1. Late Shri. K. C. Kashyap who was the husband of respondent No.1 and father of respondent No. 2 let out the property hearing No. C-4/33 Safdarjung Development Area, New Delhi to Shri. Pukhraj Jain, appellant herein for a limited period of three years after obtaining permission under S. 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on 3rd December 1979, The premises were let purely for residential purpose. It was stated in the application that the premises were not let out under S. 21 previously and were in fact constructed for the use and occupation of Shri. Sudhir Kashyap, respondent No. 2 herein who would require the premises after he returns from Sweden. Shri. K. C. Kashap died on 19th November 1981 leaving behind a will dated 25-5-1981. Under the will the life interest in the property is given, to respondent No.1 and thereafter the property is to devolve on respondent No. 2. Though late Shri. K. C. Kashyap had other legal heirs they were not given any share in the property. Since the appellant did not vacate the premises in dispute the respondents herein filed the execution application praying that they be put back in possession of the property. Objections were filed by the appellant to the execution application, which were dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller by her order dated 21st February 1984. An appeal filed by the appellant before the Rent Control Tribunal was also dismissed on 29th August 1984. The appellant has, thereforee, filed this second appeal under S. 39 of the Act.
2. The following submissions were put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant:
(a) That late Shri K.C.Kashyap had obtained the permission by playing a fraud on the Court. It was submitted that respondent No.2 has permanently settled in Sweden and has married a Swedish girl and has also obtained Swedish nationality and is thus not likely to return to India. Thus, the ground given by late Shri. K. C. Kashyap in his application for permission under S. 21 of the Act was false. It was further submitted that even before the premises were let out to the appellant, the same were let out to another tenant for a period of two years and this fact had not been brought to the notice of the Additional Rent Controller. It was submitted that late Shri. K. C. Kashyap had other properties as well and this fact was also not brought to the notice of the Additional Rent Controller before obtaining the permission;
(b) That the respondents had no locus standi to file the execution proceedings inasmuch as the permission which is granted by an order under the First Part of S. 21 is purely personal and the legal heirs of late Shri K. C. Kashyap cannot take advantage of such an order. If an application is made by 'a landlord' under the First Part of S. 21 and he dies before permission, no person claiming under him can seek substitution in that application and the application dies with him. Similarly after the permission is granted only that landlord who has obtained permission is competent to enter into an agreement with the tenant in pursuance of the permission. Thus, if the landlord dies or he parts with the property, warrants of possession cannot be issued to any person claiming under him. Learned counsel referred to The Martin Burn Limited v. The Corporation of Calcutta, : [1966]1SCR543 , Mrs. Shubra Bagchi v. P. K. Bagchi AIR 1975 J&K; 83, Janapada Sabba Chhindwara v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. : [1970]3SCR745 , and Mysore State Electricity Board v. Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd. : AIR1963SC1128 and submitted that inconvenience and various situations and evils cannot be a deciding factor while interpreting a statute;
(c) That S. 21 of the Act is a complete Code in itself and thus provisions of Transfer of Property Act, Code of Civil Procedure and other provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act including S. 42 of the Delhi Rent Control Act are not applicable. The second order under S. 21 is only in the nature of execution but it is not an execution of an eviction order and thus no person other than the landlord who had obtained the permission is competent to make an application for being put into possession. Reference was made to Kasturi Lal v. Shiv Charan Das Mathur 1976 Ren CR 703, Vijay Kumar Bajaj v. Inder Sain Minocha : AIR1982Delhi260 , J. R. Vohra v. M/s. India Export House Pvt. Ltd. : [1985]2SCR899 and Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna : [1987]3SCR765 .
(d) Alternatively it was submitted that assuming it is held that a person other than the landlord to whom permission was granted can file an application for execution he must show that the property has exclusively vested in him after the death of the original landlord and permission to let had been obtained by the original landlord for his benefit. It was submitted that in the present case even if the will is proved since respondent No. 1 has been given only life interest in the property because the permission was obtained by late Shri K. C. Kashyap for the benefit of the son she is not entitled to claim possession. Furthermore, the son cannot be said to have any interest in the property till the mother is alive because even if the mother was given life interest in the will, as per the present law life interest would ripen into full ownership and thus even he cannot claim possession. Learned counsel submitted that in any case the fact that under the will life interest was given to respondent No. 1 shows that the ground given by late Shri K. C. Kashyap while obtaining permission was totally false. Reference was made to Vaddeboyina Tulasamma v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi, AIR 1977 SC 1944.
(e) That the will cannot be considered in evidence because it is not proved. Furthermore, since the will showed that the respondents are not the only heirs of late Shri K. C. Kashyap, in the absence of other heirs the application filed by the respondents is not maintainable.
(f) That both the order granting permission and the order putting back the landlord in possession are discretionary in nature. If the special need lapses because of the subsequent events, these events have to be taken into consideration. Thus, even assuming that respondent No. 2 had not obtained citizenship of Sweden when the permission was granted if it was found that he has now obtained the citizenship of Sweden, the Additional Rent Controller was not obliged to put back the respondents in possession of the premises. Reference was made to Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, : [1975]3SCR958 , Rameshwar v. Jot Ram, : [1976]1SCR847 and Vinod Bedi v. Maha Prabhu P. Singhania : 23(1983)DLT447 .
(g) That the appellant had the mandatory right to lead evidence to prove that a fraud had been played on the Court and the Additional Rent Controller wrongly refused the permission to lead evidence.
3. Learned counsel for the respondents made the following submissions in reply:
(a)The statement of late Shri K. C. Kashyap while obtaining permission as recorded by the Additional Rent Controller on 3-12-1979 makes it abundantly clear that the premises were required for the use and occupation of Shri Sudhir Kashyap, respondent No. 2, who was at that time away to Sweden for his technical training. The appellant did not doubt the correctness of the statement and neither objected at the stage of granting permission nor at any other time till warrants of possession were issued. Shri Sudhir Kashyap, respondent No. 2 who was in Sweden at the time the permission was obtained has come back to India. He has not become a Swedish citizen; he has married an Indian girl and had no intention of settling in Sweden at any stage. He is in dire need of the premises because he has no other place available for his residence. He cannot live in a joint H.U.F. house where his uncles with their families and other brothers are residing. These facts have been stated by Shri Sudhir Kashyap, respondent No. 2 on affidavit in the execution proceedings. Thus, there is no fraud played on the Court as alleged by the appellant;
(b) The respondents have a locus standi to move the application for warrants of possession. Under Section 42 of the Act an order made by the Controller is executable by the Controller as a decree of a civil Court and for this purpose the Controller has all the powers of the civil Court. It was submitted that it was not open to the appellant to raise this objection while he himself had resorted to the Code of Civil Procedure and filed objections to the execution under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure in proceedings under S. 21 of the Act;
(c) Since the application filed by the respondents for delivery of possession is in the nature of execution, the respondents being the legal heirs of deceased Shri K. C. Kashyap are entitled to seek warrants of possession;
(d) After the Hindu Succession Act came into force the legal position regarding the life interest of a widow has changed. Had the widow been holding life interest before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into being then it would have ripened into a right of full ownership but since in the present case Shri K. C. Kashyap died after the Hindu Succession Act came into force, the life interest of respondent No. 1 did not ripe into a right of full ownership. In any event, both, respondent No. 1 who has life interest and respondent No. 2 who is entitled to inherit the property after the death of the mother, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had jointly filed the application, they were both entitled to seek warrants of possession;
(e) Assuming for the sake of argument that the will is not proved and Shri K. C. Kashyap died intestate even then respondents 1 and 2 being the legal heirs would in any event as co-owners of the property could file the application for warrants of possession. Learned counsel submitted that a suit for eviction by a co-owner is maintainable even in the absence of other co-owners;
(f) Though the Court may be competent to take subsequent events into consideration, in the present case since respondent No. 2 has returned to India and in the application seeking permission Shri K. C. Kashyap had specifically stated that the premises were required for respondent No. 2 there is no change in circumstances; and
(g) That S. 21 of the Act gives a right to the landlord to let out his premises for a limited period. The object of this legislation is to ensure that a landlord who does not need the premises temporarily and lets out the same for a limited period he should get the premises expeditiously after that limited period is over. Section 21 provides for summary procedure. It is, thereforee, not necessary to permit protracted proceedings by giving parties opportunity to delay by leading lengthy evidence. There is no such mandatory right to lead evidence. In any event, the appellant had neither filed any list of witnesses nor documents were placed on record nor was any list of reliance filed before the Additional Rent Controller. The Additional Rent Controller had, thereforee, rightly refused permission to lead evidence.
4. When a decree is passed against a tenant for eviction as provided in Chapters III and IIIA of the Act, the landlord becomes entitled to get vacant possession of the premises under S. 25 of the Act. However, in such a case when the decree is sought to be executed, the tenant has a right to object to execution by way of an application under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When such a decree for eviction is executed, the Rent Controller follows the procedure as given in the Code of Civil Procedure because S. 42 of the Act provides that an order passed on appeal under the Act shall be executable by the Rent Controller as a decree of a Civil Court and for this purpose the Rent Controller has all the powers of a Civil Court.
5. Now there is no doubt that S. 21 of the Act is a Code by itself. The Supreme Court in Inder Mohan Lal's case : [1987]3SCR765 (supra) while considering the question whether any further agreement in writing which has to be registered arises if the premises are let out by a landlord after obtaining permission from the Rent Controller has reiterated this view and observed that S. 21 of the Act is a Code by itself. Now if a special procedure is prescribed by the legislature in a Code, general provisions of Code of Civil Procedure or Transfer of Property Act are not ordinarily applicable. thereforee, it is necessary to see if any special procedure is prescribed in S. 21 itself.
6. It will be useful to re-produce S. 21 of the Act at this stage. S. 21 reads as follows:
'21. Where a landlord does not require the whole or any part of any premises for a particular period, and the landlord, after obtaining the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner, lets the whole of the premises or part thereof as a residence for such period as may be agreed to in writing between the landlord and the tenant and the tenant does not, on the expiry of the said period, vacate such premises, then notwithstanding anything contained in S. 14 or in any other law, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by the landlord within such time as may be prescribed, place the landlord in vacant possession of the premises or part thereof by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation of such premises.'
7. On a plain reading of the section I do not find any procedure prescribed to be followed by the Rent Controller while considering the application for grant of warrants of possession. However, the Central Government has under S. 56 of the Act framed the Delhi Rent Control Rules 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). R. 5 of the said Rules reads thus :
'5. An application for recovery of possession under S. 21 by the landlord shall be made within six months from the date of expiry of the period of tenancy.'
This rule only provides for limitation for filing an application for recovery of possession.
8. The Supreme Court in J. R. Vohra's case : [1985]2SCR899 (supra) while analyzing the provisions has observed as follows (at p. 479 of AIR):-
'An analysis of the above provision will show that in regard to tenancies for limited period mentioned therein only two orders are contemplated by the section: (i) an order by the Rent Controller sanctioning or permitting the creation of a tenancy for a particular fixed period only, and (ii) an order by the Rent Controller putting a landlord in vacant possession of the leased premises by evicting the tenant and every other occupier thereof at the expiry of that period. It is also clear that before passing the first order the Rent Controller is required to satisfy himself that the two conditions mentioned in the section are genuinely satisfied in every case, namely, (a) that the landlord does not require the premises 'for a particular period' only and (b) That the letting itself is for residential purposes and no other. The landlords non-requirement of the premises for a particular period may arise out of various circumstances; for instance, being an officer he may be going on some other assignment for a particular period or being in occupation of official quarters he may have to vacate the same on his retirement or having borrowed a loan for the construction he may desire to clear it off before occupying the premises for his own use, etc. It cannot be disputed that both the conditions must be truly fulfilled and not by way of any make-belief before the Rent Controller grants his permission for the creation of such limited tenancy but once such limited tenancy is properly created, the second order of putting the landlord in vacant possession of the leased premises by evicting the tenant at the expiry of the fixed period has to be passed as a matter of course because the tenant in view of the non obstinate clause contained in the section, has no right or protection whatsoever under law to continue in possession nor has, he any defense to eviction and the section does not contemplate the passing of any order of eviction against the tenant before issuing the warrant of possession in favor of the landlord. It is thus clear that the second order contemplated by the section is in the nature of a process in execution where under the landlord has to be put in possession of the leased premises by evicting the tenant and every other occupant thereof, and no notice to the tenant is contemplated before issuing the warrant of possession for putting the landlord in possession.'
The Supreme Court in J. R. Vohara's case (supra) has observed that in view of the non obstinate clause contained in S. 21 the tenant has no right or protection whatsoever under law to continue in possession nor has he any defense to eviction after the period of limited tenancy expires. But does that mean that after the period expires, the tenant has no right to object the warrants of possession at all? It is authoritatively held that when a landlord seeks to get warrants of possession as provided in the Second Part of S. 21 of the Act the tenant has a right to object to the issuance of warrants of possession on the ground that the permission had been obtained by fraud.
9. Though the order of the Rent Controller granting permission is not a decree for eviction yet the proceedings initiated by the landlord seeking warrants of possession as provided in the Second Part of the section are in the nature of execution. I find great force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that if Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable then the tenant would have no right to even object to the second order for warrants of possession by resorting to S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Wad, J. in Vinod Bedi v. Maha Prabhu T. Singhania, (1983) 2 RCJ 244 has held that Civil Procedure Code applies to execution under S. 21 while determining whether an order made under 0.21, R.23 being a determination of a question within S. 47 amounts to a decree within the meaning of S. 2(2) and an appeal lies. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Wad, J. Thus, in my view, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable even in proceedings initiated by the landlord seeking warrants of possession as provided in the second Part of the section.
10. It is the case of the appellant that since the right under S. 21 is a personal right of the landlord and it is not a right attached to a property, the heirs of a deceased landlord cannot seek warrants of possession. It is the case of the appellant that the section talks about 'the landlord' and thereforee, only 'the landlord' who had obtained the permission can apply for warrants of possession. Learned counsel argued that inconvenience and various situations or evils cannot be taken into consideration while interpreting a statute and referred to certain judgments. To my mind, these judgments are not quite relevant. It is well-settled that where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous it must be interpreted in its ordinary sense even though it may lead to what the Court considers a manifest absurdity or results in injustice. But when the statute is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which is reasonable must prevail. In my view, the word 'the landlord' also includes the persons claiming under the landlord. Thus, the legal heirs of the landlord who are entitled to inherit the property can file the application for warrants of possession. Take for example a Government servant who obtains permission to let out the premises for a limited period and before the period expires he dies, can it be said that the widow of the Government servant cannot move the second application seeking warrants of possession. To my mind, the interpretation given by the learned counsel for the appellant will not only lead to disastrous consequences but will be contrary to the object of the Act. The object for which S. 21 of the Act was enacted and incorporated in the Act has been explained by the Supreme Court in S. B. Naronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, : [1980]1SCR281 which reads as follows (at Pp. 195-196 of AIR):
'We can correctly visualise the scope and sweep of this provision only in its proper social setting. It carves out a category for special treatment. Why no landlord can evict without compliance with Ss. 14, 19 and 20 does a liberal eviction policy underlie S. 21? Apparently contrary but actually not, once we understand the raison d'etre of the section. Parliament was presumably keen on maximizing accommodation available for letting, realizing the scarcity crisis. One source of such spare accommodation which is usually shy is potentially vacant building or part thereof which the landlord is able to let out for a strictly limited period provided he has some credible assurance that when he needs he will get it back. If an officer is going on other assignment for a particular period, or the owner has official quarter so that he can let out if he is confident that on his retirement he will be able to re-occupy, such accommodation may add to the total lease-worthy houses the problem is felt most for residential uses. But no one will part with possession because the lessee will become a statutory tenant and even if bona fide requirement is made out, the litigative tiers are so many and the law's delays so tantalising that no realist in his sense will trust the sweet promises of tenant that he will return the building after the stipulated period. So the law has to make itself credit worthy. The long distance between institution of recovery proceedings and actual dispossession runs often into a decade or more -- a factor of despair which can be obviated only by a special procedure.
Section 21 is the answer. The law seeks to persuade the owner of premises available for letting for a particular or limited period by giving him the special assurance that at the expiry of that period the appointed agency will place the landlord in vacant possession.'
11. This view has been reiterated in a later judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Mohan Lai's case : [1987]3SCR765 (supra) as follows (at Pp. 1988-89 of AIR):
'The Rent Acts all over the country came in the wake of partition and explosion of population in metropolitan and new urban cities. There are acute; shortages of accommodation. Very often these shortages and the demand for accommodation led to rack renting as well as unreasonable eviction of the tenants. To meet that situation to facilitate proper letting the Rent Acts were passed all over the country ensuring fair return to the landlords and giving the landlords the right of eviction for limited purposes and at the same time protecting the tenant from unreasonable eviction by the landlords. This led to a series of litigations leading to long delays resulting specially in metropolitan cites like Delhi, Calcutta and Bombay in reluctance of many landowners who had vacant premises for letting out only for limited period either because of the family conditions or official commitments as they did not require the premises immediately and at the same time who were reluctant to part with the said premises on rent because of the long delay and the procedure that had to be followed to recover possession of those premises.
Section 21 of the Rent Act was an attempt to meet that reluctance.'
12. Now, if the object of enacting S. 21 was to induce the reluctant and potential landlord to create tenancies then if the interpretation given by the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, no landlord will be willing to give premises on rent even for limited period as provided under S. 21 of the A ct.
13. Learned cousel for the appellant gave some illustrations of an unscrupulous landlord who may sell the property after renting it out for a limited period after obtaining permission from the Rent Controller or a landlord who may obtain permission from the Rent Controller to let out the premises for a limited period on the ground that the premises are required by his son after that period but bequeath the property to a concubine or servant on his/ her death in his will. To my mind, these are questions which can be gone into by the Rent Controller when he considers the application for warrants of possession and if the tenant is able to prove that the permission was obtained by fraud, the Rent Controller has the discretion to reject the application for warrants of possession on the ground that the permission had been obtained by fraud. The Supreme Court in Kakumanu Padasubhayya v. Kakumanu Akkamma : [1959]1SCR1249 has considered the scope of O. 22, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and observed that 'the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona has application only when the action is one for damages for a personal wrong.' Thus, in my view, the right of the landlord under S. 21 is not a personal right. This Court in R. M. L. Bhatanagar v. Inder Parkash 1974 RLR 409 has held that the right to get vacant possession under S. 21 is not a personal right, which is not transferable and observed as follows:
'Under S. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, property of any kind can be transferred except as otherwise provided by the said Act or by any other Act for the time being in force. An interest in property restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally, however, cannot be transferred. The right of the landlord under S. 21 of the Act not being a right restricted in its enjoyments to the owner personally, thereforee, is transferable according to S. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under S. 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, if the Lesser transfers the property leased, the transferee in the absence of a contract to the contrary acquires all the rights and if the lessee (sic) all the liabilities of the Lesser as to the property transferred. There is, thereforee, nothing to prevent or restrict the transfer of the rights of the Lesser landlord under S. 21 of the Act in favor of the vendee. Under S. 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where any proceedings may be taken or, application made by or against any person, then the proceedings may be taken or, the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him. Respondent No. 2 claims the right given by S. 21, under Shri Inder Parakash, respondent No. 1. He thereforee can take proceedings and make an application under S. 21 for the eviction of the appellant tenant. The appellant, thereforee, having obtained possession of the premises as a tenant for a limited period with the permission of the Controller under S. 21, has to vacate the said premises on the expiry of the said period notwithstanding anything contained in S. 14 of the Act. Respondent No. 2 is thereforee entitled to file his application for the appellant's eviction under S. 21 of the Act and the Controller was right in issuing warrants of possession of the premises. I, thereforee, find that the Tribunal's order dismissing the appellant's first appeal is correct.'
The Gujarat High Court in Champak Lal v. Smt. Saraswatiben (1977) 1 RCJ 664 : AIR 1977 Guj 48 held that a purchaser is entitled to serve the tenant with a notice of demand and sue the tenant on the ground of non-payment of such arrears of rent and has in para 13 of the judgment referred to several authorities of various High Courts dealing with the rights of a purchaser to sue a subtenant.
14.This Court in Arjan Dass v. Madan Lal 1970 RCR 785 has observed that even an order of eviction obtained by a landlord on the ground of bona fide need can be executed by his legal heirs after his death though if the landlord transfers the property during the pendency of the eviction petition the position may be different. In my view, the position in respect of legal heirs of a landlord under S. 21 is not in any way different. The courts below have in my view rightly held that the legal heirs of deceased Shri K. C. Kashyao had locus standi to file the application.
15. I do not find any force in the alternative submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant. Late Shri K. C. Kashyap in his Will gave life interest to respondent No. 1 and thereafter bequeathed the property to respondent No. 2. In the present case, the application for warrants of possession was made jointly by respondent No. 1 who is the widow of late Shri K. C. Kashyap and respondent No. 2 who is the son of late Shri K. C. Kashyap. It would have been a different matter if only one of them had applied because in that event if only respondent No. 1 had applied it could have been said that since respondent No. 1 has only life interest she is not the owner of the property and if respondent No. 2 had alone applied it could have been said that since respondent No. 1 has got life interest he is not yet the owner. Admittedly Shri K. C. Kashyap died after the Hindu Succession Act came into force and thus there is also no force in the contention that the life interest of respondent No. 1 ripened into full ownership. The decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant pertain to life interest of a widow in an H.U.F. before the Hindu Succession Act came into force and are not relevant to the facts of the present case. In my view, the fact that Shri K. C. Kashyap gave life interest in the property to respondent No. 1 does not in any manner show that the reason given by him while seeking permission was false because the property is ultimately bequeathed to respondent No. 2.
16. Now, even if the Will is not accepted, at best it can be said that Shri K. C. Kashyap died intestate. Respondent No. 1 being the widow and respondent No. 2 being the son would in any event be entitled to inheritance under the Hindu Succession Act. It is nobody's case that any of the other heirs of late Shri K. C. Kashyap have any objection to the respondents making an application seeking warrants of possession. It is well-settled that when the other co-owner do not object to the eviction, one co-owner can maintain an action for eviction even in the absence of other co-owners. I gain support for this proposition from Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, : [1977]1SCR395 Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak, : [1977]3SCR412 1599) and Pal Singh v. Shri Sunder Singh (dead) by Lrs., : [1989]1SCR67 . In this view of the matter, the respondents in any event had the locus standi to move the application as co-owners of the property.
17. The next question to be determined is.whether the appellant had a mandatory right to lead evidence. The case of the appellant is that if opportunity was given to him to lead evidence he would have proved that the respondents did not actually have any right in the property and the original order of the Controller granting permission was obtained by fraud.
18. Section 37 of the Act reads thus:
'37. (1) No order which prejudicially affects any person shall be made by the Controller under this Act without giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the order proposed to be made and until his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same have been considered by the Controller.
(2) Subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in any proceeding before him, follow as far as may be the practice and procedure of a Court of small causes, including the recording of evidence.
(3) In all proceedings before him, the Controller shall consider the question of costs and award such costs to or against any party as the Controller considers reasonable.'
The Supreme Court in J. R. Vohra's case : [1985]2SCR899 (supra), has analysed the scope of the section as follows (at pp. 479-480 of AIR):
'Counsel for the respondents relied upon S. 37 of the Act to canvass the contention that service of a prior notice upon the tenant before he is evicted would be necessary but that section deals with the practice and procedure required to be followed by the Rent Controller in proceedings before him and it mainly provides that subject to any rules that may be made under the Act the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in any proceeding before him, follow as far as may be the practice and procedure of a court of small causes, including the recording of evidence. In particular counsel relied upon sub-section (1) of Section 37 which provides that 'no order which prejudicially affects any person shall be made by the Controller under this Act without giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the order proposed to be made and until his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same have been considered by the Controller'. In our view all that sub-section (1) does is to incorporate a rule of natural justice, namely that an order prejudicially affecting a person shall not be made without hearing him and considering his objections, if any, to the proposed order. But an order can be said to affect a person prejudicially only if any right of his would be affected adversely and as stated earlier in view of the non obstinate clause contained in Section 21 the tenant on the expiry of the limited period has no right or protection whatsoever under any law to continue in possession and as such the issuance of a warrant of possession directing him to vacate the premises in his occupation cannot be regarded as one which prejudicially affects him. Section 37(1) thereforee cannot be construed as requiring service of a prior notice upon the tenant before issuance of a warrant of possession against him. In other words neither Section 21 nor Section 37 nor the Rules framed under the Act require service of any prior notice upon the tenant before he is evicted and the order directing issuance of warrant of possession under Section 21, without prior notice to the tenant, for the purpose of putting the landlord in possession of the leased premises at the expiry of the limited tenancy cannot be regarded as illegal, invalid or unwarranted.'
19. The Supreme Court has further observed that the competing claims of landlord and tenant must be harmonised and the special procedure provided for the benefit of the landlord in Section 21, warrants immediate approach.
20. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the appellant had neither filed any list of witnesses nor placed any documents on record nor had filed any list of reliance before the Rent Controller.
21. In my view, the enquiry contemplated while dealing with application for execution is summary in nature. The tenant cannot have any mandatory right to protracted proceedings. No doubt, the discretion exercised by the Rent Controller while considering the application is a judicial discretion and the Rent Controller can take into account even the subsequent events, however if vague allegation, unsubstantiated by documents are made by a tenant in his objections, the Controller may not permit evidence. Section 37 of the Act has to be read with the object of Section 21 in view. The Court cannot be a party to the abuse of the process of the court and permit evidence in support of allegation of fraud, which lacks in material particulars. If the Controller finds that cogent evidence and definite facts are not even suggested by the objector, in my view, no opportunity to lead evidence need be given.
22. Now, it appears that respondent No. 2 had filed an affidavit that he still continue to be an Indian citizen and had no intention of settling down in Sweden at any stage. In view of the affidavit filed by respondent No. 2, the Additional Rent Controller was satisfied that no further evidence was necessary. The Rent Control Tribunal has observed that the present case was such that it could be decided without oral evidence and the facts stated by the parties were sufficient for the decision in the matter. It appears that the appellant did not even place prima facie evidence on record. Both, the Additional Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal have considered the allegations and found baseless. This being a concurrent finding of fact, I do not consider it necessary to interfere with it in this second appeal.
23. The appeal is, thereforee, without any merit and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the appellant is granted two months' time to vacate the premises.
24. Appeal dismissed.