S. Ravindra Bhat, J.
1. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the relief claimed is a direction to set aside the order dated 18.10.1978 passed by the Central Government under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereafter called the Act) and also order dated 17-4-1978 passed by the Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 24 of the Act.
2. One Sh. Ram Chand Bhatia migrated to India and settled in Delhi in the aftermath of partition. Being a displaced person, he was allotted property bearing No. 26/27, West Patel Nagar on 9.8.1951 on rent of Rs. 20/- per month. One of his sons, namely, Kishan Chand Bhatia (the petitioner who has since expired during pendency of these proceedings and referred to as the petitioner) was also allotted the same premises as a co-allottee. Sh. Ram Chand Bhatia died on 10.7.1957. His widow, namely, Smt. Ram Lubhai (arrayed as respondent in these proceedings during which she too passed away) applied for the purchase of the entire property pursuant to press notices issued by the Central Government asking allottees on rent to apply for the purchase of such property on easy installments. The press notices were issued in April and September 1959. Thereafter, Smt. Ram Lubhai applied for substitution of her name instead of, her husband in respect of the tenancy for the same premises. That request was acceded or by an order of the Managing Officer dated 22.9.1959. A provisional transfer deed dated 8.11.1960 was subsequently executed in favor of Smt. Ram Lubhai. Smt. Ram Lubhai secured the no objection certificates in respect of the premises from other heirsof late Ram Chand Bhatia at the time of seeking substitution of her name, for the tenancy. The petitioner avers that he was unaware about the transfer of name exclusively in his mother's favor which was kept a secret and that he became aware of that position, in the year 1975. A letter was written by him to the respondents for issuing a conveyance deed in the name of the joint allottees, namely, himself and his mother Smt. Ram Lubhai. At this stage, it is alleged, the fact that the substitution made exclusively in favor of Smt. Ram Lubhai and that a provisional conveyance deed had been executed allotting the entire property to her in 1960, came to light. He, thereforee, applied for an appropriate amendment or correction.
3. A corrigendum was issued on 30.8.1976 which resulted in the petitioner and his mother being shown as joint owners of the suit property. This decision was administratively affirmed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, through an order dated 28th October, 1976.
4. Smt. Ram Lubhai felt aggrieved by this move and applied under Section 33 of the Act. That was dismissed has not maintainable by an order dated 8.10.1976. The Chief Settlement Commissioner was thereupon requested to interfere; he declined to disturb the corrigendum after considering a report submitted by the Managing Officer in that regard. The appeal under Section 22 of the Act was dismissed as not maintainable on 30.3.1977.
5. Smt. Ram Lubhai and Anr. son of the late Sh. Ram Chand Bhatia, namely, Sh. Madan Lal Bhatia (who was not arrayed as a party but was subsequently imp leaded in the proceedings) filed a petition under Section 24 of the Act. That was allowed by an order dated 17.4.1978. The petitioner's revision petition was rejected by the impugned order dated 18.10.1978. The grievance of the petitioner is that the first two respondents ought not to have exercised their jurisdiction, since he along with his deceased father were joint allottees of the property; after the death of his father, the other co-allottee, i.e the mother, Smt. Ram Lubhai, could not have been allotted as a sole allottee, and could at best be treated as co-allottee, entitled to the share held by his father. It is thereforee contended that the substitution effected in respect of the entire property in favor of Smt. Ram Lubhai was not sustainable in law. Hence, the authorities were within their rights in issuing the corrigendum. The petitioner avers that the impugned orders erroneously have interfered with the valuable rights of the petitioner which were correctly recognized through the corrigendum. It has also been alleged that the petition filed by Smt. Ram Lubhai could not have been entertained since her earlier attempts to seek redressal of the same grievance had met with no success.
6. The stand taken by the respondents is that after the death of Shri. Ram Chand Bhatia, the Central Government had issued a press note in the year 1959 which held out a offer to all allotters such as those in the present case. The offer was for sale of the allotted property upon payment of easy installments. It is averred that Smt. Ram Lubhai alone applied for purchasing the property in this regard. Her application was processed and eventually a provisional conveyance deed was executed in the year 1990. It is averred that Smt. Ram Lubhai paid the stipulated consideration for such sale transaction such transfer. thereforee, her move seeking substitution of name in respect of the entire property has been justified. It has also been averred that after the provisional transfer, the Central Government had on two occasions passed orders seeking to resume the property due to non-payment of installments. The property was, however, saved when these deficiencies were rectified through deposit of the amounts, by Smt. Ram Lubhai in the years 1966 and 1967.
7. The respondents have further averred that the petitioner was all along aware of the correct position vis--vis the property and the fact that his mother had made efforts to purchase the property and protected from resumption. He never came forward with any grievance at that point in time and after a considerable period of time, namely, 15 to 16 years, he surreptitiously, by resort to administrative process, had his name included in the conveyance deed. It is averred that this process of inclusion of is name is not authorised by law and it in any case ignored the realty that the tenancy rights had been eclipsed by the transfer effected in favor of Smt. Ram Lubhai in 1960. It has also been alleged that if indeed the petitioner wanted to be a co-allottee or wanted conveyance in his favor, nothing prevented him from coming forward and applying to the authorities in that regard when the public notices were repeatedly issued in April and September 1959.
8. Mr. S.S. Tomar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that upon the death of Sh. Ram Chand Bhatia, in the year 1957, the share in respect of the tenancy rights devolved in the existing ratio. This meant that the petitioner continued with the half hare which had been allotted to him in the first instance; the other half share was succeeded to by Smt. Ram Lubhai as the heir of Sh. Ram Chand Bhatia. He submits that the rights of the petitioner could not, thereforee, be diluted and at best Smt. Ram Lubhi could claim exclusive rights in respect of the half share of Sh. Ram Chand Bhatia. It is submitted that Sh. Madan Lal Bhatia, another son of Sh. Ram Chand Bhatia and the petitioner's younger brother, was instrumental in conniving with Smt. Ram Lubhi and getting the conveyance executed in her favor in respect of the entire property. The petitioner was unaware of this fact; when he came to know of it, he moved the authorities validly issued a corrigendum. The said corrigendum dated 30.8.1976 corrected the position.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the impugned orders ought not to have been passed since the petition under Section 33 filed earlier against the issuance of corrigendum had been rejected and the petition under Section 22 filed by Smt. Ram Lubhai was also rejected on 30.3.1977. Thus, the issue about correctness of the corrigendum and the inclusion of the petitioner's name in the conveyance deed, had assumed finality. Under the circumstances, the power of revision ought not to have been taken recourse to.
10. It was submitted that the petitioner was always in occupation of the property and his rights could not have been defeated. He submits that the impugned orders have resulted in cancellation of his rights or his lease and that the same could be done only in the manner spelt out under Section 19 of the Act. Mr. Tomar, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported as S. Jagjit Sinch vs. Union of India 1980 (2) Del 1139. It was held there that the authorities, in exercise of powers under Rule 102 of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, are under obligation to give notice and hearing before cancelling a lease.
11. Mr. B.K. Sood, learned counsel appearing for Sh. Madan Lal Bhatia who was imp leaded as one of the heirs of late Smt. Ram Lubhai justified the impugned order. According to him, the conduct of the petitioner dis-entitles him to relief. It is submitted that after death of Sh. Ram Chand Bhatia in 1957, Smt. Ram Lubhai applied for the purchase of the property and also sought for transfer of the name in respect of the said lease in her favor. The application for purchase of the allotted premises were made pursuant to public notices issued by the Central Government on 19.4.1959 and 6.9.1959. It was open to all allotters including the petitioner to apply for purchase of their respective rights. thereforee, when Smt. Ram Lubhai alone applied, the authorities accepted the request and a conveyance was executed on 8.11.1960. These facts were within the knowledge of the petitioner who kept quiet for 16 years. It is submitted that all the charges as per the conveyance deed (as opposed to the amounts payable under the tenancy which had ceased to exist) were paid by late Smt. Ram Lubhai. There were occasions when on account of default, namely, 8.3.1966, 8.10.1966 and 16.5.1967, the Central Government threatened to re-enter and auction the premises. These defaults had occurred due to hardships faced by Smt. Ram Lubhai. In spite of this, payments were made subsequently and the deficiencies were cured. The rights under the conveyance, thereforee, were preserved by Smt. Ram Lubhai. It was much later in 1975 that the petitioner by an innocuous application claiming a mistake on the part of the authorities in not including his name in the conveyance deed managed to have the corrigendum issued.
12. Learned counsel for Mr. Madan Lal Bhatia submits that the corrigendum could not have been issued because it amounted to impairing or dilating the property rights of late Smt. Ram Lubhai which had undergone a change and she became a owner. There was on question of any co-allotment enduring in favor of the petitioner. He could have either jointly with Smt. Ram Lubhai or independently applied for purchase of the property pursuant to public notices issued in that regard. Not having done so, he could not claim inclusion of name in the conveyance deed. Further more, the petitioner by his own conduct had forfeited the right to make any claim. Right through the responsibility of maintaining and protecting the property was shouldered by Smt. Ram Lubha
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the corrigendum is legally indefensible, it was initially, albeit wrongly impugned under Section 33. When that attempt was unsuccessful the corrigendum was impugned n proceedings under Section 22. There too, the application/petition was held to be not maintainable and Smt. Ram Lubhai was told that her grievance could be looked into through the proper channel, namely, in revision proceedings under Section 24. Under the circumstances, the matter was considered under Section 24 and the corrigendum of the year 1976 was held to be bad. The earlier proceedings under Section 33 and 22 at the behest of Smt. Ram Lubhai were thereforee merely rejected as not maintainable and thereforee the principle of finality was not attracted. Learned counsel further submits that the corrigendum which is relied upon by the petitioner could not have been issued. Section 25(2) empowers a Settlement Officer or Authority to carry out clerical or arithmetical mistakes. It does not extend to affecting substantive rights which is exactly what has happened in the present case. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in : AIR2000SC2352 .
14. Lastly, it has been submitted that there is no question of violation of Section 19 or rule 102 and that those provisions deal with instances of cancellation of lease. In the present case, the non-inclusion of a name and the subsequent direction to delete a name wrongly and illegally included do not amount to exercise of powers under Section 19 or Rule 102. It is submitted that since the petitioner himself never applied to purchase the property nor did he participate in that process, there is not question of cancelling his rights in that regard. With the execution of the conveyance, right of Smt. Ram Lubhai altered and she became full owner under law.
15. Mr. A.K. Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing for the Union of India has submitted that the facts of the case do not warrant interference under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the corrigendum, relied upon by the petitioner was in purported exercise of administrative powers which could not be resorted to since it adversely effected rights of parties to property and that if at all quasi-judicial powers under the Act alone could have been invoked. Since that was not doe, the corrigendum did not confer any right upon the petitioner.
16. Before proceeding with the discussion on merits, it would be useful to notice certain relevant provisions of the Act, and Rules. Section 8 lays down that a displaced person shall be paid compensation as determined under Section 7 subject to any rules that may be made under this Act in different forms such as in cash; in Government bonds; by sale to the displaced person of any property from the compensation pool and setting off the purchase money against the compensation payable to him; by any other mode of transfer to the displaced person of any property from the compensation pool and setting off the valuation of the property against the compensation payable to him; etc.
17. Section 14 constitutes a compensation pool, which consists of evacuee property including urban and rural agricultural land. Section 16 confers power on the Central Government to take such measures as it considers necessary or expedient for the custody management and disposal of the compensation pool in order that it may be effectively utilised in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 20 provides that subject to any rules that may be made under the Act the Managing Officer or Managing Corporation may transfer any property by sale or by lease to a displaced person or by allotment or in any other manner as may be prescribed. Section 40 confers power on the Central Government to frame rules to carry out the purpose of the Act. Sub-section (2) specifies the matters in respect of which rules may provide for payment of compensation. Clause (j) provides for framing of rules laying down procedure for transfer of property out of the compensation pool and the manner of realization of the saleproceeds or the adjustment of the value of the property transferred against the amount of compensation. The Central Government in exercise of its powers under the Act framed rules known as the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 [hereafter called Rules]. These rules were notified on May 21, 1955.
18. The Rules contain an entire set of provisions in Chapter VI dealing with allotment of Government built property, that can be transferred to displaced persons. Rules 40 to 42 empowered the Central Government, in different contingencies, to offer its properties, in the occupation of allotters, for sale. Certain amendments were made in 1956 and 1958, pursuant to which allotters were given the option of purchasing the properties in installments.
19. Section 19 and Rule 102, relied upon by the petitioner, read as follows:
19. Powers to vary or cancel allotment of any property acquired under this Act.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or any other law for the time being in force but subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, the managing officer or managing corporation may cancel any allotment or amend the terms of any allotment under which any evacuee property acquired under this Act is held or occupied by a person, whether such allotment was granted before or after the commencement of his Act.
Rule 102 of the rules is as follows:
102. Cancellation of allotments. A managing officer or a managing corporation may in respect of the property in the compensation pool entrusted to him or to it, cancel an allotment or vary the terms of any such allotment if the allottee
(a) has sublet or parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the property allotted to him without the permission of a competent authority, or
(b) has used or is using such property for a purpose other than that for which it was allotted to him without the permission of a competent authority, or
(c) has committed any act which is destructive of or permanently injurious to the property, or
(d) for any other sufficient reason to be recorded in writing: Provided that no action shall be taken under this rule unless the allottee has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The points arising for examination are as follows:
(a)Correctness of the corrigendum issued on 30-8-1976;
(b)Whether any finality attached to the previous orders under Sections 33 and 22 declining to examine the legality of the corrigendum;
(c)Whether the impugned orders require interference.
Point no (a)
20. The facts narrated earlier show that initially, Ram Chander Bhatia and the petitioner, had -+ share each, in respect of the property, as allottes. Upon Ram Chander death, in 1957, there was no immediate move to have his heirs substituted in his stand, as allottees. The application for purchase, made by the widow, Ram Lubhai, was almost simultaneous with her request to be substituted as heir. Both applications were processed together, and she was given property, through conveyance. That was in the year 1960. This development resulted in conferring a superior right, as owner (of course subject to the reservations and conditions outlined in the conveyance, regarding payment of installments, etc). This right was secured after a separate application, apparently in terms of provisions in Chapter VI of the Rules, dealing with transfer and disposal of property. The application was made pursuant to public notices issued in that regard. It was open to all eligible persons, including the petitioner, to make a offer/ application for purchase of property. It has neither been pleaded nor urged that the petitioner was unaware of this, or that he had applied for purchase of property, pursuant to such public notice, nor had he made any payments in that regard. The plain inference thereforee he did not wish to purchase the property.
21. In this background, the petitioner appears to have moved the authorities, in a seemingly innocuous manner, and convinced them about a mistake in not including his name as a co-allottee as well as a legal heir of Ram Chander, in respect of a tenancy, which in fact, had long since ceased. His name was included, through exercise of power G?' stated to be under Section 25 of the Act (the power to rectify clerical or arithmetical mistakes) in the conveyance deed which conferred altogether different right
22. The move of the petitioner invoking the power to correct errors, and the issuance of the corrigendum has to be also seen in the light of other facts. Admittedly, Ram Chander died in 1957. The petitioner has not shown any material as to when he independently moved, in respect of even the tenancy rights. He has also not shown any material disclosing that he was paying the rents. On the other hand, it has come on record that all measures to secure the property, including protecting it from distrait, and threatened public auction, on no less than three occasions, were taken by Ram Lubhai. The petitioner, who claims to have been living in the same premises, cannot claim complete ignorance of these facts. Hence, legality apart, the petitioners request fr issuance of corrigendum, in 1975 was hopelessly belated, and ought not to have been entertained at all.
23. That apart, the power to correct an error, under Section 25 is confined to clerical and arithmetical errors/ mistakes. The Supreme Court, in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, : AIR2000SC2352 , held, at page 770 as follows:
The possession of the land which was sold by auction in his favor in 1959 was not handed over and only a part of the land was handed over to him in 1959. This dispute he raised in 1982, that means, after a lapse of 23 years. Considering the long laps of time and the fact that there is no question of a clerical or arithmetical error, the authorities ought not to have exercised jurisdiction under Section 25(2) of the Act which only empowers the authority to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes is any order or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. Under the guise of corrigendum authorities have passed an order handing over possession of additional land in favor of Respondent 2. It is also apparent that the Chief Settlement Commissioner has not applied his mind to the facts of the case and has only observed that there is no bar on issuing the second corrigendum or more corrigenda in correcting the arithmetical error.
24. The facts show that the entire amount for transfer of property was paid for by Ram Lubhai. The petitioner did not apply for transfer of the property in his favor. The facts shows that he was aware of this. He moved the authorities stating that his name had not been shown in the conveyance because of some mistake or inadvertence. This was a calculated move meant to somehow have his name included in the lease/conveyance, even though he had never paid consideration. The action taken, viz to have the petitioners name included in a corrigendum and its acceptance, was itself unjustified, to say the very least. Having regard to the provisions, particularly Section 25, the Central Government ought not to have issued the corrigendum, which had the effect of adversely impacting upon some other persons right to property. Hence, the first point is answered in the negative, against the petitioner.
Point No. 2
25. Smt. Ram Lubhai had, initially approached the Central Government under Section 33 of the Act. That provision empowers the Central Government to call for the record of any proceeding and pass such orders as it thinks fit. It is characterized as a revsional power. The Central Government took the view that the revision petition was not maintainable. Smt Ram Lubhai, thereforee, approached the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 22; that provision is in the nature of an appellate power. The Chief Settlement Commissioner held that the appeal was not maintainable.
26. The factual narrative discloses that the attempts of Smt Ram Lubhai to secure redressal of her grievances by invoking the remedies under Sections 22 and 33 were not successful. The applications were rejected as not maintainable. It was under such circumstances that the remedy of revision under Section 24 was invoked. Section 33 is in the nature of a residual power. The Central Government thereforee was of the opinion that the grievance of Smt Ram Lubhai could be examined under the appropriate power invested with the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Instead of invoking the provisional power under Section 24, the appellate power was invoked. This was not appropriate, since the corrigendum was not an order. The Commissioner thereforee rejected the appeal as not maintainable.
27. It would thereforee be clear that the dismissal or rejection of the applications under Sections 22 and 33 were not on their merits; but purely on grounds of maintainability. Since there was no determination on the merits of Smt Ram Lubhai petition, their rejection could not foreclose examination of a properly maintained proceeding under the Act, namely, a revision petition under Section 24 of the Act.
Point No. 3
28. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, under Section 24, as well as the Central Government, under Section 33, have concurrently held that the corrigendum impugned by Smt Ram Lubhai had been wrongly and improperly issued. It has also been held by them that the petitioner did not make a grievance about his non-inclusion in the transfer document, when it was issued or at least, within a reasonable time. It has also been held that the petitioner cannot claim the right to tenancy, on the basis of his status co-allottee, since it was open for him to seek transfer pursuant to the two Press Notes issued in 1959. Smt Ram Lubhai, on the other hand, applied for transfer; her application was accepted. These, impugned orders, have also reasoned that it was Smt Ram Lubhai alone who, at all material times, took steps to protect and secure the property when it was threatened; the petitioner did not take any steps towards that end.
29. Learned counsel for the petitioner had urged that denial of a hearing to the petitioner rendered the decision of the Commissioner illegal. He has relied upon Rule 102, to bring home this submission. A look at that provision would immediately show that it applies in the case of cancellation of allotments. The conditions or situations where allotments can be revoked or canceled have been outlined; the procedure prescribed is that the Managing Officer is obliged to issue notice and grant opportunity to the allottee. Having regard to the nature of the power and the circumstances when it can be exercised, I am of the opinion that it has no application to the facts of this case. Firstly, no allotment was sought to be canceled, when Smt. Ram Lubhai was given title by virtue of the conveyance executed by the authorities in her favor. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the petitioner was unaware of this transfer when it took place. Secondly, the attempt on his part was to have his name included in the provisional Conveyance deed; which reveals that there was no question of cancellation of any allotment in his favor. Thirdly and importantly, the conduct of the petitioner in doing nothing for 16 years and then, innocuously seeking inclusion of his name through a corrigendum, belies the claim of lack of notice. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, who claims to have been living at the same premises, was completely unaware of the Conveyance deed. thereforee, the submission that Rule 102 was violated, and that the impugned orders are not sustainable, has no force; it is accordingly rejected.
30. The question which then arises is whether the view taken by the Commissioner and the Central Government require interference. In certiorari proceedings, which is what the present petition is, the court is concerned about the legality of the decision and the procedure adopted while arriving at the decision, by the concerned tribunal. While exercising the power of judicial review or superintendence over tribunals/subordinate Courts, under Articles 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution, the Court as a limited jurisdiction. After considering all major decisions outlining the powers of High Courts, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, (including judgments such as L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India : [1997]228ITR725(SC) ; Chandrasekhar Singh v. Siya Ram Singh : 1979CriLJ13 , Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque : [1955]1SCR1104 and T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, : [1955]1SCR250 ) the Supreme Court restated the law, inter alia, as follows, in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 75:
(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) is excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice.
(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceeding such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.
(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.
-----------------------------------(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in depreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or the Chemical character.
A tribunals orders ought to be interfered with, thereforee, where the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and a grave injustice or gross allure of justice has occasioned. The court, in writ proceedings, does not convert itself into a fact appraising authority reviewing the decision complained against as if it were an appellate authority.
31. In view of the reasons mentioned earlier, the orders impugned in these proceedings, cannot be characterized as manifestly erroneous, or such as would result in gross failure of justice. The view taken is concurrent, which is also a relevant factor to we kept in mind. Hence interference under Article 226/227 of the Constitution is not warranted, for the reasons mentioned earlier.
32. In view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition has no merit; it is dismissed. All pending interlocutory applications are disposed off in the light of the judgment.Rule discharged. No costs.