Judgment:
ORDER
A.K. Sikri, J.
1. These two appeals involve same question of law to be decided which relates to interpretation of Section 22 of The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 ('SICA' for short). As per the provisions of Section 22(1) of the SICA where in respect of a industrial company an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, among others, no suit for recovery of money shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. It is thereforee an admitted position that in respect of such an industrial company no civil `suit for recovery of money' is maintainable and if it is pending it is not be proceeded with further. Further progress of proceedings in such a suit have to be halted and the suit can proceed only if Board or Appellate Authority consents for the same. The question to be determined is as to whether this bar would apply to arbitration proceedings pending under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as well? In both the appeals, arbitrators have rendered their awards after the arbitration proceedings which were conducted under the Arbitration Act, 1940. Arbitration awards were filed in the Court for making rule the Court. Cement Corporation of India Ltd. ('CCI Ltd.' for short) which is a party in both the cases has suffered awards. Not satisfied with the awards, it has filed objections in both the cases. One is registered as suit No.171-A/95 out of which FAO (OS) No.84/97 arises and other suit is registered as Suit No. 3125A of 1992 out of which FAO (OS) 1/98 arises. CCI Ltd. has made reference to Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction ('Board' for short) constituted under SICA which has been registered. In view thereof in both the cases, CCI Ltd. filed application under Section 22 of SICA with the prayer that the proceedings in the aforesaid cases be stayed and be not proceeded with.
2. is filed in Suit No. 171-A/95 by the CCI Ltd. has been allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 5th February, 1997 and proceedings in the suit are stayed. This order is reported in 1997 (66) DLT 858, LLoyd Insulations(India)) Ltd. v. Cement Corporation of India. On the other hand, is filed in suit No. 3125A of 1992, has been dismissed vide order dated 20th November, 1997 by another learned Single Judge holding that provisions of Section 22 of SICA are not applicable to such proceedings. This order is : 70(1997)DLT783 , Wekcast Steels Ltd. v. Cement Corporation of India. In this order, the learned Single Judge has noted the order dated 5th February, 1997 passed in suit No. 171-A/95 but has not agreed with the view taken on the ground that it goes contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Shree Chamundi Moped's Ltd. Vs . Church of South India Trust Association, Madras : [1992]2SCR999 . Thus there is an apparent conflict between the two views taken by two learned judges. Appellant Lloyd Insulation has filed FAO (OS)) No.84 of 1997 against order 5th February 1997 and CCI Ltd. is the appellant in FAO (OS) 1 of 1998 which has felt aggrieved by order order dated 20th November, 1997. This is the background in which the aforesaid question of law arises for consideration and for resolution as to which view is correct. Before proceeding to consider this question, it would be useful to reproduce the provisions of Section 22 of SICA in its entirety:
'Section 22: Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc.: (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof (and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any (sic) in respect of any loans or advance (sic) to the industrial company) shall (sic) or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board, or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.
(2) Where the management of the sick industrial company is taken over or changed [in pursuance of any scheme sanctioned under section 18], notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or in the memorandum and articles of association of such company or any instrument having effect under the said Act or other law
(a) it shall not be lawful for the shareholders of such company or any other person to nominate or appoint any person to be a direction of the company;
(b) no resolution passed at any meeting of the shareholders of such company shall be given effect to unless approved by the Board.
(3) [Where an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to in section 17 is under preparation or during the period] or consideration of any scheme under section 18 or where any such scheme is sanctioned there under, for due implementation of the scheme, the Board may by order declare with respect to the sick industrial company concerned that the operation of all or any of the contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force, to which sick industrial company is a party or which may be applicable to such sick industrial company immediately before the date of such order, shall remain suspended or that all or any of the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising there under before the said date, shall remain suspended or shall be enforceable with such adoptions and in such manner as may be specified by the Board:
Provided that such declaration shall not be made for a period exceeding two years which may be extended by one year at a time so, however, that the total period shall not exceed seven year in the aggregate.
(4) Any declaration made under sub-section(3) with respect to a sick industrial company shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 91 of 1956 (sic), or any other law, the memorandum and articles of association of the company or any instrument having effect under the said Act or other law or any agreement or any decree or order of a court, tribunal, officer or other authority or of any submission, settlement or standing order and accordingly,
(a) any remedy for the enforcement of any right, privileges, obligation and liability suspended or modified by such declaration, and all proceedings relating thereto pending before any court, tribunal, officer or other authority shall remain stayed or be continued subject to such declaration; and
(b) on the declaration ceasing to have effect-
(i) any right, privileges, obligation or liability so remaining suspended or modified, shall become revived and enforceable as if the declaration has never been made; and
(ii) any proceeding so remaining stayed shall be proceeded with, subject to the provisions of any law which may then be in force, from the stage which had been reached when the proceedings became stayed.
(5) In computing the period of limitation for the enforcement of any right, privileges, obligation or liability, the period during which it or the remedy for the enforcement thereof remains suspended under this section shall be (sic) luded.'
3. Mr. A.S.Chandhiok, learned senior counsel appearing for appellant, M/s Lloyed Insulation India (Ltd.) in FAO (OS) 84 of 1997 submitted that the provisions of Section 22(1) would not apply to such arbitration proceedings pending before the Court inasmuch as these proceedings are not in the nature of `suit for recovery of money'. He referred to sub-section (3) of Section 22 of SICA as per which Board had the power to declare, with respect to the sick industrial company concerned that the operation of all or any of the contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force, shall remain suspended or be enforceable with such adoptions and in such manner as may be specified by the Board. His submission was that since `awards' are included in sub-section (3) of section 22 of SICA, which expression would include arbitration awards as well, to such proceedings pending under sections 14 and 17 of Arbitration Act, 1940 provisions of sub-section (3) of section 22 of SICA would apply and there would not be an automatic suspension but the suspension would come into play only when Board passes an order and makes a declaration to this effect. thereforee, it was for the CCI Ltd. to apply for such a declaration before the Board. His further submission was that sub-section (1) of Section 22 of SICA would not apply. He referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Shree Chamundi Moped(supra) to contend that as per un amended provisions of Section 22(1) of SICA bar was not extended to these kinds of proceedings. By amendment made in section 22(1) of SICA, by Act of 1994, the provision was extended, inter alia, to `suit for recovery of money'. Arbitration proceedings in the instant cases were not `suit'. To buttress this submission, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Sheel Chandra Vs . Central Bank of India & Ors. : AIR1982Delhi179 defining the word `suit' and specifically excluding the proceedings under Arbitration Act from the ambit and scope of `suit'. His submission was that restrictive meaning needed to be given to the expression `suit for recovery of money' and he also tried to gain support from the judgment of Madras High Court in the case of Trichy Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. Arvind Steels (P) Ltd & Anr. reported as (1996) 85 Comp Cas 425 where insolvency proceedings were held to be not in the nature of `suit for recovery of money' interpreting the Section 22(1) of SICA. He also cited the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of BSI Ltd. and Anr. Vs . Gift Holdings Pvt Ltd. and Anr. : 2000CriLJ1424 to contend that Supreme Court had not included criminal proceedings within the scope of aforesaid expression contained in section 22(1) of SICA while deciding a case under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Reliance was also placed on another judgment of Supreme Court in the case of AGIO Counter Trade Pvt. Ltd Vs . Punjab Iro & Steel Co. Ltd. : (1999)5SCC734 .
4. Mr. S.S.Rana, learned counsel for the respondent in FAO (OS) 1 of 1998 adopted the arguments of Mr. Chandhiok. In addition he quoted the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Nawab Usmanali Khan v. Sagar Mal reported as AIR 1965 SC 1788 for the proposition that proceedings under section 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 were held to be not in the nature of `suit' by the Supreme Court in that case.
5. Mr. S.K.Taneja. learned senior counsel who appeared on behalf of CCI Ltd. on the other hand submitted that after the award is rendered and filed in the Court for making it rule of the Court under section 17 of the Act, if it is made rule of the Court decree has to follow and thereforee these proceedings are to be treated in the nature of `suit for recovery of money'. Thus in effect and in substance it is an action for recovery of money and thereforee `suit' within the meaning of Section 22(1) of the SICA. He relied upon the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order dated 5th February, 1997 and contended that purposive interpretation needs to be given to the expression `suit for recovery of money' keeping in view the objective which was sought to be achieved by introducing such an amendment by the legislature. It was submitted that the word `suit' is not defined either in CPC or in General Clauses Act or even in SICA. thereforee the expression used in the context and in generic sense is to be adopted. He referred to the legal dictionaries as per which term `suit' was very comprehensive and applies to any proceeding in Court of justice by which an individual pursues that remedy which the law affords him. He referred to law Lexicon, 1997 edition which defines the expression `suit' as under:
'The term suit is a very comprehensive one, and is said to apply to any proceeding in a Court of justice by which an individual pursues that remedy which the law affords him. The modes of proceedings may be various but if the right is litigated between the parties in the court of justice, the proceeding in a suit.
Prosecution pursuit of some claim, demand or request; the act of suing, the process by which one endeavors to gain an end an object; attempt to obtain a certain result, an action or process for the recovery of a right of claim, prosecution of some demand in a court of justice, any proceeding in a court of justice in which plaintiff pursues his remedy to recover a right or claim.'
6. He also referred to Black's Law Dictionary which defines this expression in the following manner
'Suit a generic term, or comprehensive signification referring to any proceeding by one person or persons against another or others in a court of law in which the plaintiff pursues, in such court, the remedy which the law affords him for the redress or an injury or the enforcement of right, whether at law or in equity.'
7. He thereforee submitted that term `suit' as mentioned in section 22(1) of the Act was merely a nomenclature given to the legal proceedings and the intention was to suspend all legal proceedings and the intention was to suspend all legal proceedings as was clear from the heading of the section itself which reads `suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc.' In support of his aforesaid submission, he relied upon the following judgments:
1. Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. Vs . State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and Anr. : [1993]1SCR340 .
2. Tata Davy Ltd. Vs . State of Orissa and Others. : (1997)IILLJ989SC .
3. Vaijnath and Ors. Vs . Guramma and Anr. : AIR1999SC555 .
4. Spring Meadows Hospital and Anr. Vs . Harjol Ahluwalia through K.S.Ahluwalia and Anr. : [1998]2SCR428 .
8. We have given our utmost consideration to contentions of counsel on either side.
9. The un amended provisions of sub-section (1) of 22 of SICA have come up for consideration on in various cases before the Supreme Court as well as High Courts. The authoritative pronouncement can be traced in the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of M/s Shree Chamundi Moped(supra). The Supreme Court in that case held that the ban imposed as per section 22(1) of SICA is against the maintainability of three kinds of legal actions. After the introduction of amendment to sub-section (1) of section 22, fourth type of legal action, namely suits for recovery of money or for enforcement of any security against the company or guarantee in respect of loan or advance granted to the company. Thus in BSI Ltd.(supra) where this amended section came up for interpretation in respect of proceedings under sections 138, 141 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 the Apex Court carved out the ban imposed as per section 22(1) of SICA, in respect of maintainability of the following legal actions:
(1) Proceedings for the winding up of the company;
(2) Proceedings for execution, distress or the likes against any of the properties of the company;
(3) Proceedings for the appointment of a receiver in respect of such properties;
(4) Suits for recovery of money or for enforcement of any security against the company or guarantee in respect of any loan or advance granted to the company.
10. It is an admitted case of both the parties that the arbitration proceedings which are pending in the two cases under section 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 are not the proceedings of the nature covered by legal actions as enumerated at 1 to 3 above. thereforee the attempt of the CCI Ltd. was to bring the case within the expression `suit for recovery of money'. thereforee, the task before us is to interpret the expression `suit for recovery of money'occurring in section 22(1) of SICA for deciding the question involved.
11. Admittedly terms `suit' is not defined in CPC or General Clauses Act or in SICA. However, there are some pronouncements of the Courts interpreting the word `suit' in the context of arbitration proceedings itself. The first case which may be referred to is that of this Court in the case of Sheel Chandra (supra). That was a case where petitioner, Sheel Chandra had moved an application under sections 33, 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against Central Bank of India for recovery of gratuity amount of Rs.52,524/- with the prayer that the claim be referred to arbitration under arbitration clauses contained in the agreement dated 19th September, 1950. The application was opposed by the respondent bank on the ground that such an application was not maintainable. The learned Single Judge however allowed the application and directed each of the parties to appoint its arbitrator within one month of the order. Respondent bank filed appeal before the Division Bench. At that stage petitioner filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure seeking amendment of the main petition thereby converting the said arbitration petition into a regular suit for recovery of money. The Division Bench remitted the case back to the trial Judge. This is how the matter came up before the learned Single Judge for deciding the said application under Order 6 rule 17 CPC. The application was opposed by the bank on the ground that petition under Arbitration Act cannot be treated as a plaint in a suit, and thereforee, the amendment was not permissible when it involved supersession of one legal proceeding and substitution of altogether a different proceeding. The Court accepted this contention and held that such an application was not maintainable as proceedings under the Arbitration Act, 1940 were not in the nature of a `suit'.
12. This judgment, after referring to various judgments culls out the following propositions of law:
a) Merely because an application under sub-section (2) of section 20 provides that application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is to be numbered and registered as a suit would not suggest that it is a suit in its fullest sense of the term.
b) `Suit' ordinarily means, and apart from some context must be taken to mean, a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint.
c) A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or petition in the nature of a plaint or where the claim is not in respect of dispute ordinarily triable in a civil court would prima facie not be regarded as `suit'.
d) Proceedings under section 8, 20(2) and 33 of the Arbitration Act were not to be treated as a `suit'.
13. This amended section 22(1) of the SICA came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of BSI Ltd.(supra). The question to be decided was as to whether proceedings under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were in the nature of `suit for recovery of money'. This submission arose in the following background:
'Para 14: Some of the learned counsel pointed out that when a company is convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act the court can only impose a fine as the sentence since a juristic person like the company cannot possibly be sent to prison. On its premise learned counsel contended that recovery of the fine covered by such sentence would be impractical on account of the ban envisaged in Section 22(1) of SICA against proceedings for execution, distress or the likes as against any of the properties of the company. As a corollary, it was submitted that prosecution against the company cannot be maintained since a court would not be able to effectively impose a sentence on a company after convicting it of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act.'
14. The Apex Court negatived the aforesaid contention by observing as under:
'Para 15: The fallacy of the above contention is twofold. First is, that maintainability of prosecution proceedings is not to be tested on the touchstone of any practical hurdle in enforcing the sentence which might be imposed on a company after conviction. Second is, there is no insurmountable hurdle for recovery of the fine covered by the sentence even from a sick industrial company because the ban contained in Section 22(1) is only conditional as could be discerned from the last limb thereof which reads thus: '[E]xcept with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the appellate authority.' It means that with such consent the court would be in a position to resort to proceedings for distress against the properties of the sick industrial company. Hence the aforesaid contention has no merit at all.
Para 16: It was next contended that the ban against maintainability of a suit for the recovery of money would encompass prosecution proceedings also. To support the said contention reliance was sought to be made on the following meaning of the word 'suit' as given in Bouvier's Law Dictionary:
'Suit is a generic term of comprehensive signification, and applies to any proceeding in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues, in such court, the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of any injury or the recovery of a right....In its most extended sense, the word suit includes not only a civil action, but also a criminal prosecution, as, indictment, information and a conviction by a Magistrate.'
Para 17: Learned counsel invited out attention to the maxim contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissimo in privileges (contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law)) for the purpose of stretching the scope of the word 'suit' to envelop criminal prosecution as well.
Para 18: Our attention has also been invited to the observation of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd. While considering the purpose and objects of suspension of proceedings mentioned in Section 22(1) of SICA, therein it has been held that the expression 'proceedings' in the sub-section must be widely construed. This is what the Bench has observed: (SCC p.158 para 10)
'The legislature has advisedly used an omnibus expression `the like' as it could not have conceived of all possible coercive measures that may be taken against a sick undertaking.'
Para 19: The said contention is also devoid of merits. The word 'suit' envisaged in Section 22(1) cannot be stretched to criminal prosecution. The suit mentioned therein is restricted to 'recovery of money or for enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advanced granted to the industrial company'. As the suit is clearly delineated in the provision itself, the context would not admit of any other stretching process.'
15. Although in this case the question involved was whether criminal proceedings under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was `suit for recovery of money', what is significant for our purposes is that court did not accept the meaning of word `suit' as defined in Bouvier's law dictionary. Court also distinguished its earlier judgment in the case of Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. (supra). It has already been noted above that counsel for respondent in the instant case has also advanced these two contentions which merit rejection in view of this judgment itself. Moreover in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd.(supra) the Supreme Court was interpreting the un-amended provisions of Section 22(1) of SICA and the expression `proceedings' occurring therein. Admittedly in these appeals we are concerned with the expression `suit for recovery of money' which has been introduced by way of amendment. Otherwise it is a common case of the parties, as already noticed above, that the arbitration proceedings pending in the two cases under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 are not covered by un-amended provision.
16. There is yet another judgment of Supreme Court which virtually clinches the issue viz. AIR 1965 SC 1788, Nawab Usmanali Khan v. Sagar Mal. This case is almost proximate to the issue involved in the present case inasmuch as the point for consideration in this case as to whether proceedings under section 14 read with section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 would be in the nature of a suit. This question came up for consideration in the context of the provisions contained in Section 86(1) of the CPC as per which no suit could be filed against ruler of former Indian state. The proceedings filed by an employee under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for making an award rule of the Court against a ruler of a former Indian state were sought to be terminated on the ground that such proceedings were not maintainable against the ruler in view of the provisions under section 86. The Supreme Court negatived the contention holding that these proceedings were not in the nature of a suit and thereforee the proceedings could go on against the ruler of former Indian state.
17. Mr. S.K.Taneja, learned senior counsel appearing for CCI Ltd. was conscious of the herculean task before him because of the aforesaid pronouncements. It was for this reason that he took circuitous route by submitting that purposive interpretation should be given to the words `suit for recovery of money'. However, this submission has not impressed us. The primary and golden rule of interpretation is the literal construction. No doubt the object of interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, that meaning is to be given to the language in the Statute. It is only when words are susceptible of more than one meaning that other rules of interpretation come into play. In the instant case the legislature has intentionally used the word `suit' in so far as recovery of money is concerned. The un-amended section which covered winding up, execution, distress etc.has used the expression `proceedings'. Thus the legislature had in mind that as far as winding up, execution, distress etc. is concerned, no proceedings of this nature shall lie or be proceeded with except with the consent of the Board. However, when the section was amended to add the claims for recovery of money, legislature used the expression, `suit' and not `proceedings'. Thus if one has to really see the intention, it was to confine to suits only i.e. suits which are understood in common parley namely which are filed in civil courts. It is for this reason that while amending sub-section (1) of section 22 of SICA, sub-section (5) it was provided that in computing the period of limitation for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation or liability the period during which it or the remedy for the enforcement thereof remains suspended under this sub-section shall be excluded. The reason is obvious. It is the suit in respect of which if limitation expires, there is no provision for condensation of delay in the Limitation Act which is not the case in respect of proceedings under section 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. thereforee need was felt to introduce specific provision i.e. section 22(5) of SICA for saving limitation in respects of `suits' coming within the umbrella of section 22(1). Thus when sub-section (5) is read with along with `suit for recovery of money' occurring in sub-section (1), the intention becomes further clear that the word `suit' related only to the civil suits in the court of law which are governed by section 9 of CPC.
18. There is yet another reason for coming to the conclusion that the expression `suit for recovery of money' would not include the proceedings pending before the Court under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Sub-section (3) of section 22 empowers the Board to declare with respect to the sick industrial company concerned that the operation of all or any of the contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force, shall remain suspended etc. Thus the word `awards' finds mention in sub-section 3 of section 22 of SICA. If the Board is satisfied it may suspend the operation of the `award'. As we do not agree with the contention of learned senior counsel for CCI Ltd. that the expression `awards' is relatable only to the awards rendered by the industrial tribunal/labour courts under the Industrial Dispute Act and we are of the opinion that the expression `awards' would include award rendered by the arbitrator under the provisions of Indian Arbitration Act as well, the CCI Ltd. is not remedyless. It could still apply to the Board under section 22(3) of the SICA with a prayer for declaring suspension of the award in question. The only difference between the provisions under section 22(1) and section 22(3) is that while in the former case the proceedings of the suit of the nature mentioned in sub-section (1) shall not lie or proceeded with except with the consent of the Board, in the latter case Board has to declare the suspension of such contracts; settlements awards etc. Since awards are mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 22 of SICA that is another reason to infer that the legislature did not intend such awards to be covered by the expression `suits for recovery of money'.
19. Accordingly we hold that the arbitration proceedings pending under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 in suits No. 171 A/95 and 3125/92 cannot be treated as `suits for recovery of money' and thereforee, would not be covered by sub-section (1) of section 22 of the SICA. We may summarise the reasons for taking this view:
1) The expression `suit' under sub-section (1) of section 22 of SICA is to be given the meaning in which it is normally understood i.e. civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint. This would refer to the suit as contemplated by section 9 of CPC. Proceeding under section 14 read with section 17 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 for the passing of a judgment and decree of an award does not commence with a plaint or a petition in the nature of a plaint, and thereforee, cannot be regarded as a suit. This is the authoritative pronouncement of Supreme Court in the case of Nawab Usmanali (supra) and is sufficient to annihilate all arguments of CCI Ltd. to the contrary.
2) The legislature, mindful of the expression `proceedings' already occurring in sub section (1) of section 22(1) of SICA still used the expression `suit' in so far as recovery of money or the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company is concerned. thereforee legislature wanted to give restricted meaning to the word `suit' which is understood in the common parlance and not all kinds of proceedings for recovery of money.
3) The purpose of amendment by adding `suit for recovery of money' etc. is clear when understood along with sub-section (5) of section 22 inasmuch as it is in suits where the law of limitation applies stricto sensu without any provisions for condensation of delay. A specific provision had to be added in the form of sub-section (5) because of the expression `suit' introduced in sub-section (1) of section 22.
4) The arbitrator has given the `award'. This award would be covered by the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 22 of SICA and this, by necessary implications, excludes the awards from the expression `suit' occurring in sub-section (1) of section 22 of SICA. Otherwise, in respect of `awards' both sub-section (1) as well as sub-section (3) of section 22 would be applicable which would create an anomalous situation.
5) The purpose for which section 22 in SICA was inserted is still achieved by reading sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of section 22 in the manner indicated above inasmuch as still Board has power to declare that such an arbitration award shall remain suspended or be enforceable with such adoptions and in such a manner as may be specified by the Board. The only difference would be that instead of automatic stay of proceedings under section 22(1), it will require a declaration by Board to this effect under section 22(3) of SICA.
20. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that FAO (OS) No.84 of 1997 succeeds and is allowed and order 5th February, 1997 passed in suit No. 171-A/95 is hereby set aside. FAO (OS) No.1 of 1998 is hereby dismissed and order dated 20th November, 1997 passed in suit No. 3125A/92 is confirmed. Parties to bear their respective costs.