Judgment:
S.B. Wad, J.
(1) This is an appeal against the learned Sub Judge. Delhi, dated 15.9.1984 rejecting the appellant's application under Order Ix, Rule 13, read with section 151, CPC. By an agreement between the parties dated 7th July 1978 the disputes were referred to the sole Arbitration of Shri Y P. Nanda. Shri Nanda rendered his award on 2.9.1978 and filed the same in court. The award was made the rule of the court on 15.10.1980, apparently because the appellant did not file any objection. The appellant filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13, read with section 151, Civil Procedure Code alleging that no notice was served by the court on him before the award was made the rule of the court. He also contended that he got the knowledge of the order of the court making the award the rule of the court only on 15.10.1980 and thereafter he immediately moved the said application. The learned Sub-Judge had recorded the evidence as regards the service of the notice and came to the conclusion that the appellant had been duly served. He thereafter rejected the application of the appellant.
(2) Apart from the question of service the appellant has challenged the very jurisdiction of the court passing an order making the award the rule of the court. His submission is based on valuation of the properties involved, in the agreement of arbitration. We may note at this stage the terms of the arbitration agreement because they will show as to what properties were involved in the disputes between the parties on which the Arbitrator rendered his award:
'(I)Settlement of bigger Hup assets of Shri Chuni Lal father of the parties. (ii) Settlement of Smt. Krishna Wanti's share in the property bearing Nos. lIB, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi, and S-134, Greater Kailash Part-11, New Delhi, as also her share in the Huf menti oned above and other assets left by her at the time of her death as per her registered Will. (iii) Disputes relating to the show room on the ground floor of the property bearing No. lIB, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi, at present with Shri S.K. Pahwa. (iv) Settlement in respect of first floor portion bearing No. 40, Pusa Road, New Delhi occupied by Shri Suraj Parkash, Manmoban, Kirti Kumar Pahwa etc. (v) Settlement of share of each of the brothers in the cold storage at Bulandshar after its sale.'
(2) The argument of the appellant is that looking to the properties the valuation of which being much beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Sub- Judge, he had no jurisdiction to make the award the rule of the court. He has referred to the definition of the court given in section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act. The definition reads :
'COURT' means a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under section 21, include a Small Cause Court.'
The counsel for the appellant has referred to the decision of this court rendered by Justice Jagjit Singh in Civil Revision No. 13 of 1968, reported in 1969 M.L.R. 157 (The Punjab State Electricity Boards. Shri Siri Ram Bansal Govt. Contractor Candaghat) in support of his contention. The learned Judge has held that since the valuation of the subject matter in that case exceeded Rs. 25.000.00 after 1st May, 1967 the High Court became the 'Court' in terms of Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act and that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction. This submission is countered by the counsel for the respondents with reference to Section 31 of the Act which speaks of the jurisdiction. His submission is that the words used in Section 31(1) are 'any Court having jurisdiction in the matter'. The counsel submits that there is no pecuniary limit for filing of the arbitration award and making it the rule of the court. It can be filed in any court. The only limitation is that the court should have the pecuniary territorial jurisdiction. In other words, the submission is that the words 'any Court having jurisdiction' referred only to the territorial jurisdiction and not the pecuniary jurisdiction. The counsel further submits that the same interpretation applies to section 2(c) of the Act where the word court has been defined. The submission of the respondents cannot be accepted in face of the judgment of this court referred to above. But apart from that judgment the interpretation does not appear to be correct on the very reading of the section. The word used of section 31(1) is jurisdiction simplicitor. If the Legislature wanted to restrict the meaning of the word jurisdiction, it could have clarified it by adding the word 'territorial' to the words 'jurisdiction'. In the absence of such a limiting clause the word jurisdiction has to be used in any normal connotation to mean both the pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction. The counsel has also referred to Section 31(2) of the Act in support of his submission. However, I do not think that the interpretation, as suggested by him, are convincing.
(4) The properties involved in the dispute which were the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement as also on which the award has been rendered on the face of it are very valuable properties both moveable and immoveable. Considering the present prices of the properties, it cannot be said that they are worth less than Rs. 25,000.00 which is the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Sub-Judge. I thereforee, have no hesitation in holding that the learned Sub- Judge had no pecuniary jurisdiction.
(5) The counsel for the respondents, however, submits that the nature of the arbitration award in the present case is similar to that of a suit for declaration, What the Arbitration was called upon to do and what he has done is merely to declare the shares of the parties and nothing more. In view of this submission, according to him, there was no question of exceeding the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Sub-Judge involved in the case. If the arbitration and more particularly the award rendered by the Arbitrator is closely examined and its implications are analysed, it would be seen that the Arbitrator had purported to finally dispose of the property rights of all the claimants. The effect of this award is that once it has been made the rule of the court the parties would be straightaway entitled to the properties falling to their shares. The intention of the parties was finally to bring to an end all their disputes after their shares were given to them by the Arbitrator. This is also clear from the fact that the Arbitrator is a well known family friend of the parties. There is no merit in the submission of the counsel for the respondents and the same is rejected.
(6) The next submission of the counsel for the respondents is that the appeal is not maintainable in view of the fact that the impugned order is not an order passed after considering the application for filing of objections and its rejection. The application of the appellant under Order 9, Rule 13 & under section 151, CPC. is misconceived. This submission is also to be rejected. The objection to the jurisdiction of the Sub-Judge goes to the root of the matter, and the appeal will certainly lay for setting aside the order of Sub-Judge which is without jurisdiction. The Arbitrator is directed to file the award in the proper court.
(7) For the reasons stated above the impugned order is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.