Judgment:
S.P. Bharucha and; K.S. Paripoornan, JJ.
1. Leave granted in the SLP.
2. Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1990 and the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 12023 of 1991 impugn the same judgment and order of the Delhi High Court. Civil Appeals Nos. 1656-59 of 1992 impugn another judgment and order of the Delhi High Court. Since both judgments deal with the levy of demurrage by the International Airport Authority of India on baggage, they may be dealt with together. In the former set of appeals the baggage was unaccompanied baggage; in the latter set of appeals it was baggage under transhipment.
3. For the purpose of this judgment, it is sufficient to refer to the facts of the former set of appeals. The first respondent therein returned to India on transfer of residence and was granted the benefit of the rules applicable to transfer of residence. On 16-7-1986, Air India carried the first respondent's unaccompanied baggage under an Airway Bill. There were three containers, one containing a computer, another containing a keyboard and the third containing two printers. The third container was lost while in the custody of the Authority. The first respondent's application to the Customs authorities for being treated as a person who had transfer of residence status was rejected. The Collector of Customs dismissed his appeal. The Central Government dismissed his revision petition. The first respondent thereupon filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court, including a prayer concerning demurrage. Pending the petition, the Central Government reviewed its earlier order and, pursuant to the High Court's directions, allowed exemption under the Transfer of Residence Rules to the first respondent. Thereupon, the two containers were delivered to the first respondent by the said Authority without prejudice to the parties' rights and contentions. The first respondent was required to pay 20% of the demurrage thereon, amounting to Rs 8960, the Chairman of the said Authority having waived 80% of the demurrage. It was then reported that the third container was untraceable.
4. The High Court, in the judgment and order under appeal, noted that it has not been seriously contested that the three containers were unaccompanied baggage. It held, upon an interpretation of the relevant provisions, that demurrage was not chargeable by the said Authority on baggage. It also held that, in any event, the Chairman of the Authority ought to have given full waiver of demurrage to the first respondent. In regard to the lost container the High Court ordered the Authority to trace and deliver it or pay the value thereof to the first respondent.
5. When special leave to appeal was granted, it was made clear that, whatever be the final outcome of the appeal, the amount which had been paid by the Authority to the first respondent as the value of the lost container would not be returned to the Authority.
6. Mr Aruneshwar Gupta, learned counsel for the Authority, drew our attention to certain provisions of the Customs Act. Section 2(3) defines “baggage” to include unaccompanied baggage. “Goods” include, among other things, baggage (sub-section 22). “Prohibited goods” mean any goods the import or export of which is prohibited under the Customs Act or any other law for the time being in force (sub-section 33). Section 44 in Chapter VII, which deals with the clearance of imported goods, makes it clear that the provisions of Chapter VII do not apply to baggage. Section 45, also in this Chapter, requires all imported goods unloaded in a customs area to remain in the custody of a person approved by the Collector of Customs until cleared for home consumption or warehousing or transhipment. Such person in the present case is the Authority. Section 52, in Chapter VIII which deals with goods in transit, states that the provisions of Chapter VIII do not apply, inter alia, to baggage. Chapter XI makes special provisions for baggage. There is no provision therein similar to Section 45 requiring unloaded baggage to remain in the custody of a person approved by the Collector of Customs, that is, in the instant case, the Authority.
7. The relevant regulations at the time the said containers were imported were the International Airport Authority (Storage and Processing of Goods) Regulations, 1980, made under the provisions of the International Airport Authority Act, 1971. “Cargo” was defined by Regulation 2(b) to mean “any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores and baggages”. “Demurrage” was defined by Regulation 2(g) to mean “the rate or amount payable to the airport by a shipper or consignee or carrier for not removing the cargo within the time allowed”. Mr Aruneshwar Gupta drew our attention to the regulations that came into force on 26-6-1993, and submitted that the definitions of baggage, cargo and demurrage therein should be taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting the 1980 Regulations. He submitted that, upon a true construction, the word “cargo” as defined in the 1980 Regulations must take within its sweep all goods and articles for the purposes of storage and processing which were stored and processed by the Authority; also that the word “cargo” must be given an extended meaning and “baggage” must be given a limited meaning to give meaning, effect and purpose to the object of the 1980 Regulations.
8. No external aid to construction is necessary. The words of the 1980 Regulations are crystal clear. “Cargo” is expressly defined therein to mean property other than baggage. There is, therefore, no way by which “cargo” can be read to include baggage. The definition of “demurrage” in the 1980 Regulations restricts it to what is chargeable for non-removal of cargo within the time allowed. For the reason that baggage is not cargo, demurrage cannot be levied upon baggage. The High Court was, therefore, right in the view that it took in this behalf.
9. Insofar as baggage in transhipment is concerned, the same principle applies and no demurrage is chargeable by the Authority thereon.
10. In view of the fact that this Court had made it clear at an interim stage that the amount paid by the Authority to the first respondent for the lost container was not to be returned to the Authority even if it succeeded in the appeal, we thought that this was not the most appropriate case to decide the question of liability of the Authority in respect of property that could not be traced while in its custody; we so indicated but learned counsel for the Authority thought otherwise. There is no dispute that the lost container was landed and placed in the custody of the Authority and that it was untraceable while in its custody. It was, therefore, a case to which the principle of res ipsa loquitur applied. It was for the Authority to give some explanation about how the container became untraceable, whereon the first respondent could have been relegated to a suit. Since there was no explanation whatever, the plea of the Authority that the first respondent should be relegated to a suit was taken only to buy time and the High Court was justified in requiring the Authority to compensate the first respondent for the value of the lost container.
11. The appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.