Judgment:
Sunanda Bhandare, J.
(1) The appellant landlord who was working in United States of America as an Administrative Assistant in the World Bank, let out the first floor of his house no. 0-161, Naraina Vihar New Delhi on 13th October 19^8 for a limited period of 22 months. The reason given in the affidavit in support of the application for letting out the premises for a limited period was that he did not require the premises for a period of 22 months and thereafter he would need the premises for his own use and occupation because he was likely to be transferred back to India The Additional Rent Controller after considering the application of the appellant, the statement of the attorney of the appellant and the statement of the respondent granted permission to the respondent to occupy the premises till 12th August 1980. At the time when the permission was granted, the appellant's father Along with the appellant's mother and brother were residing in rented premises at 14/17 East Patel Nagar, New Delhi Since the respondent did not vacate the premises after the expiry of the period, the appellant filed an application for execution before the Additional Rent Controller which was objected to by the respondent. The Additional Rent Controller by order dated 7th January 1985 dismissed the application filed by the appellant. The appellant filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal which was also dismissed by order dated 29th November 1985. The appellant has challenged these two orders in this second appeal.
(2) It is the case of the appellant that during the period of 22 months of the tenancy, certain material changes took place. The ground floor of the property at G-161, Naraina Vihar, New Delhi which was under the tenancy of M.E.O. Delhi Cantt fell vacant on 11th November 1980. His father who was staying at East Patel Nagar had to vacate the premises because he lost in the eviction petition filed by his landlord and the father Along with the mother shifted to the ground floor flat. The appellant's brother Shri Devender Nath Sethia Along with his family comprising of his wife, three daughters and one son who lived with the father bad to shift lo rented accommodation of two rooms belonging to his father-in-law at Tilak Nagar, New Delhi. The appellant did not succeed in getting himself transferred to India before the execution petition was filed but now because of the re-organisation of the World Bank, the appellant has lost his assignment with the World Bank and be has been asked to shift his household effects and car to New Delhi on or before 30th November 1988.
(3) It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the observation of the Additional Rent Controller that no reason was mentioned in the application under Section 21 for letting out the premises is not correct. Reason was given in the application. The Rent Control Tribunal did not agree with the Additional Rent Controller but held that though reason was given it was a mindless order because the appellant had not proved that he was likely to be transferred to India and, thereforee, the reason given by him was not bona fide. Learned counsel submitted that this finding of the Rent Control Tribunal is not correct because when the appellant gave the premises to the respondent he was hoping to get himself transferred back to India in the near future. Though he did not succeed in getting the transfer, the reason given in the application was genuine. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, : [1987]3SCR765 and submitted that what is necessary is that the statement of the landlord must be bona fide and there must not be any fraud or collusion. Learned counsel contended that the very fact that the appellant has now come back to India for good and has lost his assignment with the World Bank shows that the reason given by him in the application was bona fide. The other circumstances regarding the need of the father and the brother mentioned in the application for execution were only additional and incidental.
(4) The main objection raised by the respondent is that at the time when the application for creating a limited tenancy was made and the order passed by the Additional Rent Controller, the need of the appellant mentioned in the application was not bona fide and there likelihood of the appellant coming back to India within the specified period and the Additional Rent Controller had passed a mindless order while allowing the application under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
(5) It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that even assuming it is accepted that the appellant-landlord has now come back to India because his assignment with the World Bank has been terminated, what is to be seen is whether there was enough evidence before the Additional Rent Controller to enable him to give a decision whether the reason given by the landlord for letting out the premises for limited period was bona fide and genuine. Learned counsel submitted that even at the time when the application for execution was moved, the appellant continued to be employed with the World Bank and continued to reside in United State of America. In the application be put up a new case of bona fide need because of the eviction of his father and brother ; and even if the appellant has now lost his job and come back to India during the pendency of the second appeal, the subsequent fact should not weigh with the court in deciding whether the Additional Rent Controller had applied his mind when he passed the first order permitting limited tenancy. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.B. Naronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, : [1980]1SCR281 and V.S. Rahi v. Smt. Ram Chambeli : [1984]2SCR290 and submitted that since the Additional Rent Controller's order for limited tenancy of 22 months was a mindless order, the appellant is not entitled to execution of that order.
(6) The Supreme Court in the cases of S.B. Naronah (supra), V.S. Rahi (supra). J. R. Vohra v. India Export House Pvt. Ltd. & Another : [1985]2SCR899 and Smt. Dhanwanti v. D.D. Gupta : [1986]3SCR18 has considered the scope and ambit of Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In the latest judgment in the case of Inder Mohan Lal (supra), the Supreme Court on the analysis of the section and the judgments referred to hereinabove has very succinctly observed as follows :-
'AN analysis of the judgment which has been applied in the various cases would indicate that Section 21 only gives sanction if the landlord makes a statement to the satisfaction of the court and the tenant accepts that the landlord does not require the premises for a limited period: this statement of the landlord must be bona fide. The purpose must be residence. There must not be any fraud or collusion. There is a presumption of regularity. But it is open in particular facts and circumstances of the case to prove to the satisfaction of the executing court that there was no (sic) collusion or conspiracy between the landlord and the tenant and the landlord did not mean what he said or that it was a fraud or that the tenant agreed because the tenant was wholly unequal to the landlord.'
The order of the Additional Rent Controller granting permission for limited tenancy has to be seen in the light of the above observations of the Supreme Court in Inder Mohan Lal's case (supra). Whether the appellant was guilty of fraud and collusion will depend on the genuineness of the reason given by the appellant in the application. If the reason given was bona fide even if the circumstances changed later, the original order cannot be called mindless. The onus of proving that the landlord had made a false or a wrong statement is on the tenant who objects to the execution of the decree In the present case, I find that the respondent-tenant has not discharged that onus at all. There is nothing on record to indicate that there was no intention on the part of the appellant to return back to India or to occupy the premises himself. In Smt. Dhanwanti's case (supra) the Supreme Court observed as follows :
'IT is perfectly possible for the owner of a premises, on looking to the immediate future, to find that for certain reasons he is unable to occupy the premises forthwith himself but that he may do so later in the not very distant future. It is not always that a man can plan his life ahead with any degree of definiteness. Prevailing uncertainty in the circumstances surrounding him may not permit clear-sighted Vision into the future. The circumstances may justify his envisioning his need for the premises two or three years later and, thereforee, applying for permission under Section 21 of the Act to let out the premises accordingly. And yet, thereafter, on the expiry of that period he may find that the circumstances have changed and his use of the premises has now to be postponed by another few years.
(7) From the pleadings, it appears that the reason given by the appellant in the application for permission to let out for a limited period of 22 months was that 'he will need the premises after 22 months because he was likely to be transferred to India.' The respondents in his objections has nowhere stated that when the permission was sought by the appellant, there was no likelihood of the petitioner being transferred back to India. The respondent-tenant only stated that the petitioner is residing in Washington for the last several years Along with his wife and children. As observed by the Supreme Court in Smt. Dhanwanti's case (supra) even if the landlord had reasonably expected to come back at the end of the specified then the reason given by him when he sought the permission must be held to be bona fide. A man working in a world organisation and posted in a foreign country may have reasonable plans of coming back to his country at some stage and yet he may not succeed in coming back on a given date for some reason beyond his control. The fact that the appellant has returned back to India now during the pendency of the second appeal indicates that he had all throughout contemplated coming back to India after the expiry of his assignment with the World Bank. The court cannot completely ignore subsequent events. The genuineness of the reason at the time when it was given has not been considered by the courts below at all. The fact that the appellant still continued to be in Washington when the execution application was filed, would not, to my mind, make the original reason false. The additional grounds mentioned by the petitioner in the application for execution regarding the need of his aged father and his brother would not alter the situation in any manner. The additional grounds would strengthen the case of the appellant that the premises were bona fide needed by him for his own use. To my mind, these additional grounds would not make his original reason mala fide. In my view, both the courts below considered the additional grounds in detail but lost track of the fact that the tenant has failed to prove that the original reason given by the appellant at the time the permission was given, was not bona fide. In my opinion, this is not a case of a fraud played on the court and it cannot be said that the order granting permission for limited tenancy was a mindless order.
(8) I, thereforee, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 7th January 1985 and the Rent Control Tribunal dated 29th November 1985. In the result, the objections of the respondent filed before the Additional Rent Controller on 3rd October 1980 and 11th February 1981 are dismissed. I direct the Additional Rent Controller to issue warrants of possession of the premises in question against the tenant and in favor of the appellant-landlord. In the circumstances of the case however, the parties will bear their own costs.