S.S. Chadha, J.
(1) An Act to establish a Press Council for the purpose of preserving the freedom of the Press and oF maintaining and improving the standards of newspapers and news agencies in India was enacted by Parliament, being Press Council Act 1965 (Act 34 of 1965), (hereinafter called the 'Act'). In furtherance or its object the Press Council is empowered to help newspapers and news agencies to maintain their independence. The Jurisdiction of the Press Council was invoked by two complaints under sections 12(2) (a) and (e) of the Act. What is the meaning and scope of the terms 'Freedom of Press', Independence of Newspapers' and the Independence of the Editor of a Newspaper' is one of the interesting questions which goes to the 'out of the jurisdiction of the Press Council that has arisen in this case.
(2) On November 4, 1974. respondent 27, Shri D. R. Mankekar, addressed a complaint to the Press Council of India (hereinafter referred to as the 'Press Council') under section 12(2) (a) of the Act and Regulation 16 of the Press Council (Procedure for Inquiry) Regulations, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations) alleging inter alia, that he is a Journalist of 40 years' standing and concerned with maintaining the independence of the Press from pressures of any sort, including pressures from the proprietors of newspapers; that the freedom of the Press is synonymous with the freedom of the editor from external pressure to pursue the editorial policy; that Shri B. G. Verghese, Editor of the Hindustan Times has been following an independent editorial policy exposing the defects and misdeeds of the Establishment; that Shri K. K. Birla (the petitioner in the writ petition) conceived the idea of terminating the services of Shri B. G. Verghese so that he might be replaced by one who is more amenable to Shri Birla's dictates or v/ho would not initiate or incur the displeasure of the Government by his writings in the newspapers; that the petitioner for promoting his business interest, is beholden to the Government and is, thereforee, either under the pressure from the Government or is desirous of placating the Establishment to further his business interest; that there was thus a threat to the termination of the services of Shri B. G. Verghese; that the free- G; dom of speech and expression which is mentioned in Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution includes the freedom of the Press of and the freedom of the Press has no meaning unless the editor is free from pressure, including pressure from the proprietor; that Shri B. G Verghese was sought to be punished by terminating his services for the sin of exercising his right of freedom of expression; and that the threat of the termination of the services of Shri B. G. Verghese has greatly agitated Journalists who are interested in a free Press with an independent Editor free from pressures.
(3) On November 5, 1974 respondent 28, Shri C. P. Ramachandran, the Chairman of Hindustan Times Committee and Assistant Editor of the Daily Hindustan Times, New Delhi, also addressed a complaint to the Chairman of the Press Council under sections 12(2)(a) and (e) of the Act, read with Regulation 16 to remove, what he alleges, a grave threat to the freedom of the Press and independence of the newspapers flowing from the decision of the Management of the Hindustan Times Ltd. to remove Shri B. G. Verghese from the editorship of the newspaper and its allied English publications. After referring to the constitution and objects of the Hindustan Times Ltd. respondent 28 alleged in the complaint, inter alia, that Shri K. K. Birla, (petitioner herein) had sent a notice to Shri B. G. Verghese in August last asking Shri Verghese to cease to be the Editor with effect from February 28, 1975, but the petitioner has declined to disclose the reasons for the action; that the petitioner is contemplating a new editorial structure for the Hindustan Times Ltd. and its allied publications, which will completely whittle down the independence of the editor and other members of the editorial staff and thus undermine the integrity of the profession; that the threat is inherent not only in the action proposed to be taken against the present editor but also in the new dispensation which is expected to follow his removal; that during the last six years of his editorship, Shri Verghese has not only scrupulously and faithfully pursued the policy described in the Memorandum of Assoriation of the Hindustan Times Ltd., but also brought prestige to the newspaper in doing so; that Shri Birla himself is against faithfully implementing the policies and in fact is seeking to suppress them; that it is conceivable that powerful persons in the ruling party and the administration to whom independence of the Press is anathema and who like to use Hindustan Times for furthering their political and other interests have exerted pressure on the petitioner; that the petitioner who has extensive industrial and business interests has taken the action to terminate the services of Shri B. G. Verghese because he finds the editorial policy that is being pursued by Shri B. G. Verghese embarrassing and unsuitable for the pursuance of these interests, and that alternatively, it is clear that he is seeking to ingratiate himself with Government agencies and/or the ruling party for the same purpose. It is also stated that besides refusing to give the reasons for the proposed removal of Shri Verghese as the Editor, Shri Birla has threatened legal action against Shri Verghess if, he published the correspondence that passed between him and Shri Birla on the subject.
(4) On the receipt of the aforesaid two complaints, the Press Council, who is respondent No. 1 in this petition by its letter dated December 2, 1974, called for the comments of the petitioner on the said two complaints. The petitioner filed before the Press Council a written reply dated December 6, 1974 to both the complaints, taking preliminary objections regarding jurisdiction and maintainability of the said two complaints under the Act, contending inter alia, that the complaints are not maintainable under sections 12(2) (a) and (e) of the Press Council Act as section 12 is intended to help newspapers only if there is an encroachment on the freedom of the newspapers from Government or Public authorities that the freedom of the Press is hurt only if under pressure from Government or Public authorities news or comments are not published or news or comments that ought not to have been published arc found to be published, and as no instance of such publication or non-publication has been cited in the complaints they are not maintainable under sections 12(2) (a) and (e), and that in its opinion the controversy stated in the complaints falls under the Industrial Disputes Act and thus the Press Council has no power to adjudicate under proviso to section 12(2) (i) of the Act. By letter dated December 23, 1974 respondent I asked for certain clarifications in the written statement filed on behalf of the petitioner. By letter dated January 2. 1975 of the Secretary of the Press Council, the petitioner was informed that the Press Council would be considering the said two complaints at its meeting to bs held at 11 A..M. on January 20, 1975 and was directed to appear before the Press Council at the appointed date and time to adduce such evidence, oral or documentary and make such oral submission as he may deem necessary in support of his case. Shri M. D. Dalmia, a Director of Hindustan Times Ltd. in response to the afore- said letter of December 23, 1974 sent a reply to Press Council, stating, inter alia, that the preliminary points raised by the petitioner in his written statement should be decided first of all. Shri M. D. Dalmia, by his letter dated January 6, 1975, raised another preliminary objection before the Press Council that editors and journalists, as a body, are an interested party in the controversy pending before the Press Council under sections 12(2) (a) and (e) and, thereforee, editors and journalists who are members of the Press Council are not entitled either to vote or participate in the discussion relating to the said controversy in view of regulation 13. Copies of certain correspondence which was relied upon in support of the objection, were also forwarded Along with the letter. The Seoretary to the Press Council in his letter dated January 9. 1975 accepted the position and stated that the preliminary points raised before the Press Council would be considered first and only ofter hearing of these preliminary points, the Press Council would proceed to consider the two complaints on their merits.
(5) In the sitting of the Press Council on January 20, 1975, the preliminary objections of the petitoner to the maintainability and jurisdiction of the Press Council to entertain and hear the said two complaints were urged and argued. After the arguments on the pre- liminary objections were concluded, the Press Council considered and then decided to reject the preliminary objections but stated that the reasons would be given only at the final stage. Counsel for the petitioner again desired that the reasons for rejecting the preliminary objections should be given immediately, but the request was rejected by the Press Council, who decided to proceed with the trial of the two complaints immediately. Shri B. G. Verghese, who had been summoned Along with certain documents as a result of a decision taken by the Press Council at 10.30 A.M. earlier in the day, was sought to be examined by the Press Council. An objection was taken by the counsel for the petitioner that he was completely taken by surprise as no notice was given that any witness would be examined. The objection was overruled and the deposition of Shri B. G. Verghese was recorded till about 5.30 P.M. The counsel for the petitioner again renewed, his request for time to enable him to receive instructions from the petitioner to study the documents filed by Shri Verghese and to prepare the cross-examination. The case was, however, adjourned to next day. On a written application made on January 21. 1975 by the counsel for the petitioner asking for a short adjournment for a fortnight, the Press Council granted the adjournment to February 4, 1975 and fixed the hearing to continue day to day thereafter.
(6) In the meantine, the present writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the jurisdiction of the Press Council constituted under the Act to entertain and proceed with the said two complaints, namely one dated November 4. 1974 filed by Shri D. R. Mankekar, respondent 27 in this writ petition and the other dated November 5, 1974 filed by Shri C. P. Ramachandran, respondent 28 in this writ petition, was filed on January 30, 1975. It is alleged that when important questions of jurisdiction and non-maintainability of the complaints were raised which go to the root of the matter, the Press Council ought to have given reasons for the rejection of the said preliminary objections. The order of the Press Council pronounced on January 20, 1975 rejecting the prelimninary objections and reserving the reasons to be given only at the end of the proceedings has been challenged as being contrary to low and principles of natural justice, null and void. The jurisdiction of the Press Council is questioned mainly on two grounds. The first ground is that the aforesaid two complaints were not maintainable under the Act; or in other words, the complaints did not disclose any cause of action which brings them within the purview of the Act so as to enable the Press Council to assume jurisdiction to entertain them. According to the petitioner, in substance, the said two complaints alleged that Shri B. G. Verghese was being sacked either under pressure from the Government or at the behest of the ruling party or his contract of employment is being cancelled or he is being removed from the editorship. This, according to the petitioner, is a direct fight between the editors of the newspapers and the Management about the security of service of the editors and not any question relating to the freedom of Press. The second ground is that the Press Council is quorum-non-juris inasmuch as the Press Council consisted, inter alia, at the time of hearing, of six editors and seven journalists who were directly or indirectly intrested and were thereforee acting in violation of the provisions of Regulation No. 13, that the exclusion of Mr. Chandrekar who was a member of the Press Council in the capacity of a Member of Parhament and Mr. Rattan Lal Joshi, who was a member of the Press Council in the capacity of an editor was illegal, and that respondent 2, the Chairman of the Press Council was biased and prejudiced against the petitioner.
(7) Mr. S. T. Desai, who had appeared in the first instance for respendents 1 and 2 raised three preliminary objections and contended that the present writ petition is not maintainable. The first objection is that the writ petition involves disputed questions of fact, the main one being as to whether Shri B. G. Verghese has resigned or whether his services are being terminated. However, at the hearing no other disputed question of facts was pointed out. Mr. Frank Anthony counsel for the petitioner stated that whether Shri B. G. Verghese has resigned or his services have been terminated and if so, it is for what reason, is a subsidiary point not yet decided by the Press Council, and thereforee, the question of going into this point does not arise. If that be the case, there are no disputed questions of fact which have to be gone into and determured in this writ petition. The first preliminary objection has thus no force.
(8) The second preliminary objection urged by the learned counsel was that the writ petition as framed does not disclose any cause of action. The argument was that the only cause of action disclosed in paragraph 28, is the alleged apprehension of the petitioner that the Press Council may pass an order against the petitioner with the result that the same will get publicity causing great prejudice and harm to the petitioner, and, this, according to the counsel, is no ground for asking a writ in the nature of prohibition. The third objection was that because the Press Council does not adjudicate upon or make any decision on any legal right of any party and admittedly cannot issue any enforceable order or direction, but merely expresses its opinion on the matters brought to its notice, and the expression of an opinion which has no legal sanction is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. Desai challenged the right of the petitioner to come to this Court as there was no infringement of any of his legal rights which enabled him to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He contended that the Press Council was only going into the question of the petitioner's propriety of action and not the illegality of his action. Since no legal right of the petitioner is infringed, it was argued that the petitioner could not come before the High Court on the question of jurisdiction in the absence of an infringement of his legal rights The counsel submitted that the petitioner who asked the High Court to decide the issue as to the absence of the jurisdiction of the Press Council must first have locus standi, meaning that he must have a legal right. Reliance is placed on Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietory) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Others. : AIR1962SC1044 wherein the Supreme Court held:
'ARTICLE 226 in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply there under; but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. The existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The legal right that can be enforced under Article 226, like Article 32, must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief. The right that can be enforced under Article 226, also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified.'
The counsel argued that the Press Council when pronouncing its opinion on the propriety of the termination of the services of an editor, like Shri B. G. Verghese, does not, like the other Tribunals or forums, afford any relief to the editor or invalidate any action of the employer. Its opinion has no coercive power, it exercise no jurisdiction to nullify any act, or confer any relief to the party. Its opinion, as the opinion of a body of representatives journalists and eminent laymen, acts only on the moral plane and it serves to inform the Public and Parliament in any report it might submit to it, that a gross impropriety has been committed. A mere apprehension that at the end of the inquiry in the matter complained of, the Press Council might arrive at a conclusion of impropriety as regards the conduct of the petitioner in the context of Independence or Freedom of Press does not entitle the petitioner to seek a writ of prohibition or any other similar prohibitory order against the Press Council. The counsel further contended that the case was. not of an inherent lack of jurisdiction but of lack of jurisdiction to entertain the type of the said two complaints. The counsel argued that whether the acts complained of are established or not is only for the Press Council to decide. It is not for thisourt to determine whether the acts complained of amounted to an interference with the independence or freedom of the Press. The counsel contended that the High Court could not sit in appeal against the decision of a body created under the Statute to look into specific complaints and then determine whether there is any threat to freedom of the Press in the removal of Shri B. G. Verghese as editor of Hindustan Times by the petitioner.
(9) Mr. Frank Anthony, who appeared for the petitioner in the writ petition, on the other hand contended that some of the legal rights of the petitioner would be infringed if a report of impropriety is ultimately made by the Press Council, and thus he had a legal right to come before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel urged that the petitioner as a businessman, had the fight to carry on his business without any damage to his reputation, stigma on his fair name or tarnishing of his image as it would affect his newspaper's readership, advertisement, his family prestige and his other businesses. It was argued that the petitioner was a man of considerable and appreciable reputation, and reputation is a part of a person's character and personality. Any finding hurting or insulting the petitioner or his reputation could have serious repercussions on his business and personal life, and thus his legal rights and proprietory rights would be affected. Apart from this, the counsel submitted that he had a legal right to approach this Court . when a statutory body acts beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the Statute creating it. The petitioner has challenged the jurisdiction of the Press Council, as in his opinion the Press Council was acting beyond jurisdiction, and contrary to statutory provisions. It was further contended that this Court was fully compotant to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution when the challenge is to the decision of a quasi-judicial body on the question of jurisdiction, al fact. According to the counsel, no authority, much less a quasi-judicial authority, can confer jurisdiction on itself by wrongly deciding a jurisdictional fact. The question whether the jurisdictional fact is rightly decided or not, is a question, according to the counsel, open for examination by this Court in an application for a writ. The counsel further urged that the ground of attack in the writ petition is that the Press Council is quorum-non-juris. This question can be determined only by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(10) Before dealing with these two preliminary objections it will be necessary to examine at this stage whether the Press Council is an administrative or a quasi-judicial body. Counsel for the petitioner, counsel appearing for interveners on the side of the petitioner and counsel for respondents I and 2 had all contended that the Press Council is a quasi-judicial body. Mr. Rama Murthy, appearing for respondent No. 28 and Mr. B. R. L. lyenger appearing for respondents 7 and 8, however, contended otherwise. According to them, the functions performed by the Press Council under section 12 of the Act. do not affect the rights of any parties or visit them with any civil consequences, and unless penal action is contemplated, the function of any body cannot be held to be quasi-judicial. For the purpose of ascertaining whether the functions and the proceedings before the Press Council are quasi-judicial or not, we have to go through the Statute and the regulations framed there under. The preamble of the Act shows that the Act was enacted to establish a Press Council for the purpose of preserving the freedom of the Press and of maintaining and improving the standards of news papers and news agencies in India. Again, under section 12 of the Act, the object of the Press Council shall be to preserve the freedom of the Press and to maintain and improve the standards of newspapers and news agencies in India. Under sub-section (2) of section 12 the Press Council may, in furtherance of its object, perform certain specified functions. Under section 13 of the Act, power is conferred on the Press Council to warn, admonish or censure the newspaper, news agency, the editor or the journalist, to dis-approve the conduct of the editor or the journalist, as the case may be. Under section 14(3) of the Act, every enquiry held by the Press Council shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 20 of the Act affords protection of action taken in good faith by the Press Council and its members. Under section 21 of the Act, every member of the Press Council shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of section 23 of the Act, the Press Council has made regulations. By virtue of Regulation 16, the procedure prescribed by the regulations in respect of complaints under section 13(1) of the Act. applies mutates mutants to complaints received by the Council seeking its help to maintain the independence of newspapers and news agencies or in respect of any matter falling under sections 12(2)(a) (e) and (f). Regulation 3 provides for the contents of the complaints and Regulation 4 provides that where a complaint does not comply with the requirements of Regulation 3, the Chairman may return the complaint directing the complainant to bring it in conformity with such requirements and represent it. The order returning a, complaint has to give reasons for the return. Under regulation 5, a notice to show cause why action should not be taken has to issue to the newspaper, news agency, editor or other working joumalist against which or whom the complaint is made. Under regulation 6, the written statement in reply to the complaint has to be filed. The Chairman is empowered to call for any further information either from the complainant or the respondent in order to clarify matters appearing in the complaint or written statement. Power is also conferred to call for documents or further statements : Under section 14 of the Act, as also under regulation 9, the Press Council has the same powers throughout India as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of various matters like summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and examining them on oath, requiring the discovery and production of documents, requisitioning public records etc. Under regulation 10, in the Inquiry before the Press Council, the parties are entitled to adduce oral or documentary evidence and make any oral submissions in support of their contentions. Under regulation I I, the Press Council may pass orders giving its decision and proceed to dispose of the case. If the Press Council is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, it may require any newspaper to publish therein in such manner as the Press Council thinks fit, any particulars relating to the inquiry. The orders of the Press Council have also to be communicated in writing to the parties to the case. Under regulation 12, the parties are entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner or a duly authorised representative. Regulation 13 imposes certain restrictions on the members of the Press Council. No member of the Press Council can vote or take part in the discussion of any complaint coming up for consideration, if the case is one in which he is personally involved or has any direct or indirect interest by himself or through his partner in which he is interested professionally on behalf of a client or as an agent or representative of any newspaper, news agency, editor or other working journalist, as the case may be.
(11) As to when the functions of an authority or the proceedings before it can be said to be quasi-judicial we may refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Province of Bombay v. Khushal Das S. Advani (since deceased and after him his legal heirs and others, : [1950]1SCR621 wherein it was held :
THEprinciples, as I apprehend them are : (i) that if a Statute empowers an authority not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a list and prima-facie, and in the absence of anything in the Statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act ; and (ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.'
In Civil Writ Petition No. 522 of 1972 (Union of India v. Shri J. N. Takru, New Delhi), decided on October 20, 1972(3), this Court had laid down that when an authority is bound to hear a person concerned, either in person or through a lawyer, it implies that the authority has a duty to act judicially or in other words, its function is a quasi-judicial one.
(12) Looking into the provision of the Act and the Regulations, the question is whether the functions and the proceedings betore the Press Council can be said to be quasi-judicial. There are admissions of the Chairman of the Press Council to that effect in his reply affidavits dated March 12, 1975 and March 17, 1975. In the affidavit dated March 17, 1975 of Shri A. K. Jain, respondent No. 7, and the affidavit dated March 17, 1975 of Shri Jang Bahadur Singh respondent No. 8 ('though Mr. lyenger contended otherwise) that the Press Council has to function as a quasi-judicial body. Apart from that, the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the regulations are clearly indicative that the Press Council has to function in a quasi-judicial capacity. The nature of the duties cast upon the Press Council, the power to require any newspaper to publish the particulars of the inquiry and the elaborate procedure set down in the regulations for hearing of the complaints all lead to the conclusion that the Press Council has to act quasi-judicially. The Press Council has to determine in every case by a majority of the votes of the members of the Press Council and then to communicate in writing the decision to the parties to the case. Ay decision of impropriety in a complaint under section 12 is likely to effect a man's reputation. Thus, an objective assessment has to be made in such cases. A duty to act judicially has to be inferred from the nature of the rights affected. There has to be a quasi-judicial approach in the matter of determination of complaints before the Press Council. Various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to the Press Council in holding enquiries before it. Every enquiry held by the Press Council shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. It is also. for the Press Council to give the parties a reasonable opporobligatory tunity to be heard in the enquiry, to produce evidence, to cross-examine witnesses and to appear before the Press Council by a legal practitioner. All these, in our opinion, impart a duty on the Press Council to act judicially, and consequcntly the functions performed by it have to be held to be quasi-judicial in character.'
(13) To see whether any legal right of the petitioner would be infringed by any decision of the Press Council, which is a statutory body, it has to be assumed that the Press Council gives a verdict that it is satisfied that an impropriety has been committed by the petitioner. The two complainants before the Press Council allege that the petitioner was terminating or threatening to terminate the services of Shri B. G. Verghese from his post as editor of the Hindustan Times for one of two reasons, both of which constitute a threat to the freedom of the Press, The reasons have been summarised by the Press Council itself, in the counter-affidavit, as under :
'INthe complaint it has been stated that the petitioner was terminating or was threatening to terminate the services of Mr. Verghese from his post as Editor of the 'Hindustan Times' for one of two reasons, both of which constituted a threat to the freedom of the Press : . (i) that the petitioner had been pressurized by some external forces or agency to terminate his services. This has to be read in conjunction with the averment that Mr. Birla had stated to the complainant that he had no complaint against Mr- Verghese on the ground either of his professional competence or Editorial integrity. In view of this it was stated that the termination of his services was brought about by external forces, who pressurized Mr. Birla to ease out Mr. Verghese for furthering their own political or other interests, they having a dislike to his independent editorial policy; (ii) Alternatively it was averred that the petitioner who is a leading industrialist sought to further his business interests by terminating the services of Mr. B. G. Verghese who was following an independent policy which was not to the liking of the Government and the 'ruling party' or the powers that be. As it was not denied even by the petitioner that the freedom of the Press was coterminus with and at least largely involved the freedom of the editor to pursue his editorial policy as well as the news coverage of the paper, the allegations made in the complaint brought it prima-facie within the scope of section 12(2)(a).
Reference is made in the petition to section 12(2)(e). It was presumed E by the Council that the reference to section 12(2)(e) in the complaint was based upon the allegation that the petitioner had been injuncting Mr. Verghese not to publish the correspondence between the petitioner and himself. It was said by the complainants that this correspondence would have proved to till the charge regarding the motivation of the petitioner in secking the termination of the service's of Mr. Verghese and the direction to Mr. Verghese not to publish this correspondence was apparently the basis upon which section 12(2)(e) was invoked'.
(14) We will have to assume at this stage that the Press Council agrees with the contentions raised in the said two complaints and gives a decision of impropriety against the petitioner. The impact and effect of this decision on the petitioner is then to be ascertained. Even though the opinion that may be expressed by the Press Council has H no coercive power, the fact that the Press Council has power un^er Regulation Ii to require any newspaper to publish therein, in such a manner as the Press Council thinks fit, any particulars relating to the Inquiry against the newspaper is of a great significance. A wide publicity would be given to the impropriety affecting the reputation of the petitioner. The petitioner has a right to carry on his business, untarnished or un-impaired by any expression of opinion by the Press Council.' In M/s. Brusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Another, : [1975]2SCR674 the Supreme Court has held : 'Reputation is a part of person's character and personality. Blacklisting tarnishes one's reputation.' Not only the reputation which is a part of a person's character and personality may be impaired by wide circulation of the decision of the Press Council about impropriety, the proprietory interest of the petitioner in running the newspaper may also be affected. If the verdict of the impropriety in the termination of the services of Shri B. G. Verghese as constituting a threat to the freedom of the Press is given, it will certainly affect the circulation of the newspaper of the petitioner.
(15) According to section 4 of the Act, the Press Council shall consist of a Chairman and 26 other members. The Chairman shall be a person nominated by a Committee consisting of the Chairman of the Council of States, the Chief Justice of India and the Speaker of the House of People, and other members have to be nominated in the manner prescribed therein. Looking at the composition of the Council, and the nature of the functions entrusted to it, 'the decision given by the Press Council about the impropriety of the action of the petitioner in terminating the services of Shri B. G. Verghese and the publicity that may be given to that decision, will have considerable influence on the public reading the newspapers published and circulated by the petitioner. Such a publication will have serious repercussions on the circulation of the newspapers and would thus also affect the proprietory rights of the petitioner. Thus a person who will be prejudicially affected by the opinion of the Press Council has sufficient legal interest to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In exceptional cases, as the expression ordinarily indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, can file a writ petition even though he has no proprietory or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter (see Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh) : [1966]2SCR172 . The petitioner is not a mere busy body who wants to interfere in things which do not concern him, but he is a, person who has a genuine grievance, because the opinion of impropriety may 'affect his reputation. The petitioner is thus entitled to bring the matter of jurisdiction of the Press Council before this Court.'
(16) The question for determination in this writ petition relates to the jurisdiction of the Press Council to entertain the said two complaints filed under sections 12(2)(a) and 12(2)(e) respectively of the Act. If the said two complaints do not fall under the relevant sections, the Press Council has no jurisdiction and thus it becomes a question of determination of a jurisdictional fact. If the jurisdictional fact exists, the Press Council has jurisdiction, and if it docs not, the Press Council has no jurisdiction. Normally, under the Act, it is for the Press Council to decide the jurisdictional fact whether the jurisdiction is there or not. Where a Statute creates a certain body and entrusts jurisdiction on the basis of a certain jurisdictional fact to such a body, the existence or non-existence of that fact is to be determined by that body. The Press Council has assumed jurisdiction by rejecting the preliminary objections and is now proceeding with the two complaints.' Questions of inherent jurisdiction are always to be decided before the merits are considered, and this is what is done by the Press Council. We do not, however, have the advantage of the reasons of the Press Council in repelling the contention of the petitioner to the lack of jurisdiction to entertain and proceed with the two complaints.'
(17) In Dr. Chatkar Jha vs. Dr. Vishwanath Prasad Verma and others, : [1971]1SCR586 the Supreme Court held that if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record or consists of a misconstruction of law on which assumption of jurisdiction is made, which otherwise does not exist, a certiorari can issue. In M/s. Raza Textiles Ltd. Rampur v. The Income-tax Officer, Rampur, : [1973]87ITR539(SC) the Supreme Court has laid down :
'NOauthority, much less a quasi-judicial authority, can confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly. The question whether the jurisdictional fact has been rightly decided or not is a question that is open for examination by the High Court in an application for a writ of certiorari. If the High Court comes to the conclusion, as the learned single Judge has done in this case, that the Income-tax Officer had clutched at the jurisdiction by deciding a jurisdictional fact erroneously, then the assessed was entitled for the writ of certiorari prayed for by him. It is incomprehensible to think that a quasi-judicial authority like the Income-tax Officer can erroneously decide a jurisdictional fact and thereafter proceed to impose a levy on a citizen.'
We will, thereforee, have to proceed with the scrutiny of the two complaints before the Press Council to see 'If the facts alleged in those petitions disclose any cause of action or are such as to confer jurisdiction on the Press Council to preserve the freedom of the Press and to maintain and improve the standards of newspapers and news agencies in India. The Press Council is a statutory body having limited jurisdiction and powers and has to act within its legal bounds. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a supervisory jurisdiction; meant to supervise the work of the Tribunals, public authorities and statutory bodies and to see that they act within the limits of their respective jurisdiction. The relief that is claimed in the writ petition is for the issue of an appropriate writ, directions or order restraining the Press Council.
(18) A writ in the nature of Certiorari or prohibition can be issued whenever any body or persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of the subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, acts in excess of its or their legal authority II. Mr. Anthony relied upon N. V. Suba Rao v. State, A.I.R. 1968 A.P. 96 wherein it was held that where the question of total or inherent lack of jurisdiction of a tribunal is involved, and the Court is satisfied that the tribunal has usurped jurisdiction which it did not have, the High Court would not hesistate even at the instanec of a stranger to issue a writ of Certiorari. 'The consensus of judicial opinion has so far been that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not meant to be exercised at the instance of a stranger or a busy body who wants to interfere in things which do not concern him. The petitions for issue of writs of Certiorari and/or prohibition can be filed by a person aggrieved, and that includes any person whose interests may be prejudicially effected or who has a genuine grievance or whose legal rights have been infringed or who has any substantial interest in impugning the order. In the aforesaid case (N. V. Suba Rao v. State) an exception has been carved out that a stranger may move the Court if the question involved is of total or inherent lack of jurisdiction. The underlying idea is that all inferier courts, authorities or tribunals having limited jurisdiction or powers must be kept within their legal bounds, and this is the concern of the State for the orderly administration of justice. We are not expressing any considered opinion for the question does not arise in this case as the petitioner has sufficient legal interest in the controversy before the Press Council and before us. If the proceedings before the Press Council are without or in excess of the legal authority, then certainly a writ of prohibition can issue directing the Press Council, which is a statutory body exercising quasi-judicial functions, forbidding it from continuing with the proceedings. And this can be done at the instance of the petitioner who has been arrayed as a respondent in the two complaints, and who will be prejudicially affected by the opinion of the Press Council.'
(19) We thus see no substance in the preliminary objections, and we proceed to consider the merits of the other contentions raised in the writ petition.
(20) Article 19 of the Constitution of India guarantees to all citizens Freedom of Speech and Expression but does not specifically or separately provide for the liberty of the Press. It has, however, been authoritatively held that the liberty of the Press is implicit in the Freedom of Speech and Expression which is conferred on citizen. The Freedom of Speech and Expression comprehends the Freedom of Press. But it is contended by Mr. Anthony that the protection to the Freedom of Press was available against the State action, and not against an individual or a joint stock company as the petitioner. The counsel submitted that the 'Freedom of Press', as used in section 12 of the Act, has the same meaning as is assigned to it under Article 19 of the Constitution, in other words, the word 'Freedom of Press' is used in the same sense and scheme in section 12 of the Act. Reliance is placed on the Supreme Court judgment reported as P.D. Shamdasani v. The Central Bank of India Ltd., : [1952]1SCR391 wherein it was observed :
'NEITHERArt. 19(l)(f) nor Art. 31(1) on its true construction was intended to prevent wrongful individual acts or to provide protection against merely private conduct. The language and structure of Art. 19 and its setting in part Iii of the Constitution clearly show that the Article was intended to protect those freedoms against State action other than in the legitimate exercise of its power to regulate private rights in the public interest. Violation of rights of property by individuals is not within the purview of the Article.'
It was further urged that the Press Commission in its report, paras 960 and 1453 had thought that the expression 'Freedom of Press' should be understood as meaning freedom to hold opinion', to receive and te impart information through the printed word, without any interference from any public authority. It is in this context that the counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the Press Council has no jurisdiction, as no question of 'Freedom of Press' is involved in the complaint under sections 12(2) (a) or (e) Council for the alleged infringement of the Freedom of Press by the petitioner or other proprietors of the Hindustan Times. The complainants, according to the counsel, themselves invoked the Supreme Court decision in Benctt' Coleman & Co. Ltd. and other's case : [1973]2SCR757 wherein it was held that infringement of Article 19(l)(a) is only against State action or actions of Public Authorities and not against a private person or body. It was submitted that the editor has no fundamental right of Freedom of Press under Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution of India as against the proprietor of a newspaper. Any individual, may be proprietor, editor and any citizen may complain that State has impinged upon his independence, but it cannot be conceived, ceived, urged the counsel, that an editor or some one at his instance or on his behalf may come before the Press Council, against a proprietor complaining infringement by the proprietor. The counsel con- tended that the proprietors of a newspaper had the right to lay down the policy for their newspaper and have their point of view expressed through the newspaper. Relying on the 15th Annual Report of the Press Council (U.K.), that 'the Freedom of the Press includes freedom to be partisan', the counsel submitted that the petitioner had a right to follow any editorial policy and choice as to personnel to propagate it. Reference was made by counsel to paras 900 and 901 of the Press Commission's Report, about the basic right of the owner./proprietor to have his point of view expressed through the newspaper, and if a difference of opinion arises on a question of policy and such difference is considered by either party to be so vital as to necessitate severance of employment, then the liability of damages and the extent thereof is only to be determind. Reference was also invited to the Constitution of All India Newspapers Editors Conference (hereinafter referred to as the 'Conference') relating to editor's charter, wherein para 33(h) provides that 'in the event of disagreement between the Board of Management and Editor, leading to the Editor's resignation of removal, the editor shall be entitled to six months' pay, gratuity, and pay in lieu of leave due to him at the time'.
(21) Another fact of the objection to the jurisdiction of the Press Council, is the right claimed by the management to run the newspaper and express a certain point of view through the personnel of its own choice. 'In Express Newspaper's case it is said that there can be no doubt that liberty of the Press is an essential part of the Freedom of Speech and Expression guaranteed by Article 19(l)(a). The Press has a right of free propagation and free circulation without any previous restraint on publication. If a law were to single out the Press for laying down prohibitive burdens on it that would restrict the circulation, penalise its freedom of choice as to personnel, prevent newspapers from being started and compel the press to government aid. This would violate Article 19(l)(a) and would fall outside the protection afforded by Article 19(2)' (Bennet Coleman and Company Ltd. and others v. Union of India.) : [1973]2SCR757 . Reiving on this observation, Mr. Anthony streonuously contended that the petitioner, undoubtedly, had the freedom of choice as to personnel and if in exercise of his right the services of the editor of the newspaper were terminated in terms of the contract of employment, it could never be construed as a threat to the Freedom of Press by any standard. The counsel submitted that the Freedom of Press involves freedom of employment or the non-employment of the necessary means of exercising this right; that is freedom from restriction in respect of employment in the Editorial Board. The Press Council, it was urged, had no jurisdiction to entertain any complaint regarding termination of the services of Shri Verghese and force Shri Verghese on the Management, for this would have the effect of restricting the choice of employment in the editorial force. The whole dispute, according to the counsel arising out of the said two complaints, is the security of service of the editors who wanted to continue in their positions till the age of superannuation, irrespective of the contracts. It was contended that even the constitution of the Conference did not provide that the editors should continue till the age of retirement; it provided that in the event of an editor's removal he would be entitled to six months's salary, gratuity and pay in lieu of leave due to him. The counsel submitted that section 12(2) (a) of the Act only provided that it was the duty of the Press Council to help newspapers to maintain their independence, and not to help the editor to impose himself on a newspaper. Even if the services of an editor are dispensed with and a dispute arose, it had to be dealt with under the Industrial Disputes Act and not the Act, for the Press Council has no intercessory role to play. Section 12(2) (i) of the Act only prvides that the Press Council may promote a proper functional relationship among all classes of persons engaged in the production or publication of G newspapers or in news agencies. Assume, the counsel submitted, that there is a mal-functioning of functional relationship, even then the role of the Press Council is only intercessional between the proprietor and editor about the production or publication of the newspaper. The role is only advisory as the word 'promote' suggests but if the dispute degenerates to termination of services, the proviso to section 12(2) (i) comes into play. Thus, urged the counsel, the functions of the Press Council are circumscribed, and as soon as it relates to a dispute to which the Industrial Disputes Act applies, the Press Council has no jurisdiction. If one looks at Regulation 16, it shows, according to the counsel, that the function of the Press Council is not to entertain any compltint under section 12(2) (i) of the Act. It was submitted that the regulations themselves cannot alter the meaning of the words of Statute, but they may be looked at as being an interpretation placed by the Press Council on the words of the Statute. Thus, wherever there is termination of services, the role of the Press Council, the petitioner contended, is purely mediatory and never put one party or the other in the dock, and particularly the proprietor of a newspaper at the instance of the editor or on his behalf. The substance of the two complaints, according to the counsel, is the termination of the services of Shri Verghese and not any infringement ment of the freedom of press or for helping or maintaining the independence of the newspaper.
(22) Referring to the definition of 'complaint' and 'matter' contained in regulations 2(d) and (e), the counsel submitted that the complaint referred to in Regulation 16 must relate to some 'matter' as defined in Regulation 2(e), namely an article, news-item, news report, or any other matter which is published by a newspaper. It was contended that the Press Council has jurisdiction under section 12 of the Act if the matter of complaint relates to an article, news item. news report or any other matter which is published by a newspaper, and since the two complainants have not made any complaint in respect of any such item, the Press Council has no jurisdiction to entertain, examine and pronounce its views on them.
(23) Mr. G. A. Thakker, who appeared on behalf of the interveners, Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society, (allowed to intervene by our orders dated March 10, 1975 in C. M. No. 473 of 1975), made legal submissions regarding the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Press Council under sections 12(2) (a) and (e) of the Act. It was contended that under section 12(1) of the Act the object of the Press Council is two fold, firstly, to preserve the freedom of Gr the press, and secondly to maintain and improve the standards of newspapers and news agencies. Under section 12(2). the Press Council is to perform certain specified functions in furtherance of its object. In furtherance of the object to preserve the freedom of the press, the Press Council may perform the functions set out in clauses (a), (e), (f) and (j) while in furtherance of the object to maintain and improve the standards of newspapers and news agencies, the Press Council may perform the functions set out in sub-clauses (b), (e), (d), (g), (h), (i) and (k). The Press Council may lay down the standards of journalistic ethics or public taste or code of journalistic I ethics, etc. and if there is a breach, a complaint lies under section 13 of the Act. Complaints under section 12 of the Act can only be under section 12(2)(a), (e), (f) and (j). The complaint under section 12(2)(a) can be for maintaining the independence of the newspaper. It was contended that the ex- expression newspaper whose independence was sought to be protected by the Press Council means the proprietor and not the editor. It was submitted that the editor is only a part or limb of the newspaper and one limb could not complain against another; the complaint could only be jointly by the proprietor and editor or any one on behalf of the whole organisation against external interference. It was argued that on a true construction of section 12(2) (a) of the Act the independence of newspaper intended to be maintained or protected is from or against the external agencies or force such as Government or local or public authority.
(24) Shri Ram Narain Sinha, printer and publisher of Hindustan Times was allowed to appear as an intervener. Dr. Y. S. Chitley, appearing on his behalf invited our attention to the provisions contained in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 and contended that the object of section 3 of this Act, requiring the name of the printer and the place of publications should be printed on every book or paper, was to inform the public who the responsible printer or publisher was and to convey that information on the face of the paper. No newspaper can be published except in conformity with the rules laid down in section 5 of this Act. It was further contended that it is the fundamental right of every proprietor, printer or publisher of a newspaper to have his own political theories and ideas, to propogate them and work for their establishment, so long as he does not infringe any law. The owner and proprietor has the basic right to have his views expressed and the editor of the newspaper employed by the proprietor is enjoined to follow the policy laid down for the newspaper. The function of the editor, the counsel urged, is only to control the selection of the material that is published in the newspaper, but the whole responsibility is that of a publisher and printer. The right to publish belongs to the newspaper organisation consisting of proprietors, publisher, printer, editor, editorial staff, printing and publishing staff; each one has a separate and distinct responsibility and duties to perform. Neither the Constitution nor any Statute nor the Act confer any rights separately on the editor. It was submitted that the Act does not contemplate Freedom of Press qua the Editor, it only refers to the editor when the professional standards, standards of public taste, journalistic ethics or conduct is involved, as in sections 12(2) (b), (e) and (d) of the Act. The editor may have separate and distinct rights of Freedom of Press as a citizen, but as an editor of newspaper, his right is with the newspaper and not against the proprietor, publisher or printer of the newspaper. Relying on 'Alice Lee Grosiean v. American Press Company' 80 Law Ed. (660) (II) that the freedom of speech and of the press are rights of the same fundameental character, safeguarded by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by State Legislation in America, it was contended that in the like manner citizen's right guaranteed under Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution of India is no higher than that available in America. The concept of freedom of speech and expression as it obtains in the U.S.A. was stated in Express Newspaper Ltd. and another v. The Union of India and Others, : (1961)ILLJ339SC :
'IT is clear from the above that in the United States of America: (a) the freedom of speech comprehends the freedom of press and the freedom of speech and press are fundamental personal rights of the citizens ; (b) the freedom of the press rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public; (c) such freedom is the foundation of free Government of a free people; (d) the purpose of such a guarantee is to prevent public authorities from assuming the guardianship of the public mind; and (e) freedom of press involves freedom of employment or non-employment of the necessary means of exercising this right or in other words, freedom from restriction in respect of employment in the editorial force.'
The purpose of guarantee, it was argued is to prevent public authorities from assuming the guardianship of the public mind. Addressing further arguments on the same aspects as Mr. Anthony, it was submitted that the freedom of press used in the Act only relates to Freedom of Speech and Expression, as used in Article 19(l)(a), and includes the freedom of choice of personnel to express it, and the remody for its infringement is available only against the State action.
(25) Before dealing with these contentions, we may turn to the history of the legislation to ascertain the legislative purpose and content of the Statute. Article 19(l) of the Constitution of India provides that all citizens shall have the right to Freedom of Speech and Expression. During the first fifteen months of the working of the Constitution, certain difficulties had been brought to light by judicial decisions and pronouncements specially in regard to the chapter on Fundamental Rights. The citizen's right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(l)(a) had been held by some courts to be so comprehensive as not to render a person culpable even if he advocated cated murder and other crimes of violence. In other countries with written Constitution, freedom of speech and of the press was not regarded as debarring the State from punishing or preventing abuse of this freedom. With these objects and reasons, the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill, 1951 was proposed. During the debate in Parliament on the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill, 1961, the Prime Minister said that he was prepared to appoint a Committee or a Commission, including representatives of the Press, to examine the state of the Press and its content. On June !, 1951, he elaborated the idea further when he indicated that an enquiry covering the larger issue of the Press, such as had been carried out in the United Kingdom by the Royal Commission, might be productive of good for the Press, and the development of this very important aspect of public affairs. The appointment of a Commission to inquire into the working of the Press was again discussed during the debate in Parliament on the Press (Incitement to Crime) Bill, later named the Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1952. In his address delivered to the Parliament on the 16th may 1952, the President announced that the Government hoped to appoint, in the near future, a Commission to consider various matters connected with the Press. The appointment of the Commission under section 3 of the Commission of Enquiry Act. 1952 was announced ed in a communique issued by the Government of India on 23rd September 1952, notified on October 2, 1952. By the aforesaid notification dated October 3, 1952, the Central Government expressed the opinion that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an enquiry into the state of Press in India, and thus appointed the Press Commission to enquire into the state of Press, its present and future lines of development and in particular enjoined it to examine, inter alia, freedom of Press and repeal or amendment' of laws not in consonance with it and to make recommendations thereon. The Press Commission submitted a detailed report. Chapter Xix of the said Report deals with Standards and Performance. Chapter Xx I deals with Press legislation. It was reported that the Press is a responsible part of a democratic society, that it should provide the public with an intelligent narration of day's events, set in a context which gives them meaning, and that it must also clarify the values of society and present a clear picture. In para 913 it was reported. 'The need for truthful, objective and comprehensive presentation of news from all corners of the world was never more urgent. Hundreds of millions of our people have been enfranchised. A large number of them may yet be illiterate, but they have also shown considerable shrewdness and understanding of political events. The man behind the plough is eager to understand the world community of which he has become a part. He wants to know all that is happening around him, and he reads the newspaper eagerly or listens to it being read out. The future of the country depends on him, and it is his choice that is going to decide questions of peace or war. He wants tacts, but also expects his newspaper to give him the truth about the facts.' Again in para 947 it was stated 'We have discussed earlier, the need for maintaining editorial independence, objectivity of news presentation, and fairness of comment. These aspects should be looked after by a Press Council which will also have the responsibility of fostering the development of the Press and protecting it from external pressure. We consider that the regulation of the conduct of the Press in the matter of such objectionable writing as is not legally punishable should also be the responsibility of the Press Council'. In the recommendations, the need for setting up a Press Council under a statute was again emphasised with the object, inter alia, to safeguard the freedom of the Press and to help the Press to maintain its independence. The Press Council Bill was later introduced to implement these major recommendations of the Press Commission concerning the establishment of a Press Council in India consisting of people principally connected with the Press which would safeguard the liberty of the Press. The Press Council Act, 1965 received the assent of the President on November 12, 1965.
(26) The Preamble of the Act reads as follows :
'ANAct to establish a Press Council for the purpose of preserving the freedom of the Press and of maintaining and improving the standards of newspapers And News Agencies in India.' Section 12 of the Act reads as follows : . '(1) The object of the Council shall be to preserve the freedom of the Press and to maintain and improve the standards of newspapers And News Agencies in India. (2) The Council may, in furtherance of its object, perform the following functions, namely :- (a) to help newspapers And News Agencies to maintain their independence; (b)to build up a code of conduct for newspapers And News Agencies and joumalists in accordance with high professional standards; (e)to ensure on the part of newspapers And News Agencies and journalists the maintenance of high standards of public taste and foster a due sense of both the right and responsibilities of citizenship; (d) to encourage the growth of a sense of responsibility and public service among all those engaged in the profession journalism; (e)to keep under review any development likely to restrict the supply and dissemination of news of public interest and importance; (f)TO Keep Under Review Cases Of Assistance Received By Any Newspaper Or News Agency In India From Any Foreign Source Including Such Cases As Are Referred It By The Central Government Or Are Brought To Its Notice By Any Individual Association Of Persons Or Any Other ORGANISATION: Provided that nothing in this clause shall preclude the Central Government from dealing with any case of assistance received by a newspaper or news agency in India from any foreign source in an other manner it thinks fit; (g)TO Undertake Studies Of Foreign Newspapers, Including Those Brought Out By Any Embassy Or Other Representative In India Of A Foreign State, Their Circulation And IMPACT. ExplanationN-FOR The Purpose Of This Clause The Expression 'FOREIGN STATE' Has The Meaning Assigned To It In Section 87A Of The Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908. (h) to provide facilities for the proper education and training of persons in the profession of journalism; (i) to promote a proper functional relationship among all classes of persons engaged in the production or publication of newspapers Or In News AGENCIES: Provided That Nothing In This Clause Shall Be Deemed To Confer On The Council Any Functions In Regard To Disputes To Which The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, APPLIES; (j) to study developments which may tend towards monopoly or concentration of ownership of newspapers And News Agencies, including a study of the ownership or financial structure of newspapers And News Agencies, and if necessary, to suggest remedies therefore; (k) to promote technical or other research; (1) to do such other acts as may be incidental or conducive to the discharge of the above functions.'
(27) The history of the legislation as brought out above, shows that the Act was passed to establish a Press Council for the purpose of preserving the freedom of the Press and of maintaining and improving the standard of newspapers and news agencies in India. In construing an enactment and determining its true scope, it is permissible to have regard to all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account to ascertain the intention of the legislature. In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, it is certainly relevant to enquire what the Act aimed at to achieve. It is legitimate to consider the scope and purpose of the Act including the circumstances which necessitated the enactment. To ascertain the legislative intent, it is permissible to enquire the reasons which led to its being passed. The reason was to safeguard the liberty of Press. Freedom of Press is commonly understood as the freedom of expression of opinion, idea, views, information through the medium of printed material and published for circulation. The freedom of press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion. It embraces hand bills and literature, pamphlets and leaflets, newspapers, books, periodicals or any printed mode which would prove effective instrument in the dissemination of news, views, information or opinion. Freedom is always from certain things and certain circumstances. It is a state of being at liberty rather than in constraint or under restraint. Freedom is exemption from external control, interference or regulation. The freedom of Press then is the right to publish through the medium of printed material without any restriction or compulsion from any source whatsoever and subject only to valid laws made under Article 19(2) of the Constitution or laws of libel, obscenity, sedition etc. It is the right to publish and circulate the ideas, opinions, views and comments with complete freedom. The right to propagate one's ideas is inherent in the freedom of self-expression. It is the absence of interference of pressure from any source and direction. A free Press is free from compulsions from whatever source, governmental or social, external or internal. The liberty of the Press is indeed essential to the nature of a free democratic State. It consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication, by any agency. The need for truthful, objective and comprehensive presentation of news was felt by the Press Commission. The need for maintaining editorial independence, objectively of news presentation, and fairness of comment was also felt. Democratic society lives and grows by accepting ideas by experimenting with them, and where necessary rejecting them. It is necessary, thereforee, that as many as possible of these E ideas which its members hold, are freely put before the public. The right of free expression is derived from the responsibility for the common good. Acceptance of that responsibility is the only basis for this right which has been accepted as fundamental. In any modern democratic society, freedom of the Press is as vital as before.' It is with this background that the Press Commission recommended that these and other aspects should be looked after by a Press Council which will also have the responsibility of fostering the development of the Press and protecting it from external pressure. The Royal Commission on the Press in the United Kingdom recommended the establishment on the Press Council and it was felt that it should be statutory, but the Council that has come into existence in U.K. is purely voluntary. It was, however, felt that a voluntary body of the nature of Press Council in U.K. might not have the necessary sanction behind its decision nor legal authority to make inquiries and, thereforee, it. was recommended that an All India Press Council should be set up by Statute with the objects, inter alia, to safeguard the freedom of the Press and to help the Press to maintain its independence. These are the recommendations which have been accepted by the legislature and implemented by enactment of the Press Councilct, 1965.
(28) Viewed with this background and the reason for enactment, we may now ascertain the intention of the legislature which is of supreme importance in the construction of Statutes. What the legislature intended to be done can legitimately be ascertained from what it has chosen to enact by the expressed words in section 12 of the Act. The object of the Press Council is to preserve the freedom of the Press. The legislature has not chosen to define the word freedom of Press. Elaborate arguments were addressed by the counsel for the parties appearing before us on the concept of freedom of Press, with a view to define it. We do not think it either feasible or desirable to lay down any fixed definition, when the legislature itself has not chosen to do so in the Act. 'The concept of freedom of Press cannot also be put in any narrow strait jacket. It is a concept which is living. It cannot be confined in any narrow limits thus restricting its growth.' In the absence of any definition, the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the words used. It must be remembered that the cardinal rule of interpretation of Statutes is to construe its provisions literally and grammatically giving the words their ordinary and natural meaning. The meaning would be as is commonly understood by the newspaper industry. Now it is well settled that where the definition of a word has not b
(29) In Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and Others, : (1961)ILLJ339SC , (12) Bhagwati J. quoted the following two passages on the general meaning of freedom and resulting conception of the freedom of Press, from 'Freedom of the Press-A framework of Principles' (Report of the Commission on Freedom of Press in the United States of America). 'The General Meaning of Freedom To be free is to have the use of one's powers of action (i) without restraint or control from outside (ii) with whatever means or equipment the action requires. 'The primary suggestion of the term 'freedom' is the negative one, the absence of external interference whether to suppress or to constrain. To be free is essentially to be free from something-some arbitrary impediment to action; some dominating power or authority. And so long as it can be taken for granted that the unhindered person has all the needs to act with-which is usually the case the negative meaning remains the chief elements of the conception. 'But since freedom is for action, and action is for an end, the positive kernel of freedom lies in the ability to achieve the end; to be free means to be free for some accomplishment. And this implies command of the means to achieve the end. Unless the equipment necessary for effective action is at hand, unrestraint may be a mockery of freedom.Unrestraint without equipment is not liberty for any end which demands equipment.' Resulting conception of Freedom of the Press: 'The emerging conception of freedom of the press may be summarised as follows : As with all freedoms, Press freedom means freedom from freedom for. A free Press is free from compulsions from whatever source, governmental or social, external or internal. From compulsions, not from pressures; for no press can be free from pressures except in a moribund society empty of contending forces and beliefs. These pressures, however, if they are presistent and distorting-as financial, clerical, popular, institutional pressures may become-approach compulsion; and something is then lost from effective freedom which the Press and its public must unite to restore. 'A free press is free for the expression of opinion in all its phases. It is free for the achievement of those goals of press service on which its own ideals and the requirements of the community combine and which existing techniques make possible. For these ends it must have full command of technical resources, financial strength, reasonable access to sources of information at home and abroad, and the necessary facilities for bringing information to the national market. The press must grow to the measure of this market.'
(30) As already stated, freedom of Press is commonly understood as the freedom of expression of opinion, idea, views, information through the printed material and published for circulation; and free from interference, pressure, restraint or compulsion from whatever source, governmental or social, external or internal. The emerging conception of the freedom of Press has been summarised in the above quotation and was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court. The concept of freedom of Press as used and understood in section 12 of the Act is also of widest amplitude. As rightly pointed out by Dr. L. M. Singhvi, learned counsel appearing for Shri Verghese, widest meaning has to be assigned to the word 'Freedom of Press' in the Act. In our opinion 'Limitation cannot be read in a provision of the Statute, if none is provided by the legislature. The courts cannot arbitrarily cut down the amplitude of an expression used by the legislature. Where the language of the section is plain, it is not open to read in limitations which are not there. To limit the meaning of freedom of Press in section 12 of the Act, by adding words or importing the concept of freedom of Press as understood in Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution, alleged to be available only against the State action, would be defeating that legislative intent and laying down a different policy. The legislative purpose is clear from the preamble and section 12 of the Act that the Press Council is enjoined to preserve the freedom of Press, in whomsoever it vests and against whosoever infringes, be that State or public authority, legal or fictional person, individual or joint stock company. The interpretation suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner that under section 12 of the Act the object of the Press Council is to preserve the freedom of Press against the State action only, would need the addition of the words 'against the State action' in the section itself. This is not permissible for the courts have no power to add words if not used by the legislature. Press Council is to safeguard the Freedom of the Press against threats of its violation originating from any source whatsoever. It is the Press Council which must preserve the liberty of Press against insidious attempts constantly made to restrict, impinge upon or infringe it. But there is nothing in the Act or any intention of the legislature spelled out from the provisions of the Act to confine the jurisdiction of the Press Council against the State or State functionary. One of the functions entrusted to the Press Council is to help newspapers to maintain their independence. The independence of the newspapers can be jeopardised by any external pressure emanating from any source, be that the political parties, trade unions, advertisers, other newspapers or any other conceivable agency. Again under section 12(2)(e) the Press Council is to keep under review any development likely to restrict the supply and dissemination of news of public interests and importance. 'Any development' sugest to restrict it to only as against State action. There is further built in guidance when we refer to the provisions of section 12(2)(f), under which the Press Council is called upon to keep under review cases of assistance received by any newspaper or news agency in India from any foreign source. Here the state or state functionary is not involved at all, yet the Press Council in furtherance of its objects is enjoined to perform the function to keep under review such cases.'
(31) We are not here directly concerned with the meaning and the content of the phrase 'Freedom of Press' in the context of Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution. What is of importance for our purpose is the meaning that may be assigned to Freedom of Press in section 12 of the Act. Since it was contended that the Freedom of Press, used in section 12 of the Act has the same meaning as is assigned to it under Article 19 of the Constitution, and for that purpose great reliance was placed on P. D. Shamdasani's case (supra), we may now pause to consider it.
(32) In P. D. Shamdasani's (supra) case, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was invoked under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of the fundamental rights under Articles 19(l)(f) and 31(1) alleged to have been violated by the Central Bank of India Ltd., a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. In that case five shares held by the petitioner Shamdasani were sold by the Bank in purported exercise of its right of lien for recovery of debt due to it and the transfer was registered in the books of the Bank. Shamdasani instituted series of proceedings in the High Court at Bombay challenging the validity of the said sale and transfer; the last being a ouit filed against the Bank wherein the plaint was rejected under Order 7 or ll(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Instead of filing an appeal Shamdasani filed the writ petition under E Article 32 praying that all adverse orders in the previous proceedings be quashed and the said High Court be directed to have the suit set down to be heard as undefended and pronounced judgment against the Bank. It is on these facts that the Supreme Court observed that Article 19 was intended to protect those freedom against State action and violation of rights of property by individuals is not within the purview of the Article. These observations have to be read with the context in which they were made. The ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court seems to us to be that Shamdasani had misconceived his remedy by filing a petition under Article 32 as no infringement of fundamental right against the State was complained of. Article 32 guarantees the right to a Constitutional remedy and relates only to the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part. Ill of the Constitution Unless a question of the enforcement of a fundamental right arises, Article 32 does not apply. Thus in dealing with petitions under Article 32, the Supreme Court has naturally confined its consideration to the impugned action by which the petitioner's fundamental rights were either affected or threatened. However, the right to move the Supreme Court guaranteed under Article 32(i) is subject to the condition of appropriate proceedings. The expression, appropriate proceedings, has reference to proceedings which may be appropriate having regard to the nature of the writ which the petitioner seeks to obtain from the Supreme Court. Under Article 32(2) the Supreme Court has power to issue directions or orders or wirts, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part Iii of the Constitution. Thus only those proceedings are appropriate which invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, by an original petition for issue of a writ, order or direction of the type specified in the said Article 32(2). It is now established that Articles 32 and 226 of our Constitution have adopted the English Prerogative writs founded on common law. These prerogative writs could only be directed either to the Union of India, or a State or some official acting under the orders of one or other, but not to a private person.
(33) Part Iii of the Constitution enshrines the rights guaranteed under the Constitution. In some of the Articles, for example. Articles 13(2), 14, 15, 16. 23 and 31, the guarantee is specifically mentioned as against interference of the State. There is no express reference to the State in Articles 21 and 22, but it is inherent that the guarantees contained therein are connected with the State. But in several other Articles of Part Iii, the State does not figure, e.g. Article 24 provides prohibition of employment of children in factories etc; Article 25 provides freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of of religion; Article 26 provides freedom to manage religious affairs; Article 27 provides freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion; Article 28 provides freedom as to attendance at religious institution or religious worship in certain educational institutions: Article 29 provides for protection of interests of minorities; Article 30(1) provides rights of minorities to establish educational institutions: in the rights conferred by all these Articles, the State may not be concerned and violations may be by persons other than the State. This docs not lead to the conclusion that the individual is without a remedy. Similarly Article 19 guarantees to the citizens of India the seven fundamental freedoms which are exercisable by them. These freedoms are those great and basic rights which are recognised as the natural rights inherent in the status of a citizen. For example, a citizen shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. If the right is infringed by the State, the remedy will lie in the Supreme Court under Article 32 or in the High Court under Article 226 or even in ordinary law courts of the country; but if the infringement of the right to property is by other persons (other than the State) the remedy would lie in an ordinary court of law alone and not by a writ petition under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution. It is in this light that the Supreme Court in Shamdasani's case held that 'we are of the opinion that the petitioner has misconceived his remedy and the petition must fail on a preliminary point'. The reason for holding the petition as not maintainable seems to us to be that Shamdasani had not founded his petition on any allegation that his fandamental rights under Articles 19 or 31 had been infringed or impinged upon by any action of the State or by anybody deriving authority from the State. The Supreme Court could not be intended to be saying that there are no rights to the property outside Article 19 or that they can be enforced only when they are infringed by the State. What is intended was that the violation of rights of property by individuals are not enforce- able by a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.
(34) In State of West Bengal v. Union of India : [1964]1SCR371 , Sinha C. J. who spoke for the majority observed :
'BYArt. 13(1) all laws in force before the Constitution to the extent of inconsistency with Ch. Iii are declared void: and by clause (2) the State is prohibited from making any law which takes away or abridges fundamental rights, and the laws made in contravention of the prohibition are void. The fundamental rights are primarily for the protection of rights of individuals and corporations enforceable against executive or legislative action of a governmental agency, but it has to be remembered that all laws-pre-existing which are inconsistent with, and post-constitutional which contravene the prohibitions -are to the extent of the inconsistency or contravention void. Some of these rights are declared in form positive, but subject to restrictions authorising the State to make laws derogating from the fullness of the protection e.g. 15(4), 16(3) 16(4), 16(5). .... .19(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), 22(3), 22(6), 23(2), 25(2), 28(2) and (3); there are certain Articles which merely declare rights e.g. 17, 25(1), 26, 29(1) and 30(1): and there are others merely prohibitory without reference to the right of any person body or agency to enforce them e.g. 18(1), 23(1), 24 and 28(1). Prima facie, these declarations involve an obligation imposed not merely upon the 'State', but upon all persons to respect the rights so declared, and the rights are enforceable unless the context indicates otherwise against every person or agency seeking to infringe them. The rights declared in the form of prohibition must have a concomitant positive content; without sue positive content they could be worthless. Relief may be claimed from the High Court or from this Court, against infringement of the prohibition by any agency, unless the protection is expressly restricted to State action.'
(35) The whole object of Part Iii of our Constitution is to provide protection for the freedoms and rights mentioned in this part against arbitrary invasion, infringement or impingement by the State. Article 19 of the Constitution enumerates certain freedoms under the caption 'Right to Freedom' Article 19(l)(a) declares the citizen's right to freedom of speech and expression. 'Although Article 19(l)(a) does not mention the freedom of the Press, it is settled view of the Supreme Court that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of Press. These rights are basic rights which are recognised as the natural rights inherent in the status of a citizen. Any illegal pressure or undue influence on the exercise of right to freedom of Press would be an interference with the liberty of the Press, whoever might be the person who exerted such pressure or attempted to influence or interfere. Such pressure or interference may emanate from any source or come from any direction, not necessarily from the State or public authority. Every illegal act would obviously give rise to a cause of action at the instance of the aggrieved person. If any act of the State or State functionary infringes any of the guaranteed rights under Part Iii of the Constitution., the remedial measure is also constitutional having been provided in Article 32 of the Constitution. For redress of grievance against others, the ordinary common law remedy is available.' The purpose of the Act is to establish a Press Council for the purpose of preserving the Freedom of the Press. If the Freedom of Press was to be preserved only against the State action, then there was hardly any necessity for this legislation. The Constitution under Article 19(l)(a) already guarantees to all citizens freedom of speech and expression, in which freedom of Press is implicit, against arbitrary invasion by the State, and had also provided Constitutional remedy under Article 32 besides the reliefs available under Article 226 or common law. Another forum pronounce upon the impropriety of infringement of the Freedom of Press by the State alone could not be intended by the legislature, when otherwise legally enforceable remedies were already available. We do not think the legislature could have intended to provide a second effective remedy for invasion by the State alone. 'The concept of freedom of Press mentioned in section 12 of the Act in addition to it being a fundamental right is made a statutory right with statutory machinery to preserve it. Whenever there is infringement or impingement of the freedom of the Press and independence of the newspaper, irrespective of the source of the threat, the jurisdiction of the Press Council is attracted. If there is a violation of right to the liberty of the Press be that by the State, State functionary. Public Authority, companies, avidual or any person real or frictional, it will give jurisdiction to the Press Council to pronounce on the impropriety of the action conplained of. The Press Council has the responsibility of fostering the development of the Press protecting it from external pressure, irrespective of the source or origin of the pressure'. We are thus unable to pursuade ourselves to agree to the contention advanced by the petitioner that the remedy for infringement of the Freedom of Press as used in section 12 of the Act is available only against the State action.
(36) We shall now proceed with the examination of the width, scope and content of the expressions 'Freedom of Press' and 'Independence of the Newspaper', as used in section 12 of the Act to ascertain if any such freedom or independence is available to an Editor. Article 19 of the Constitution presupposes that the citizen to whom the possession of these fundamental rights is secured, is already vested with these rights. It deals with certain particular rights which in their origin or inception, arc attributes of the freedom of the citizen but being of great importance arc regarded as specific and independent rights. Article 19 of the Constitution gives a list of such liberties including freedom of speech and expression which comprehends the freedom of Press. 'The right of self-expression, by whatever mode, is a natural right and has now become a right guaranteed by the Constitution.' One may write and publish what he pleases, so long as he does not injure another individual through unwarranted exercise of this liberty. The liberty of Press is not license and it guarantees no immunity from punishment or damages when there is such use of liberty that other's rights are violated. 'The nature of the right of the freedom of Press is both affirmative and negative.' The negative part has been discussed carlier. 'It is affirmative on the part of the individual so far as writing or publishing what he pleases. The editor of a newspaper has the right to gather the news, right to select the news for inclusion in the newspaper, the right to print the news so selected, and then the right to comment or express his own views on all matters of public importance.' All these rights were in existence and had arisen from the common law, before they were declared and guaranteed by the Constitution. One of the questions that arose in Bennett Coleman's case (supra) before the Supreme Court was whether the share-holder, the editor, and the printer who are all citizens, have the right to freedom under Article 19(l) and to invoke those rights for freedom of speech and expression claimed by them for freedom of the Press in their daily publication. The fundamental right was held to vest also in the editor of a newspaper, to give him locus standi to challenge the State action before the Supreme Court. It was further observed 'that it is indisputable that by freedom of the press is meant the right of all citizens to speak, publish or express their views. The freedom of the Press embodies the right of the people to read. The freedom of the Press is not antithetical to the right of the people to speak and express.' The press has to carry on its activity by keeping in view the class of readers, the conditions of the labour, price of material, availability of advertisement, size of the paper and different kinds of news coments and views and advertisements which are to be published and circulated. These are all to be carried out by the proprietors, owners or shareholders through their editors. The editor is the living articulate voice of the press and speaks through the paper. The value of the newspaper is in its contents, the selection of which is the sole and undivided responsibility of the editor.
(37) The proprietors/owners of the newspapers have the right to lay down the editorial policy or the guidelines which the editor has to follow or to have their own point of view expressed through the paper. In the report submitted by the Press Commission, it is stated that they do not deny to the owner or proprietor his basic right to have his point of view expressed through the paper and that this right has been admitted by almost all the journalists who were addressed on the question, and had been emphasised by the proprietors. While making the recommendation in para 1413 it was reported :-
'WEdo not deny to the owner or proprietor his basic right to have his point of view expressed through the paper. But when a proprietor chooses his editor, he should also delegate to him a measure of individual authority which would enable him to carry out his policy and to resist any attempt to divert the policy in anti-social directions. We consider it thereforee, natural that before he takes up his duties, the editor should be enjoined to follow the general policy of the paper. With a view to stabilise and define the editor's ultimate responsibility in the conduct of a newspaper, we recommend that the appointment of an editor should invariably be attended with the execution of a contract of employment or letter of appointment laying down the general policy of the paper in as precise terms as possible. The contract should also make provision for the determination of editorial policy on such matters as have not been covered specifically by the contract and for the settlement of any differences arising there from. In any event, the editor in discharging his responsibility, shall be bound by the generally accepted code of journalistic ethics and practice. If a difference of opinion arises on a question of policy within the general statement of policy embodied in the contract of appointment and such difference is considered by either party to be so vital as to necessitate severance of employment, the liability turn damages and the extent thereof, up to the limit specified in the contract should be determined by some outside authority.'
Mr. Natesan, counsel for respondents I and 2 had not disputed that the proprietor who owns the newspaper, has the right to hold views and work for its establishment by laying down the guidelines or the policy for the editor to follow. He contended that within the frame work of that policy the editor was independent, having full control of the views and news content of the paper. Any pressure or influence on the editor, according to him, would be an interference with the freedom of the Press, however might be the person who exerted such pressure or attempted to influence the editor. Elaborating this point further, the counsel contended that the pressure may be exerted by the owner or the proprietors themselves or it may come from any other direction. It may be that the owner or proprietor is pressurised by outside agencies to influence the editor. The pressure may be from men in power to whom the proprietor may be obliged for his advancement in industry or business, may be for licenses or permits, or it may be to oblige high ups in political power for his own advancement in the political field. There may be cases where the editor succumbs or yields to such undue pressure or influence and the proprietor may have acquiesced in his own interest. In such cases, the counsel submits, the question of the interference with the freedom of Press can be raised before the Press Council by any interested, person. Yet there is another class of cases where the editor of the newspaper resists such interference or pressure and on that ground the services of the editors are terminated. It is here, according to the counsel, that the role of the Press Council comes into play to pronounce upon the impropriety of the action taken in terminating the services. There seems to be great force in these contentions of the counsel.
(38) We have already expressed our opinion that the freedom of Press contemplated in section 12 of the Act is not limited to the freedom from interference by State or by other public authorities. .Any pressure subversive of the freedom of Press from any quarter, agency or authority will amount to infringement with that freedom. Any intereference with the presentation of the news, views of comments or any attempt to suppress or constrain it would be impairment of that freedom. The selection of the news is the sole responsibility of the editor. The) sole responsibility for truthful, objective, and comprehensive presentation of news from all corners of the world falls on the editor for the existence or survival of the newspaper as an industry. There is no question of any policy involved in it. It is only in the matter of comment or criticism of political or other policies that there can be an enunciation of the policy. Such a policy has necessarily to be laid down for any newspaper before the proprietors or owners choose their editors. The proprietors or owners of a newspaper are entitled, if they so wish, to lay down any partisan policy for their newspaper and make the newspaper an instrument of propagation of that policy. The readers of the newspaper would know in advance that the particular newspaper is partisan or even those readers may be interested in the views and comments in favor of such partisan policy. But once having laid down the policy, the editor has to be left to work independently within the framework of that policy. The expression 'editor' is not defined in the Act itself, but it has the same meaning as is assigned to it in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867. Editor has been defined there to mean the person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in the newspaper. The editor thus is a person who is responsible for the selection of the material that is included in the paper. The selecsion is not confined to only news items, but it extends to the views or comments. The views or comments may be written or expressed by others, or may be written by the editor himself in the editorial column reserved for him. The editor has to make the choice of the material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to the content, treatment of public issues and healthy criticism on public officials constitutes the exercise of editorial control and judgment, it will be apposite to quote from British Editors on Press Freedom. 'The immediate guardians of what The Times has called 'the imperfect but rare and remarkable freedom of the British Press', are the editors. It is the editors, working within the various limitations imposed by the law, who ultimately satisfy the public desire to read freely published opinion and information. Editors are thereforee, in a position both privileged and burdensome. To fulfill their role they have to be free men constrained, of. course, by the need for their papers to survive commercially, and constrained by the known law, but unconstrained by hidden influences and the constant menace of professional insecurity. One crucial part of this role is the relationship editors have with their staff. This is a constant two-way communicating relationship. Newspapers are produced by a partnership of many talents. The editor takes legal responsibility for the product, but in the reality of newspaper work he is in many ways primus inter pares. Newspapers are a collective, not of ownership but of production. The editor is the guarantor of the freedom of this collective to work without political or proprietorial interference
(39) The newspaper whose independence is to be protected under section 12 of the Act, is not only the printed material as is suggested, but the entire newspaper establishment. Under section 2 of the Act read with section I of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 the newspaper has been defined to mean any printed periodical work containing public news or comments on public news. It is not the lifeless printed work which is to be helped but the persons who are responsible in bringing out the printed work and it would include the proprietors and editors. In turning out a newspaper, the role of an editor is significant as pointed out earlier. His journalistic independence cannot be impared or impinged upon. Our attention was invited to various provisions of the Act and the regulations, to base an argument that the words newspaper and editor have been used in contradistinction therein and one is not included in the other. In other words editor is not included in newspaper as used in section 12(2) (a) of the Act. This contention is only to be stated to be rejected. Newspaper is not an entity representing the owner alone, but in it is included every one who is responsible in bringing out the newspaper, including owners, printer, publisher, editor, editorial and printing staff. The presentation of a newspaper involves in its process the proprietors who authorise or publish the work; the editors who are responsible for the content, the selection of the news and views; the editorial staff who edit; and the printers who print. Section 12(2) (a) of the Act only mentions in a compendius manner as to who are to be helped by the Press Council in maintaining their independence, i.e. newspapers and news agencies. It does not mention any individual as being responsible for publication of the newspaper. The help is to any printed periodical work containing public news, views or comments. It has reference to the contents remaining independent without any restriction or interference from any source whatsoever. The person responsible for the contents is the editor who controls the selection of the matter that is published in the newspaper. Thus the independence of the editor is included in the independence of the newspaper as used in section 12 of the Act.
(40) The Freedom of Press involves freedom of employment or nonemployment of the necessary means of exercising this right. The owner or proprietor of a newspaper has this freedom from restriction in respect of employment in the editorial force. The choice as to personnel certainly vests in the owner or proprietor of a newspaper. The owner or proprietor is at liberty to exercise his undoubted right of 'hire and fire' or to terminate the employment of an editor by issuing notice in terms of the contract of employment or severe his relationship for any cause that seems to it proper save only as a punishment or for discouragement of the Editor's responsibilities and functions which relate to freedom of Press or independence of thenewspaper. When this is done, the jurisdiction of the Press Council is attracted under section 12 of the Act to preserve the editor's Freedom of Press and to maintain its independence. It will be for the Press Council to determine as to what is the foundation of the terination. The Press Council has jurisdiction to find out the motive behind the 'termination of an editor's services and ascertain whether any improper or undue influence was being brought to bear on the editor in the discharge of his duties as an editor; the resultant effect of which motive was to curb the freedom of expression of news, views and comments by the editor. The Press Council has jurisdiction to decide whether on the facts of the given case there has been any pressure on the editor subversive of the freedom of the Press. or vocative of the independence of the newspaper in its context. One of the functions that have been assigned to the Press Council is to promote a proper functional relationship among all classes of persons engaged in the production or publication of newspapers or in news agencies. Mr. Anthony is certainly right in contending that such role of the Press Council is only intercessional between the proprietor and the editor and if the dispute degenerates to termination of services, the proviso to section 12(2) (i) of the Act comes into play. The jurisdiction of the Press Council is excluded in regard to disputesto which the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 applies. The Press Council thus has no jurisdiction to settle the terms or conditions of services of the editors or to order the reinstatement or to pass any enforceable orders for the grant of salary, wages, gratuity or other benefits accruing on the termination of service. The Press Council is not competent to force an editor on the proprietors. The functioning of the Press Council is not in these areas, but is in the fields or activities which are subversive of the freedom of the editor. The action of termination or dismissal may be legally correct, but at the same time it may constitute a threat to the freedom of the Press. In such cases the Press Council may pronounce its opinion on the propriety of the tennination or dismissal. The opinion of the Press. Council acts only on the moral plane and it serves to inform the public and the Parliament about the impropriety that has been committed. The forum was established for maintaining editorial independence, objectivity of news presentation and fairness of comment. If any undue pressure has been exerted on the editor and a pronouncement of impropriety is made by the Press Council, it will act as a deterrent to undue pressures. Such expression of opinion by the Press Council will discourage or even restrain the other from similarly acting or proceeding, as througf fear of feeing pronounced upon. ft will dissuade others from infringing the freedom of the editor. This, in our view, is what the legislature wanted to achieve in entrusting the functions to the Press 'Council to pronounce its opinion.
(41) The relationship between the proprietor and editor has often been a delicate one. We have already pointed out that the proprietor/ owner of a newspaper has a determining influence on the policy for the newspaper, and the editor is responsible for the decisions to carry that policy into effect in addition to his right to control the selection of the matter and the content of the newspaper. It was brought to our notice that some of the leading journalists are of the opinion that legal delimitation of the position of the owner/proprietor and editor would be a valuable support for sound ideas about their relationship. On this we express no opinion. It is, however, generally understood in the newspaper industry that when an editor accepts the appointment, he is considered to share the paper's political basic views or the policy laid down for the paper. Within: those circumscribed limits, the editor has complete freedom to maintain his own opinions, views or comments, even though they may not in some cases be shared by the proprietors. In case any change is made by the proprietors in the basic policy or views, and the editor comes into insoluable conflict with such policy, then the editor has to give up his appointment. But if the editor travels within the boundary or framework of the basic policy and any hurdles or checks are placed in the exercise of editorial control which relates to his freedom and independence, then the jurisdiction of the Press Council would be attracted.
(42) This takes us to the consideration of the contention that the complaints under Regulation 16 can only be in respect of 'matter'' as defined in regulation 2(e). Regulation 16 reads as follows:
THEprocedure prescribed by these regulations in respect of complaints under section 13(1) of the Act shall apply mutates mutants to complaints received by the Council seeking its help to maintain the independence of newspapers and news agencies or in respect of any matter falling under section 12(2) (a), (e) and (f), as also to the case of any inquiry in respect of any matter under clause (j) thereof, provided that the inquiry shall be conducted by the Council itself.'
The complaints referred to in this regulation can be in respect of any matter falling under section 12(2) (a), (e) and (f) Section 12(2)(f) enjoins the Press Council to keep under review cases of assistance received by a newspaper or news agencies in India from any foreign source. Here no question of 'matter' as defined in Regulation 2(e) is even remotely involved. The opening words of regulation 2 are 'unless the context otherwise requires'. The word 'matter' used in the context of regulation 16 indicates a situation, state or affair falling under section 12(2)(c), or (f) of the Act. Under section 12(2)(e) of the Act, the Press Council is to keep under review ' any development likely to restrict the supply and dissemination of news of public interest and importance. Here the emphasis is on 'any development likely to restrict'. It is a cause which is anterior to publication. The matter thus used in Regulation 16 is not one defined in Regulation 2(e). The same word may be used in different senses in the Regulations, if the context so requires. If sufficient reason can be assigned to construe a word in one part of the Regulation in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of the regulation, then it is proper to construe so. In Regulation 16 the word 'matter' has been used in the ordinary sense of the word as to bring in its fold any situation arising under section (12)(2)(a)(e) and (f) of the Act.
(43) The present is not a writ of Certiorari against the decision of the Press Council on the merits of the two complaints or the dispute before it. We have, thereforee, confined our views on the nature of the issue before the Press Council to examine if it has jurisdiction to entertain the said two complaints. For the purpose of ascertaining the maintainability of the two complaints, the allegations made therein will have to be assumed as correct and then to find out if they disclose a cause of action to give jurisdiction to the Press Council. In the earlier part of the judgment we have set out in brief the allegations contained in the complaint dated November 4, 1974 filed by Shri Mankekar and the complainant, dated November 5, 1974 of Shri Ramachandran but it seems necessary to recall them. Shri Mankekar stated that the freedom of the Press is synonymous with the freedom of the editor from external pressure to pursue the editorial policy; that Shri B. G. Verghese, editor of the Hindustan Times has been following an independent editorial policy exposing the defects and misdeeds of the Establishment; that Shri K. K. Biria coaceived the idea of terminating the services of Shri B. G. Verghese so that he might be replaced by one who is more amenable to Shri Birla's dictates or who would not initiate or incur the displeasure of the Government by his writings in the newspapers; that the petitioner, for promoting his business interest is beholden to the Government and is, thereforee, either under pressure from the Government or is desirous of placating the Establishment to further his business interests; that the freedom of the Press has no meaning unless the editor is free from pressure, including pressure from the prop- rietor; that Shri B. G.Verghese was sought to be punished by terminating his services for the sin of exercising his right of freedom of expression. Shri Ramachandran invoked the jurisdiction of the Press Council to remove, what he alleged, a grave threat to the freedom of the Press and independence of the newspapers flowing from the decision of the Management of the Hindustan Times Ltd. to remove Shri B. G. Verghese from the editorship of the newspaper and its allied English publications. After referring to the constitution and objects of the Hindustan Times Ltd., Shri Ramachandran alleged, in the complaint, infer alia, that Shn K. K. Birla, had sent a notice to Shri B. G. Verghese in August last asking Shn Verghese to cease to be the Editor with effect from February 28, 1975, but the petitioner has declined to disclose the reasons for the action; that the petitioner is contemplating a new editorial structure for the Hindustan Times and its allied publications, which will completely whittle down the independence of the editor and other members of the editorial staff and thus undermine the integrity of the profession; that the threat is inherent not only in the action proposed to be taken against the present Editor but also in the new dispensation which is expected to follow his removal; that during the last six years of his editorship, Shri Verghese has not only scrupulously and faithfully pursued the policy described in the Memorandum of Association of the Hindustan Times Ltd., but also brought prestige 'to the newspaper in doing so; that Shri Biria himself is against faithfully implementi
(44) He cause of action in the two complaints is not for infringement of fundamental right under Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution, but maintaining the independence of the newspaper and freedom of the Press from pressures of any sort, including pressures from the proprietors of the newspaper. The jurisdiction of the Press Council is invoked to remove, what is alleged, a grave threat to the freedom of the Press and independence of the newspaper, flowing from the decision of the petitioner to remove Shri B. G. Verghese who has scrupulously and faithfully pursued the policy described for the newspaper. It is also alleged that Shri Verghese was sought to be punished by terminating his services for the sin of exercising his right of freedom of expression. If the allegations are taken as correct and examined in the light of our views expressed on the Freedom of Press and independence of Newspaper including the right of freedom of the editor, then certainly the Press Council has jurisdiction to enquire and pronounce upon the conduct. Whether the conduct complained of amounts to infringement of the freedom of Press or interference in the independence of the newspaper would have to be determined by the Press Council. We may state here that we have not expressed any opinion on merits of the complaints, but only on the nature of the complaints before the Press Council.
(45) Coram Non Judicis : The next main question which falls to be considered is whether the Press Council is corain non judicis. The objection is founded, firstly, on the ground that editors as a class and journalists as a class are interested parties and thus disqualified under regulation 13 to participate in the proceedings; secondly on the ground that the six Editors and seven Journalists are partisan or suspected of partisanship by reason of their association with All India Newspaper Editors' Conference (hereinafter referred to as the Conference) and National Union of Journalists (India) hereinafter referred to as N.U.J.(I) respectively, who are intcrvsners before the Press Council on the side of the said two complainants ; thirdly on the ground
(46) It will be fruitful to examine the manner in which this objection was raised before the Press Council. This objection was notleaded in the comments on the aforesaid two complaints of Sarvashri D. R. Mankekar and C. P. Ramachandran, i.e. in the written statement dated December 6, 1974 (Annexure 'C') filed by the petitioner even though other preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Press Council were raised. An application was filed for inter- vention in the two complaints by the N.U.J.(I) and certain correspondence . exchanged between, the Conference and the petitioner was and it is only then that the petitioner raised the objection of Coram- non-judicis on the first and second grounds before the Press Council. In the letter dated January 6, 1975 (Annexure 'J') addressed to the Press Council, the petitioner stated that he was forwarding the copies of several letters including the letters dated November 19) 1974 (Annexure 'D') and December 13, 1974 (Annexure 'F') from the Conference. The letter dated November 19, 1974 was addressed to the petitioner complaining inter alia, that Shri Verghese is being forced to quit and it would be outrageous on the part of the Management to terminate his services in this manner, that some people think that there are certain political influences working for his exit from the Hindustan Times, that the Conference is vitally interested not only in the freedom of the Press but also in safeguarding the rights and privileges of the editors and that the Standing Committee of the Conference will meet and this matter will be extensively discussed in that meeting. The letter dated December 13. 1975 was addressed to Shri Dalmia, a Director of Hindustan Times expressing that it is a pity that the Management of the Hindustan Times is treating so shabily a person of such outstanding ability and ethical standards as Shri Verghese and further staling that the Standing Committee is meeting in Delhi on 4th and 5th of January 1975 and the question about the termination of the services of Shri Verghese is bound to agitate the minds of the editors who will be coming from all over India. In this letter, the Management of the Hindustan Times was also requested to attend so that their version could be placed before the Standing Committee. It is then stated in the petitioner's written statement dated January 6, 1975 that :
'from the above correspondence you will kindly see that editors as a body are an interested party in the controversy pending before you under section 12(2) (a) and (e) and, thereforee, editors, who are members of the Press Council are not entitled either to vote or participate in the discussion relating to this controversy under section (13) of Press Council (Procedure for Enquiry) Regulations, 1971. National Union of Journalists (India) have also applied for intervention in the complaint vide their letter No. NUJ(1)/601/74 dated 30th December 1974 sent to us along with your forwarding letter dated 1st January, 1975 The journalist members of the Council are also not entitled either to vote or participate in the discussion relating to this controversy under section (13) of Press Council (Procedure for Enquiry) Regulations, 1971'.
The objection before the Press Council was thus based on the specific bias attempted to be spelt out of the correspondence and the application for intervention by N.U.J.(I) and not bias of the editors and journalists as a class, which seems to be an improvement of the case. In the pleadings before us it is averred that the preliminary objections were argued by counsel including the objections as to the validity of the constitution of the Press Council and, inter alia, the objection to the editor and journalist members participating in the proceedings in view of regulation 13. In the grounds it is stated that the journalist and editor members of the Press Council are interested parties and in any event indirectly interested and, thereforee, disqualified under regulation 13 to participate in the proceedings. 46. Further material has been brought on the record in the affidavit dated March 5, 1975 of Shn M. D. Dalmia in support of the plea of bias of the six editors and particularly the bias of Sarvasliri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh. It is stated that the complainant Shri D. R. Mankekar addressed the complaint to the Press Council on behalf of the Editors' Conference, that it shows the identity of interest between the editor conference members of the Press Council and the complainant, and that the organisations view is the collective view of the members. The copy of the minutes of the proceedings of the Standing Committee of Conference held on 4th and 5th of January 1975 has been placed on record. It records the presence of Shri A. K. Jain and Shri Jang Bahadur Singh. The relevant resolution, from which the bias of the six editors, specifically of Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh, is spelt out is reproduced below:
'ITwss decided that since the termination of the services of Mr. B. G. Verghese constituted an infringement of the freedom of the Press, the A.I.N.E.C. should refer the matter to the Press Council. In order to draft the memorandum to be sent to the Press Council, Mr. S. Basu, Mr. V. P. V. Rajan, Mr. A. K. Jain and Mr. Virendra were asked to draft it.'
The letter dated January 7, 1975 (Annexure 'H') drafted in pursuance of the resolution and addressed to the Press Council has also been placed on record. The relevant extract reads as follows:
'THEAll India Newspapers Editors' Conference is of the opinion that the Editor is the custodian of the freedom of the Press ; it is, thereforee, imperative that his independence be assured and fully safeguarded. To that end it is essential that the continuity and permanence of his tenure be guaranteed, preferable in a written agreement between him and the conductors of the newspaper that employ him. Even if it be a time bound agreement, it should be allowed to run at least till the editor attains the age, of superannuation. He should not prematurally be removed except on grounds of proven incompetence gross misconduct or moral turpitude. The A.I.N.E.C. notes with concern the decision of the management of The Hindustan Times to terminate the services of Mr. George Verghese, its Editor, who has not yet attained the age of superannuation, nor has any charge been brought against him in justification of the unwarranted action. In the opinion of the A.I.N.E.C., it constitutes a threat to editorial freedom and thereforee to the freedom of the Press. If the Editor's security be in jeopardy it scarcely be possible for him to work in an atmosphere of freedom. Uncertainty will not only cramp his style but will be a constraint on his freedom. In the view of the A.I.N.E.C., this is a fit case for consideration by the Press Council. We, thereforee, request the Press Council to take up this case.'
The allegations of bias against the Chairman of the Press Council were made by way of amendment in para 8-A of the amended writ petition (the amendment being allowed by us in our order dated April 9, 1975). The manner in which this objection was raised will be dealt with in detail subsequently.
(47) National justice demands not only that , person whose legal right or interest is likely to be affected by the decision, should ' be given an opportunity of being heard (the hearing rule-Audi alteram partem), but also he should be heard by an impartial and disinterested Court or Tribunal (the Bias Rule-Nemo debut esse Judex in Causa Propria Sud). In common law, no man is competent to adjudicate if he has a direct pecuniary interest in the dispute before him. No man who is himself a party to a proceeding or who has any direct pecuniary interest in the result thereof is qualified to judicate in the judicial proceedings. No man can act both as an adjudicator and a prosecutor or plaintiff or defendant in any proceeding. These principles have been adopted in limiting the jurisdiction of statutory bodies or other authorities in exercisc of quasijudicial functions. In case of quasi-judicial proceedings, the authority or body empowered to give a decision must, thereforee, be one without any bias against one side or the other. This is so because the principle that it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be, done equally applies to quasi-judicial bodies and authorities. The authority or body should be able to act impartially and without any leaning in favor of one party or without any prejudice against the other. Tendency on one side or the other produced by some previous connection with the parties is indicative of 'bias'. The factors which hinder or may possibly hinder in the administration of even-handed justice are within the fold of 'bias'.' To put it in the words of Lord Thakerton (Franklin v. Min. of Town Planning, 1947(2) All E.R. 289, (15) the use of wor:l 'bias' should be confined in its proper sphere :
'ITSproper significance is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi judicial office, such as an arbitrator. The reason for this clearly is that. having to adjudicate as between two or more parties, he must come to his adjudication with an independent mind. without inclination or bias towards one side or other in dispute'.
Any monetary interest, however small, in the result of the proceedings, has consistently been judicially pronounced to disqualify a person from acting as an adjudica or in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings ; the reason being that it is against public policy that a person having any pecuniary interest, however small, in the result of the proceedings should take part in them as a Judge. In other cases the question to be determined is: whether there is any real likelihood of bias. Bias in these cases is to be judged from the standard of a reasonable man who would be judge of any matter in the conduct of his own business. It is based on the reasonable apprehension of a reasonable man fully conscious of the material facts and circumstances, but it has to be a real likelihood or substantial possibility of bias. In Reg. v. The Mayor and Justices of Deal, 45 L.T. 439 (16), it was held :
'THEinterest or bias which disqualified must be real and substantial, and such as was likely to influence the mind -not a mere interest in humanity or the welfare of society, or an interest in the protection of animals from cruelty; such an interest would no more disqualify a magistrate than an interest in the suppression of vice. The interest or bias which disqualified must be an interest or bias in the matter to be litigated-that is, in this case, whether the person prosecuted had been guilty of cruelty to an animal. A mere general interest in the general object to be pursued would not disqualify a magistrate. All magistrates and all judges have general sympathies and feelings of this kind-feelings in favor of the protection of the innocent or the helpless, feelings in favor of the punishment of crime; but these general feelings or sympathies do not disqualify them from sitting in criminal cases. The interest or bias which disqualifies is an interest or bias in the particular case-something reasonably likely to bias or influence their minds in the particular case.'
There arc dicta and passages to be found in three judgments of the Supreme Court on what is real likelihood of bias and the measure to be adopted in finding it out.
(48) In Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, : [1957]1SCR575 (17) Rajendagadkar J. who spoke for the Supreme Court, held :
'IT is well settled that every member of a tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to get judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. As Viscount Cave L. C. has observed in Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices 'this rule has been asserted not only in the case of Courts of Justices and other judicial tribunals but in the case of authorities which, though in no sense to be called Courts, have to act as judges of the rights of others'. In dealing with cases of bias attributed to members constituting tribunals, it is necessary to make a distinction between pecuniary interest and prejudice so attributed. It is obvious that pecuniary interest, however, small it may be in a subject matter of the proceedings, would wholly disqualify a member from acting as a judge. But where pecuniary interest is not attributed but instead a bias is suggested, it often becomes necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice.'
Again in The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Hyderabad and another v. Sri Satyanarayana Transports (Private) Ltd. Guntur and others, : AIR1965SC1303 it was held:
'IT is an elementary rule of natural justice that a person who tries a case should be able to deal with the matter before him objectively, fairly, and impartially. Anything which tends or may be regarded as tending to cause such a person to decide a case otherwise than on evidence must be held to be biased. Thus, if a person has a pecuniary interest in the case brought before him, or is hostile to a party whose cause he is called upon to try, that would introduce the infirmity of bias and would disqualify him from trying the cause. In dealing with cases of bias, it is necessary to remember that 'no one can act in a judicial capacity if his previous conduct gives ground for believing that he cannot act with an open mind'. The broad principle which is universally accepted is that a person trying a cause even in quasi-judicial proceedings, must not only act fairly, but must be able to act above suspicion of unfairness'.
Again in S. Parthasarthi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, : (1973)IILLJ473SC it was held :
'WEthink that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seem to be done. If right minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless. There must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision'.
(49) The rules of natural justice operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. Regulation 13 made in exercise of the powers conferred under the Act provides for restrictions of power of any member to discuss and vote, if the case one in which he is personally involved or has any direct or indirect interest by himself or his partner. Regulation 13 reads as under:-
'RESTRICTIONof power of members to discuss and vote in certain cases.-No member of the Committee shall vote or take part in the discussion of, and no member of the Council shall vote or take part in the discussion of any complaint coming up for consideration at a meeting of the Committee or the Council, as the case may be, if the case is one in which he is personally involved or has any direct or indirect interest by himself or his partner, or in which he is interested professionally on behalf of a client or as an agent or representative for any newspaper, news- agency, editor or other working journalist, as the case may be.'
Thus it provides for certain cases only when bias is attributed. For other eventualities the rules of natural justice have to be looked into, for the rules of natural justice do not supplant the law but supplement it. It, thereforee, becomes necessary to consider on the facts and circumstances of this case on each ground of attack, whether any member is personally involved or has direct or indirect interest or there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias from the standard of a reasonable man.
(50) The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. It depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, the framework of the law under which enquiry is held and the constitution of the body of the persons appointed for that purpose. It would, thereforee, be necessary to refer to the provisions of the Act and the composition of the Press Council. The preamble and section 12 of the Act states that the object of the Press Council shall be to preserve the freedom of the Press and to maintain and improve the standards of the newspapers and news agencies in India. In furtherance of the object the Press Council is empowered to perform certain specified functions including help to newspapers and news agencies to maintain their independence. The composition of the Press Council is provided in section 4 of the Act. Under section 4(1), the Press Council is to consist of a Chairman and twenty six other members. Under section 4(2), the Chairman is to be nominated by a nominating committee, consisting of the Chairman of the Council of States, the Chief Justice of India and the Speaker of the House of the People. Under section 4(3) (a) thirteen members are nominated by the said nominating committee from among the working journalists, of whom six are editors of newspapers and the remaining seven are working journalists other than editors. Under section 4(3) (b), six members are nominated by the said nominating committee from among person who own or carry off business of management of newspapers. One member is nominated by the said nominating Committee from among persons who manage news agencies. Thus it will be seen that the majority of the members of the Press Council are from newspaper industry. The. other members of the Press Council are nominated by various bodies. Three members are persons having special knowledge or practical experience in respect of Education and Science, Law and Literature and Culture of whom respectively one is nominated by the University Grants Commission, one by the Bar Council of India and one by Sahitya Academy. Three members are Members of Parliament of whom two are nominated by the Speaker from among members of the House of the People and one nominated by the Chairman of the Council of States from among its members. Section 4(4) provides that before making any nomination of the editors, journalists, proprietors of the newspaper industry or manager of the news agencies, the nominating committee lias to invite panels of names comprising twice the number of members to be nominated from such associations of persons of the respective categories, as may be notified in this behalf by the Press Council. In pursuance of the provisions of section 4(4) of the Act, the Press Council notified by a notification dated June 30, 1970. the following associations of persons of the categories referred to in clause (a) and clause (b) of sub-section 3 of section 4 of the Act, namely :
(1)Associ)ations of persons referred to in Clause (a) of sub-section 3 of section 4:- (1) The Indian Federation of Working Journalists; (2) The All India Newspapers Editors' Conference; (3) The Press Association (II) Association of persons referred to in clause (b) of sub-section 3 of section 4:- (1) The Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society; (2) The Indian Language Newspaper Association.
In. pursuance of the aforesaid notification dated 30-6-1970. the All India News papers Editors' Conference submitted a panel of names from whose panel the six editor members of the Council have been nominated by the nominating committee. The seven working journalists other than editors, have been nominated by the nominating committee from the panel of names submitted by the Press Association.
(51) The legislative purpose of the Press Council is to preserve the freedom of the Press and of maintaining and improving the standards of newspapers and news agencies in India. To achieve this, the statute itself provides a body composed of different segments of the newspaper industry namely, six editors, seven journalists (other than editors), six proprietors of newspapers and one manager of the news agencies and the manner of their selection and appointment, besides three experts in their own fields and three members of the Parliament. The Press Council has been designed to make it fully representative of different categories in the newspaper industry or the Press so as to inspire public confidence, but at the same time the statute contemplates the possibility of the Press Council being a judge of its own cause. The statute can confer power on an authority and impose a duty on it to decide a dispute in which it has an official bias. But, before we can say that the legislature has departed from the principle of natural justice, it has to be ascertained whether the legislature has expressly ordained so. In this connection, the statement of objects and reasotis might be admissible, not for construing the Act, but for ascertaining the conditions that prevailed when the legislation was enacted. It also furnishes valuable historic material in ascertaining the reasons which induced the legislature to enact a statute. It provides a background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation. We have already narrated the circumstances which led to the appointment of the Press Commission which submitted its detailed report. Chapter Xix of the report deals with the standards and performance. It was pointed out that Press is a responsible part of a democratic society, that it should provide the public with an intelligent narration of the day's events, set in a context which gives them meaning, and that it must also clarify the values of society and present a clear picture. The need for maintaining editorial independence. objectivity of news presentation and fairness of comment has been extensively discussed in this chapter. It was, thereafter, recommended by the Commission that these aspects should be looked after by a Press Council. The Composition of the Press Council is then recommended. In the statement of objects and reasons for the Act it is stated :
'INthe matter of its composition, the Bill closely follows the recommendations of the Press Commission and guarantees predominant representation to members drawn from the Press who will consist of working journalists, including working editors of both English and Indian language newspapers, and persons who own and carry on the business of management of newspapers. The remaining few members will represent the interests of education, literature, law and culture as recommended by the Commtesion, and also public opinion through three representatives drawn from Parliament. The Chairman of the Council will be nominated by the Chief Justice of India. The members of the Press Council, other than Members of Parliament, will be selected by a committee consisting of the Chief Justice of India, the Chairman of the Press Council and a, person to be appointed by the President of India, the selection in respect of the representatives from the Press being made with due regard to the panels of names furnished by established associations of working journalists, editors and of person carrying on the business of management of newspapers.'
(52) The legislature, thus, wanted to achieve the object of preserving the Freedom of Press and of maintaining and improving the standards of newspapers and news agencies, through the Press Council consisting predominantly of members drawn from the newspaper industry, editors, journalists and the persons who own or carry the business of management of the newspapers. The legislature was fully aware of the nature of the complaints which may come before the Press Council for conducting an enquiry and recording a finding thereon. One of the functions which the Press Council is enjoined to perform is to help newspapers and news agencies to maintain their independence. To remain independent would include absence of uncalled for interference or undue influence of Proprietors, Editors, Journalists, Advertisers, Trade Union, State or Public Authorities etc. We have aleary expressed that a proprietor has the right to lay down the editorial policy or guidelines which the editor has to follow, but within the framework of the policy the editor has independence having full control over the presentation of the views and news content of the paper. The ^complaints to the interference in the independence of the newspaper or interference with free functioning of the Press or encroachment on the freedom of the Press can thus legitimately be either by the proprietors, or managers of the newspapers, or editors, or journalists: and may be against any one or more of them. The majority of the complaints had necessarily to be against the class to which the proprietors, editors and journalists belong. Knowing this, the legislature has provided the composition of the Press Council to consist of men from newspaper industry, who are aware of the standards of the newspaper and the need to improve them, and who can comprehend the expression Freedom of Press and the need to preserve them. The legislature must be taken to be conscious that the six editors, seven journalists, six proprietors of newspapers and one manager of news agencies, who have to make decisions while sitting as members of the Press Council, can hardly insulate themselves from their views about the Freedom of Press, standards of newspapers, independance of newspapers, standards of journalistic ethics, public taste, etc. it seems to us that they have been brought in purposely by the legislature because of their familiarity with the problems and the issues or even with the conduct of the parties. It would, thereforee, be inappropriate for us to insist on the editors or journalists maintaining the lofty detachment required of a judicial officer determining a lis. In their case. the rule against class bias has to be tampered with realism. When the legislature in its wisdom clearly and expressly entrusted the functions to be performed under the Act to the Press Council comprising of persons drawn from classes to which the complainants or respondents, belong, it cannot be held that the Press Council is conam-non-judicis merely because the six editors and seven journalists members belong to the class of the complainants or the interveners siding the complainants.
(53) Even though allegations have been made that the editors 'and journalists are partisan or suspected of partisanship by reason of their association with the Conference and N.U.J(I) respectively, who have associated or aligned with the said two complainants instituting the proceedings, we cannot hold them to be disqualified by reason of such association or alignment unless the facts established or circumstances show or point to a real likelihood of bias, by which is meant an operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious in relation to a party or an issue before them. As already pointed out, the seven working journalists other than editors, have been nominated by the nominating committee from the panel of names submitted by the Press Association and not by the National Union of Journalists (India) as is allged by the petitioner. The application for intervention on the side of the complainants in the two complaints concerning Shri B. G. Verghese, was filed by the N.U.J.(I) and not the Press Association. The request is contained in the letter dated December 30, 1974 (Annexure 'I'), and it states that a prima-facie case of invasion of the freedom of Press is involved in the Management's attempts to remove the editor Shri B.C. Verghese from his post, and that the manner and circumstances in which the editor is sought to be removed from his job involve the principle of editorial freedom, and as such concern all journalists who value their professional independence. The petitioner has not sworn any affidavit on record that the seven journalist members (respondents 9 to 15) arc members of the N.U.J.(I) and/ or are committed to the view of that Union. In fact, the N.U.J.(I) has not expressed any firm view or committed itself. Respondents 9 to 15, the journalist members, have filed separate affidavits but in identical words staling as follows :
'Istate that once I have been nominated as member of the Press Council. I am there along with other colleagues as members of self-regulatory body of journalists whose sole aim is to maintain and improve the standards of newspapers and news agencies and to uphold and preserve the freedom of Press which are the objects for the attainment of which the Council has been established. I state that I function as integral unit of a corporate body and record findings, reach conclusions only on the basis of an objective assessment of the materials placed before the Council'.
'NOmaterial has been pointed out by the petitioner from which we could infer any real likelihood of bias. The attack of the petitioner regarding the alleged bias of the seven journalists thus fails'.
(54) The question for consideration then is whether the six editor members are biased or disqualified to participate in the proceedings of the Press Council. It was contended that the object of the Conference is, inter alia, to establish and preserve the authority and independence of the editors and to safeguard the interests of the editors in general, that the members of the Conference are bound to be directly interested in the cause of editors taken up by the Conference, that the members of the Conference are bound by any decision taken by the Conference or its Standing Committee, that the Conference wrote scries of abrasive: letters including that of November 19, 1974 and of December 13, 1974 accusing and condemning the proprietor of Hindustan Times that the Conference passed a resolution to the effect that since the termination of the services of Shri Verghese constituted an infringement of the freedom of the Press, the Conference should refer the matter to the Press Council, and that the Conference in fact requested the Press Council for intervention by its letter dated January 7, 1975 on the side of the complainants and this shows deep interest of the six editor members who are in fact prosecutors before the Press Council. It is on these facts that it was submitted that the petitioner has a reasonable apprehension that the six editor members arc biased.
(55) In our opinion, the four editor members (we will deal with the case of Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jarig Bahadur Singh separately) could not be reasonably or substantially suspected of bias in this case. Under the constitution of the Conference, the membership is open to newspapers and news agencies. The editors themselves are not members of the Conference, but represent the members at the Conference. Every applicant for membership has to subcribe in writing that he will observe and follow the code of Ethics, the Code of Conduct and the Editor's charter approved by the Conference. No provision in the Charter has been brought to our notice which makes the decision of the Standing Committee binding on the representatives of the members, namely on the editors or the editors' nominee. Even on members, the binding nature is only to the Code of Ethics, the Code of Conduct and Editors Charter approved by the Conference. The editors who are representing the members at the Conference are neither committed to the view of the Standing Committee nor are they bound by any decisions. The editor members do not have any direct or indirect interest in the controversy pending before the Press Council. The dispute before the Press Council could not be regarding the terms and conditions of the service of editors, for such a dispute would be outside the scope of jurisdiction of the Press Council by virtue of the proviso to section 12(2)(i) of the Act. 'There is thus no force, in the contention of the petitioner that the entire controversy before the Press Council is as regards security or tenure of the services of the editors, and that each editor is interested in the result of the adjudication by the Press Council. The editor members cannot be said to have such an interest as to disqualify them from participating in the inquiry before the Press Council, merely because the Conference has expressed one view about the subject matter of the controversy or made an application to the Press Council for being imp leaded as intervener on the side of the two complainants. The court has to refuse to hold that a member of a large Public body or authority is disqualified from sitting to hear a case merely on the ground that he is a member or subscriber of the voluntary association, that is a party to the proceedings'. In Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration, 1889 52 Ch. D. 366. (20) the General Council of Medical Education and Registration, acting under the powers of the Medical Act, 1858 held an inquiry in which they adjudged a medical practitioner to be guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect, and removed his name from the register of medical practitioners. The proceedings were instituted by the Managing Body of a company called the Medical defense Union, whose object was to protect the character of medical practitioners. and to suppress and prosecute unauthorised pra,ctitioners. Two out of twenty nine persons who held the inquiry were members of the Medical defense Union, but not of the managing body of the Union. It was held in that case that the two members had not such an interest in the matter in question as to disqualify them from taking part in the inquiry; and the Court refused to interfere with the decision of the Council. Cotton L.J. observed :
'Imay also observe that as regards the objects of the Union (I give no opinion as to whether it is desirable to form such unions), the objects are just as much to defend those who are improperly attacked as to bring before the General Medical Council any question which may reflect on the conduct of any member of the profession, so that on that ground they are not be considered as complainants here-as persons who are bringing forward this charge- and there was hardly any contention that their position as members of the Union did actually involve a bias which would prevent them from adjudicating on this case'.
Bowen, L.J. observed :
'NEXTcomes a very serious question, whether or no the tribunal which adjudicated in respect of the Appellant's conduct was, in respect of two of its members, rendered incompetent by the fact that they had taken part as accusers before the Council of the person upon whose conduct they were adjudicating. As the Lord Justice has said, nothing can be clearer than the principle of law that a person who has a judicial duty to perform disqualifies himself for performing it if he has a pecuniary interest in the decesion which he is about to give, or a bias which renders him otherwise than an impartial judge. If he is an ac- cuser he must not be a judge. If he has a pecuniary interest in the success of the accusation he must not be a judge. Where such a pecuniary interest exists, the law does not allow any further inquiry as to whether or not the mind was actually biased by the pecuniary interest. The fact is established from which the inference is drawn that he is interested in the decision, and he cannot act as a Judge. But it must be in all cases a question of substance and of fact whether one of the judges has in truth also been an accuser. The question which has to be answered by the tribunal which has to decide-the legal tribunal before which the controversy is waged-must be: Has the judge whose impartiality is impugned taken any part whatever in the prosecution either by himself or by his agents I think it is to be regretted that these two gentlemen, as soon as they found that the person who was accused was a person against whom a complaint was- being alleged by the Council of a society to which they subscribed, and to which they in law belonged as members, did not at once retire from the Council. I think it is to be regretted, because judges, like Ceaser's wife, should be above suspicion, and in the minds of strangers the position which they occupied upon the Council was one which required Explanationn. Whatever may be the result of this litigation, I trust that in future the General Medical Council will think it reasonable advice that those who sit on these inquires should cease to occupy a position of subscribers to a society which brings them before the Council. But having said that, I come back to the point which we have to decide, whether these two gentlemen took any part whatever in the prosecution either by themselves or by their agents. It appears to me, in spite of true cloud which the ingenuity of the Appellant's counsel raised upon the point, that the true answer must be here upon the facts-and it is a question of fact in the negative. I think although they were members of the incorporation whose Council brought this complaint before the General Medical Council, they did not themselves take any part and could not have taken any part whatever in the prosecution, and that the prosecution was not conducted really by the Council of the Union as their agents. The Council of the Union was supreme in the matter, and I think that they stand clear, upon the facts being investigated, of all suspicion whatsoever'.
(56) The above judgment has been followed in several decisions subsequently. The mere fact that two of the members of the General Medical Council were members of the Medicial defense Union did not disqualify them from sitting as members in the inquiry. On lire same reasoning and analogy, the editor members of the Press Council cannot in any way be improper persons to sit in the inquiry by the Press Council. The four editor members did not participate in the deliberations of the Conference on 4th or 5th of January 1975. The editor members, in view of the mandatory requirement of section 4(4) of the Act, had to be nominated from the panel of names from such associations of persons of the respective categories as may be notified in this behalf by the Press Council. The Press Council, in the notification dated June 30, 1970, had included the All India Newspaper Editors' Conference as an association of persons referred to in section 4(3) (a). Thus, the mere fact that the editor members are representing the nominees of the members of the Conference cannot disqualify them from acting on the Press Council. In substance and in fact, the editors who are members of the Press Council, cannot be termed as accusers or as being on the side of the complainants. In that affidavit dated March 5, 1975, Mr. M.D. Dalmia, had stated : 'The Press Council has tried to draw a distinction between the views of organisation and the views of individual members of the organisation. In case there is any such distinction in fact, then it is for the editors who are members of the Press Council to state as a fact that they did not form the conclusive opinion at that stage'. The petitioner himself is thus conscious of the fact that the view of the Standing Committee cannot be the view of each individual member. Four of the editors, namely respondents 3. 5, 7 and 8, have filed affidavits in identical terms staling :
6.That I state that I have no interest direct or indirect in the subject matter of the complaints against the management of the Hindustan Times Publication Ltd., which are now pending before and are being inquired into by the Press Council of India. I deny and repudiate as totally false, frivolous and malacious that I am interested directly or indirectly in the subject matter of the complaint referred to earlier. I state that once I have been nominated as member of the Press Council I am there along with other colleagues as members of self-regulatory body of journalists whose sole aim is to maintain and improve the standards of newspapers and news agencies and to uphold and preserve the freedom of press which are the objects for the attainment of which the Council has been established. T state that T function as integral unit of a corporate body and record findings, reach conclusions only on the basis of an objective assessment of the materials placed before the Council.
(57) Under these circumstances it seems to us to be impossible for any reasonable person to think that the editor members are biased or that in substance and in fact, they can be suspected of bias.
(58) There is a controversy between the parties whether Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh participated in the proceedings of the Standing Committee of the Conference and, in passing the resolution relating to Shri Verghese. Mr. Iyenger, counsel for respondents 7 and 8, invited our attention to the affidavits of Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh Shri A. K. Jain had stated that the statement that he participated in the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Conference, in which the resolution regarding Shri Verghese was passed is incorrect, that he denied the correctness of the statement that he participated in drafting the memorandum to the Press Council, that at the time the question relating to Shri Verghese came up, he informed the members that being a member of the Press Council which would be hearing the complainants he would not participate in the drafting, and that the question about Shri Verghese cropped up incidentally on 4th, being an item which was not on the agenda but introduced with the permission of the Chairman. Shri Jang Bahadur Singh had stated in his affidavit that the question about making a representation to the Press Council in respect of the alleged improper termination of the services of Shri Verghese was brought up, that he immediately mentioned to the Standing Committee that as a member of the Press Council which had been seized of the matter and in which he would have to participate as a member, he could not take part in the discussions by the Standing Committee and for that reasons he did not participate in the proceedings of the Standing Committee, when the matter in relation to Shri Verghese was discussed.
(59) In our opinion, the averments made in the affidavits by Shri A. K. Jain and Shri Jang Bahadur Singh cannot be accepted as correct, as they are contrary to the minutes recorded by the Conference. As already pointed out, in the letter dated November 1.9, 1974 addressed to the petitioner by the Conference it was stated that the matter about the termination of the services of Shri Verghese will be extensively discussed in the next meeting of the Standing Committee. Again, in the letter dated December 13, 1974 from the Conference to Shri M. D. Dalmia, it was stated that the Conference is a body consisting of the editors of the newspapers and that its main function is to safeguard the interests of the editors and to fight for their rights and privileges wherever it is necessary. Shri Dalmia was requested in this letter to let the Conference know whether the services of Shri Verghese were being terminated or not, as the Standing Committee was meeting in Delhi on 4th and 5th of January 1975 and this question was bound to agitate the minds of the editors who were coming from all over India. Shri M. D. Dalmia was called upon to give his version so that it could be placed before the Standing Committee when they would discuss the matter. It is, thereforee, not correct to say that the question about Shri Verghese cropped up incidentally even though it was not an item on the agenda. If Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh did not participate in the discussions of the Standing Committee on Shri Verghese, it would have been so recorded in the minutes themselves. The fact about the inability to participate in the discussion relating to Shri Verghese not having been recorded in the minutes, leads to an inference that no such inability was expressed. If, in fact, such an objection was raised there was no reason to include the name of Shri A. K. Jain in the Sub-Committee to draft the memorandum to be sent to the Press Council. The objection is to the bias of Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh was raised in the affidavit dated March 5, 1975 of Shri M. D. Dalmia, wherein it is stated that the meeting of the Conference took place on 4th and 5th of January, 1975 that a copy of the minutes is enclosed as annexure, that the meeting was attended by Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh-two members of the Press Council, that in that meeting it was decided to refer the matter of Shri Verghese to the Press Council and one of the members, Shri A. K. Jain, participated in drafting the memorandum, and that the copy of the resolution passed (including the letter drafted in pursuance thereof) was enclosed as annexure. Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh filed separate counter affidavits dated March 17, 1975 in. reply to the aforesaid affidavit dated March 5, 1975 of Shri M. D. Dalmia, but did not question either the minutes or the letter drafted in pursance thereof. During the course of arguments, Mr. Iyenger contended that as the minutes had not been confirmed, no reliance could be placed on them. Since there was no affidavit either way, it was suggested to him to ascertain the factual position. In all fairness, Mr. lyenger placed before us a copy of the minutes of 144th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Conferenca held at New Delhi on March 16, 1975, wherein the minutes of the last Standing Committee meeting held on January 4 and 5, 1975 were confirmed. It is significant to note that Shri Jang Bahadur Singh was present in this meeting of 16th of March 1975, but raised no objection to the correctness of the recorded minutes of the meeting of 4th/5th January, 1975. We thus hold the minutes as representing the true state of affairs. We had quoted in extenso the resolution dated 4th/5th January, 1975 and relevant extracts from the letter dated January 7, 1975 with the sole purpose to show the extent of expression of views on the merits of the controversy. The two editors have committed themselves so firmly while being a party to the resolution of the Standing Committee of the Conference as to make it impracticable for them to deal fairly with the said complaints on their merits while sitting as members of the Press Council. They have personally taken an active part and have voted in favor of the resolution that the termination of the services of Shri Verghese constituted an infringement of the freedom of the Press. For the purity of the administration and the discharge of its functions by the Press Council, any member who is to take part in it should not be in such position that he may be suspected of having pre-judged the issue and thus biased. In substance and in fact, Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh can be suspected of having committeed themselves to hold that 'the termination of services of Shri Verghese constituted a threat to the freedom of the Press'. This commitment, however, is on the merits of the two complaints now before the Press Council. No objection was raised on 20th January, 1975 about the bias of Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh before the Press Council, when it rejected the preliminary objections. The expression of opinion of these two persons is not alleged to be on the preliminary objections made by the petitioner before the Press Council. The decision of the Press Council given on January 20, 1975 is thus not vitiated by reason of Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh participating in the deliberations of the Press Council. There is, however, a real likelihood of bias of Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh sitting as members of the Press Council when hearing the two complaints on merits.
(60) The next limb of the argument on the question of Caram- non-judicis is that the two members, namely, Shri R. L. Joshi and Sbri C. L. Chandrekar were wrongly excluded by the Chairman. The allegations are that the Chairman, before the hearing, had directed Shri R. L. Joshi and Shri C. L. Chandrekar not to participate in the proceedings, as he considered them to be interested parties on the ground that Shri R. L. Joshi was connected with the Hindi Daily called 'Hindustan' which belongs to the Hindustan Times group and Shri C. L. Chandrekar was concerned with the paper of Hindustan Times group. It was contended that Shri Chandu Lal Chandrekar is a member of the Press Council in the capacity of a Member of Parliament and debarring him from the sitting of the Press Council is illegal. It was further urged that Shri R. L. Joshi was excluded from the deliberations of the Press Council mala fide by the Chairman'. There is no substance in these submissions of the petitioner. In the affidavit, the Chairman denies that he issued any directions to the said two members not to attend the meeting of the Press Council. Shri R. L. Joshi in his affidavit however, states that he did not attend the proceedings before the Press Council in pursuance of directions received from the Chairman. It is nobody's case that any oral instructions were given by the Chairman, A copy of the letter, dated January 4, 1975, written by the Chairman to Shri R. L. Joshi and Shri C. L. Chandrekar . only pointed out that since they are connected with the Hindustan Times group, it would not be proper for them to take part when the complaint regarding the propriety of the termination of the services ' of Shri B. G. Verghese as editor by the Management of Hindustan Times, is considered. Shri C. L. Chandrekar is the Joint Editor of the Hindustan, a Hindi daily, which is a sister publication of the Hindustan Times, which is being run by the same Management. So is also Mr. R. L. Joshi, editor of the Hindustan which is a sister publication of the Hindustan Times. 'As employees of the sister publications of the Hindustan Times, against which the complaints had been filed, the said two members could reasonably be inclined to take one particular view. In any case there could be a reasonable apprehension of bias. If that was the situation, it was rightly brought to the notice of the said two members that it would not be proper for them to take part in item No. 2 of the agenda. It is evident that the said two members did not attend the meeting of the Press Council. If in their wisdom the said two members chose to abstain from attending the meeting, the petitioner cannot allege that they were excluded mala fide by the Chairman. There is thus nothing upon which to found a suspicion of bias on this ground.
(61) This takes us to the consideration of the allegations of bias against the Chairman of the Press Council. The allegations are contained in para 8-A of the amended writ petition. It is averred that the Chairman of the Press Council is also disentitled to continue as a member of the Press Council as he is interested directly or indirectly in the subject matter of the said complaints, that the Chairman took an active part by a proposal prior to the said complaints in trying to convert the ownership of the Daily Hindustan Times into a Trust as a part of the objective to diffuse ownership and to delink the newspaper from the so-called big business houses, that the petitioner had resisted the same and in the course of correspondence with Shri Verghese had made certain observations critical on the Chairman and which correspondence was known to the Chairman, and that for these reasons the petitioner has reasonable apprehension that proper justice may not be done if the Chairman continues to participate in the proceedings of the Press Council. The allegations of bias against the Chairman were brought on the record of this case for the first time in the affidavit dated March 5, 1975 of Shri M. D. Dalmia in reply to the affidavit of respondent No. 1. The allegations were that the forum of the Press Council was caram-non-judicis on account of the additional reason which is very clear from the correspondence between Shri Verghese and Shri Birla in relation to the formation of Trust for the Management of the Hindustan Times, and the correspondence was annexed as annexures C-l to C-9, that the correspondence among other things contained severe criticism by Shri K. K. Birla of the Chairman, that Shri Verghese in his cross- examination before the Council admitted having conveyed the contents of this correspondence to the Chairman, and that there is reasonable apprehension that the petitioner may not receive justice at the hands of the Chairman. When allegations were made by the petitioner in the said affidavit, the Chairman filed an affidavit dated March 12, 1975 denying the allegations relating to his entertaining some prejudice against Shri Birla.
(62) The question for consideration is whether the petitioner had made certain observations critical of the Chairman in the correspondence with Shri Verghese, and whether this correspondence was known to the Chairman, and for this reason the Chairman entertained any prejudice against the petitioner. Another aspect for examination is whether the Chairman entertained any prejudice against the petitioner for resisting the proposal for diffusion or delinking. During the course of examination-in-chief of Shri Verghese before the Press Council, Shri Verghese made a statement that he had. on several occasions suggested to Shri Birla in writing and in discussions that he should convert the Hindustan. Times into a genuinely independent Trust, that he again reverted to this matter when there was diffusion and Delinking Bill, that Shri Birla pleaded certain difficulties about forming a Trust because of the role of public trustees, and that an alternative proposal was thereafter put before him that there might be a board of editorial trustees which might in a sense delink the ownership of a paper from editorial control. Shri Dalmia, in his affidavit dated March 18, 1975, has stated that when the subject matter was referred to by Shri Verghese in his examination-in-chief, the petitioner remembered that some correspondence took place in 1973 which was introduced later in cross-examination on 5th of February 1975. The Chairman has sworn an affidavit to the effect 'when the bunch of letters was produced before the Council it was the first time when I looked into them because I was no even aware that there had been correspondence between Shri Verghese and Shri Birla in relation to the formation of a Trust and dealing with matters which were subject of discussion between us'. There is no valid ground to disbelieve the affidavit of the Chairman. The petitioner had put to Shri Verghese the question as to whether he had conveyed the contents of the correspondence or shown it to the Chairman. The petitioner had moved an application dated March 31, 1975 before he Press Council in which reference is made to the correspondence between May 17, 1973 and December 4, 1973 and it is alleged that in the final transcript of the evidence as settled by Shri Verghese and the Secretary to the Press Council, the question and answer, namely : Did you discuss this correspondence with the Chairman Yes. I had conveyed the gist to him.' had been deleted. Shri Verghese, in his reply letter dated April 2, 1975, had stated :'l state I had communicated the views of the Chairman on trustification to Mr. Biria and Mr. Birla's reactions to these ideas to the Chairman'. Shri Verghese has filed an affidavit dated April 21, 1975 in this Court wherein he has again stated 'that I never communicated to the Chairman the alleged critical comments by the petitioner about the Chairman either verbally or by showing him relevant correspondence between me and the petitioner. In actual fact the correspondence said to contain those critical comments was produced for the first time before the Press Council on February 5, 1975 by the petitioner's counsel while cross-examining me'. It would also be reasonable to infer that any derogatory references made by the petitioner in the letters would not have been conveyed to the Chairman when the gist of the correspondence was conveyed. In our opinion, the Chairman cannot be said to have been aware of the existence of any correspondence that might have been exchanged between the petitioner and Shri Verghese and thus, there could be no question of the Chairman entertaining any prejudice against the petitioner by reason of any uncomplimentary references in the aforesaid correspondence. Some argument was tried to be built on the annexure 'A' to the affidavit of respondent No. 2 that it does not represent the correct version of the evidence given by Shri Verghese. It was contended that the aforesaid question relating to the discussion of the correspondence with the Chairman and the answer about conveying the gist to him was excluded mala fidc by the Chairman from the transcript. The Chairman has file an affidavit dated April 18, 1975 in C.M. 679 of 1975 and annexed with it the correspondence showing how the transcript was settled. In the letter dated February 25, 1975, the Secretary of the Press Council pointed out that the text of the evidence as recorded by the Stenographers of the petitioner and as supplied by him had been checked up with reference to the tape, as well as the shorthand notes taken by Press Council's Stenographers and it was found that certain corrections were required to be carried out. A copy of the deposition as finalised by the Press Council staff later was handed over to Shri Verghese who read through it in full and made several corrections, and thereafter the corrected and authenticated copy was sent to the petitioner with the letter dated February 28, 1975 from the Press Council. An application for correction of the record was made on March 31, 1975 and is pending before the Press Council. We are, thereforee, not expressing any opinion on the merit in the argument. The Chairman has admitted that Shri Verghese had conveyed to him the substance of Shri K. K. Birla's reaction to the trustification scheme etc. as early as 1973 and thus no motive can be attributed to the Chairman. It is nobody's case that the Chairman himself was present when the transcript of the evidence was finalised.
(63) The correspondence relating to formation of Trust has been placed on the record of the writ petition as Annexure C-l to C-9 exchanged between May 17, 1973 and December 17, 1973. The alleged derogatory references are contained in the two letters dated July 3, 1973 and November 6, 1973 from Shri Birla to Shri Verghese. In the letter dated July 3, 1973 Shri Birla had written :
'WHILEon this subject, I would like to pose one question with a certain amount of hesitation. It is, why the Judge should take so much personal interest in the affairs of Hindustan Times In my opinion, his concern should be for the industry as a whole rather than for a particular newspaper. After all, it is not that one individual newspaper, like Hindustan Times that represents the entire newspaper industry. Hence what the judge should really Strive for is to interest himself in solving the difficulties of such concerns as are desirous of selling off their shares either to the public or to some Trust.'
In the letter dated November 6, 1973 it is stated :
'WHILEon the subject, I was sorry to hear adverse comments about Justice Rajagopala Ayyanger whom I had met twice along with you. People have been critical of the way he has been convassing with the proprietors of newspapers. Some feel that it does not at all behave him to indulge in such personal approaches which they attribute to his anxiety to get his tenure of the office extended. Speaking for myself, I was fairly well impressed by Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar but I too thought that after giving his advice, he should not force himself like this on any of the proprietors.'
After reading the entire correspondence and particularly the above quoted passages, we feel that it has been brought in merely for the purpose of basing an argument of alleged bias. Under Section 5(6) of the Act, a retiring member (which includes the Chairman by virtue of definition contained in Section 2(c) of the Act) is eligible for renomination for not more than one term. There could, thus, be no anxiety by the Chairman to get this tenure of the office extended, as the terms of office are restricted to two terms and he was in his second term. The critical comments expressed in [he letter arc not of Shri Birla, but what he had heard from others. The Chairman has stated in the affidavit that he had told Shri Birla that he had discussed the matter with Shri Irani of the Statesman and Shri Goenka of the Indian Express, but had found Shri Irani adopting a somewhat rigid posture and that Shri Goenka, though a pragmatist, might be unwilling in this and that is why he had turned to Shri Birla. In the letter dated December 4, 1973 from Shri Verghese to Shri Birla, it is stated that 'the Judge gave me the impression that he has talked to both Mr. Goenka and Mr. Irani on this and other issues. He feels that while Mr. Goenka is a practical person, Mr. Irani can be rather rigid and fundamentalist'. The Chairman thus could not have felt offended by the comments contained in the letter dated July 3, 1973. Thus the so called critical comments are not of such a serious nature, as to prejudice the mind of any reasonable man. In fact, the petitioner, in one of the letters, has paid compliments to the Chairman. A real likelihood of bias must be proved to exist before the proceedings of the Press Council can be said to be vitiated on the ground that the Chairman was prejudiced. A mere suspicion that the Chairman was aware of the critical comment and thus biased is not enough. There is no reasonable evidence to satisfy us that there was a. real likelihood of bias on this ground.
(64) The Council in furtherance of its object has a statutory duty to study developments which may tend towards monoply or concentration of ownership of newspapers and news agencies, including the study of the ownership or financial structure of newspapers and news agencies and if necessary, to suggest remedies thereforee. The Chairman has given a detailed affidavit dated March 12, 1975 giving the background for the trust proposal. In brief, the averments are that at the first meeting of the Press Council, the Chairman placed before the members the need for conducting a study of this problem, that as sub-Committee was appointed to go into this question, that the subcommittee studied the problem and prepared a report in 1972, that before the Council could consider the report it was reported in the Press that the Government themselves had appointed a sub-Committee of members of the Cabinet to consider the question of delinking newspapers from industrial houses and diffusion of ownership, that the Council then decided to ascertain the views of the Government and authorised the Chairman for the purpose, that the Chairman met the Union Minister for Information and Broadcasting and was told that the Government would like to have the considered view of an indebody like the Council, that it was also suggested from the Government side that the matter of delinking of newspapers from business houses could be settled on a voluntary basis without the necessity for legislation, and that it was only after this that he got in touch with the Hindustan Times Editor, Mr. Verghese. It is in this context that the Chairman stated in his affidavit that he rang up Shri Verghese whom he did not know previously and asked him whether his boss Sh. K. K. Birla would be willing to discuss the matter with him. It is in this connection that certain correspondence may have been exchanged between Shri Verghese and Shri Birla. It is also stated in the affidavit by the Chairman that he was finally told that shri Birla was against the proposal of delinking newspapers from industrial houses or diffusion of ownership, and that there was nothing more to be done and it would be left to the legislation to follow. The Chairman had specifically stated on oath that he had not entertained any prejudice against the petitioner.
(65) We are unable to see any scope for a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that the Chairman was: biased on account of the references that had been made in the correspondence between Shri Verghese and Shri Birla or the rejection of the proposal by the petitioner about the delinking or diffusion of ownership. The petitioner is presumed to be fully aware of the correspondence that w:is exchanged in 1973, and yet no objection was raised against that Chairman in the proceedings before the Press Council. On February 5, 1975, during the cross-examination, Mr. Frank Anthony, counsel for the petitioner, made a reference to the proposal to form a Trust and said that this was absolutely irrelevant and Shri Verghese tried to prejudice the Chairman. The reaction of the Chairman is recorded as 1 am not prejudiced'. Mr. Anthony continued the cross examination and asked the question as to whether Shri Verghese and the Chairman were co-authors of a scheme for changing the Management of the Hindustan Times, and Shri Verghese replied by saying 'not co-authors'. The Chairman at that time said that when the question of diffusion and delinking was in the air, he had suggested it. The members of the Press Council desired that if there is any correspondence they would like to have it. It is at that stage that the correspondence was produced by the petitioner. Even after the correspondence had been placed on record, no objection was raised by the petitioner against the Chairman continuing to preside over the proceedings. Apparently, the petitioner was satisfied with the observation made by the Chairman that he was not prejudiced. The petitioner, for the first time, in the affidavit dated March 5, 1975, alleged that there is a reasonable apprehension that the petitioner may not receive justice at the hands of the Press Council because of the strong criticism of the Chairman of the Council by the petitioner. If there was in fact any reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of the petitioner, he would not have forgotten about the correspondence of 1973 and would have raised the objection at the first opportunity before the Council, i.e. on December 6, 1974, when he filed the written statement.
(66) Mr. Frank Anthony next contended that the Chairman was fully aware of the said correspondence between the petitioner and Shri Verghese much before the said two complaints were filed before the Council, and that the correspondence shows active efforts made by Shri Verghese with the assistance of the Chairman to pursuade the Management of Hindustan Times to agree to what is called 'diffusion of ownership' by handing over the shares to trustees, and failing that, to pursuade the Management to constitute an editorial board of trustees. The stand taken by Shri Birla was that all the friends with whom he had discussed the matter advised him strongly against entertaining any idea of a Trust which they thought would only result in the Management of the Paper being passed on into the hands of the public trustees who are appointed by the Government. Since the petitioner had taken a definite stand and the talks were inconclusive', it was urged that the Chairman has now exploited the opportunity while hearing the two complaints against the petitioner in attempting to achieve the same objective of eliminating the management control in an indirect manner by advocating that editorial freedom is synonymous with the freedom of the Press. It was contended that the condluct of the proceedings by the Chairman has confirmed the bias that arose from the concerted action of the Chairman and Shri Verghese in proposing the setting up of a Trust for Hindustan Times and the refusal of the petitioner to agree to that proposal. It may be mentioned at this stage that the amended writ petition (para 8-A) does not contain any allegations that the Chairman was interested in the subject matter of the proceedings or biased. The allegations of bias on account of subsequent conduct arc contained in the affidavit dated March 17. 1975 of Shri Dalmia, filed in reply to the affidavit of the Chairman dated March 12, 1975. Similar allegations have been made in the counter affidavit in reply to the affidavit of respondent No. 2 filed in reply to the application turn amendment of para 8 of the writ petition. Since these allegations are not contained in the writ petition, neither the Chairman nor any of the respondents have specifically filed affidavits controverting the same. Mr. Natesan, counsel for respondents I and 2, tried to explain the allegations relating to the conduct of the proceedings by the Chairman on the basis of the existing record and the counter affidavits filed on the record of the case. The particulars of the circumstances have been narrated in the aforesaid two affidavits and we will deal with them separately.
(67) The first circumstance pointed out by the petitioner is that the Secretary, Press Council intimated in his letter dated 9th January, 1975 that some correspondence might have passed between the petitioner and Shri Verghese from July 1974 up to the end of the year 1974. It was contended that this period was not mentioned in the complaints a,nd thus it clearly showed that the officers of the Press Council were in collusion with Shri Verghese and were aware of the nature of the correspondence. This by itself, in our opinion, does not show that the Chairman was interested in the subject matter of the proceedings or was biased or prejudiced. The affidavit of Shri Verghese shows that the correspondence that passed between the petitioner and Shri Verghese commenced on May 28, 1974. Shri Ramachandran's complaint mentions that Shri Birla had confirmed that he had sent what was purported to be a notice to Shri Verghese in August last, asking Shri Verghese to cease to be the editor with effect from February 28, 1975 and that he declined to disclose the reasons for the action. It is mentioned in the said letter that Shri Birla made him understand that following his action in serving the alleged notice on Shri Verghese, there had been lengthy correspondence between Shri Birla and Shri Verghese. In the letter dated December 23, 1974, the Secretary of the Press Council made a reference to the aforesaid complaint of Shri Ramachandran and desired the production of the correspondence as it will help to clear the air and establish that the termination was not motivated in the manner suggested by the complainants and a request was made to the petitioner to produce that correspondence. Shri Dalmia in his reply dated January 8. 1975 had made reference to the suggestion to produce certain correspondence, but observed that the Secretary had not specified which letter or letters should be produced and under which section. In reply to this letter, the Secretary wrote the letter dated January 9, 1975 that 'you would have seen from the complaint that it is to a very large extent based upon the correspondence that passed between you and Mr. Vorghese, it is presumed from July 1974 to the end of the year from which the inference has been drawn that there was motivation behind the action said to have been taken by you to terminate the services of Mr. B. G. Verghese as editor of the Hindustan Times'. If Shri Verghesc had really given the date as is alleged, then he would have given the date of the commencement of the correspondence which commenced on May 28, 1974. The language used by the Secretary is 'it is presumed from July 1974' and it would show that it was only an estimation placed on the allegations made in the complaint that the notice was served in August last. We are unable to sec any conduct of the Chairman in calling for the correspondence from July 1974 onwards, on which to found the allegation of bias.
(68) The second circumstance relied on as pointing out to the bias of the Chairman is the alleged act of the Press Council in deciding at 10.30 A.M. to summon Shri Verghese along with the correspondence before it; this prejudicing the preliminary objections even before hearing commenced. The Chairman has filed an affidavit dated March 12, 1975 admitting that the members of the Press Council were summoned to meet at 10.30 A.M. whereas the petitioner as well as the complainants were summoned before the Press Council at 11 A.M., and that this half an hour was thought to be necessary to discuss the matter between the members of the Press Council before the parties were called in. A copy of the relevant portion of the draft minutes of the meeting of the Press Council held on 20th of January, 1975 has been filed as annexure to this Affidavit. It is stated in the minutes that the Chairman acquainted the members briefly about the pleadings in the case and the correspondence that passed between the Press Council and the petitioner and the members considered that it should have 'before it the correspondence that passed between Shri Verghese and Shri K. K. Birla because it was on this that reliance had been placed in support of their case. It was noticed that neither of the complainants were in possession of this correspondence, and that the petitioner who had copics showed Ins unwillingness to produce it, raising legal objections to the maintenance of the complaints and the jurisdiction of the Press Council to conduct the Inquiry. In the circumstances, the Press Council considered that it was necessary to summon the production of this correspondence from Shri Verghesc. It is further stated that the Secretary be directed to prepare and issue a proper summoos, under section 14(1) of the Act, to Shri Verghese to produce the correspondence that passed between him and the Management of the Hindustan Times which would be relevant to the matters raised in the complaint.
(69) As already pointed out, the Secretary of the Press Council made two unsuccessful attempts in his letters dated December 23, 1974 and January 8, 1975 to procure the correspondence from the petitioner. Section 14(1) of the Act as well as regulation 9 clearly empower the Press Council to summon and enforce attendance of persons and requiring production of doduments. If the correspondence was not produced by the petitioner and it was considered relevant for the purposes of inquiry, the Press Council was fully justified in directing the production of the correspondence by issuing the summons to Shri Verghese. The holding of the meeting at 10.30 A.M. was necessary to discuss preliminaries before the hearing of the two complaints commenced. It was also suggested for the first time in the meeting of the Council at 10.30 A.M. that summons to Shri Verghese might direct him to appear before the Press Council at 3 P.M. as it was thought that by that time ' the Press Council might be able to conclude the arguments on the preliminary objections and in the event of the Press Council upholding the preliminary objections Shri Verghese would not be asked to produce the correspondence and to give evidence but in case the objections arc rejected it would be proper to examine Shri Verghese as a witness when he appeared before the Press Council to produce the correspondence. There seems to be nothing objectionable in summoning the correspondence from Shri Verghese and also issuing a direction that he would be examined as a witness in case the necessity arose. The Press Council (Procedure for Conduct of Meetings and Business) Regulations, 1967 show that the meetings have to be called ordinarily with at least 15 days notice before the meeting. The members of the Council come from all over India. There was thus difficulty in convening the meeting of the Press Council immediately. Keeping this in view, the Press Council was fully justified in requiring the presence of Shri Verghese Along with the correspondence in case it was necessary lo continue with the complaints on the rejection of the preliminary objections. There is nothing to indicate from the minutes of the proceedings that the Press Council had already decided to reject the preliminary objections of the petitioner. In fact, the language used in the minutes is very cautious without expressing any opinion on the merits of the preliminary objections raised by the petitioner before the Press Council. There is thus no force in the contention of the petitioner that the hearing of the preliminary objections was only a meaningless formality before the Press Council which had made up its mind. We do not see any indication of bias of either the Chairman or the members of the Press Council in deciding to summon Shri Verghese Along with the correspondence.
(70) The next conduct pointed out by the petitioner arises out of the minutes recorded on January 20, 1975. The Chairman had considered that from the nature of the preliminary objections and the manner in which they had been raised, there was a likelihood of the petitioner filing a writ petition challenging the jurisdiction of the Press Council and this, according to the petitioner shows a foregone conclusion even before hearing of arguments on preliminary objections, that they were to be rejected. The minutes, however, are :
'NEXTthe chairman pointed out that from the nature of the preliminary objections and the manner in which they had been raised, there was a likelihood, in the event of these objections not being upheld, of the respondent management taking the matter to court by filing a writ petition challenging the jurisdiction of the Council and seeking relief on that basis. The members of the Council expressed the view that in that event it would be necessary for the Council , take steps to defend such litigation'.
In our opinion, any person of the standing and judicial experience, as the Chairman had, could reasonably anticipate from the nature of the preliminary objections (maintainability of the two complaints, scope and the extent of jurisdiction of the Press Council and the objection that editors and journalists as a class are not entitled to participate in the proceedings of the Press Council by virtue of Regulation 13) that in the event of these objections not being upheld there was a likelihood of the filing of a writ petition by the petitioner. This is what the Chairman pointed out to the members. The members' reaction; as recorded was that in that event it would be necessary for the Press Council to take steps to defend such a litigation. The decision, thereforee, was of the members and not only of the Chairman. We cannot infer any bias of the Chairman from this conduct, as the decision was taken by the Press Council anticipating the filing of a writ petition and making the preparation for defending the same.
(71) The next circumstance pointed out by the petitioner is that the fact that the Press Council took a decision to plunge into the litigation before the High Court and also voted funds for such litigation in advance clearly shows bias of the Chairman against the petitioner. It was contended that the Council took up a highly contentious attitude trying to substantiate its jurisdiction to entertain and heal the aforesaid two complaints. Mr. Anthony urged that it is elementary principle of the rule of law that Judges and Tribunals who preside over trials never enter the arena. Reliance is placed on the case Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. Shri Mool Raj and others, : [1964]4SCR884 . wherein it was held that it is an elementary principle of the rule of law that Judges who preside over trials, civil or criminal, never enter the arena. Reference is. also invited to Shripad Amrit Dange v. Sir Harsiddhobhai V. Divatia and others, A.I.R. 1948 Bom 20. It was further contended that quasi-judicial tribunals never contest the proceedings before court and Support their jurisdictional decision, and that this was done only because the Chairman was biased.
(72) From the minutes of the proceedings dated January 20, 1975,. we find that reference was made to the nature of the preliminary objections and the manner in which they were raised. The preliminary objections went to the root of the jurisdiction of the Press Council. 'If the Press Council felt that its very jurisdiction to help newspapers and news agencies to maintain their independence is being questioned by the- petitioner, then no other party would be more interested in upholding its jurisdiction than the Press Council itself'- In Smt. Kaushalya Devi's. case, an application was made in the Supreme Court for transfer of the case to some other Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the facts alleged by the complainant might perhaps constitute a civil dispute but the said facts had been deliberately twisted and a criminal complaint had been made to harass her. Even though no allegations had been- made in the transfer application personally against the Magistrate, he filed an affidavit opposing the application and stating, inter alia, that the clause indemnifying the purchaser contained in the sale deed on which the petitioner relied on would not absolve the petitioner from criminal liability. In these circumstances the Supreme Court held that the action of the Magistrate in making an affidavit and opposing the application for transfer was wholly improper. All essential attributes of a fair and impartial criminal trial were put in jeopardy. By entering the arena, the Magistrate disentitled himself to act independently and judicially. The principle that Judges who preside over trials never enter the arena can, however, apply to Courts and Tribunals proper and not quasi-judicial bodies as the Press Council, and especially when their very jurisdiction is challenged. Authorities like Commissioner of Income-tax, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Collector of Central Excise, and other statutory Tribunals, bodies and authorities have invariably defended their jurisdiction whenever questioned. In the petition for a writ of certiorari, the authorities and tribunals are necessary parties. In normal circumstances unless allegations are made against them which necessitate a reply from them, it is not usual turn these authorities and tribunals to appear and defend their adjudications. But when they are concerned with the merits of the dispute in any sense and particularly when their very jurisdiction is questioned or the scope of their authority is to be determined, it is appropriate that they appear and present their view point. It is not as if the powers and functions of the Press Council can be exercised only on the receipt of a complaint. The Chairman can xno moto issue notice in respect of any matter published in a newspaper which he regards as objectionable and proceed to hold an inquiry as if it was a complaint under Regulation 3. In such a case the decision of the Press Council could even be questioned by the opposite party and even challenged in a proceeding by way of a writ. The only person then competent to contest a proceeding would be the Press Council itself. The case Shripad Amrit Dange v. Sri Harsiddhobhai V. Divatia, and others A.I.R. 1948 Bom 20 relied upon by the petitioner, docs not advance the argument at all. In that case, the Governor of Bombay was pleased to appoint Commissioners for the trial of an Election Petition regarding a seat in the Bombay Legislative Assembly. The preliminary objections raised in the Election Petition were overruled by the Commissioners and it was directed that the petition be taken up for further hearing. A petition was filed in the Bombay High Court contending, inter alia, that the Commissioners had no authority or jurisdiction to entertain or hear the election petition on several grounds. The Commissioners appeared through counsel and took up a contentious attitude trying in vain to substantiate their appointment. by arguing various points. Bhagvati J. only ordered them to pay the costs of the petitioners, and did not hold anything further. It was only observed that they ought to have submitted to the orders of the Court and offered to be guided by whatever decision the Court would arrive at, on the hearing of the petition. In the case before us, the object of the establishment of the Press Council and the functions assigned to it by the Statute clearly suggest that when its iurisdication is questioned, it would be justified in appearing before the Court and defend the jurisdiction.
(73) The next circumstance pointed out by the petitioner is the enormous hurry with which the Press Council started the case on the merits by calling Shri Verghese to be ready at about 3 P.M. on the same day as a witness after merely orally rejecting the preliminary objections and postponing the giving of the reasons to the stage of the final decision on the merits. The Secretary of the Press Council in his affidavit dated February 10, 1975 has stated that the practice of the Press Council has been that unless a preliminary objection is upheld and the proceedings are terminated, all preliminary questions are dealt with in a reasoned order which is released to the Press and made available to the parties after the entire inquiry is over and the adjudication is rendered. It is further stated that this practice had been follewd in seevral cases, the particulars of which have been given in the affidavit. We thereforee, do not find any basis to infer any bias arising out of the postponement of the recording of the reasons for the rejection of the preliminary objections. There is no legal infirmity in postponing the recording of the reasons for the rejection of the preliminary objections.
(74) The next circumstance pointed out by the petitioner is that on January 20, 1975 and thereafter, the Press Council insisted upon the petitioner undertaking to maintain the status-quo in relation to Shri Verghese till the final desposal of the proceedings before the Press Council, before it granted an adjournment. It was contended that since the Press Council had no power to demand such an undertaking, it was clearly an act to pressurise the petitioner. No undertaking was given by the petitioner on January 20, 1975. On a written application made by the petitioner January 21,1975, the Press Council granted the adjournment prayed for till February 4, 1975, but againt no undertaking was either demanded or given on this date. As already pointed out, the writ petition was admitted on January 31,1975. In C.M. No. 208-W of 1975, this Court issued notice for February 17, 1975 and further directed that the petitioner will also maintain the status-quo with regard to Shri Verghese. Thus, on January 31, 1975 this Court had directed the maintenance of the status-quo regarding Shri Verghese, namely that effect will not be given to the notice of the termination of services of Shri Verghese. The undertaking given by Mr. Dadachanji on 8th of February 1975 was as under :
'MYclients have instructed me to file the following undertaking :- At our request the Press Council was pleased to adjourn the date of hearing to 2nd March 1975 for leading our evidence. It was indicated to us that the arguments will be held soon after our evidence is closed and thus the proceedings before the Press Council will finish by about 8th or 9th March, 1975. The Press Council desired us to give an undertaking to maintain status-quo regarding Verghese will one month after the close of the arguments subject to the decision of the High Court. We, thereforee, hereby undertake to maintain status-quo regarding Verghese till 15th April, 1975 subject to the decision of the High Court.'
It is mentioned in the statement of Mr. Dadachanji that the Press Council had desired them to give an undertaking to maintain statusquo regarding Mr. Verghese. In view of the order passed by this Court on January 31,1975 (which was confirmed on February 17,1975) it cannot be inferred that the Press Council put any pressure on the petitioner to give he undertaking. It was only a desire expressed by the Press Council which was agreed to by the petitioner when he gave the undertaking on February 8, 1875. There is thus no question of any bias.
(75) Another circumstance that has been urged by the petitioner is the act of the Chairman and the members of the Council in crossexamining Shri Birla at' considerable length. No serious arguments have been addressed by the counsel for the petitioner on this aspect. In the discharge of the functions by the Press Council in helping the newspapers to maintain their independence, it might have been necessary to elicit information from the petitioner. Even in judicial proceedings it is open to the courts to ask questions in cross-examination of the parties or their witnesses. We see no real likelihood of bias in the Chairman or the members cross-examining the petitioner.
(76) Yet another circumstance alleged as pointing towards bias is that the contents of the rejoinder affidavit dated March 12, 1975 of the Chairman were divulged and reported in the Indian Express in its issue of the 13th March 1975, when the affidavit in fact was filed in this Court on March 13, 1975, after 10 A.M. We find that the affidavit in fact was signed and got attested on March 12, 1975, when the hearing of the case was on. Mr. K.B. Rohtagi, counsel for respondents 1 and 2 stated at the Bar, that copies were served on some of the parties to the Writ petition on March 12, 1975 and to others on March 13, 1975, and the contents may have been disclosed to the Press by some of the other respondents. Assuming, but without holding that the Chairman may have disclosed the contents of the affidavit to the Press, it was only to clear himself and not to create any atmosphere against the petitioner. The Chairman had only given the background of the proposal for diffusion and delinking or trust proposal and not any decision on the merits of the two complaints. The act of divulging the contents of the affidavit before it became the Court record may be lacking prudence but not mala fide or biased.
(77) The last circumstance which has been pointed out is that the affidavit of the Secretary clearly shows that the real fight is between the petitioner and the Press Council and not between the petitioner and the complainants. There is no substance in this submission of the petititoner. The Press Council has been made a party respondent and the Press Council was obliged to file a detailed affidavit in opposition to the writ petition.
(78) The result of the above discussion is that the present writ petition fails, except to a limited extent of the bias of Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed subject to our findings regarding the disqualification of Sarvashri A. K. Jain and Jang Bahadur Singh. As the questions of law relating to the interpretation of the various provisions of the Act have arisen in this case for the first time, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.