18.Interim orders stand vacated.
19.In view of the fact that the petitioner has chosen to challenge the said demand and in view of the interim orders has enjoyed the amount in question of Rs.3,32,490/-, which the respondent No. 1 has been compelled to incur on account of the directions of the concerned authorities under the said Act, the petitioner shall also pay interest @ 12% per annum from the date when the demand was liable to be paid under the impugned notice dated 04.10.1989 till the date of payment.
20.Parties are left to bear their own costs.