Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. The Petitioner is an international airline having its main office in Bombay. It also has an office in Delhi where it has employed certain staff.
2. Sometime in 1986, the Petitioner proposed to streamline its functioning in Delhi and as a part of its proposal, it planned to hand over the ticketing work in the Delhi office to a General Sales Agent (GSA). This would have rendered surplus some employees in the ticketing section in the Delhi office. With a view to avoid any hardship to its employees, the Petitioner proposed to transfer them to its other establishments in India or to be retrenched after due compensation as per law Along with an offer of alternative employment with the GSA.
3. The employees of the Petitioner, through their association that is Respondent No. 3, raised an industrial dispute. Since conciliation proceedings failed, the Delhi Administration referred the following dispute to the Industrial Tribunal on 27th February 1986: --
'Whether the proposed action of the Management in giving ticketing work on contract to M/s General Sales Agent is illegal and/or unjustified and if so, what directions are necessary in this respect.'
4. Subsequently, the Petitioner intended to pass on its cash handling and accounting work to its GSA from 1st September 1986. Respondent No. 3 raised another dispute in this regard and when the conciliation process did not succeed in respect of this dispute also, the Delhi Administration made the following reference to the Industrial Tribunal on 31st December 1986: --
'Whether the proposed action of the Management in handing over disbursements of payments, handling of accounts and its other operations to General Sales Agent is illegal and/or justified and if not, what directions are necessary in this respect.'
5. Both the above references were registered before the Industrial Tribunal as ID No. 18 of 1986 and ID No. 22 of 1987 respectively. Feeling aggrieved by the reference of these disputes to the Industrial Tribunal, the Petitioner preferred a writ petition in this Court challenging the legality and validity of the reference orders. On 18th February 1987, a Division Bench admitted the writ petition and further proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal were stayed. On 22nd April 1987, a learned Single Judge confirmed the interim order pending disposal of the writ petition because learned counsel for the Respondents stated that they had no objection to the continuance of the interim order.
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted before me that it is the general international practice to appoint a GSA to handle some aspects of the airline business. In fact the International Air Transport Authority (IATA) has accepted and recognized this practice. Learned counsel placed before me Resolution 800 being Passenger Sales Agency Rules. Section 1 thereof defines General Sales Agent as meaning 'any person to whom a Member or a non IATA carrier has delegated general authority to represent it for purposes of sales of passenger and/or cargo air transportation in a defined territory and who is remunerated accordingly.' It is submitted that since the appointment of a GSA is a well accepted practice, all that the Petitioner was wanting to do was to streamline and improve its functioning in Delhi. It was submitted that the decision to appoint a GSA is essentially a business decision and cannot form the subject matter of any industrial dispute or industrial adjudication. It was submitted that the references were premature because the proposed actions may or may not have had any adverse impact on any of the employees and members of Respondent No. 3. It was prayed that under these circumstances, the references deserve to be quashed. It was stated that during the pendency of the writ petition the Petitioner had already appointed its GSAs and no adverse impact was felt by any of the employees; this was all the more reason for quashing the references.
7. The aggrieved party is really Respondent No. 3. No one appeared on its behalf or on behalf of Respondent No.1 to contest the writ petition, when it was heard on 22nd January, 2004. Subsequently, on 24th January, 2004 learned counsel for Respondent No.3 filed written arguments. Consequently, I refixed the case for hearing on 29th January, 2004. After hearing learned counsel for the parties (Respondents No.1 was again unrepresented), orders were reserved.
8. In opposition to the writ petition, the employees association (Respondent No. 3) filed its counter affidavit sometime in March 2003, that is, almost 16 years after the writ petition was filed. Opposing the writ petition, it is stated in the counter affidavit by Respondent No. 3 that this Court should not interfere in the matter because both the references have been validly made. It is, however, stated in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit that the work of cash handling and accounting work has been given to a GSA under the garb of stay of proceedings. To this extent, the statement made by learned counsel for the Petitioner has been fully endorsed by Respondent No. 3, and it virtually stands confirmed that by this action, no adverse impact has been felt by the members of Respondent No.3.
9. Viewed in the context of the above facts, it appears that I am only required to decide an issue that has become academic over the years. Insofar as the industrial dispute regarding passing over the cash and accounting work to a GSA is concerned (reference made on 31st December 1986) that has not resulted in any industrial unrest. If any real dispute had arisen as a result of this action of the Petitioner, the members of Respondent No. 3 would have certainly raised an industrial dispute, not with regard to some proposed action, as in 1987 but with regard to actual action having been taken resulting in the existence of an industrial dispute. That this has not happened, nor has Respondent No. 3 made any mention of any adverse impact as a result of the action of the Petitioner in its counter affidavit, quite clearly shows that the apprehensions of Respondent No. 3 were not well founded. Consequently, on the admission made by Respondent No. 3 in its counter affidavit, and no adverse impact having been felt by the action of the Petitioner, the validity of the reference made by the Delhi Administration on 31st December 1986 is purely academic and due to the subsequent events, it requires to be quashed. The dispute pending before the Industrial Tribunal pursuant to this reference also deserves to be quashed. It is ordered accordingly.
10. Insofar as the first reference dated 27th February 1986 is concerned, there is no opposition to the statement made by learned counsel for the Petitioner that a GSA has been appointed for ticketing purposes also. No industrial dispute or industrial unrest appears to have arisen as a result of the appointment of a GSA for ticketing purposes.
11. In the counter affidavit filed by Respondent No. 3, there is absolutely no averment that in the last 16 years there has been any retrenchment of any employee as a result of the appointment of any GSA either for ticketing purposes or for disbursement of payments or handling of accounts. In the absence of any material having been placed by Respondent No. 3 in this regard, I am of the view that permitting the reference to go on in terms of the order dated 27th February 1986 would not serve any useful purpose whatsoever. Accordingly, the reference dated 27th February 1986 as well as the dispute pending before the Industrial Tribunal are required to be quashed.
12. An order passed under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is an administrative order and can be set aside in appropriate cases. [See Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs . K.P. Madhavankutty, : (2000)ILLJ561SC and National Engineering Industries Ltd. vs . State of Rajasthan, : (2000)ILLJ247SC ]. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, in view of the pendency of the case for the last 16 years and the developments that have taken place during this period, particularly the fact that there is today no allegation of any actual industrial dispute or any industrial unrest or any adverse impact on any employee as a result of the appointment of a GSA, I am of the view that no purpose will be served by going into the merits of the case (as suggested by learned counsel for the Petitioner) to ascertain whether the references were made in accordance with law or not. The exercise now appears to be entirely academic, and it is well settled that the Court will not decide any academic issue.
13. In any event, even if no GSA had been appointed during the pendency of this writ petition, the references as framed are totally misconceived, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the Petitioner. Quite clearly, the Petitioner was only proposing to enter into contracts for the appointment of GSAs. Whether those contracts would eventually be entered into or not, was in the realm of conjecture. If the contracts are be entered into, what would be their terms and conditions was also not known since nothing had been finalized or formalized. Consequently, to assume that those contracts, when entered into, would be illegal or unjustified is not only hypothetical, but also premature. Both the references are, thereforee, liable to be set aside for this reason also.
14. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and the references dated 27th February 1986 and 31st December 1986 are quashed. ID No. 18 of 1986 and ID No. 22 of 1987 are also quashed. There will, however, be no order as costs.