Judgment:
Yogeshwar Dayal, J.
1. This matter is at the show cause stage but since the entire counter-affidavit has been filed and the facts are not in dispute, the writ petition itself is being disposed of.
The petitioner herein has challenged an order dated 7th February, 1986 which reads as under;
'Please refer to your letter dated 21st January, 1986 tendering resignation from the Bank's Service. The same has been accepted by the Competent Authority with immediate effect by waiving the condition of notice.
In view of the above, you are hereby relieved from the service of the Bank today (afternoon) i.e. 7th February, 1986.
Your dues shall be settled in terms of Rules.
Sd. Chief MBD
2. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was a permanent employee of the respondent bank and had sent a communication dated 21st January, 1986, Annexure' 'A' which reads as under :-
'REGISTERED
Pradeep Kumar Mittal
C-208, Naraina Vihar.
New Delhi-110 028
Manager (on leave)
H.B. Divn. P.N. Bank.
H.O. New Delhi.
21st January, 1986.
The Dy. General Manager (MBD) Punjab National Bank, H.O., New Delhi.
Through : Chief MBD, H.O. New Delhi
Sir,
I hereby tender my resignation from the service of the bank due to personal reasons. The date of receipt of this letter be also treated as the date of commencement of notice period, so that inclusive of same my resignation becomes effective on 30th June, 1986.
With regards. Thanking you.
Yours faithfully;
Sd. - P. K. Mittal'
3. Further case of the petitioner is that when his resignation letter was sent by him which was effective from 30th June, 1986, the Deputy General Manager who was the Competent Authority under the Punjab National Bank (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979 directed that it may be accepted with effect from 30th June, 1986. Instead of that order being communicated, the aforesaid order dated 7th February, 1986 was communicated.
4. The effect of the order dated 7th February, 1986 is that the resignation of the petitioner is effective with immediate effect on the date of the letter and not as wanted by the employee.
5. The further development in the case is that the petitioner vide communication dated 15th April, 1986 has withdrawn even the communication dated 21st January, 1986. The relevant service regulations in this behalf is Regulation No. 20 sub-section (1) and (2) which reads as under :-
'20. (1)
Subject to sub-regulation (3) of regulation 16 the bank may terminate the services of any officer by giving him three months' notice in writing or by paying him three months' emoluments in lieu thereof.
(2) No officer shall resign from the service of the bank otherwise than on the expiry of three months from the service of the Bank of a notice in writing of such resignation.
Provided further that the competent authority may reduce the period of three months, or remit the requirement of notice.'
6. It will be noticed that sub-regulation (1) gives a right to the Bank to terminate services and is not relevant for our purpose and sub-regulation (2) gives a corresponding right to the employee to resign from service but he cannot resign unless he gives three months' notice in writing of such resignation. The proviso contemplates that a period of notice can be reduced or even fully remitted by the Competent Authority but this remission can only be at the request of the employee as it is meant for his benefit. Admittedly in the present case no such request for reduction of the period was made on behalf of the petitioner. It may be seen from the regulations that there is no provision of acceptance. The resignation if not withdrawn automatically relieves the employee of a service contract, and, thereforee, it was meaningless for the respondent to issue letter dated 7th February, 1986. Since the regulations did not contemplate any acceptance of resignation, the order dated 7th February, 1986 is meaningless.
7. Mr. Khanna on behalf of the respondent submitted that the proviso to sub-regulation (2) can be resorted to by both the parties, either the employer or an employee, with all the respect, we do not agree with this submission. This proviso is purely for the benefit and on request of the employee. We are taking this view in view of the context in which this proviso appears. There appears no proviso to sub-regulation (1). This proviso is only for sub-regulation (2) and sub-regulation (2) is for benefit of the employee who wants to leave the service. The termination of service under sub-regulation (2) becomes effective only at the instance of the employee. The services cannot be terminated by the employer under sub-regulation (2).
8. Mr. Khanna refers to a decision of the Court in the case of Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking V. Tara Chand 1978(2) S.C.R. 425. It will be noticed that the Division Bench in the above case was dealing with service regulations framed under the Electricity Supply Act. They are totally different. This decision did not refer to any proviso of the type we are dealing with.
9. The Supreme Court while dealing with the law of resignation in the case of Union of India etc. V. Gopal Chandra Misra and others (1978 1 LLJ 492 took the view at para 48.
'The general principle regarding resignation is that in the absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a 'prospective' resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate the employment, or the office-tenure of the resignor. This general rule is equally applicable to Government servants and constitutional functionaries. In the case Government or functionary who cannot, under the conditions of his service or office, by his own unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up his service or office, normally, the tender of resignation becomes effective and his service or office tenure terminated, when it is accepted by the competent authority. In the case of a Judge of a High Court, who is a constitutional functionary and under Proviso (a) to Art. 217(1) has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office, his resignation becomes effective and tenure terminated on the date from which he, of his own volition, chooses to quite office. In terms of the writing under his hand addressed to the President, he resigns, in presenti, the resignation terminates his office-tenure forthwith, and cannot thereforee, be withdrawn or revoked thereafter. But, if he by such writing, chooses to resign from a future date, the act of resigning office is not complete 'because it does not terminate his tenure before such date and the Judge can at any time before the arrival of that prospective date on which it was intended to be effective, withdraw it, because the Constitution does not bar such withdrawal.'
10. The position is similar in the case before us also. Here also there is no provision of acceptance of resignation. The resignation takes effect from the date it is made effective. The resignation could have been given by the petitioner effective in presenti but he did not deliberately do so. He postponed it to the future date. There was no jurisdiction whatsoever under the Regulations for the competent authority to determine his services earlier. So long as the resignation is not to become effective in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the petitioner had a right to withdraw, and, if fact, he has exercised that right.
11. Mr. Khanna submitted that the right to withdraw ceased to exist when there was acceptance of resignation. As we have noticed earlier, there is no provision of acceptance and acceptance of resignation was useless in the circumstances of the case and of no effect.
12. We may notice that this writ petition was filed at a stage when the petitioner had not sent his letter dated 15th April, 1986 whereby he withdrew his resignation letter dated 21st January, 1986. This is subsequent development during the pendency of the writ petition. thereforee, we are not called upon to decide earlier grievance that the resignation could not have been accepted at an earlier date. Even to that submission we would have said that there is no provision of acceptance but that question does not arise so we will not deal with it further. Result is that the impugned order dated 7th February, 1986 is hereby quashed and it is declared that the petitioner continues to be in service with the respondent-bank. However, in view of the facts of the present case, parties are left to bear their own costs of the presents proceedings.