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Assistant Commissioner of Income Vs. Meghraj GolechA. (Meghraj - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
CourtIncome Tax Appellate Tribunal ITAT Mumbai
Decided On
Reported in(1997)60ITD448(Mum.)
AppellantAssistant Commissioner of Income
RespondentMeghraj GolechA. (Meghraj
Excerpt:
1. all these cross-appeals and cross-objections arise from a common order of cit(a) in the above-mentioned assessment years. they were heard together and are being disposed of by a common order for the sake of convenience. facts giving rise to these appeals and cross-objections may be briefly stated as under.2. assessee is an individual. assessee was claimed to be the proprietor of m/s asian trading co. and m/s ekta sales. a search was conducted at the business premises of the assessee on 12th feb., 1982. according to the revenue assessee was running 11 other concerns in different names from the same premises, namely, abhinandan, kalbadevi, bombay. assessee did not and has not till today, admittedly, filed any income-tax return for the assessment years under consideration. ex parte.....
Judgment:
1. All these cross-appeals and cross-objections arise from a common order of CIT(A) in the above-mentioned assessment years. They were heard together and are being disposed of by a common order for the sake of convenience. Facts giving rise to these appeals and cross-objections may be briefly stated as under.

2. Assessee is an individual. Assessee was claimed to be the proprietor of M/s Asian Trading Co. and M/s Ekta Sales. A search was conducted at the business premises of the assessee on 12th Feb., 1982. According to the Revenue assessee was running 11 other concerns in different names from the same premises, namely, Abhinandan, Kalbadevi, Bombay. Assessee did not and has not till today, admittedly, filed any income-tax return for the assessment years under consideration. Ex parte orders dt. 12th Feb., 1986, were passed for all these years since assessee defied all notices issued under ss. 147, 139(2), 142(1) and 131 of the IT Act, 1961. The view of the AO was that assessee had been making purchases and sales on which he was earning huge profits and was also doing hawala business to accommodate other persons for evasion of tax. In the assessment order for the year 1985-86, the AO had also mentioned that peak loans of Rs. 27.33 lacs were noticed in the accounting year 1st July, 1978, to 30th June, 1979. It was also stated from the side of the Revenue, and admitted on behalf of the assessee, that an offer was made from the side of the assessee to the Department to assess undisclosed income at about Rs. 27 lacs and that offer had not been accepted by the Revenue and thereafter since the assessee had not cooperated, the AO passed a detailed order for the asst. yr. 1985-86 in which assessee's total income was assessed at Rs. 1,00,38,384. For the asst. yrs.

1982-83 to 1984-85 short orders were passed based on AO's order for the asst. yr. 1978-79, dt. 18th Feb., 1986, and the income was assessed at Rs. 9,29,000 for the asst. yr. 1982-83 and Rs. 6,00,000 for the asst.

yr. 1983-84 and Rs. 53,79,380 for asst. yr. 1984-85 on an estimate basis. When assessee went in appeal, the learned CIT(A) vide his orders dt. 10th March, 1988, for the asst. yrs. 1978-79 to 1983-84 and dt.

11th March, 1988, for the asst. yrs. 1984-85 and 1985-86, set aside all the assessments mainly because he found that on the one hand the AO had stated that assessee could not have possibly done the business of trading in cloth because of various factors such as there being no godown, etc., having been noticed by him, and yet have an estimated income from business. He also noticed certain contradictions in the orders of the AO. He, therefore, directed that fresh assessments should be made taking into account his observations in his order.

3. Meanwhile, another search was conducted by the Department at the premises of the assessee on 27th Aug., 1984. However, no fresh assessments on the basis of the direction of the learned CIT(A) vide his above-mentioned order dt. 10th March, 1988, and 11th March, 1988, were ever completed by the AO. However, on 29th March, 1993, the AO, with the previous approval of the CIT, issued notices under s. 148 to the assessee which were served on him on 30th March, 1993, for all the four above-mentioned assessment years. Again assessee did not comply with those notices and as mentioned earlier in this order, till today no income-tax returns were filed for the above-mentioned assessment years in spite of notices issued under s. 142(1) by the AO. Assessee, however, wrote only one letter to the AO, dt. 10th Oct., 1990, in which instead of complying with the notices under s. 148/142(1), assessee wrote to the AO with reference to recovery proceedings for asst. yrs.

1978-79 to 1985-86 that after setting aside of the assessment orders by the CIT(A), the income-tax demand had become nil and he had not received any fresh assessment orders but no compliance was made or information was supplied with reference to the notices issued under ss.

148 and 142(1). Another letter dt. 11th Feb., 1994, was sent by the assessee in response to summons under s. 131 which is placed on page 43 of the paper book of the assessee but again no compliance was made with the requirements under s. 131 by appearing personally nor was the required information furnished. The AO, therefore, again completed assessments for the abovementioned assessment years at Rs. 4,70,000 for asst. yr. 1982-83, Rs. 5,85,000 for asst. yr. 1983-84, Rs. 7,53,500 for asst. yr. 1984-85 and Rs. 12,69,140 for asst. yr. 1985-86. All these assessments are dt. 23rd March, 1994. The AO, however, mentioned that these assessments were being made under s. 143(3) r/w s. 147. The assessee challenged all these assessments before the learned CIT(A).

However, the grounds taken therein were against initiating proceedings under s. 147 during the pendency of assessment proceedings and that the notices under s. 148(1) were bad in law etc. The learned CIT(A) has passed a very detailed order running into 33 pages which is a common order for all these assessment years and in which the learned CIT(A) has met with all the arguments which had been advanced on behalf of the assessee and has also supported his decision dismissing all the objections with citing extracts from various High Court and Supreme Court decisions, so far as the validity of the fresh assessments was concerned. However, so far as the quantum of assessments is concerned, he had allowed relief of Rs. 60,000 for the asst. yr. 1982-83, Rs. 75,000 for 1983-84, Rs. 2,96,978 for 1984-85 and relief of Rs. 1,47,254 for the asst. yr. 1985-86.

4. It is in this background that while the assessee has challenged the partial confirmation of the assessment orders and the validity of the assessments in the appeals filed by him, the Revenue has challenged the relief given by the learned CIT(A) to the assessee and against those appeals assessee has filed his cross-objections.

5. The first and main objection of the learned counsel for the assessee was regarding the validity of reopening of the assessments. According to the learned counsel since the original assessment proceedings had been set aside by the learned CIT(A) vide his orders dt. 10th March, 1988, and 11th March, 1988, and, it could be said that those assessment proceedings were pending and hence no fresh notices under s. 147/148 could be issued to the assessee. In this context, he heavily relied on the decision of the Jaipur Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Jaidev Jain & Co. vs. ITO (1994) 48 TTJ (Jp) 493 : (1994) 48 ITD 124 (Jp), to which one of us (Shri J. K. Verma) was a party. He further submitted that there was nothing to show that the proceedings for these assessment years which were pending after the assessments were set aside by the learned CIT(A), were dropped by the AO and hence, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Raja Pratap Singh (1961) 41 ITR 421 (SC) also no fresh notices under s. 147/148 could be issued. In order to further strengthen his proposition the learned counsel also referred to the decision in the case of R. Y.Durlabhji vs. ITO. He also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ghanshyamdas vs. Regional Asstt. CST & Ors. (1964) 51 ITR 557 (SC) to support his argument that income cannot be said to have escaped assessment unless a final order in the pending proceedings was passed. Referring to the observations of the learned CIT(A) in his order that notices issued in the original proceedings being invalid the AO was justified in not pursuing those proceedings, the learned counsel argued that if at all they were invalid, the AO himself could have recorded these findings and could have dropped the proceedings before initiating fresh proceedings. The learned counsel thereafter referred to the decisions in the cases of CIT vs. P. Krishnakutty Menon (1990) 181 ITR 237 (Ker), Sheila Brij Jaggi vs. ITO & Ors. (1990) 184 ITR 50 (Bom), CIT vs. Laxmidevi Mehta (1993) 70 Taxman 399 (Cal) and CIT vs.

Kurban Hussain Ibrahimji Mithiborwala (1971) 82 ITR 821 (SC). The learned counsel also stated that there was nothing to show that the AO had recorded any reasons for issue of notices. He further pointed out that both in the orders of the AO as well as in the orders of the CIT(A), date of notices was mentioned as 24th May, 1993, and if that were true, assessment proceedings for the asst. yrs. 1982-83 were time-barred under the provisions which are effective from 1st April, 1989, and that for all the assessment years, if proceedings are considered to be governed by provisions of law before 1st April, 1989.

The learned counsel further pointed out that since the original assessments were made at much higher incomes for all these years (which we have already mentioned in the earlier part of this order) than the figures at which the present assessments are made, it could not be said that the AO had any reason to believe that income liable to assessment has escaped assessment because he had already made assessments on higher figures. According to the learned counsel, for this reason also, notices under s. 147/148 on the basis of which the present assessment orders had been framed, were invalid.

6. Coming to the merits of the case, the learned counsel argued that the lower authorities had estimated assessee's income at Rs. 10,000 from house property. However, as per the evidence at pages 68, 69 and 70 of the paper book, it was obvious that the house property was in the name of assessee's mother and hence income from that property could not be assessed in the hands of the assessee. He further submitted that even assuming that it is assessee's self-occupied property, since it was not let out, the income had to be taken at nil.

7. Regarding the estimate of income from bogus hawala business, the learned counsel argued that since all the material had been seized by the income-tax Department there was no evidence with the assessee to work out the profit and prove his case and hence, in the absence of any cogent material having been brought on record by the AO, the estimate of income was without any basis and should be deleted. The learned counsel further argued that neither the AO nor the learned CIT(A) had looked into the question as to whether assessee really owned the 13 concerns of which he is alleged to be the owner. Finally, he objected to charging of interest under s. 139(8), under s. 215 and under s. 216, etc., and for this proposition relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Gamon India (1983) 141 ITR 847 (sic).

8. So far as the cross-objections are concerned, the learned counsel pointed out that although the AO had written that assessee had not complied with various notices like under ss. 147/148, 142(1), etc., he had framed the assessments under s. 143(3) and not under s. 144 and hence, the assessment orders were invalid.

9. The learned Departmental Representative, on the other hand, argued that assessee was not only indulging in tax evasion but was assisting other parties in tax evasion which could be read from the details discussed in the assessment order for the asst. yr. 1985-86, dt. 23rd March, 1994. He submitted that the assessee had offered Rs. 27.33 lacs for being taxed, yet no returns of income were filed by him nor any compliance was made to the statutory provisions and notices. He submitted that the searches had revealed large scale of tax evasion not only by the assessee himself but by others also on the basis of assistance given by him by making hawala entries.

10. Regarding the validity of the issue of fresh notices, while the learned Departmental Representative heavily relied on the orders of the learned CIT(A), he pointed out that there were typographical errors in the orders of the AO which had perhaps been repeated without verification in the orders of the learned CIT(A) when the dates for issue of notices under s. 147/148 were given as 24th May, 1993, and their service being on 31st March, 1993. The learned Departmental Representative has filed photostat copies of the notices which were issued by the AO and pointed out that the notices are dt. 29th March, 1993, and they were served on 30th March, 1993. He has also filed photostat copies of the reasons recorded by the AO before issue of notices. He has also filed photostat copies of the proposal of the AO sent to the CIT which bears his signature and approval dt. 26th March, 1993, for the issue of notice under s. 148. He pointed out that against item 12 of the prescribed proforma the date when the proposal was sent to the CIT is also legible and reads 23rd March, 1993. He pointed out that in this case notices under s. 139(2), dated 17th Nov., 1984, and 25th Nov., 1985, were served on the assessee for asst. yrs. 1984-85 and 1985-86, respectively. Notices for the asst. yrs. 1982-83 and 1983-84 had originally been issued on 19th Nov., 1984. In this background under the amended provisions, which being procedural provisions and which were applicable after 1st April, 1989, the issue of notices for all the four impugned assessment years was within a period of 10 years, and since escaped income in each year was more than Rs. 1,00,000, the notices for each assessment year had been issued and served well within the prescribed time. In this context, the learned Departmental Representative had also filed photostat copies of the reasons recorded by the AO, CIT's approval for all the 4 years under consideration and also photostat copies of notices issued to the assessee, and pointed out that they proved that the proposal to the CIT for reopening the assessments had been sent, his approval had been taken and notices under s. 148 had been issued and served before 31st March, 1993, which is within a period of 10 years even for the asst. yr. 1982-83. The learned Departmental Representative argued that the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the assessee on the cases cited by him was not justified because he had ignored the basic changes brought about in the IT Act in s. 147 w.e.f. 1st April, 1989. According to the learned Departmental Representative all the cases cited by the learned counsel for the assessee dealt with law as it prevailed before the amended provisions came into effect from 1st April, 1989. Dealing with the argument of the learned counsel for the assessee that the approval of the CIT had not been received and that it would be clear from scoring out of the printed words to the effect the approval of the CIT had been taken, the learned Departmental Representative submitted that it was only a clerical mistake. He submitted that it appears that instead of scoring out the words that the approval of the CBDT had been received, the words pertaining to the approval having been received from the CIT had been scored out. He submitted that merely on account of this clerical mistake, which was apparent from the fact that the stamp as well as signatures and the date of approval of the CIT were clear on the prescribed proforma, this minor mistake had to be ignored.

10.1. The learned Departmental Representative emphasised that even as per the Commentary of Chaturvedi & Pithisaria, page 3539, Fourth Edition, it was clear that the amendment being of a procedural nature was retrospective in effect and would apply to all the proceedings which were to be initiated after that date even in respect of the earlier assessment years. He pointed out that the main difference between the old provisions of s. 147(a) and 147(b) and the present provisions of s. 147, was that several preconditions and restrictions imposed on the AO to enable him to issue notice under those two sub-sections, had been dispensed with and now the only requirement was the satisfaction of the AO to the effect that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year. Thus, according to the learned Departmental Representative, the old restrictions and riders to the effect that the AO could issue notice only if the escapement was on account of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully the particulars of income, as per s. 147(a), or that it should have been in consequence of information in his possession as per s. 147(b) had been dispensed with. In other words, according to the provisions of s. 147(a), and 147(b) a notice could be issued only if the escapement of income for an earlier year was on account of failure of the assessee to disclose truly an fully all the particulars of his income or even if there was no failure on the part of the assessee, the AO on getting some information after the assessment had been completed, had reason to believe that income liable to tax had escaped assessment. On the other hand, under the provisions effective from 1st April, 1989, even if there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all the particulars of his income or there was no information received by the AO after the completion of the assessment, yet the AO had reason to believe that income liable to tax had escaped assessment, he could validly issue notice under s. 148. On this basis the learned Departmental Representative argued that the case law cited by the learned counsel for the assessee including the decision in the case of Jaidev & Jain Co. vs. ITO (supra) in which one of us (Shri J. K. Verma) was the author, did not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case.

Similarly, he explained that the provisions with respect to time within which a notice could be issued for initiating proceeding for earlier years had also undergone sea-change. Now, the time-limit was 10 years instead of 8 years with the approval of the CIT and 16 years with the approval of the CBDT as per the provisions of law before 1st April, 1989. In this background, the learned Departmental Representative drew our attention to pages 39 to 40 of Department's paper book which showed that assessee had filed a petition before the CIT, Bombay, and had offered some income for tax which had not been assessed to tax. On this basis the AO had reason to believe that income liable to tax had escaped assessment and in this connection detailed reasons were recorded while reopening the proceedings for the asst. yr. 1985-86. The reasons recorded by the AO also took note of the search which had been conducted at the premises of the assessee and it would reasonably lead the AO to believe that income liable to tax had escaped assessment for the asst. yrs. 1982-83 to 1985-86. He referred to page 5 of the assessment order for the asst. yr. 1985-86 and pointed out that there were total sales of about 4.50 crores to Asian Trading Co., etc. which were discovered in the search conducted on 27th Aug., 1984. He submitted that these papers were never contested by the assessee and, yet at no stage assessee filed his return of income for the impugned assessment years. No attempt was made to explain the adverse evidence found during the course of search.

11. Regarding the objections of the learned counsel of the assessee to the effect that since the assessment proceedings which had been set aside by the learned CIT(A) for these assessment years vide his orders dt. 10th March, 1988, and 11th March, 1988, had got time barred and hence, no fresh proceedings under s. 147/148 could be initiated, the learned Departmental Representative vehemently argued that in view of the changed provisions of law which are applicable after 1st April, 1989, the case law on this issue would also not apply. He submitted that when the AO issued the notices for the assessment years under consideration on 29th March, 1993, no assessment proceedings for these years were pending. He emphasised that in this case since assessee had not filed any return of income for any assessment year under consideration in spite of issue of notices under s. 148 for asst. yrs.

1982-83 and 1983-84 and issue of notices under s. 139(2) for the asst.

yrs. 1984-85 and 1985-86 in time, it could not be said assessee's case was similar to the case of CIT vs. Ranchhodas Karsondas (1959) 37 ITR 569 (SC) and several other cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee because in all those cases assessee had filed the returns of income and which had got barred by limitation. Thus, according to the learned Departmental Representative, in those cases assessee had discharged his duty by filing valid income-tax returns and the Revenue had failed to complete valid income-tax assessments on the basis of those returns. On the other hand, in the instant case in spite of issue of valid notices at the first stage and issue of fresh notices at the second stage, assessee had not filed his returns of income and thus, even if it could be said that assessment proceedings which should have been completed on the basis of the assessment orders for these years having been set aside by the learned CIT(A) vide his orders dt. 10th March, 1988, and 11th March, 1988, it got barred by time, in the first instance none of the assessment proceedings in which assessee had filed a valid return of income had got barred by time and hence, there was nothing wrong when the AO issued fresh notices under s. 148 for these assessment years on 29th March, 1993. Secondly, as argued by him earlier, on account of change in law, even if the proceedings had got barred by time, yet, if the AO had reason to believe that income liable to tax had escaped assessment, he could issue notices under s. 148.

12. In the same context, the learned Departmental Representative dealt with the argument of the learned counsel of the assessee to the effect that since the income originally assessed was more in all the four years than what has finally been assessed in these fresh assessments, the entire basis that income had escaped assessment was wrong, the learned Departmental Representative submitted that in the first instance the income originally assessed was not on any proper basis and hence those assessments had been set aside by the learned CIT(A).

Secondly, according to the learned Departmental Representative there was no assessed income existing nor was there any returned income by the assessee in the absence of any return having been filed by him and hence, the total income which has now been assessed is the income which can be said to have escaped assessment and which justifies the issue of notices by the AO for all these years.

13. So far as the objections regarding proper opportunity not having been given by the CIT(A) to the assessee, estimate of income from house property at Rs. 10,000 and upholding of income from hawala business are concerned he relied on the order of the AO and also of the CIT(A) but submitted that the CIT(A) was not justified in giving relief to the assessee against which part of the order of the learned CIT(A), the Revenue was in appeal before us. Similarly, regarding the addition of Rs. 1,30,191 in the asst. yr. 1985-86, the learned Departmental Representative submitted that this was on account of unexplained assets which were seized and heavily relied on the orders of the AO and the CIT(A). He further submitted that the facts as mentioned in the orders of the AO as well as the CIT(A) so also the facts as have been stated by him during the course of his arguments clearly indicate that the assessee had not at all cooperated with the AO in spite of repeated opportunities having been given to him and hence, no question of natural justice arises in this case, particularly when assessee never complied with any notices issued by the AO.14. In his rejoinder, the learned counsel for the assessee submitted that the arguments of the learned Departmental Representative that the amendment in ss. 147/148 w.e.f. 1st April, 1989, was retrospective was not correct. He was, however, fair enough to concede that if the notices had been served in March, 1993, then none of the notices could be said to be barred by time. He, however, pointed out that in the Commentary of Chaturvedi & Pithisaria on which the learned Departmental Representative relied, it was mentioned that these amendments were retrospective and apply to earlier years unless those proceedings were already barred by time. He submitted that since in the instant cases the set aside proceedings had got barred by time, the retrospective nature of the amendments would not help the Revenue. The learned counsel also submitted that the language of the reasons recorded by the AO, copies of which had been supplied by the Departmental Representative, would show that the AO had recorded the reasons after he had received the approval from the CIT because at the end of the reasons he has written that the CIT had given approval for issuing of notices. Further, according to the learned counsel, as per page 9 of Department's paper book and the reasons recorded by the AO, it was clear that there was no fresh material with the AO to initiate proceedings under s. 147. Regarding the offer of assessment of Rs. 27.33 lacs having been made by the assessee, he claimed that the entire offer was for assessment years preceding the assessment years under consideration. The learned counsel again relied on the case law which he had already cited and also on the decisions in the cases of Laduram Laxminarayan vs. Addl. ITO & Ors. (1976) 102 ITR 599 (Gau), East Coast Commercial Co. Ltd. vs. ITO (1981) 128 ITR 326 (Cal) and Govind Chaudhary vs. ITO & Ors. (1977) 109 ITR 370 (Ori) to support his contentions that reopening of assessments in the facts and circumstances of this case was invalid and all the assessments framed by the AO should be quashed as invalid being against provisions of law.

15. In appeals filed by the Revenue, the Revenue has objected to reliefs of Rs. 60,000, Rs. 75,000, Rs. 2,96,978 and Rs. 1,47,257 having been given by the learned CIT(A) for estimate of interest income on rotation basis. He submitted that when the income as mentioned above was generated, it was only normal for the AO to estimate income from interest on that newly generated income. The learned counsel for the assessee strongly supported the orders of the learned CIT(A) on this issue.

16. In his cross-objections, the assessee has again challenged the validity of the assessment orders and their being upheld by the learned CIT(A).

17. We have carefully considered the rival submissions, the detailed arguments, material on record and the case law which has been cited before us. In our opinion, first and foremost issue to be decided in this case is regarding the validity of reassessment proceedings. We do not consider it necessary to reproduce the argument advanced by both the sides, yet, after having considered them we are of the opinion that the main objection of the assessee that the notices were issued beyond time is not correct and is proved against him by material on record.

Thus, the reasons recorded by the AO are for the issue of notices under s. 148 for which prior approval had been received from the CIT. CIT's approval is dt. 26th March, 1993, and notices had been issued on 29th March, 1993, the same date and had been served on the assessee on 30th March, 1993. The reasons for the belief that income had escaped assessment are as per (sic) dt. 23rd March, 1993 sent to CIT (which is typed in prescribed proforma Submitted to the CIT). We agree with the argument of the learned Departmental Representative to the effect that since the reassessment notices with the prior approval of the CIT for the asst. yrs. 1982-83 and 1983-84 had been served on the assessee on 30th March, 1993, they were within a period of 10 years even for the asst. yr. 1982-83. Further, since the escaped income was more than Rs. 1 lac they could be issued with the prior approval of the CIT within a period of 10 years under the procedure which prevailed on 30th March, 1993, i.e., after 1st April, 1989. We further agree with the argument of the learned Departmental Representative that the facts and circumstances of the assessee's case are clearly distinguishable from the case law cited by the learned counsel for the assessee. In all those cases, in the first instance, the decisions pertain to the position of law as it prevailed before 1st April, 1989. Thus, for example, in the case of Jaidev Jain & Co. (supra), the assessment years involved were 1971-72 and 1972-73 and the notices under s. 148 were served in the first instance on 9th Oct., 1973, and were issued in the second instance for both the years on 31st March, 1980, and 18th March, 1981, respectively. In these circumstances, the amended provisions were not applicable in that case. We further agree with the arguments of the learned Departmental Representative that in view of the changed language of the provisions of s. 147 the requirement of proving by the Revenue that assessee had failed to disclose truly and fully all the material facts necessary for his assessment or that there was fresh information in his possession on the basis of which fresh reassessment proceedings were being initiated, have been dispensed with and now the AO has to establish that he had a reasonable basis for forming a belief that income liable to tax had escaped assessment. Of course, different periods with reference to different quantum of income have now been prescribed and that too with reference to the section under which the earlier assessments had been made, but they are not relevant for our purposes because in the instant case for all the assessment years under consideration no returns of income had been filed by the assessee, for all the years the escaped income is more than Rs. 1,00,000 and in all the years the notices have been issued within a period not exceeding 10 years and hence, in our opinion, neither the issue of notices nor the framing of fresh assessments can be said to be invalid. We also agree with the submissions of the learned Departmental Representative that since in the instant case assessee had not filed any return of income, the case law relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee would not help the assessee. Further, since the assessee did not comply with any of the notices issued by the AO, it shows assessee's deliberate defiance of law and his failure to file any evidence before the AO. In these circumstances, his filing of any fresh evidence, submissions of arguments before the CIT(A) which were not filed before the AO carry no weight. In fact, if the CIT(A) had admitted any fresh evidence, it should have been contrary to the provisions of r. 46A of the IT Rules.

Similarly, we agree with the submissions of the learned Departmental Representative that since assessee had not filed any return of income even in response to the first set of notices under s. 148 and under s.

139(2), on the basis of which original assessments had been framed under s. 144 and which assessments had been set aside by the learned CIT(A), there remained neither any return filed by the assessee which got time barred nor there remains any justification for assessee to claim that principles of natural justice had been defied in this case.

It is a well known maxim of law that a person who wants justice must come with clean hands. In the instant case, a person who was found in possession of undisclosed income and assets at the time of two searches, a person who had offered for taxation income to the tune of more than Rs. 27 lacs on settlement basis before the CIT and, yet defied the notices issued under ss. 148 and 139(2) by not filing any returns of income, and also defied repeated issue of notices under s.

142(1) cannot be said to be a person who has come to ask for justice with clean hands. On the other hand, the AO has complied with all the provisions of the IT Act, and in our opinion, was justified in estimating the income of the assessee on the basis of material held in his possession while framing assessments under s. 144 for all these assessment years. We, therefore, uphold the validity of the issue of notices under s. 148 and framing of the assessments under s. 144. We agree with the learned CIT(A) that merely writing or typing s. 143(3) instead of s. 144 when the assessments were being framed, admittedly in a situation where not even a return of income was filed, cannot invalidate the assessments framed by the AO. This objection of the assessee is, therefore, also rejected.

18. Coming to the quantum of income, we are of the opinion that the AO as well as the learned CIT(A) have given sufficient justification for the estimate of income of the assessee. So far as the estimate of income from house property is concerned, in the absence of any evidence having been advanced by the assessee to the contrary in spite of particulars having been given to him and in view of the fact the assessee's mother is not found to be having any source of income so also this particular premises being found to be occupied by the assessee and assessee's address having been given as those premises, in our opinion, the AO as well as the CIT(A) were justified in assessing the income from the impugned property as assessee's income from house property. We are also not prepared to attach much weight to the argument of the assessee to the effect that even if it is treated as self-occupied property, no income from there should be assessed because assessee has failed to adduce any evidence to support any of his contentions before any of the authorities. Moreover, the exemption from tax of income from self-occupied property was given by the Finance Act, 1986, w.e.f. 1st April, 1987, and would not be available to the assessee in these assessment years. This objection is, therefore, also rejected.

19. For all these reasons which we have mentioned above in some detail and also for the reasons given by the learned CIT(A) in great detail in his order, we dismiss all the four appeals filed by the assessee.

20. So far as the appeals filed by the Revenue are concerned, again we find that the learned CIT(A) has given very proper and reasonable basis for coming to the conclusion that merely on the basis of suspicion and conjectures no additions for estimated interest could be sustained in the income of the assessee. We find ourselves in agreement with him all the more because it is a case where two searches had taken place, various books of accounts as well as incriminating documents had been seized by the Revenue and if assessee had really earned the impugned interest in these years, the Revenue should have been in a position to substantiate its allegations against assessee with some documentary evidence. Since Revenue had not done this, we uphold the decision of the learned CIT(A) in this regard and dismiss all the four appeals filed by the Revenue.

21. So far as the cross-objections of the assessee are concerned, as mentioned earlier, they are against the decision of the learned CIT(A) upholding the validity of the assessments. We have already dealt with this issue while dealing with the main appeals of the assessee and have already held in the earlier part of this order that both the initiation for proceedings for assessments as well as completion of assessment proceedings for all the four assessment years under consideration are valid. Therefore, we dismiss all the four cross-objections also filed by the assessee.

22. Accordingly, all the 4 appeals filed by the assessee, all the four appeals filed by the Revenue as well as all the 4 cross-objections filed by the assessee are dismissed.


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