J.D. Jain, J.
(1) The controversy in this revision petition lies in a very narrow compass, the sole question which falls for determination being whether the civil courts have jurisdiction to try the suit instituted by the plaintiff-petitioner against the defendants-respondents with respect to a plot of land bearing No. 46 (old)/10 (new) Manohar Park situated in the revenue estate of Basai Darapur.
(2) The facts germane to the decision of this petition in brief are that way back in 1966 the petitioner instituted a suit for possession of a plot of land measuring 200 sq. yards and bearing No. 46 (old)/10 (new) on the ground that he bad purchased the same from Raghbir Singb, respondent No. 2 vide registered sale deed dated 25th March 1960 and be was put into possession thereof by the vendor. However, sometime in 1965 be learnt that respondents, l, 3 & 4 respondent 3 & 4 being daughters of respondent No. I had illegally occupied the same and bad built a boundary wall and some rooms thereon. The suit was contested by respondents 1,' 3 & 4 who asserted that Smt.Usha, respondent No. 4, had purchased a plot of land bearing No. 48 (old) corresponding to new No. 10 situated in the revenue estate of Basai Darapur from respondent No. 2 vide sale deed dated 25/6/1960 which was later on amended vide corrigendum deed dated 7/2/1962 after obtaining the necessary sanction from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (for short 'the Corporation') and as such she was in possession of the said plot in her own right as owner. The respondents, however, raised a preliminary objection to the effect that Raghbir Singh respondent No. 2 was bhumidar of the land in question and as such suit for possession of the same was maintainable in the Revenue Court as provided for in the Delhi Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Consequently the civil courts bad no jurisdiction to try the same.
(3) Faced with this situation, the plaintiff-petitioner amended his plaint and, inter alia, averred that the plot described as bearing No. 48 (old) by the defendant-respondent was in fact the same which he had purchased from respondent No. 2 but the latter played fraud by misrepresenting that plot as bearing No. 48 (old) instead of 46 (old) in respect of which respondent No. 2 had earlier executed a sale deed in petitioner's favor. He ) also asserted that the plot in question is situated within the urbanised area of Municipal Corporation of Delhi and as such the provisions of the Act 1 were not attracted to the same.
(4) It would appear from the record that Raghbir Singh was originally owner of Khasra Nos. 216 to 221 and 223 situated in the revenue estate of Basai Darapur and he was declared bhumidar thereof after the Act came into force in the Union Territory of Delhi. However, he carved out a number of plots in the aforesaid khasra numbers and got the layout plan duly sanctioned from the Corporation (vide resolution No. 292 dated 24/6/1960 of the Standing Committee of the Corporation). Thereafter, he sold plots to various persons including the petitioner and respondent No. 4. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that Raghbir Singh, respondent No. 2 being bhumidar of the land in question, the petitioner could at best claim to be a bhumidar in respect of the plot in question by virtue of its purchase and on his own showing the respondents were in occupation thereof as trespassers. Thus, the only remedy available to the petitioner is under Section 84 read with Section 185 of the Act and Schedule 1 annexed thereto. On the other hand, the submission of the petitioner is that the- aforesaid land having been urbanised under the provision of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (for short 'DMC Act'), it was no longer governed by the provisions of the Act. Hence, the civil court has jurisdiction to try the suit for possession thereof.
(5) The Act came into force in July 1954. It extends to the whole of the Union Territory of Delhi but docs not apply to the areas which are or may, before the first day of November, 1956, be included in a municipality or a notified area under the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911oracantonmentundcrthe provisions of the cantonment Act, 1924 (Sec Section 1, Sub-section (2) (a) of the Act).
(6) Relying on this provision the learned counsel for the respondents has canvassed with considerable fervour that the revenue estate of Basai Darapur not being included in a municipality or a notified area under the Punjab Municipal Act or the cantonment area uptil November 1956 would be still governed by the provisions of the Act and the Dmc Act will not apply to the same because the Dmc Act came into force much afterwards. In order to appreciate the validity of this argument, thereforee, we have to examine the relevant provisions of the Dmc Act which came into force during 1957-58. The Dmc Act extends to Delhi which means the entire area of the Union Territory of Delhi excepting New Delhi and Delhi Cantonment (vide Section 2(10) thereof. 'New Delhi' has been defined to mean the area within the boundaries described in the First Schedule (see Section 2(32). Section 514 further provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Punjab Municipal Act 1911 as applicable to New Delhi Municipality or in any notified area there under the limits of that municipality shall be as described in the First Schedule. The combined effect of these provisions would, thereforee, be that the Dmc Act will extend to whole of the Union Territory of Delhi minus the areas falling under the jurisdiction of New Delhi Municipality and Delhi cantonment. Hence, the jurisdiction of the Dmc Act extends to not only urbanised areas but also rural areas in the Union Territory of Delhi excepting of course, the areas falling under New Delhi Municipality and Delhi cantonment. Section 2(52) defines 'rural areas' as meaning the areas of Delhi which immediately before the establishment of the Corporation were situated within the local limits of the District Board of Delhi established under the Punjab District Boards Act, 1883 but do not include such portion thereof as may by virtue of a notification under Section 507 cease to be included in the rural areas as defined therein. Under Section 2(61) of the Dmc Act 'urban areas' mean the areas of Delhi which are not rural areas. Obviously, thereforee, the Dmc Act draws a distinction between 'rural areas' and 'urban areas' and it also provides for conversion of rural areas into urban areas by issuing notification under Section 507. It may be also pertinent to notice here that the second schedule lists the bodies and local authorities whose functions' have been taken over by the Corporation. These include the erstwhile Municipal Committees of Delhi, Delhi-Shahdara, West Delhi, South Delhi, various Notified Area Committees and the District Board, Delhi etc.
(7) On a mere juxtaposition of various provisions of the Dmc Act adverted to above, and Section 1 (2) (a) of the Act.it is abundantly clear that the jurisdiction of the Corporation extends over the whole of the Union Territory of Delhi minus the areas falling under New Delhi Municipality and Delhi cantonment Board. However, the operation of the Act is restricted further by excluding the areas which were included in a municipality or a notified area under the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act before the first day of November 1956. The crucial question for determination is whether the areas to which the Act applies will still be governed by the provisions of the Act even though the same fall within the jurisdiction of A the Corporation also.
(8) The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the revenue estate of Basai Darapur was declared as urban area by the Corporation with the previous approval of the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred by Section 507 of the Dmc Act vide two notifications, namely, (i) bearing No. F9/5/59-R & S dated 28/12/1959 and (ii) No. RNZ/526 dated 23/5/1963 and in consequence thereof the Act ceased to be operative in Basai Darapur. perusal of the said notifications would show that a part of the land comprised in the revenue estate of Basai Darapur ceased to be rural area vide notification dated 28/12/1959 and the remaining land of Basai Darapur too ceased to be rural by notification of 1963. It is, thereforee, beyond the pale of controversy that the whole of the revenue estate of Basai Darapur is no longer rural area within the meaning of Section 2(52) of the Dmc Act. To put it differently, it now forms part of urban areas comprised in the limits of the Corporation. The critical queson, however, would be whether exclusion of Basai Darapur from rural areas and its inclusion in the urban areas for the purposes of Dmc Act would in any way impinge upon the operation of the Act in that area by virtue of the notifications issued under Section 507. The said section contains some special provisions as to rural areas. It provides that the Corporation may with previous approval of the Central Government declare that any portion of the rural areas shall cease to be included therein and upon the issue of such notification that shall be included in and form and integral part of the urban area. It does not say as to what would be the effect of the change so brought about on the operation of the Act in the area so excluded indeed, the Dmc Act does not in terms repeal or over-ride any of the provisions contained in the Act. It does not even say that the Act or any provision thereof would cease to be operative in any area which is declared urban under the said section. So the only possible effect of the transformation of certain rural areas into urban areas would be to deprive the rural areas of the benefits and concessions which they may be enjoying under clause (b) of Section 507 i.e. exemption of' the rural areas or any portion thereof from such of the provisions of the Act as the corporation deems fit and levy of lower rates of taxes and fees etc. but that would not render the provisions of the Act inapplicable to such areas. In other words, there is considerable merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the provisions of the Act would remain in force in the areas mentioned in Section 1(2) (a) of the Act even after coming into force of Dmc Act because the latter Act covers both urban and rural areas irrespective of the fact whether the provisions of the Act are applicable thereto or not. Unless, thereforee, some more areas excluded from the operation of the Act by specifically amending Section 1(2) (a) thereof, the mere fact that an erstwhile rural area has ceased to be so by conversion into urban area by virtue of a notification issued winder Section 507 cannot proprio vigore have the effect of excluding that area from the operation of the Act. In other words, nothing turns on the notifications adverted to above so far as the critical question arising in this case is concerned and the answer may have to be found elsewhere
(9) As stated above, Raghbir Singh was admittedly a bhumidar of the land in question. However, he prepared a layout plan carving out a large number of plots for building purposes and he sold those plots after obtaining the requisite sanction from the municipal authorities under Section 313 of Dmc Act. Section 312 of the Dmc Act provides that if the owner of any land ells, leases oututilises, or otherwise disposes of such land for the construction of buildings thereon he shall lay down and make a street or streets giving access to the plots into which the land may be divided and connecting with an existing public or private street. Section 313 further lays down that before utilising, telling or otherwise dealing with any land under Section 312, the owner thereof shall send to the Commissioner a written application with a layout plan showing the particulars specified therein for obtaining necessary sanction and Sub-section (3) of Section 313 empowers the Standing Committee of the Corporation to either accord sanction to the layout plan on such conditions as it may think fit or disallow it or ask for further information with respect to it. Since the land in question falls within the jurisdiction of the Corporation it was incumbent upon Raghbir Singh to obtain requisite sanction from the Corporation with regard to the layout plan before he could sell the same in the form of plots. This is precisely what he did and it is common ground between the parties that both of them purchased a plot each from Raghbir Singh in the colony called 'Manohar Park'. Ex. 25 is the original layout plan of Manohar Park which was duly sanctioned by the Standing Committee of the Corporation on 24th June, 1960. Thus there can be no room for doubt that the plots in question have been duly approved and sanctioned by the Corporation for construction of buildings. The question would, thereforee immediately arise whether despite the land having been sold in the form of plots pursuant to the necessary sanction obtained from the Corporation it can still be called land within the meaning of the Act io as to exclude the Jurisdiction of the civil courts. On giving. my careful thought and consideration, I am persuaded to reply the same in the negative.
(10) Section 2(13) of the Act defines 'land' as under :
''land' except in Sections 23 and 24, means land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming and includes- (a) buildings appurtenant thereto, (b) village abadis, (c) grovelands, (d) lands for village pasture or land covered by water and used for growing sigharas and other produce or land in the bed of a river and used for casual or occasional cultivation, but does not include- land occupied by buildings in belts of areas adjacent to Delhi town and New Delhi town, which the Chief Commissioner may by a notification in the official Gazette declare as an acquisition thereto.'
(11) On its plain language it is manifest that any land before it can be termed land' for the purpose of the Act must be held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry etc. Admittedly the land in question has not been used for any of the purposes contemplated therein since 1960 or even earlier when the layout plan was submitted to the Corporation for necessary sanction. It is so stated not only in the sale deeds executed by Raghbir Singh, respondent No. 2, in favor of the petitioner as well as respondent No. 4 but is also manifest from the khasra girdavari for the year 1965-66, a copy of which is to be found at page 271 of the trial Court record. Its perusal would show that while Raghbir Singh was recorded as bhumidar under column 4 thereof the whole of the land has been described as 'Gair Mumkin Plot Wa Makan,' i.e. uncultivable land under plots and buildings. It thus ceased to be land for the purposes of the Act. If that be so, the provisions thereof will no longer apply and the remedy of the aggrieved party, if any, would be under the general law of the land. As stated in the preamble to the Act itself, the Act was designed to provide for modification of zamindari system so as to create a uniform body of peasant proprietors without intermediaries, for the unification of the Punjab and Agra systems of tenancy laws in force in the State of Delhi Fand to make provision for other matters connected therewith. Consequently, the erstwhile proprietors of agricultural land in the Union Territory of Delhi ceased to exist after the Act came into force and if any land was part of a holding of a proprietor he became a bhnmidar of it. If it was part of a holding of some other person such as tenant or sub-tenant etc. he became either a bhumidar or an asami, whereupon the rights of the proprietor in that land ceased. Lands, which were not holdings of either the proprietor 841). Scc 2 (1970) Singh, Sunder v. Hatti (See Sabha Gaon the in veiled person, other any
(12) SO. under the provisions of the Act, a person could either be a bhumidar of agricultural land or he could be an asami. (See Section 4(1) of the Act). Section 22 of the Act provides that :
'ABhumidar or Asami shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have the right to the exclusive possession of all land comprised in his respective holding and to use land for any purpose connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry farming and to make any improvement.'
(13) Evidently user of the land for any purpose other than that connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry etc. by a bhumidar is prohibited by this Section. However, Section 23 allows a bhumidar or an asamisto use his holding or part thereof for industrial purposes other than those immediately connected with any of the purposes referred to in Section 22 if the same is situated within the belt declared for the purpose by the Chief Commissioner by notification in the official gazette. He may also do so after obtaining sanction of the Chief Commissioner in the prescribed manner even though the land does not lie within such a belt. It is thus essential for a bhumidar to retain possession of its holding at all material times and to use the same for the purposes specified in Section 22 only if he is to continue to be a bhumidar. Section 33(1) debars a bhumidar from transferring by sale or gift or otherwise any land to any person other than a religious or charitable institution if as a result of the transfer, the transferor shall be left with less than eight standard acres of land in the Union Territory of Delhi. Of course, he can transfer the whole of his land as envisaged in Sub-section (2) of Section 33 if his entire holding is less than eight standard acres.
(14) Section 35 debars a bhumidar from letting, for any period whatsoever, any land comprised in his holding except in the cases provided for in Section 36. Section 36 enumerates the categories of bhumidars who are permitted to let the whole or any part of his holding. These include widows, minors, lunatics and persons incapable of cultivating themselves by reason of blindness or physical infirmity etc. Under Section 43 of the Act, transfer of holding or part thereof accompanied with possession is deemed to be a sale. Section 44 lays down the consequences which flow from a bhumidar letting his holding or part of it in contravention of the provisions contained in Section 35 and 36 of the Act and the lessee shall then be deemed to be purchaser within the meanings of Sections 33 and 42. The latter Section provides that on transfer of any holding or a part thereof by a bhumidar in contravention of the provisions of the Act, the transferee and every other person who may have obtained possession of such holding shall notwithstanding anything in any law be liable to ejectment from such holding or part thereof on the suit of the Gaon Sabha. Even the revenue assistant on receipt of information about the same can take action on his own motion to eject the transferee and every person who may have obtained possession, as stated above. Section 47 provides for the consequences of ejectment winder Section 42 and lays down that all the rights and interests of bhumidar in the holding shall stand extinguished.
(15) Section 81 of the Act too provides for penalty which a bhumidar may entail if he uses the land for any purpose other than a purpose connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry, the penalty being that he is liable to ejectment on the suit of the Gaon Sabha and he is also liable to pay damages. Thus, on a bare perusal of the foregoing provisions of the Act it is manifest that the bhumidar is bound not only to retain possession of his land but also use it for specified purposes at all material times if he is to continue to be a bhumidar. A perusal of Section 84 to 87 would further countenance this conclusion.
(16) In Ram Mehar v. Mst. Dakhan, (1972) Ii Delhi 922, a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider all these and some other provisions of the Act in order to determine whether succession to bhumidari of a Hindu bhumidar was governed by the provisions of the Act or Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Their Lordships held that :
'THUS,it is quite plain that the interests of a bhumidar is quite different from that of a normal tenant. But it is quite clear from the various provisions of the Act detailed above that a bhumidar has not an unrestricted interest of his land. He is given the right to use the land in a particular manner. He cannot lease out the land, be cannot transfer possession of it and he has to use it for agriculture. In a sense the bhumidar can be described as a tenant holding land under the State.'
(17) Still later, another Division Bench of this Court considered all these and other provisions of the Act in order to determine whether alienation of bhumidari rights could be challenged by the female lineal of the bhumidar under the customary law or whether the right and interest of bhumidar in agricultural land were controlled by the provisions of the Act only. Observed their Lordships: .
'THESE provisions and various other provisions of the Act show that a Bhumidar does not have an unrestricted interest in the agricultural land which was held by him before the commencement of the Act as an owner or proprietor. After the commencement of the Act and the declaration of the Bhumidari rights, he is only given the right to use the agricultural land in a particular manner as specified in the statutory provisions. There are restrictions laid down on the rights of a Bhumidar to create leases. A Bhumidar cannot transfer possession of the land. A Bhumidar is obliged to use the land for agricultural purposes. A Bhumidar is only a tenure holder having lost the right of ownership on agricultural land after the commencement of the Act. There is, however, a great security of the tenure under the Act. Bhumidari rights are, thereforee, special rights created on the abolition of the ownership of the agricultural land and are controlled and regulated by the provisions of the Act. The language of Section 5 of the Act shows that a Bhumidar has all the rights and is subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon a Bhumidar by or under the Act. The rights to the tenure holder arc granted under the provisions of the Act. The restrictions imposed on the rights of a Bhumidar arc also by or under the Act. There is no warrant to travel outside the Act, and the Rules for further restrictions in the right or manner of transfer of the Bhumidari rights.'
(See Nathu v. Hukam Singh and others : AIR1983Delhi216 .
(18) In view of the foregoing statement of law as regards nature, extent and scope of the rights of a bhumidar over his holding, there can be no room for doubt that his action in carving out a number of plots out of his holding for sale as such was clearly in total violation of the various provisions of the Act adverted to above. However, it was open to the concerned persons/authorities like Gaon Sabha to take action under various provisions of the Act by way of ejectment etc. not onlyofre(r)pondentNo.2butalso of the transferees and other persons who had come to occupy the land in contravention of the provisions of the Act. However, that is not the subject matter of this case as we are concerned with the only question whether the provisions of the Act would still be applicable so as to oust the jurisdiction of civil courts.
(19) Reverting to the provisions contained in Sections 312 & 313 of the Dmc Act it is manifest that it is obligatory on an owner to obtain the requisite sanction with regard to the layout plan if he intends to utilise, lease out or otherwise dispose of the land for construction of buildings thereon. Obviously he would be entitled to such sanction if he satisfies the municipal authorities on various aspects enumerated in Section 313 itself. Since the land in question fell within the jurisdiction of the Corporation also, it was incumbent on respondent No. 2 to get the layout plan sanctioned from the Corporation irrespective of whether the land was situated in an urban area or in a rural area. This is precisely what he did as would appear from the sanctioned layout plan. Ex. P5. Since the Corporation was. exercising jurisdiction over the land in question it was competent to grant the requisite sanction. Indeed, it was its duty to ensure that the layout plan was in conformity with the requirements of the Dmc Act and the by laws made there under. Hence by no stretch of reasoning the sanction granted by the Corporation can be said to be wrongful or illegal.
(20) Finding himself in this predicament, the learned counsel for the respondent made a feeble attempt to urge that the Corporation ought not to have sanctioned the layer plan because the proposed user was in total contravention of the provisions of the Act. To me it appears to be an argument of despair. Sub-section (4) of Section 313 provides for the eventualities in which the Corporation is bound to refuse sanction. It nowhere contemplates that the sanction is to be refused because the layout plan for building purposes may offend the provisions of another enactment. Perhaps the idea that the layout plan constituted an infringement of the provisions of the Act did not even occur to the concerned municipal authority. Anyhow, it is one thing to say that the municipal authorities ought to have taken notice of this aspect of the matter and another to say that they were bound to do so. In other words, the sanction of the layout plan is not vitiated by any illegality which would render it nonest.. Needless to say that the Dmc Act is a later enactment. It creates a totally different jurisdiction and operates in entirely different sphere. As observed earlier, the object and the purpose of the Act was to do away with all intermediaries and abolish ownership rights in the agricultural land by creating new rights for the purposes of the Act. It has brought into existence new class of tenure holders called 'bhumidars'' and sub-tenure holders called 'asamis' and they are required to use the land for agricultural purposes and purposes akin thereto. Various provisions contained in the Act are aimed at ensuring the same. However, the aim and object of the Dmc Act is to consolidate and amend the law relating to the municipal government of Delhi. Its purpose is to regulate matters regarding public convenience and civic amenities so as to prevent haphazard construction of buildings and streets and provide efficient lighting system etc. Since Dmc Act is a later statute in point of time, its provisions must take precedence over the provisions of the Act in the event of there being any conflict or inconsistency between them. Since both these acts operate in different spheres and create different types of jurisdictions the question of implied repeal of the Act by the Dmc Act as such does not, however, arise. It is settled law that the court leans against implying a repeal and unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both of them at the same time, a repeal will not be implied. However, if there is a inconsistency which precludes the two Acts standing together, the latest expression of the will of the Parliament must always prevail. I find support in this view of the matter from the following observation of V.S. Deshpande, J. (as he then was) in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Hira Lal (1971) 1 Del 250 :
'IF at all, there is any inconsistency between the provisions of the Corporation Act and the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act and the Panchayat Raj Act, then it is the provisions of the Corporation Act which will prevail to the extent of the repugnancy for two reasons, namely : (i) The Corporation Act of 1957 being subsequent to the Land Reforms Act and the Panchayat Raj Act prevails over the previous enactments to the extent of repugnancy ; and (ii) Section 22 of the Government of Part C States Act, 1951 so provides.'
(See also in this context Full Bench decision of this Court in Ganga Ram v. Mohd. Usman : AIR1978Delhi107 .
(21) The upshot of the whole discussion, thereforee, is that the plot in question has since long ceased to be land as defined in Section 2(13) of the Act and as such provisions of the Act can no longer apply to the same. As a necessary corollary it would follow that jurisdiction of the civil courts which are courts of plenary jurisdiction, to try the suit in respect thereof would not be barred either expressly or by necessary implication as envisaged in Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, the impugned orders of the courts below cannot be sustained. Accordingly, I set aside the same and remand the case to the trial Court for fresh decision in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the court of Senior Sub Judge on 28/4/1986 for further directions.