P.N. Nag, J.
(1) Both the writ petitions, i.e. Cw 1004/90 and Cw 1711/88 can be disposed of by common judgment, as the common questions of facts and law arise in both the writ petitions.
(2) By writ petition No-1004/90, the petitioner has preyed for quashing of the order dated 25th January, 1990 passed by the 7th Additional District Judge, Dhanbad in Miscellaneous case No.54 etc. of 1985 where by the right of the petitioners to claim management compensation under the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') was rejected on the ground that on-the date of vesting, the petitioners were neither the owners nor occupiers rather they were at best trespassers and so not entitled to management compensation or otherwise, as claimed.
(3) In Cw 1711/88 the petitioners have prayed for a declaration that the petitioners are the owner of East Ganhcodih Colliery Co. Pvt. Ltd. and are entitled to get entire compensation and writ of mandamus commanding upon respondent No.4 to consider the petitioners claim for compensation as owner of the Ganhcodih Colliery in accordance with law.
(4) The coal mines were nationalised by the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. Under this Act, the mines vested in the Government with effect from 1st May, 1972. The Act contains a schedule showing the various mines which come under the nationalisation scheme. The mines involved in this petition is shown as Seriall No. 156, namely, Ganhcodih, in the First Schedule to the Act. The Schedule, in addition, shows the location of the mines, name and address of the owners of the mines and the amount of compensation. The owner's name in the fourth column of the mines involved in the petition is shown as S.B.Banerjee and Sons, Best Office Jharia, Dhanbad, and the total compensation as Rs.27.52,000.00 .
(5) According to the petitioners in Cw 1004/90, by virtue of a duly registered agreement dated 24.9.1956 executed by respondent No.5, petitioner No.2 under clause I thereof was appointed as Managing Contractors for a period of 10 years commencing from the aforementioned date with the offer given to the petitioners for renewal of the period for a further period of 5 years on the same terms and conditions. This period was later on further extended for five years, i.e., up to 23.9.1971. The petitioners on the basis of such agreements have been in occupation of the said colliery and continue to occupy the said colliery on the date of vesting under the Act.
(6) The petitioners being the owner under the Act filed an application before the Commissioner of Payment under the Act which was rejected by the Commissioner on 25.7.1980 holding that the petitioner was not the Managing Contractors on the appointed date as even the extended period of five years of lease had expired and they have ceased to be Managing Contractors. Against the order dated 25.7.1980, the petitioners filed a petition being C.M.J.C. No.591 of 1980 before the High Court of Delhi and Goswamy, J. vide order dated 17.5.1984 partly allowed the petition and directed that if the goods and building other than what was mentioned in the schedule to the agreement which had been provided by respondent No.5 have been nationalised and compensation was payable, the Commissioner would refer the matter to the Competent Court under Section 26 of the Act to that extent only. The compensation would be paid in accordance with the decision of the competent court.
(7) Against the aforementioned judgment dated 17.5.1984 of the High Court of Delhi, respondent No.5 moved the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition on the ground that they were not made parties in the petition but the same was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 18.12.1984 with the observation that they may take appropriate steps before the appropriate court.
(8) In compliance with the directions of this Court, the Commissioner of Payment, Dhanbad, on 8.5.1985 referred the dispute under Section 26 of the Act to the District Judge for adjudication in terms of the aforementioned order. Against the order of Commissioner for Payments, referring the dispute to the District Judge, one Krishan Dass Banerjee, one of the partners, moved the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Patna, Ranchi Bench in Cwjc No.2/86 (R) and vide order dated 25.7.1989 the Patna High Court held that the judgment of the Delhi High Court had become final and the Commissioner of Payments was bound to comply with that order and that is what exactly he had done and dismissed that writ petition. As a result thereof, the order of the Delhi High Court became final. In terms of the order of the Delhi High Court, Commissioner of Payments as already stated, vide order dated 8.5.1985 had referred the dispute to the District Judge, Dhanbad for adjudication under Section 26 of the Act regarding status of the East Ganhcodih Colliery Company Pvt. Ltd. and apportionment of compensation between the said company and the recorded owners. The learned District Judge by the impugned order has rejected the claim of the petitioners substantially on the same ground that the petitioners, as already stated above, had 'ceased to be the Managing Contractors and they were at best as trespassers. Against this impugned order, the present writ petition has been filed.
(9) In the counter affidavit, the respondents have stated that the petition is thoroughly misconceived, not maintainable and is a serious abuse of process of this court as the subject matter of the writ petition being of coking coal mines and/or a colliery situated at Jharia, Bihar, falls wholly outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and no part of cause of action arises or has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. All the respondents are admittedly outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. thereforee, the writ petition is not main tainable. No doubt the Union of India has been made a party to the writ petition but no relief has been asked for against the Union of India and the same has been arrayed as a party intentionally for the purpose of invoking jurisdiction of this Court. Further, the petition is also barred by principles of resjudicata as the earlier petition has been disposed of on merits and the same questions in the present writ petition cannot be re-agitated again as this Court has already held by an order dated .May 17, 1985 that the second petitioner has ceased to be the Managing Contractors of the said colliery on the expiry of the lease, i.e., on and from September 24, 1971. After that the matter, in pursuance of the judgment of this Court, was referred by the Commissioner of Payments under Section 26 of the Act to the District Judge and the District Judge had held that the petitioners were not entitled to compensation vide his order dated January 25, 1985 as they were only trespassers. Those questions are being re-agitated by the petitioners in this writ petition. If at all any remedy is available to the petitioners, that is by way of an appeal and not the writ petition. Even otherwise, disputed questions of facts arise for determination and this writ petition is not the proper forum. Admittedly, on the date of vesting, when the coal mines were nationalised, the petitioners had no right to plants, machinery, building etc. as the lease had already expired and they were neither occupiers nor owners but only trespassers. The petitioners are not the owners of the mines on the date of vesting under the Act and if indeed, petitioner No.2 was the owner of the said colliery (as is now being alleged by the petitioners), then the petitioners ought to have moved the Central Government under sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Nationalisation Act for correction of the aforesaid entry in the First Schedule. It has further been stated that the petitioners have complained about the violation of contractual obligation and the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to enforce the contractual obligations.
(10) It may be stated here at this stage that at the time of admission of the writ petition, on 7th November, 1990, learned counsel for the petitioners confined his prayer to the compensation towards the goods, plant, machinery and the building lying at the spot at the time of the taking over of the colliery under the Coal Nationalisation Act.
(11) Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Bhandare assisted by Mr. A.K. Sinha, submitted that according to the judgment of the Delhi High Court, which has become final and according to the terms of the lease deed, the petitioners were entitled to remain at the colliery and in sole occupation thereof for a period of three months after 23.9.1971, i.e., up to 23.12.1971 and that with the enforcement of the Act, during this period, the petitioners were compelled to hand over to the custodian appointed by the Central Government, the possession of the colliery and all the assets thereto, including stocks of coal and coke and they were not allowed to remove the plants, machinery and goods etc. thereforee, the petitioners arc entitled to compensation under the Act as they cannot be deprived of their properly save by authority of law. It was further submitted that the petitioners were occupiers and owners of the colliery and at the time of enforcement of the Act, they were in sole occupation of the colliery. They arc also entitled to compensation under the Act. However, the District Judge vide the impugned order, without going into the question whether or not the goods, plants and machinery, buildings etc. and other properties were still lying at the colliery when the Act came into force and whether these stood nationalised and the petitioners were compelled to hand over the possession to the custodian of such properly, had erroneously held that they were at best trespassers merely because the lease deed had expired and they had ceased to be the Managing Contractors. In fact the questions referred to by the Commissioner of Payments under directions of this Court had not been considered by the District Judge, Dhanbad, as the Commissioner of Payments had prima facie held that under the Act the East Ganhcodih Coal Company being in physical possession of the colliery was owner of the colliery and its machinery, plants, constructions etc. vested in the Central Government and were nationalised, and having found so, referred the matter to the District Judge, Dhanbad, under Section 26 of the Act for determination of dispute between the parties regarding status of the East Ganhcodih colliery company Pvt, Lid. and apportionment of compensation between the said company and the recorded owners. Since the learned District Judge has not decided the question as referred to him by the Commissioner of Payments as per directions of this Court, the impugned order of the District Judge requires to be set aside and they should be declared as owner of the property.
(12) Learned counsel for the respondents, however, at the very outset, submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable at all in this Court as the East Ganhcodih Colliery Company is situated in Bihar which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Judge, Dhanbad in Bihar. This Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide this writ petition. Further, all the respondents except respondent No.1, i.e., Union of India, against whom no relief has been claimed, reside and carry on their business activities outside the territorial jurisdiction of 'this Court. Other contentions raised by counsel for the petitioners have also been vehemently assailed by counsel for the respondents, which I shall deal later.
(13) At this stage it would be appropriate to decide into the preliminary question regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, raised by the respondents as the jurisdictional issue should always be tried first by the court. In Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others : [1978]2SCR272 , the Supreme Court, while considering whether or not the writ petition was maintainable in view of the bar under Article 329 of the Constitution observed that: 'lndeed, 'we should have expected the High Court to have considered the basic jurisdictional issue first, and not last as it did, and avoided sallying forth into a discussion and decision on the merits, self-contradicting its own holding that it had no jurisdiction even to entertain the petition. In case it is found that the writ petition is not maintainable then certainly this court has no jurisdiction to embark upon an enquiry on any part of the matter in dispute.
(14) Under Clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, t issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part Iii and for any other purpose. Under Clause (2) of Article 226, the power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Admittedly, the court of the District Judge, Dhanbad, whose order is sought to be assailed by the petitioners, does not lie within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. However, the question remains whether cause of action - either wholly or in part - arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court can exercise jurisdiction and power to quash the impugned order. In this context, certain relevant facts may be noted. Clause (8) of the agreement provides to the Managing Contractors three months' time for the removal of machinery, chattels etc. before the termination of lease, which is reproduced below: 'Notwithstanding anything contained in clauses 6 & 7 of these presents the properties shall have the option to purchase the machinery chattels and utensils and also the buildings structures dhowrahe pitheads baths washery and coke ovens plants or any of them provided the proprietors given notice in-writing to the Managing Contractors of their intention to exercise such option at least six calendar months before the termination of these presents at a price to be agreed between the parties in the event of such option being exercised and the parties failing to arrive at an agreement as to the price to be paid by the proprietors to the Managing Contractors in respect of the machinery chattels and utensils mentioned in clause 6 of these presents or in respect of the several premises and structures mentioned clause 7 hereof 'before the termination of these presents the Managing Contractors shall be allowed three months time for the removal of the said machinery chattels and utensils as mentioned in clause 6 hereof and demolition and removal of the premises as mentioned in clause 7 hereof without any lot or hindrance by the proprietors or any of them and the Managing Contractors shall he allowed free and unrestricted ingress and egress with tools workmen and vehicles to the said colliery and all parts thereof where such machinery chattels utensils or structures or any of them may be lying for the time being for a period of three calendar months from the termination of these presents and for such period of three months no rent or other compensation shall be payable by the Managing Contractors to the proprietors. ,
(15) According to clause (1) of the agreement the petitioners were appointed as Managing Contractors of the colliery for a period of 10 years commencing from 24th day of September 1956 with a renewal clause according to which at the option of the Managing Contractors the contract could be renewed for a further period of five years on the same terms and conditions. In accordance with the renewal clause the contract was renewed in 1966 up to 24th day of September, 1971. From the above it is clear that if Clause (1) and Clause (8) of the agreement are read together, the said fifteen years of lease expired on 23.9.1971, and three months' time was permissible to the Managing Contractors to remove the plant & machinery etc. under the lease agreement, which was to expire on 23.12.1971. However, in the meantime, this Act came into force.
(16) The Commissioner of Payments on 25.7.1980, before whom the claim of the petitioners was submitted for compensation being the occupier of the colliery, negatived on the ground that the petitioners had ceased the Managing Contractors on 23.9.1971, viz., the appointed date and the compensation was awarded by the Commissioner of Payment to respondent No.5 only under Section 6 along with interest. Against that order of the Commissioner of Payments dated 25.7.1985, a petition was filed before this Court in which Goswamy, J. held that no doubt three months period was permissible to remove the plants, machinery etc. but that docs not mean that they continue to be the Managing Contractors. It was held that the petitioners had ceased to be the Managing Contractors before the appointed date but the Commissioner of Payment should have considered the matter whether the petitioners were entitled to any compensation for the goods and machinery which admittedly was at site and could be removed by the petitioners. Relevant extract of the judgment for determining the point in controversy is reproduced below:
'IT is true that a period of three months was permissible 10 the petitioners to remove their machinery etc. but that does not mean that they continued to be the Managing Contractors. Clause 8 of the agreement clearly provides that the owners could exercise an option by giving at least six calendar months notice behalf the termination of the agreement for purchasing the property belonging to the Managing Contractors at site. Admittedly no such notice was given in the absence of such a notice, the Managing Contractors were to be allowed three months time for the removal of their goods and property. These three months had not elapsed till the appointed day which is 17.10.1971. In the circumstances there can be no dispute that the petitioners were not Managing Contractors on the appointed day but there was still time with them to remove their goods and buildings. In spite of that the Commissioner neither referred the matter to the competent court under section 26 of the Act nor allowed their claim for compensation in respect of the goods and buildings which the petitioners were entitled to remove. I cannot find any fault with the order of Commissioner of Payments of the extent that the petitioners had ceased to be the Managing Contractors before the appointed day but the question to be considered is whether they were entitled to any compensation for the goods and machinery which admittedly was at site and could be removed by the petitioners certainly cannot claim anything beyond the compensation for their goods and building which they were entitled to remove. There is yet another condition for allowing their claim even to this extent and that is whether those goods and buildings have at all been nationalised. All these questions are questions of fact and cannot be decided finally in these proceedings. In the circumstances I direct that if the good and building other than what is mentioned in the schedule to the agreement which has been provided by respondent No.5, have been nationalised and compensation is payable the Commissioner will refer the matter to the competent court under section 16 of the Act to that extent only. The compensation will be paid in accordance with decision of the competent court.'
(17) In pursuance of the judgment of this court, The Commissioner of Payments, prima facie found that for the purpose of the definition of 'owner' under the Act, included occupiers in physical possession and, according to him, even a trespasser was an occupier and owner under the Act and, thereforee, East Ganhcodih Coal Company being in physical possession of the colliery was owner of the colliery and its machinery, plants, constructions etc. vested in the Central Government and were nationalised. thereforee, the dispute between the parties regarding status of the East Ganhcodih Colliery Company Pvt. Ltd. and apportionment of compensation between the said company and the recorded owners was referred to the District Judge, Dhanbad for decision under Section 26 of the Act. The District Judge, however, without going into the question whether or not the Company was in occupation of the colliery and even as a trespasser could be termed as owner under the Act and in view of the judicial authoritative law pronounced by the Supreme Court in this regard, simply determined the status on the ground that on 17.10.71, the date of vesting, the petitioner East Ganhcodih Colliery was neither virtually owner nor occupier rather they were at best trespasser and so not entitled to any compensation management or otherwise as claimed.
(18) If the directions issued by Goswamy, J. on 17.5.1984 and consequently the reference made by the Commissioner of Payments to the District Judge, if read together, there is left no manner of doubt that the District Judge was required to decide (i) whether the petitioners, although have ceased to be the Managing Contractors according to the judgment of this Court are still the occupiers of the mine or any part thereof and hence come within the comprehensive definition of owner under the Act, even if it is assumed that the petitioners are trespassers; (ii) whether goods, machinery, plants etc. of the petitioners which were at the site at the relevant time of enforcement of the Act was required and compelled to be handed over by the petitioners to the Central Government under the provisions of the Act; (iii) whether these goods, machinery, plants etc. have been nationalised under the Act, (iv) if such goods, machinery, plants etc. other than what is mentioned in the Schedule, provided by respondent No.5 under the terms of the agreement, have been nationalised under the Act and to what extent the compensation is payable to the petitioners.
(19) All these questions are essentially questions of fact and should have been decided by the District Judge on reference having been made to him by the Commissioner of Payments. However, unfortunately, the District Judge has simply rejected the claim on the ground that since the lease has expired and the petitioners have ceased to be the Managing Contractors they are at best immediate trespassers and not owners and, thereforee, are not entitled to any compensation. He has not examined the matter in the right perspective and complied with the directions of Goswamy, J. in his order dated 7.5.1984. The finding of the District Judge, Dhanbad, that the petitioners have become trespassers, and are not owners or occupiers, is not enough and does not amount to sufficient compliance of the order of this Court.
(20) There cannot be any manner of doubt that the judgment of Goswamy, J. dated 17.5.1984 has become final as the Special Leave Petition filed against the judgment has also been dismissed by the Supreme Court and further, even the Patna High Court vide its judgment dated '15.7.1989 has observed that the District Judge is bound to comply with the order of the Delhi High Court as the judgment has become final. In the light of this, thereforee, on the basis of the judgment of Goswamy, J. dated 17.5.1984, a right had been created in favor of the petitioners and against the respondents inasmuch as the District Judge was bound to comply with the judgment of this Court and consider the aforementioned questions about the nationalisation of goods, machinery etc. and determination and apportionment of compensation between the petitioners and the respondents, within the jurisdiction of this Court at Delhi. Since there has been no compliance of the order of Goswamy, J. by the District Judge, Dhanbad, as referred to above, such a right has been infringed in Bihar beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this court. thereforee, cause of action partly arises in Delhi on the basis of judgment of Delhi High Court. Where a right for determination and apportionment of compensation by the Commissioner of Payments and the District Judge, Dhanbad has been created, cause of action also arises in Dhanbad and Bihar, where the right has been infringed, and the matter has not been considered in the light of the directions of this Court.
(21) What is cause of action has been explained by the Supreme Court in State of Rajas than and others v. M/s Swaika Properties and another. : [1985]3SCR598 that
'THE' cause of action' means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court.'
In other words it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant.
(22) In other words, cause of action consists of bundle of essential tact which, it is necessary for the petitioners to prove before they can succeed in the writ petition. In this case, in the facts & circumstances, the petitioners in order to get relief from the Court has to prove that right has been created in their favor in Delhi within the jurisdiction of this Court and that the same has been infringed in Dhanbad (Bihar). These facts, thereforee, constitute the cause of action in the present writ petition and there cannot be any dispute that the cause of action partly arises in Delhi because of the judgment of Goswamy, J., which has become final. This Court, thereforee, has every jurisdiction to entertain and try this petition. It is no doubt true that the High Court in Bihar or the courts of competent jurisdiction in Bihar have also concurrent jurisdiction in the matter but the petition can be Filed in this court as well as cause of action partly arises in Delhi. The contention of the respondents' counsel, thereforee,-is not tenable and is rejected.
(23) It was strenuously contended by counsel for the respondents that the petitioners had ceased to be the Managing Contractors as, under the terms of lease/agreement entered into by the petitioners with respondent No.5, period of 15 years had expired on 23.9.1971 and thereafter the petitioners were merely trespassers and on the appointed date, i.e. 17.10.1971 when the Act came into force, they were neither occupiers nor owners and they were only entitled to remove machinery, chattels, plants etc. if they so chose under the terms of the lease and that did not mean that they continued to be the Managing Contractors. The judgment of the District Judge, Dhanbad is, thereforee, perfectly in order, just and in accordance with law and should not be disturbed.
(24) In this context, it is suffice to refer that the matter has already been examined by Goswamy, J. in his judgment dated 17.5.1984 which has become Final and according to this judgment, the petitioners have not been held to be the Managing Contractors, This question cannot be reopened and the contention of the respondents in this regard that the petitioners have ceased to be Managing Contractors is well founded and this particular finding will bind the petitioners. However, at the same time a direction was given by this court to the Commissioner of Payment to refer the matter to a competent court under Section 26 of the Act if the goods etc. have been nationalised and for determination and apportionment of the compensation. In the light of what is already discussed above, the District Judge, Dhanbad has not examined the case in the right prospective. His approach is totally erroneous as he has not decided the matter in the light of the directions given by this Court, with the result the order of the District Judge cannot be sustained. Merely that the petitioners have been held to be a trespasser and, thereforee, not an occupier and owner and that they are not entitled to compensation, cannot be considered enough and sufficient compliance of the orders and directions of this court, more particularly in the context of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in East India Cool Co. Ltd. v. The East Bulliaree/Kendwadih Colliery Co. P. Ltd. and others. The Supreme Court in that case has clearly laid down that the definition of owner under the Act takes within its ambit occupier of the mine or any part thereof. Parliament, with due deliberation, in S.3(n) adopted by incorporation the enlarged definition of owner in S.2(l), Mines Act, 1952 to make the Nationalisation Act all embracing and fully effective. The definition is wide enough to include three categories of persons: (i) in relation to a mine, the person who is the immediate proprietor or a lessee or occupier of mine or any part thereof, (ii) in the case of a mine the business whereof is carried on by a liquidator or receiver, and (iii) in the case of a-mine owned by a company, the business whereof is carried on by a managing agent, such managing agent. Each is a separate and distinct category of persons and the concept of ownership does not come in. thereforee, in these circumstances, even if the petitioners are held to be trespassers, the matter to be considered is whether they are occupiers of a mine or a part thereof and come within the ambit of occupier of the mine or any part thereof.
(25) Next contention urged on behalf of the respondents is that the writ petition involves disputed questions of facts which cannot be decided in the writ jurisdiction and that further it relates to the enforcement of the contractual obligations and writ cannot be issued to enforce such obligation.
(26) I am afraid such contentions do not arise in the present case. In this case, neither disputed questions of fact arise nor the question of enforcement of contractual obigiation. The only question that arises is whether there has been compliance of the directions given by this court to the Commissioner of Payments and consequently to the District Judge, Dhanbad who was to decide the question of nationalisation of goods and thereafter apportionment of compensation between the petitioners and the other owners.
(27) It was next contended that the appeal would lie under the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court against the order of the District Judge. Since an effective alternative remedy is available to the petitioners, this court should not entertain these writ petitions.
(28) As already discussed above, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the question that arises is whether there has been any compliance of the directions of this Court and the order has been implemented in that light by the District Judge, Dhanbad. In order to examine this question, appeal is not the appropriate remedy or forum where this question can be agitated. Further, even if it is assumed that the appeal lies - which is not free from doubt as no appeal is provided for under the Act - there is no absolute bar for the maintainability of the writ petition.
(29) Lastly it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that they should be declared as the owner of the Colliery and they should be paid the entire compensation. On the other hand, counsel for Mr. S.B. Banerjee & Sons submitted that under Item 156 in the First Schedule to the Act, they were referred to as the owners and, thereforee, they should be paid compensation to the exclusion of others. The matter in controversy is squarely covered by the aforementioned judgment in East India Coal Co. Ltd.' s case (supra). In para 15 of that judgment, after having discussed the matter, the Supreme Court has been laid down the expression 'owner specified in the First Schedule' cannot be read into Ss.21(l), 21(2), 21(3), 21(4), 21(5) though they are absent there. The sections occurring in Chap. Vi have deliberately avoided the expression 'the owners in the first Schedule' so as to achieve the object of the definition 'owner' in the Mines Act, 1952, which definition has been bodily borrowed by this Act. If the owner whose name is mentioned in column 4 of the Schedule is alone entitled to the compensation, then there was no need for the remaining sections in Chap. Vi, for apportionment of the amount after considering the various clauses. In other words, it means that all persons who come within the ambit of owner, including occupiers of any part of a mine are entitled to compensation in accordance with law, which has to be decided by the District Judge.
(30) In the light of what is discussed above, the civil writ petitions partly succeed. The impugned order dated 25.1.1990 of the District Judge, Dhanbad, in Cw 1004/90 is set aside and the District Judge, Dhanbad is directed to consider the matter afresh in the light of what is discussed above and in accordance with law insofar as the compensation to the petitioners towards the goods, plant, machinery and the building lying at the spot at the time of taking over of the Colliery under the Act is concerned. No costs.