V.S. Aggarwal, J.
1. Sub-section (1) to Section 154 Code of Criminal Procedure runs as under:-
154. Information in Cognizable cases - (1) Every Information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to a officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.
2. It is this particular provision which is being pressed into service by the petitioner (Sanjeev Kumar) for registration of a First Information Report pertaining to offences under Section 326, 506 Part II and Section 3 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities), Act, 1989 besides Section 4 of the same Act against respondent No. 4.
3. The facts which prompt the petitioner to move the present petition can hereinafter be delineated.
4. It is alleged that on 28th August, 2001 at 4.30 PM the petitioner went to the Office of the Container Corporation of India, 2nd Floor, Le Meridian Commercial Tower, Raisina Road, New Delhi. He was to serve a notice on Mr. M.L. Shanmukh who is the General Manager (HRD) of the Container Corporation of India. Notice had been issued by Labour Officer (South). At that time Shri Shanmukh was busy and a person from his office asked the petitioner to wait. At about 5.30 PM the petitioner again tried to meet him but he was again asked to wait. Later on the petitioner was called by Shri Shanmukh. When the petitioner went to the department he was told by Shri Shanmukh that petitioner had to wait. Petitioner was called inside the cabin and was asked to close the door. He gave the copies of the notice is issued by the Labour Officer (South). Shri Shanmukh read the notice and suddenly started abusing the petitioner shouting 'salery tune mare ko notice karwya hai woh bhi merey nam se, Main tujhe dekh lunga, 'salery chamar, tu neech jati ka admi, mujhe notice karwata hai, Bhangi, 'salery tujhe to main apney office main sara kuda-karkat, latrin & sara gand uthwaunga, tu bhi yaad karega kis se pala pada hai.' Petitioner protested that he should not be abused since the petitioner belonged to scheduled caste. Thereupon Shri Shanmukh again uttered ''salery mujhe pata hai ki tu SC hai, tabhi to kah raha houn, tumhara to kam hi yahi karna hai or yahi kam tum se karwaunga'. He again threatened 'saly tujhe to main mar dunga'. He opened his table drawer and picked up some sharp edged item like a knife and moved towards the petitioner. The petitioner managed to save himself. Petitioner on coming out went to the police station Parliament Street and gave a written complaint in this regard. He was even medically treated at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital. The petitioner after being discharged was not feeling well and had undergone private treatment. The grievance of the petitioner is that despite repeated request the First Information Report has not been registered and as against No. 4 it is claimed that in terms of Section 4 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 should be taken.
5. The petition had been listed for 23rd January, 2002 but an application had been filed on behalf of Shri Shanmukh for him to be arrayed as a party. On that occasion the petitioner's learned counsel as well as the respondent's counsel agreed that they would be addressing arguments and thereforee the arguments were heard on 9th January, 2002.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently relied on number of precedents particularly the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. : 1992CriLJ527 to contend that when a cognizable offence is drawn and a complaint in writing has been made to the police, the officer in charge of the police station had no option but to register a First Information Report. He further contended that if anybody fails to discharge his duty Section 4 of the Schedule Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 would be attracted and against him for the said offence the First Information Report should be registered. In addition to that he claimed that certain offence under Indian Penal Code were also drawn against Shri Shanmukh qua those offences also First Information Report should be registered. On behalf of the respondent it was contended that a preliminary enquiry is not barred. In this regard certain extracts from the decision rendered in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) were also being read. On behalf of Shri Shanmukh it was further contended that even no offence under Section 3 of the Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is drawn because even if the assertions of the petitioner are taken to be correct he was not insulted or intimidated within public view.
7. As pointed above reliance is being placed on behalf of the petitioner to the decision in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) so as to urge that investigation should follow after the First Information Report is registered and under Sub-section (1) to Section 154 it is the duty of the concerned officer/officer in charge to record the same when cognizable offence is drawn. The findings of the Supreme Court in this regard which are so much relied upon reads:-
'Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the expression 'information' without qualifying the same as in Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions, 'reasonable complaint' and 'credible information' are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word 'information' in Section 154(1) unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, 'reasonableness' or 'credibility' of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word 'information' without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act XXV of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that 'every complaint or information' preferred to an officer in charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act X of 1872) which thereafter read that 'every complaint' preferred to an officer in charge of a police station shall be reduced into writing. The word 'complaint' which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word 'information' was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1955 which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and 190(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act II of 1974). An overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which is sine qua non for recording a First Information Report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence.
32. It is thereforee manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer is charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.'
8. If the matter had ended here indeed there was little controversy. However, nagging question that comes up for consideration is as to whether in all cases irrespective of the nature of assertions the nature of the case and all other factors necessarily it has to be so done.
9. Our attention has been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of UP v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi : 1964CriLJ140 . In the cited case the matter as such had to be probed and was pertaining to an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Supreme Court noted that since there is no prohibition under the Criminal Procedure Code, thereforee the police officer was competent to make a preliminary enquiry before registering an offence and making full scale investigation. The Supreme Court in this regard further observed:
'.... But the main object of investigation being to bring home the offence to the offender the essential part of the duties of an Investigating Officer in this connection is, apart from arresting the offender, to collect all material necessary for establishing the accusation against the offender. Merely making some preliminary enquiries upon receipt of information from anonymous source or a source of doubtful reliability for checking up the correctness of the information does not amount to collection of evidence and so cannot be regarded as investigation. In the absence of any prohibition in the code, express or implied, I am of opinion that it is open to a Police officer to make preliminary enquiries before registering an offence and making a full scale investigation into it. No doubts, Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act was enacted for preventing harassment to a Government servant and with this object in view investigation, except with the previous permission of a Magistrate, is not permitted to be made by an officer blow the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. Where, however, a Police officer makes some preliminary enquiries, does not arrest or even question an accused or question any witness but merely makes a few discreet enquiries or looks at some documents without making any notes, it is difficult to visualise how any possible harassment or even embarrassment would result there from to the suspect or the accused person....'
10. Identical has been the findings of the Supreme Court in the decision rendered in the case of P. Sirajuddin etc. v. The State of Madras : 1971CriLJ523 . It must be stated that once again the matter was with respect to an offence under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Supreme court again observed that before a public servant whatever be his status is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty which amounts to a serious misdemeanour a preliminary enquiry can always be conducted. The findings of the Supreme Court in this regard reads:-
'....Before a public servant, whatever be his status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty which amount to serious misdemeanour or misconduct of the type alleged in this case and a first information is lodged against him, there must be some suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible officer. The lodging of such a report against a person, specially one who like the appellant occupied the top position in a department, even if baseless, would do incalculable harm not only to the officer in particular but to the department be belonged to, in general. If the Government had set up a Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department as was done in the State of Madras and the said department was entrusted with enquiries of' this kind, no exception can be taken to an enquiry by officers of this department but any such enquiry must proceed in a fair and reasonable manner. The enquiring officer must not act under any preconceived idea of guilt of the person whose conduct was being enquired into or pursue the enquiry in such a manner as to lead to an inference that he was bent upon securing the conviction of the said person by adopting measures which are of doubtful validity or sanction.....'
(emphasis added)
11. Both these decisions have been referred to with approval in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) and in fact the Supreme Court recorded that the Superintendent of Police exhibited some over enthusiasm to please someone in the said case while recording the First Information Report.
12. Can we say that these findings referred to in the case of Sirajuddin and Balwant Kishore Joshi (supra) pertained to registration of First Information Reports in offences punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act or would apply in other matters that are to be registered against public servants?
13. It requires no re-mentioning that law laid down by the Supreme court under Article 141 of the Constitution binds all the courts but it is a settled principle that precedents in this regard necessarily have to be viewed with respect to ratio decidendi of the decisions. In the case of Prakash Chandra Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh : AIR1960SC195 the Supreme Court held that decision of the highest court on the questions which are essentially questions of fact cannot be cited as precedents governing the decisions of other cases which must rest in ultimate analysis upon their own particular facts. The findings of the Supreme Court in this regard reads:-
'....It is enough to say that decisions even of the highest court on questions which are essentially questions of fact, cannot be cited as precedents governing the decision of other cases which must rest in the ultimate analysis upon their own particular facts...'
14. A few years later in the case of B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry : [1967]2SCR650 the Supreme Court added that a decision of the Supreme Court is binding not because of its conclusion but with regard to its ratio and principles laid therein. Similar in the decision rendered in the case of Amar Nath Om Prakash and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. : [1985]2SCR72 the same principle of law came up for consideration. The Supreme Court held that judgments of the court have not to be taken as statutes and interpreted like statutes. The precise findings are:
'...We consider it proper to say, as we have already said in other cases that judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judge to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.'
15. The Supreme Court once again in the case of Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat and Ors. : AIR1986SC468 concluded that the decision on the case is always on the principles underlying the decisions and while it has to be applied in a later case the two principles have to be looked into. The findings of the Supreme Court in this regard read:-
'.....A decision ordinarily is a decision on the case before the Court while the principle underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent in a case which comes up for decision subsequently. Hence while applying the decision to a later case, the Court which is dealing with it should carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the previous decision. A decision often takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered. The scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation.....'
16. Lastly on the same principle we take liberty in relying to the decision in the case of Krishena Kumar v. Union of India : (1991)ILLJ191SC . The Supreme Court held that ratio decidendi is the underlying principle with respect to Article 141 and the binding nature of the decisions and also with respect to law of precedents. It was held:-
'....The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge-made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it. In the words of Halsbury (4th edn. Vol 26 para 573)
'The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, as ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which when it is clear it is not part of a tribunal's duty to spell out with difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to bound by it, and it is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a long judgment and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reasons than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment, all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi.'
17. From aforesaid it is clear that the decisions of the Supreme court are binding. The facts of the said cases necessarily have to be looked into. It has to be ascertained on analysis of the facts and process of reasoning it is the ratio of the case decided which has the binding force.
18. With the said principle one can revert back to the question posed as to whether in all cases in which allegations are made against public servants the First Information Report necessarily must be recorded or not. At is apparent and the relevant portions which have been reproduced above, the Supreme Court in the case of Sirajudeen (supra) observed that lodging of a report against a person who occupies top position in a department even if baseless would do incalculable harm not only to the officer but to the department and thereforee a preliminary enquiry before recording the First Information Report could take place. Similar is the view expressed in the case of Balwant Kishore Joshi (supra). Once such is the position it must be taken that the findings of the Supreme Court clearly makes a departure that before the first information report is permitted to be recorded against a public servant particularly when it is likely to cause incalculable harm to any of the said officer when such a report is lodged a preliminary inquiry in this regard can be effected.
19. Our attention in this regard in that event was drawn towards the Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Satish Kumar Goel v. State and Ors. 2000 II AD (Delhi) 841. A Division Bench of this court was concerned with the similar vexed question and held that when there were allegations of extortion or illegal gratification and the complaint disclosed commission of cognizable offence the First Information Report should be recorded. But herein too the Division Bench had drawn clear distinction in cases where the information laid before the officer in charge is vague, indefinite or is doubtful. The findings to that effect reads:-
'Thus the legal position appears to be that where allegations made in the complaint lodged before the police clearly and specifically disclose commission of a cognizable offence, the officer in charge of the concerned police station is duty bound to register an FIR. However, where the information recorded in the complaint is uncertain, indistinct and not clearly expressed which creates a doubt as to whether the information laid before the in charge of the police station discloses commission of a cognizable offence there from, some enquiry should proceed before the registration of an FIR.'
20. In other words, the officer in charge of the police station is under an obligation to look into the allegations made and make sure as to whether some doubt can arise with respect to the allegations or not. When it is so he can certainly hold some enquiry in this regard. It is not a straight jacket formula that anybody can give and make any allegation against public servants so as to involve him in a matter by getting the First Information Report recorded. In this connection we deem it necessary further to refer to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of All India Institute of Medical Sciences Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Ors. : (1996)11SCC582 . In the cited case a similar request had been made. The Employees Union wanted proceedings to take place against the Director of All India Institute of Medical Sciences for offence punishable under Section 409 of Indian Penal Code.
21. The Supreme Court rejected the request and held that the procedure has been prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this regard paragraphs 4 and 4 of the judgment of the Supreme Court reads:-
'4. When the information is laid with the police but no action in that behalf is taken, the complainant is given power under Section 190 read with Section 200 of the Code to lay the complaint before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and the Magistrate is required to enquire into the complaint as provided in Chapter XV of the Code. In case the Magistrate after recording evidence finds a prima facie case, instead of issuing process to the accused, he is empowered to direct the police concerned to investigate into the offence under Chapter XII of the Code and to submit a report. If he finds that the complaint does not disclose any offence to take further action, he is empowered to dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of the Code. In case he finds that the complaint/evidence recorded prima facie discloses an offence, he is empowered to take cognizance of the offence and would issue process to the accused.
5. In this case, the petitioner had not adopted either of the procedure provided under the Code. As a consequence, without availing of the above procedure, the petitioner is not entitled to approach the High Court by filing a writ petition and seeking a direction to conduct an investigation by the CBI which is not required to investigate into all or every offence. The High Court, thereforee, though for difference reasons, was justified in refusing to grant the relief as sought for.'
22. From the aforesaid precedents it is clear that following conclusions can conveniently be drawn: (i) whenever it is brought it writing or otherwise that a cognizable offence has been committed in terms of the decisions in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) a First Information Report should be recorded (ii) If the information given is not clear or creates a doubt as to whether it discloses a commission of a cognizable offence some enquiry can precede before registration of the offence. (iii) in case of a complaint of such nature made against public servants it is doubtful or similarly if it is found that ex facie there is some un-truth in the same, an enquiry can be conducted before registration of the case (iv) the enquiry need not partake that of an investigation. It only is a preliminary enquiry that can be held.
23. With this backdrop one can revert back to the facts of the present case. Brief resume of the same has already been given above. The petitioner/appellant claims that he was beaten, hurt and abused and consequently seek registration of an case punishable under Section 326 Indian Penal Code read with Section 506 Part II of the said Code besides Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The status report has been placed on the record. It appears that a preliminary enquiry in this regard has already been conducted and it was found that there is little substance in the complaint that has been made. At this stage when such is the position in our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution we deem it unnecessary to direct registration of the case because no useful purpose would be served in this regard in face of the aforesaid facts. If the petitioner so likes in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of All India Institute of Medical Sciences (supra) he may take recourse in accordance with law.
24. Keeping in view these findings we deem it unnecessary to express any opinion on the merits of the matter as was urged by learned counsel for Mr. Shanmukh.
25. As an offshoot of the reasons recorded above the petition must fail and is dismissed. By way of abundant caution we deem it necessary to add that nothing said herein should be taken as an expression of any opinion on any of the matter on merits of the same.