S. Ravindra Bhat, J.
1. In this letters patent appeal, the judgment and order of a learned single judge, allowing the writ petition of MCD ( WP 6935/03 dated 27th February, 2004) has been questioned.
2. The first issue raised here is the same as in LPA 233/03, namely what is meant by to give a notice, as per Sections 126(2) and (4)(b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereafter called the Act ). We have today delivered judgment dismissing the appeal of the MCD. In that judgment, it has been held that a notice is said to be given under Section 126, not on its date of dispatch under registered post, but, as per Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, read with Section 444 of the Act, when it would be delivered in the ordinary course of post, unless a contrary date is proved.
3. The judgment under appeal dated 27.2.04, has relied upon the decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. R.K. Khandelwal, : 101(2002)DLT169 . That judgment, as noticed by the learned single judge, was in the context of the making of an order under Section 126(4) and not concerned with the expression give a notice under Section 126. Besides, the said judgment has been set aside in the Division Bench judgment dated ( WA No 938/03, R.K. Khandelwal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi decided on 25.08.2004
4. The notice, in the present case, dated 24-3-1998, proposing enhancement was dispatched on 27th March, 1999 by registered post, and actually received on 3rd April, 1999. The notice proposed enhancement with effect from 1-4-1998. These facts have been found by the Appellate court, which allowed the appellant s appeal. The Additional District Judge also negatived the contention of MCD that the assessed had been served with the notice by pasting/ affixation, on 31-3-1999.
5. The appellant s writ petition was rejected by the learned single judge, who held that service had been effected, on the issuance of the notice, as per the single judge s decision in Khandelwal s case ( supra). In view of the fact that the judgment in Khandelwal s case is no longer correct law, the reasoning of the learned single judge on that issue cannot be sustained. We thereforee follow the reasoning in the judgment in LPA No. 233/03 on this issue.
6. The second issue which arises for our consideration is whether the notice in the present case can be said to be in accordance with law, since it contained vague reasons. The notice indicated, against the heading Reasons in brief for amendment in the Assessment List the following grounds:
Erroneously valued increase in rent. Alteration/ renovation
7. The notice proposed to increase the existing rateable value in respect of the building from Rs. 1,25,000/- to Rs. 30,80,400/-. The order was passed on 16.11.01 fixing the rateable value at Rs. 22, 37,300/-. Later, the assessment order was rectified on 7-1-02 when the rateable value was fixed @ Rs.17,88,380/- with effect from 1-4-1998; Rs. 18,77,116/- with effect from 1-5-1998 and Rs. 22,32,080/- with effect from 1-11-2000.
8. The learned Additional District Judge, allowing the appeal, held that the notice could not be sustained, as it did not disclose even brief reasons in support of the proposal for enhancement. The decision in Savitri Devi v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, : 55(1994)DLT391 and the single judge s judgment in K.L. Rathi's case, : AIR1995Delhi226 were relied upon in support of the said proposition.
9. Mr. Sandeep Bhalla, appearing for the appellant, submitted that the notice in the present case cited four reasons, namely error in value, increase in rent, alteration and renovation. It was thereforee incumbent upon the authorities to indicate, albeit briefly, the reasons or grounds in support of each head, with some particulars, to enable the assessed to effectively deal with the proposal. In the absence of any reasons, or quantification of the increase, it was impossible for the assessed to answer to the notice. Hence, the notice violated principles of natural justice.
10. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision in DCM Ltd v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, : AIR1998Delhi348 in support of the submission that giving the basis or reasons in the notice is necessary when the assesee has to answer it. The consequence of an action pursuant to the notice can be serious. Hence, fairness and reasonableness demand that the show cause notice, proposing enhancement, should briefly indicate some reasons. Counsel has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Collector v. P. Mangamma, : [2003]2SCR430 as to what is meant by reasonableness .
11. The learned counsel for MCD, Ms. Geeta Mehrotra, sought to sustain the findings of the learned single judge, both on the issue of service of notice, as well as on the issue that there is no requirement of stating reasons, in the notice. According to her the notice in question contained sufficient particulars to enable the assessed to answer the proposed enhancement in rateable value. She also submitted that even if the notice were deemed not to have been sent within the time stipulated, nevertheless it was served by affixation on 31-3-1999 and was, thereforee, within the time prescribed under Section 126.
12. Before dealing with the contention regarding the sufficiency or adequacy of reasons in the notices in question, we may state that the issue about the notice being valid for periods other than the one for which it proposed a rateable value, has also be in answered in LPA 233/03. It has been held there that in the absence of a notice for such subsequent period or periods, a notice that is invalid, or illegal, for the purpose of enhancement in respect of one particular year, on the ground of its non-service, as per law, cannot be the basis of subsequent assessments. We reiterate our findings in that regard, accept the contentions of the appellant in the present appeals. We hold that the notice in the present case, having been served on 3-4-1999, and there more beyond the period of limitation, cannot, nevertheless, constitute a valid basis for subsequent assessment years for which it did not make mention, and for which no other notices were issued. As observed by the Supreme Court in another context, the action cannot be partly good and partly bad like the curate s egg , Union of India v. Shakuntala Gupta, : AIR2002SC3079 , at page 103.
13. Learned Counsel for the MCD has next submitted that the question of notice for enhancement of rateable value has to be considered from the standpoint of prejudice. In other words, the question to be asked in all cases is whether the absence of particularization, or itemization, while proposing increase in rateable value, is whether prejudice was caused, and if so, whether it was substantial. According to counsel, the appellant in this case was in fact not prejudiced. He was able to apply for rectification. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Asstt. G.M., Central Bank of India v. Commr., Municipal Corpn. for the City of Ahmedabad, : (1995)4SCC696 for the submission that the Commissioner is under no obligation to inform as to how the rateable value, is arrived at and that it is for the assessed to prove that the rateable value is high.
14. The earliest decision of this court was rendered by a Division Bench, in New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Indian Bank, 69 PLR 381 in the context of exercise of power under Section 67(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, which is in pari material with Section 126(1) of the Act, vis--vis the amendment of assessment list. The court held that: it follows that the Municipal Committee should inform the person to be affected by the alteration its reason for proposing the alteration of the assessment so that he may have an opportunity to satisfy the Municipal Committee that those reasons are non-existent or insufficient to make the suggested alteration or the suggested alteration is not in accordance with law. In other words, the Municipal Committee must intimate to the assessed what mistake had been committed, if there was any mistake, or what fraud had been committed, if there was any fraud, or what accident had happened, if there was any, so that the assessed may be able to meet the case of the Municipal Committee . Even if Section 67(1) is read by itself, it would be clear that the legislature wanted the Municipal Committee to inform the assessed the reason for altering the assessment, so as to give the assessed a reasonable opportunity to meet the case of the Municipal Committee. Such interpretation would accord with principles of natural justice. If two reasonable interpretations (sic) which accords with principles of natural justice would commend itself to Courts. It may be further noted that here we are considering a provision relating to taxation. Such a provision has got to be strictly construed. To all these we must add that we are called upon to construe a provision of law whereunder a party is constituted as judge in its own cause..
15. Again, in Savitri Devi s case (Supra) another Division Bench held that the notice proposing change in rateable value has to disclose some reasons, and basis for the increase, and that in the absence of such reasons or basis the assessed cannot be expected to give an effective reply. This reasoning also found favor with a later Division Bench in the DCM Ltd case ( supra). In the DCM case, the court reviewed the law, and after considering the earlier judgment in the Indian Bank case, as also other decisions, held as follows:
There is nothing secret or sacrosanct- after all the Corporation must have arrived at the proposed figure of rateable value on some basis, it cannot be that the proposed figure mentioned in the notice has dawned on some officer in the Corporation from the blue. When the proposed figure has been worked out on some basis we see nothing secret or confidential in it so as not to make it available to the assessed. The proposal in the notice has serious repercussions so far as the assessed is concerned and that is why the assessed has been given a right to file objections against the proposal. Saying that the entire facts are available with the petitioner is no answer to the requirement of disclosing the basis of the proposed figure of rateable value. In order to ensure that the right is effectively exercised and that it is not rendered illusory, we are of the view that the Corporation must disclose the basis of arriving at the figure contained in the proposal.
16. As far as the reliance placed upon the decision in the Asstt. G.M., Central Bank of India case (supra) is concerned, we notice that the same was rendered in the context of a provision, viz Rule 15(2) in Schedule A to the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. That rule prescribed the contents of notices, for assessment of municipal taxes. The Supreme Court affirmed the view of the Bombay High Court, that when a statute specified as to what should be the contents of a notice (as in Rule 1(2)), the general principles enunciated by various decisions and of High Courts would be inapplicable. That, however, is not the case here. Section 126 clearly envisages a notice; it is not subject to any other provision that deals with, or limits the contents of the notice.
17. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court, in Food Corpn. of India v. State of Punjab (2001) 1 SCC 291 while dealing with a similar issue, it was held that:
Notice to the affected person mandated in the section is not an empty formality; it is meant for a purpose. A vague and unspecific notice will not provide reasonable opportunity to the notice to file objection meeting the reasons/grounds on which the amendment of the assessment list is proposed to be made. Such a notice cannot be taken to be complying with the statutory requirement.
On a perusal of the notice issued to the Corporation, which is on record, it is evident that the notice is vague and lacks particulars. It neither states the reason for/or the ground on which the amendment is proposed to be made nor does it indicate any material on the basis of which the revision as stated in the notice is proposed to be made .
18. In the light of the foregoing discussions, we hold that:
(a) The notice proposing amendment to the rateable value, was served on 3-4-1999, and following our decision in LPA 233/03, it is held to be time barred;
(b) The notice does not disclose reasons for the proposed change in rateable value, and being vague, is unsustainable in law.
19. The appeal is entitled to succeed, and is accordingly allowed. Consequently, the writ petition of the respondent MCD is dismissed, and the findings of the Additional District Judge are affirmed.
20. All interlocutory applications are rendered infructuous in view of this judgment, and are disposed off in its terms.
21. No costs.