S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. These Letter Patent Appeals having arisen out of a common judgment and involving similar question of law were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. However, we may consider the fact of the matter from the file of LPA 66/2001 arising out of CWP 1950/2000.
3. The petitoner is a registered association. Its member allegedly have entered into agreements with the fourth respondent for purchase of freehold plots at Okhla Enclave in the State of Haryana. The respondent No.4 allegedly had booked thousands of plots without obtaining requisite license as is mandatorily required in terms of Section 7 of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as 'the Act'). Allegedly, the respondent No.4 kept the purchasers at dark to the effect that although specific plots were being booked, approval for development and setting up of colony itself had not been obtained in terms of the provisions of the said Act. Allegedly, the official respondents had issued advertisements in the newspapers stating that the said respondents had been acting illegally in receiving applications and monies for allotment of the land without the requisite license. It had been contended that although the respondent No.4 gave out the impression that Director, Town and Country Planning, Haryana had provisionally fixed the development charges at Rs. 329/- per sq. yard, petitioners and other members were called upon to pay Rs. 50/- per sq. yard on or before 15th of February 1992 and the balance amount of Rs. 279/- per sq. yard within two years. It is further alleged that the respondent No.4 in August 1994 claimed that the Director, Town and Country Planning, had fixed the final development charges for plots up to 161 sq. yard @ Rs. 878 per sq. yard and for plots up to 263 sq. yards at Rs. 975/- per sq. yard without disclosing that the said rates included land costs.
4. The fourth respondent entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the purchasers fixing the development charges at Rs. 550/- per sq. yards but in breach of the said agreement, failed to deliver possession and thus cheated a number of plot holders. Several writ petitions were filed in the Apex Court such as 113/96, 477/96, 792/96 and 876/96 wherein the petitioners were not parties and therein the apex court issued the following directions:
'All the same, we direct allottee to pay a sum of Rs. 50/- per square yard within 4 weeks from today to the Government of Haryana in the account of the colonizer. We direct the colonizer to put each allottee in possession of the respective plot within 2 weeks there from. The balance amount, if any, payable by each allottees will be worked out and fixed up later.
If the amount specified above is not paid within the period of 4 weeks the colonizer is not obliged to put the defaulting allottee in possession of the plot concerned. To avoid further complications regarding payment and acceptance, we make it clear that it is sufficient that the amount is sent by draft by registered post to the Director, Town & Country Planning, Chandigarh (Haryana), if personal delivery is not found feasible. The remittance of the amount shall immediately be communicated to the colonizer in writing by registered post by the remitter.'
5. Upon directions of the Supreme Court, the government renewed the licenses granted to the fourth respondent with effect from 1993-94 as the license had expired.
6. However, notices had been issued upon the fourth respondent in terms of Section 8 of the said Act which was served upon him at Delhi. Two further show cause notices were issued.
7. By a judgment dated 2nd December 1999, the Supreme Court directed that the allottees be put in possession on payment of Rs. 50 per sq. yard whereupon they were put in possession.
8. However, when some other allottees filed writ petitions before the Supreme Court, the same were dismissed by an order dated 14th March 2000 directing them to take recourse to the other remedies available to them in law.
9. Thereafter, these writ petitions have been filed claiming, inter alia, the following reliefs:
'(a) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondents to register the allotted plots in the names of all the petitions, give physical possession of the same to them free from all encumbrances, and give all necessary permissions including 'No Objection Certificates' to enable construction of houses thereon.
(b) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to pay interest at a penal rate of 24% to the petitioners on the amount paid by them to the respondent No.4 over the last 14 years;
(c) direct respondents 1 to 3 to initiate appropriate enquiries and take penal actions against the officers responsible for permitting respondent No.4 to defraud the petitioners.
(d) direct the respondents to expedite and complete internal and external development work including providing civic amenities and facilities within a specified time frame;
(e) award costs;
(f) pass such other or further order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.'
10. The allottees who had moved the Supreme Court, however, filed writ petitions in the Punjab High Court which were also dismissed as withdrawn on 2nd June 2000 giving liberty to them to approach the Directorate of Town and Country Planning, Haryana.
11. Before the learned Single Judge, a question as regard the maintainability of these applications was raised on the ground that this court has no territorial jurisdiction in relation to the lands in question. The learned single Judge, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, inter alia, held that substantial reliefs have been sought for against respondents No.1 to 3 where for cause of action had also arisen in the State of Haryana and as such, this court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions.
12. Mr. Dholakia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, however, would submit that having regard to the provisions contained in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even if a part of cause of action had arisen within jurisdiction of this court, the impugned judgment could not have been passed. The learned counsel would submit that plots have been allotted in favor of the appellants in Delhi in respect whereof all payments had been made at Delhi. Even the respondent No.4 raised demand notices for payments had been sent to the persons, were residents of Delhi. Director, Town and Country Planning issued show cause notice to the fourth respondent at his address in Delhi and in reply whereto the show causes were also sent from Delhi by Respondent No.4. The letter of allotment issued by the Respondent No.4 contained a clause that Delhi courts alone would have jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Memorandum of Understanding dated 27th February 1995 had also been signed at Delhi. The learned counsel would further contend that all agreements as also the correspondences between the parties were sent and received at Delhi.
13. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, would submit that no part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court.
14. The primary question which arises for consideration in these writ petitions is as to whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions.
15. Cause of action constitutes a bundle of facts which are necessary to be stated for the purpose of obtaining a relief. What would be a 'cause of action' is no longer rest integra having regard to a recent decision in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., : AIR2000SC2966 .
16. However, such cause of action must have a direct nexus with the reliefs sought for in the petition. Out of the four respondents, the offices of the three respondents are in Chandigarh. Only the offence of the fourth respondent is in Delhi.
17. The transactions have been made by the petitioners with the fourth respondent. The petitioners have nothing to do with the show cause notice issued upon the fourth respondent by the third respondent herein in terms of Section 8 of the said Act.
18. It is not in dispute that the lands in question are situate in the State of Haryana. It is also not in dispute that the fourth respondent had been granted a license by the first respondent. Such license was issued from Chandigarh, outside the jurisdiction of this court. Steps for its cancellation are also being taken from Chandigarh which are again outside the jurisdiction of this court.
19. A bare perusal of the reliefs sought for by the petitioners would clearly indicate that the same are directed against the 1st to 3rd respondents.
20. The petitioners might have been cheated by the fourth respondent. The petitioners' right has also centered into the agreements entered into by the members of the Association and the fourth respondent pursuant whereto payments might have been made at Delhi. The transactions by and between the petitioners and the fourth respondent have nothing to do with the action of the respondents No.1 to 3 vis-a-vis the fourth respondent.
21. Having regard to the transactions between the petitioners and the fourth respondent a suit for specific performance of contract might have been maintainable within the jurisdiction of Delhi courts but we are of the opinion on the facts pleaded, these writ petitions are not maintainable, as a bare perusal of the reliefs sought for herein would clearly go to show that the other respondents had got nothing to do therewith. The lands being situate in the State of Haryana, registration thereof in question are also required to be done in Haryana, Possession of such plots are also required to be given at Haryana. No objection certificate to enable the petitions to raise constructions are also required to be issued by the first respondent from the State of Haryana. The land uses in terms of the provisions of Act are also required to be done within the State of Haryana.
22. So far as relief (b) is concerned, such a prayer is not maintainable. No writ can be issued in relation thereto as recovery must be made from the fourth respondent by way of a separate suit.
23. So far as relief (d) is concerned, the fourth respondent has no concern therewith. The same can be granted only against the Respondents No.1 to 3 whose residence are outside the jurisdiction of this Court.
24. Can it, in the afore-mentioned situation, be said that this court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition having regard to the Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India? The answer to the said question must be rendered in negative.
25. The learned Single Judge noticed that so far as the dispute by and between the petitions and the fourth respondent is concerned, the same involved disputed questions of fact and on that ground also, the writ petition would not be maintainable.
26. It is now trite that the residence or location of the petitioners is not relevant. In State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Swaika Properties and Anr., : [1985]3SCR598 , the apex court held:
'8. The expression 'cause of action' is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure:
'The 'cause of action' means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court.'
In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was in integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench . The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose.'
27. In Mussummat Chand Kour v. Partap Singh (15 is 156), it was held:-
'...the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defense which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favor.'
The Supreme Court in Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu ( : (1994)4SCC711 ) held that the question as to whether the court has a territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, must be arrived at on the basis of averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial.
The Supreme Court in ONGC's case ( : (1994)4SCC711 ) (Supra) held that all necessary facts must form an integral part of the cause of action. It observed:'So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereof at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15-1-1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27-1-1993.'
28. The judgment of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Swaika Properties and Anr., : [1985]3SCR598 was followed by a Division Bench of this court in Indo Gulf Explosives Ltd. and Anr. v. UP State Industrial Development Corporation and Anr., : 79(1999)DLT193 wherein in was observed:
10. In the instant case also the question arising for determination is of right of the respondents to recover arrears, which have accumulated to the tune of Rs. 84,81,022.83. The question whether or not the respondents are within their rights to enforce its demand in terms of the agreement, which was executed within the State of Uttar Pradesh or whether under the terms thereof due to non payment of dues the respondents have or have not a power of re-entry are such for which neither it is nor it was necessary for the appellant to plead service of notice on them by the respondents. The mere fact that the registered office of the appellant is in Delhi where the two communications dated 27.2.1996 and 22.7.1997 were received, will not be an integral part of cause of action for such a petition. In case the appellant has felt aggrieved by the demand raised or that the same is not in consonance with the terms of the agreement or that the respondents do not have any right of re-entry, it will be for the appellant to approach that High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the land is situated or agreement was executed and not this Court. Learned Single Judge not on the same reasonings but on different reasonings on the facts and circumstances of the case concluded that cause of action substantially and materially had arisen within the State of Uttar Pradesh.'
29. The decision of the apex court in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., : AIR2000SC2966 whereupon Mr. Dholakia has placed strong reliance, is not apposite. The court therein was concerned with a criminal offence. In that situation, it was held that so far as the question of territorial jurisdiction with reference to a criminal offence is concerned, the main factor to be considered is a place where the alleged offence was committed. Having regard to the provisions of Section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Apex Court held mere fact that the First Information Report was registered in a particular State, is not the sole criterion to decide that any cause of action has arisen even partly within the territorial limits of jurisdiction of another State. The apex court held that the Bombay High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition on the premise that a major part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the said court. It was further stated in para 27 that:
27. Tested in the light of the principles laid down in the cases noted above the judgment of the High Court under challenge is unsustainable. The High Court failed to consider all the relevant facts necessary to arrive at a proper decision on the question of maintainability of the writ petition, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Court based its decision on the sole consideration that the complainant had filed the complaint at Shilong in the State of Meghalaya and the petitioner had prayed for quashing the said complaint. The High Court did not also consider the alternative prayer made in the writ petition that a writ of mandamus be issued to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. The High Court also did not take note of the averments in the writ petition that filing of the complaint at Shilong was a mala fide move on the part of the complainant to harass and pressurise the petitioners to reverse the transaction for transfer of shares. The relief sought in the writ petition may be one of the relevant criteria for consideration of the question but cannot be the sole consideration in the matter. On the averments made in the writ petition gist of which has been noted earlier it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action for filing the writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court.'
In para 29, it was further observed:
'29. Considering the peculiar fact-situation of the case we are of the view that setting aside the impugned judgment and remitting the case to the High Court for fresh disposal will cause further delay in investigation of the matter and may create other complications. Instead, it will be apt and proper to direct that further investigation relating to complaint filed by J.B. Holdings Ltd. should be made by the Mumbai Police.'
30. We may, however, note that Thomas, J. in his concurring but separate opinion, referred to the decisions of the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Swaika Properties and Anr. (supra) and Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (supra) and stated that the same has provided sufficient guidelines for the High Court.
31. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that in a case of this nature, where the main reliefs have been sought for against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and the offices of the said respondents are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court even if it be held that a small part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, the court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. In New Horizons Limited and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., : AIR1994Delhi126 , Wadhwa, J. as the learned Judge then was, observed in para 33 as under:
'...We could certainly have directed the petitioners to approach the Andhra Pradesh High Court which also has jurisdiction in the matter since the telephone directories were required for Hyderabad Telecom District and the contract was to be entered there and the records were also maintained there in Hyderabad. We could decline to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in such a matter in spite of the fact of our having jurisdiction in the matter. However, since the arguments were addressed at length we do not think any useful purpose will be served by sending the petitioners to Hyderabad.'
32. This aspect of the matter has also been considered in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Jharia Talkies, 1992(2) Cal LT 357. In Modern Malleable Casting Works Ltd. v. Star Iron Works Ltd. and Ors., 1995(2) CHN 483, U.C. Banerjee, as his Lordship then was, observed as under:
'1. On a plain reading of Clause (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution it appears that a Writ can be issued against a Government Authority if its seat is within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court or the cause of action has arisen wholly or in part within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The introduction of the situs theory and the part of cause of action in the main body of the Article cannot in any way be stated to be a restriction on to the use of jurisdiction. As regard the situs theory, no difficulty is experienced in the matter of interpretation by reason of the express language of the Article, viz., 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.' : in so far as the meaning to be attributed to the expression 'cause of action', a long catena of judicial pronouncements set forth such a meaning to the effect that the expression means 'the bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favor by the court'.
It was further held:
'12. Turning attention on to the main thrust of challenge against the order of the leaned Trial Judge on the basis of Situs Theory in our view, there is sufficient justification in the strong criticism of Mr. Sarkar in regard to the assumption of jurisdiction by this court in the factual backdrop as noted above. If we analyze the factual aspect in slightly more greater detail here as this juncture it is apparent that the NTPC has formulated a policy for Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking and tender notice was published in Delhi Formulation of Policy was at Delhi: The rejection of offer and a acceptance of the offer did take place at Delhi itself. Merely because of the fact that some communication was received at Calcutta, in my view, will not confer jurisdiction on this court. This letter, in any event, was posted at Delhi and if an analogy is drawn as regards the formation of contract. Mr. Chatterjee's contention cannot be accepted, that the same would give rise to a cause-of-action authorizing him to initiate proceedings in this court. The observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. Girdharlal Parshottamdas & Co. and Ors. 0065/1965 : [1966]1SCR656 in the context, lends assistance to the view expressed above.
13. The main thrust of challenge in the writ petition is alleged arbitrary exercise of power in so far as Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking and NTPC are concerned - but that exercise of power also did take place at Delhi. Would this factual backdrop entitle a party to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court at Calcutta - In my view, the answer cannot but be in the negative.'
33. Recently in Union of India and Ors. v. Adani Exports Ltd. and Anr., : 2001(134)ELT596(SC) , referring to its earlier decision in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, : (1994)4SCC711 , the apex court held:
'17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in-part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in Paragraph 16 of the petition, in our opinion, fall into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.'
34. In Suresh Desai & Associates v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1998) 230 ITR 912, a Division Bench of this court has held, in a matter arising out of the Income-tax Act, that the Bench would refer the question arising out of its own order in appeal to the High Court of the State from which the appeal had come.
35. We, thereforee, are of the opinion that no case is made out for interfering with the impugned judgment. These appeals are, thereforee, dismissed without any orders as to costs.