Vikramajit Sen, J.
1. This Revision is directed against the Judgment of the Additional Rent Controller, (hereinafter referred to as 'ARC') Delhi in a petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control (hereinafter referred as DRC) Act, 1958. The judgment is lucid, well reasoned and had dealt with all the relevant questions that have arisen in these proceedings.
2. The facts are that the Appellant's tenancy commenced on permission being granted under Section 21 of the DRC Act. The Petition had been filed by Smt. Lajwanti Devi, the mother of the Respondent Smt. Iqbal Kaur. The uncontrovertable assumption that can be immediately drawn is that late Smt. Lajwanti Devi was the owner of the premises since this factor cannot be assailed by the tenant as he had been placed in possession of the demised premises by her. Secondly, it must also be assumed that the premises were let for residential purposes only. If the purpose of letting was subsequently changed it must necessarily be expressed in a written document, which in the present case, admittedly does not exist. This argument was raised by Mr. Chandiok, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner on these questions. The ARC has rejected the tenant's arguments in the original proceedings, and in my view correctly so. Once the title of late Smt. Lajwanti Devi cannot be assailed because of the provisions of the Evidence Act, all her legal heirs would become co-owners. In the present case the legal heirs, i.e. the petitioner's brother Inderjeet Singh, and her sister Daljit Kaur and Harbhajan Kaur have executed a Relinquishment Deed in her favor. Considerable effort was made to assail the legal efficacy of the Relinquishment Deed. This question loses of significance if it is borne in mind that any one co-owner is as entitled to seek the eviction of the tenant. thereforee, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Relinquishment Deed should be ignored, the petition is still maintainable.
3. Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act specifically enables only the owner of residential property, in contradistinction to its mere landlord, to seek the eviction of the tenant for the owner's bona fide residential need. Attention should be drawn to the following passage from the Apex Court's decision in Shanti Sharma and Ors. v. Smt. Ved Prabha and Ors., : [1987]3SCR1075 :
'The word 'owner' has not been defined in this Act and the word 'owner' has also not been defined in the Transfer of property Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be that ownership means absolute ownership in the thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the person who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some terms form the Govt. or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could but be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term 'owner' in the provision of Section 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as ti is understood at present. It could not be doubted that the term 'owner' has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act, This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term 'owner' is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. So far as the land is concerned he holds a long lease ad in this view of the matter as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall within the ambit of the meaning of the term 'owner' as is contemplated under this section.'
4. It would also be relevant to mention that in cases where the ownership of the petitioner, in proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, was questioned by the tenant, it has been opined in a series of judgments that all that is required is the existence of some vestige of ownership. The important factor which must exist in favor of the petitioner in such proceedings is that the petitioner is something more than a mere landlord. In the present case, it cannot be overlooked that the mutation of the premises has been effected in the name of the petitioner, namely Ms. Iqbal Kaur. The argument raised on behalf of the tenant in this petition, are accordingly, rejected.
5. It is next contended that the premises comprised three rooms and one room is used by the tenant for the business of the sale of soft drinks. There is a legal bar in the tenant raising the question of a change in user, since initially it has been let for residential purposes only, by means of an order under Section 21 of the DRC Act. Even if this is ignored, there is no alternative but to view this submission as setting out an incidental user of the premises for non-residential purpose. This would not result in non-suiting the petitioner/owner from an eviction order under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. Reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. A.N. Kapoor v. Smt. Pushpa Talwar, : [1992]1SCR472 is of no avail to the tenant since the non-residential user is itself in serious doubt. Evidence has been led to the effect that the soft drink business was carried out by the Tenant from other premises. Unlike in Kapoor's case (supra), at the highest there may be at best only an incidental non-residential user, without the consent of any of the owners. However, from the evidence that has been recorded before the ARC, even this incidental commercial user holds no water.
6. The bona fides of the petitioner should now be considered. The case set out before the ARC is that Ms. Iqbal Kaur has been living on the largesse of her brother Inderjeet Singh. His family has increased. He has school gong daughters all of whom would require their privacy. This change in requirement should not be overlooked. thereforee, while the earlier circumstances in which the petitioner was living peacefully with her brother's family have altered significantly. It has also been averred that the relations between Ms. Iqbal Kaur and her sister-in-law have become strained. This is only natural, and is bound to occur wherever there is a paucity of accommodation. A practical and pragmatic approach is to be pursued in these matters. I also find no merit whatsoever in the contention that, being a single lady, it is inconceivable for Ms. Iqbal Kaur to move to the premises and set up independent residence. It has not been controverter that she is a teacher with the MCD school earning a comfortable salary. Her bona fide needs for the use of the premises for her personal residence are beyond attack.
7. The petition is wholly without merit and is dismissed with costs of Rs. 3000/-. All pending applications are also dismissed.