ORDER
A.K. Sikri, J.
1. Petitioner is a union of the employees of Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation (hereinafter to be referred as 'DSIDC'). The present writ petition has been filed by it challenging the decision of the Board of Directors of DSIDC to merge Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation (hereinafter to be referred as 'DSMDC') with DSIDC. The writ petition contains the following prayers :
'Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari and/or mandamus and/or order directions as under:
(a) Direct the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to seek appropriate sanction and approval for merging/amalgamating the respondent No. 1 with DSMDC Government Sick Company.
(b) Direct the respondents 1 to 3 not to merge or transfer 78 employees of DSMDC into respondent No. 1.
(c) Direct the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 not to release any amount of the fund kept apart to the tune of Rs. 5 lakhs or any further allocation for the employees of DSMDC.
(d) Direct the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 before deciding the merger/amalgamation issue of the two companies, namely, DSIDC and DSMDC to allow the petitioner's involvement and participation before finally deciding and carrying out the merger. The participation of the petitioner's shall be sin aquanon.
(e) Any other or further relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favor of the petitioners and against the respondents.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the merger of DSIDC with DSMDC was illegal and malafide inasmuch as DSIDC itself is a loss making Corporation and its merger with DSMDC, another loss making Corporation, which is also declared a Sick Unit would not be proper and it would affect the rights of the petitioner and its employees. It is stated that the DSIDC is highly over-staffed and cannot take any additional burden of DSMDC employees. On merger and joining of the employees of DSMDC, the promotion chances of DSIDC's employees would get affected and the Board of Directors could not take such a decision thereby merging the employees of DSMDC with the petitioners. thereforee, there is no public interest involved in the merger of DSMDC with DSIDC and with the said merger the statutory and constitutional rights of the petitioners are affected.
3. Respondent DSIDC has filed counter-affidavit in which maintainability of the present petition is questioned. It is also explained that at one point of time DSMDC was a part and parcel of DSIDC and was looking after the mining division of DSIDC. It formed into a separate company and was duly incorporated in the Indian Companies Act. The circumstances under which the decision was taken to merge DSMDC with DSIDC were also explained in Paras 2 and 3 of the counter-affidavit of DSIDC. The said paras 2 and 3 are reproduced below :
Para 2:
'That Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation was mainly involved in the work of mining. An unfortunate accident was occurred in Bhatti Mines in which seven people were killed, as a result of which the mining operation in the Bhatti Mines was closed following prohibitory orders from the Ministry of Labour, Government of India. Complete Bhatti Mines were declared as Wild Life Sanctuary rendering the staff without utility. In order to revive the Corporation, another project in the Gujrawala Mines was started by the Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation sometime in January, 1993 in order to make an attempt for the survival of that Corporation and to take it out from the financial crisis. That, however, the work of the Corporation could not be revived upon the declaration of those areas as Wild Life Sanctuary and reserve forest, the operational base of that corporation was wiped out.
Para 3:
That the Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation had about 553 employees. Their names were circulated to various departments, autonomous bodies for absorption against appropriate posts. In fact 449 employees have since been redeployed to various Government Departments and efforts are being made to redeploys the other employees. In fact a Circular dated 21.10.1995 has been issued by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi whereby absorptions of the surplus staff or Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation would be considered. A copy of the said Circular is annexed as Annexure R-1. Such of the Circulars have also been issued on 16.6.92 and 26.5.92. The same are annexed as Annexure R-2 and R-3 respectively. That a decision have been taken by the Cabinet to merge Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation with Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation.'
4. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that Memorandum of Association & Articles of Association of both DSIDC and DSMDC permit such a merger are filed on the record. It is also explained that the merger would take place after following the procedure laid down under Sections 391 to 394 of the Indian Companies Act and scheme of merger would be made, which shall be filed before Central Government for approval. Thus respondent shall follow the proper procedure laid down for effecting the merger. It is also denied that DSIDC is a loss making Corporation. It is mentioned that DSIDC is making profits. It is further stated that petitioner would in no way be affected by this merger.
5. I have considered the respective submissions of both the parties and perused the record. In view of the position stated by the respondents in the counter-affidavit, particularly, that merger would take place in accordance with the procedure laid down in Indian Companies Act etc., the petitioner has no legal right and or locus standi to challenge this merger. The matter of merger is a policy decision and such policy decisions are not to be interfered with by the Courts unless they are mala fide or arbitrary. For this well-settled proposition of law, it would be useful to refer to the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs . S.L. Dutta and others : AIR1991SC363 . In the said case the Supreme Court held that with change of policy regarding promotion, even if promotional chances of officers are affected, court would not interfere.
6. Similarly, in Indian Railway Service of Mechanical Engineers Association and others Vs . Indian Railway Traffic Service Association & Anr. : (1993)IILLJ539SC , the Supreme Court held that unless the executive transgress their constitution limit or statutory powers and functions, administrative action cannot be interfered with by way of Judicial review. I am also tempted to quote the following observations of Supreme Court on the case of D.B. Mahajan & others Vs . The Jalqaon Municipal Council and others : AIR1991SC1153 :
'On a consideration of the matter, it appears to us that the argument that a project envisaging a self-financing scheme, by reason alone of the particular policy behind it is beyond the powers of the local authority is somewhat too broadly stated to be acceptable. A project, otherwise legal, does not become any the less permissible by reason alone that the local authority, instead of executing the project itself, had entered into an agreement with a developer for its financing and execution. The criticism of the project being unconventional does not add to or advance the legal contention any further. The question is not whether it is unconventional by the standard of the extant practices, but whether there was something in the law rendering it impermissible. There is, no doubt, a degree of public accountability in all governmental enterprises. But, the present question is one of the extent and scope of judicial review over such matters. With the expansion of the State's presence in the field of trade and commerce and of the range of economic and commercial enterprises of government and its instrumentalities there is an increasing dimension to governmental concern for stimulating efficiency, keeping costs down, improved management methods, prevention of time and cost fixed time in projects, balancing of costs against time scales, quality-control, cost benefit rations etc. In search of these values it might become necessary to adopt appropriate techniques of management of projects with concomitant economic expediencies. These are essentially matters of economic policy which lack adjudicative disposition, unless they violate constitutional or legal limits on power or have demonstrable pejorative environmental implications or amount to clear abuse of power. This again is the judicial recognition of administrator's right to trial and error,as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of authority.'
'The Courts are kept out of the lush field of administrative policy, except when policy is inconsistent with the express or implied provisions of a statute which creates the power to which the policy relates or when a decision made in purported exercise of a power is such that a repository of the power, acting reasonably and in good faith,could not have made it. In the latter case, something overwhelming must appear before the Court will intervene. That is , and ought to be,a difficult onus for an applicant to discharge. The Courts are not very good at formulating of evaluating policy. Sometimes when the Courts have intervened on policygrounds, the Court's view of the range of policies open under the statute or of what is unreasonably policy has not won public acceptance. Un the contrary, curial views of policy have been subjected to stringent criticism. In the world of politics, the Court's opinions on policy are naturally less likely to reflect the popular view than the policies of a democratically elected Government or of expert administrators.....'
'The considerations by reference to which the reasonableness of a policy may be determined are rarely judicially manageable......'
7. In the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court also quoted with approval the following words from Article ' the purpose and Scope of Judicial Review ' by Sir Gerard Brennan in 'Judicial Review of Administrative action in the 1980s' Oxford University press. It is not necessary to multiply these judgments.
8. In the present case it cannot be said that the decision of Respondent No.1 is either malafide or arbitrary. The writ petition is without any merit. It is, accordingly, dismissed with no orders as to cost.